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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Debt is an important form of financing economic development, especially external 
debt is in the form of foreign exchange inflows. Exports may not bring in the 
necessary amount of foreign exchange needed for more imports, or foreign direct 
investment may not be sufficient for rapid economic development. Debt may bring 
in benefits/profits or may become a problem of liquidity or solvency. Debt is 
profitable when its usage brings in discounted streams of rates of return greater than 
its discounted streams of costs. Illiquidity is a short-run inadequacy of foreign 
exchange whereas solvency is a long-run problem in the same respect. Debt crisis 
- 
a long run solvency problem 
- 
refers to a situation where a country or a region 
undergo rescheduling; i. e. postponement of interest and principal repayments as a 
result of inability to repay debt. Rescheduling occurs often through the process of 
negotiations between debtors and creditors. A country can also declare a moratorium 
which is more severe because it means repayments of interest or both interest and 
principal are stopped temporarily until creditors agree to negotiate. 
The 1980s marked a decade where there were developing country-wide debt 
problem. The nature of debt problem broadly differ among regions. The Latin 
American countries went into debt crisis due to excessive borrowings in the 
international credit markets including the Euro-currency market. The debt crisis in the 
African region predates that of the Latin American's due to scarcity of foreign 
exchange earnings via exports. The ASEAN region has lesser debt problems of 
illiquidity in nature, thus perceived as creditworthy by over-viewers, facilitating 
more capital inflows in either the form of foreign investment or foreign debt. 
Although debt and deficits mounted in the ASEAN region, growth of output 
though relatively low, were positive. In the late 1980s, the growth of output 
increased together with the mounting debt and increasing deficits. All of the 
ASEAN countries were categorised among the heavily indebted developing 
countries in the mid-1980s; South Korea ranked fourth, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Thailand (possibly Malaysia too) ranked amongst the top ten. The puzzling 
question is how did they not ran into debt crisis! Is the usage of debt 
profitable in the ASEAN countries? These questions are the rationale for 
investigating the ASEAN experience. There is also a lack of concern pertaining to 
debt and deficits in the ASEAN region while there are widespread concern about 
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the Latin American debt crisis. In chapter 2 we indicated that the world has focused 
too much on the crisis aspect of debt! We are also concerned with the question as 
to whether ASEAN can turn from being major debtor to creditor (or capital 
exporting) countries, with its movement towards "NICdom' or towards 'high- 
growth' region. 
The usage of debt in ASEAN is mostly by the private sectors in tradables which 
brings in exports earnings as opposed to usage by the government sector in 
basic infrastructures. Aggressive industrialization policies in the region have 
promoted exports diversification and reduced import protection. Hence, debt 
usage is likely to generate foreign exchange in these circumstances. Debt is in yen 
denominated, as opposed to the US dollar denominated, in the Latin American 
countries. Possibly the terms and conditions of loan differ, appreciation of the 
dollar does not affect valuation changes and debt denomination matches major 
currency in exports earnings. 
The study of debt and deficits links up the financial and the real sectors of an economy. 
External deficits reflect deficits in the government or the private sectors (or both). To 
prevent debt from becoming a problem, both internal and external accounts should be 
considered. 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis addresses issues of debt and the twin deficits - two serious `economic 
ills'. The central issue in this thesis (Part II) is on macromodelling of the twin deficits 
in an attempt to identify their determinants. This involves an investigation of the 
underlying theory and empirical evidence to show the workings of the links between 
debt and the twin deficits and between the twin deficits themselves. The usual 
practice in both theory and in empirical work, is to take the accounting identity and 
one or two other variables that are hypothesised to have effects on the twin deficits 
and posit causal linkages. We try to avoid this by building on the stylized facts on 
each of the macroeconomic aggregates and linking them to debt issues in building a 
full structural model of debt and the twin deficits. We arrive at a system of 
simultaneous equations, which none of the previous theory or empirical work has 
derived. We rename the deficit system of simultaneous equations which incorporates a 
debt identity and an output equation the `new twin deficits' model - signifying a 
departure from the conventional wisdom discussed in the literature survey. 
With the macromodel, we address three issues simultaneously, which are: 
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(1) the linkages between twin deficits and increased indebtedness. 
(2) the details of internal policies that have effects on the twin-deficits and increased 
indebtedness. 
(3) the linkages between debt, twin-deficits and output. 
The first issue involves the broader mechanism that explains the link between the 
government, the private and the external sector balances, and their links to changes in 
debt. Previous studies on the twin deficits covers the first part of this issue and gives 
evidence for the U. S. that the government sector caused the unprecedented level of 
external deficits in the mid 1980s and early 1990s. In our case, we argue that the 
change in debt equals the external deficits because according to our findings in Part I 
debt and deficits seem to co-move. 
Our macromodel also focus on the second issue, that is, the details of the internal 
policies that affect each of the three sector deficits and eventually increased 
indebtedness. The variables involved are numerous such as tax policies (rates, 
revenue elasticities, etc. ), financial policies (interest rates, investment versus savings 
behaviour, etc. ), trade policies (import liberalisation/control, exports strategies, 
exchange rates, prices, etc. ), debt policies, etc. as shown in the system of 
simultaneous equations in Chapter 5. Although the variables are numerous, there are 
some common ones appearing together in either two or all three of the system of 
equations which are expected to cause co-movements in the system. Obviously, 
consideration has to be made on their significance, magnitude and signs. 
The third issue involves recognising the supply side in response to debt and deficits 
which are demand-side management. The model thus ensures not only equilibrium in 
the internal and external sectors but also equilibrium in aggregate supply and the 
aggregate demand. The former equilibrium always holds because the identity serves 
as a constraint. For the latter equilibrium to hold, either one or a combination of the 
price variables found in the system adjust to maintain equilibrium in the short-run, 
while output adjusts to maintain equilibrium in the long-run. 
Having outlined the core of the thesis, it is appropriate to comment on the other parts. 
Part I presents the roots of debt and deficits; how developing countries accumulated 
debt and how it became a crisis in the 1980s. The debt and deficits situation in 
ASEAN in the 1980s is a particular focus. The essence of debt problem seems to be 
the adverse economic situation of the 1980s, against the background of mounting 
accumulation of debt. Exogenous shocks such as the second oil shock, terms of trade 
shocks, interest rates hikes, dollar exchange rate appreciation, are among the factors 
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that are associated with debt problems. Debt and deficits co-move in the representative 
Latin American and ASEAN countries. Differences among regional experiences are 
highlighted. For example the African countries went into debt problem not because of 
debt accumulation. The main crux of their problem is non-performance export sector. 
Excessive lending by creditors are associated with the Latin American countries, apart 
from loans contracted on floating rates which are associated with valuation changes 
and capital flight. The ASEAN region moved towards yen credit in the mid 1980s, 
presumably insulating their economy with further spill-overs from other NICs' 
recycling of surpluses. The differences in experiences necessitates different treatment, 
or case by case approach to debt problems. 
In Part III, we present some empirical work on aspects of debt management. Debt 
servicing capacity or creditworthiness is examined using the logit approach. We built- 
in the marginal and elasticity analysis into the logit model so as to identify which 
variables are the most significant determinants. The exercise combines variables taken 
from the balance of payments and financial variables from the balance sheet to detect 
which variables cause debt servicing breakdown. The breakdown of debt servicing 
capacity is proxied by reschedulings, taken in terms of probabilities because it is not 
known a priori that a debtor will become illiquid and unable to repay interest payments 
falling due. We postulate that it is the foreign exchange scarcity, measured by their net 
borrowing requirements which comprise of the current account deficits including 
interest repayments and the principal due, that drive a country to demand for 
rescheduling. 
We investigate the determinants of rescheduling for each region separately to capture 
the differences in their experiences with indebtedness. The most important 
determinants of rescheduling are; the ratio of the current account deficits to export, the 
reserves to import ratio and the total debt to exports. In the African sample, the 
current account deficits to exports, the total debt to exports and the use of IMF credits 
are the most important determinants for rescheduling. As in the case of the Latin 
American countries, The current account deficits to exports, the debt service ratio and 
the use of IMF credit are most important. In ASEAN, the debt service ratio appears to 
be the single most significant ratio. Thus, the differences in experiences among 
regions, a cross section for all developing countries will ignore the uniqueness of each 
region in running into debt servicing difficulties. 
In the last part of the thesis, the exchange rate management is discussed in Chapter 7, 
relating exchange rate to import and export demand function to eventually determine the 
contribution of foreign exchange, through the elasticity approach, towards foreign 
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exchange earnings and reducing debt service. Debt service seems to have links with 
exchange rates movements. We suggest that devaluation does have positive effects in 
the ASEAN countries to increase its foreign exchange earnings. 
Finally, we conclude and suggest some policy implications, especially pertaining to 
our twin deficit model. It is hoped that ASEAN would turn the already huge debt 
accumulation to more profitable investments so that not only timely repayment of 
loans is possible, the growth of output is ensured and the sustained industrialisation 
is possible! 
PART I: BACKGROUND 
CHAPTER 1: ORIGINS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT 
AND DEFICITS IN THE 1980s. 
1.1 Introduction 
The events most closely connected with the sharp increase in international bank debt 
for the developing countries were the massive oil price increases of 1973-74 and 
1979-80 and the worldwide recession of 1981-82. The oil shock of 1973-74 had a 
significant effect on international lending. Borrowing was necessary to smooth the 
adjustment to the oil shock. Lending expanded in association with the expansion of 
the Euro-currency market and international bank lending (OECD Survey, 1983). 
Besides other non-bank funding sources, a special oil facility was set up by the IMF 
to make adjustment financing easier. Still, commercial loans became the main source 
of funds for a small group of borrowers 
- 
the middle-income developing countries. 
The availability of such funds appeared likely and international lending was viable, 
since borrowings did not retard most of these countries' prospects at least to the 
extent that they continued to grow rapidly (see pages 23 and 24 for example, for the 
growth trends of some of the higher income countries of Latin America and ASEAN, 
respectively). However, the 1970s decade marked the beginning of debt build-up. 
After the second oil shock, the debt picture began to worsen. The global economic 
, system was subjected to a number of strains which contributed to the eventual 
breakdown in international lending. The second oil shock emphasized the continued 
need for further real adjustment to the oil price rise by the major developing-country 
borrowers. It was also becoming apparent that the favourable performance of 
developing nations in the mid- 1970s had resulted in part from the availability of bank 
financing itself. Although it might have been appropriate after the second oil-shock for 
developing countries to borrow funds on a temporary basis to finance the needed 
adjustments, a permanent expansion of debt was not justified. 
In 1982, the full scope of the recent debt problems among developing countries 
became evident. Massive arrears on external payments necessitating partial or total 
suspension of debt servicing and a host of ad hoc official and private rescheduling 
arrangements have characterised the international financial market since 1982. The 
former net flow of capital from the industrialised countries to the non-oil developing 
countries has been reversed, as interest payments on accumulated external debt exceed 
net new inflows of foreign capital. Estimates by the IMF suggest that there was it 
resource flow from the seven largest developing country borrowers to the creditors of 
an amount of US$ 32 billion in 1985, or nearly one fifth of their entire earnings from 
the sales of goods and services (International Financial Statistics, 1987/88). 
1.2 
The debt problem in the 1980s resulted from a number of related factors 
- 
cumulative 
changes in the magnitude and structure of developing countries' borrowing that had 
been taking place since the early 1970s; inappropriate domestic policies 
- 
including 
both inadequate demand management and policies that lowered the productivity of 
resources; and an unusual conjuncture of adverse external developments (Solomon, 
1992). The adverse impact of the exogenous shocks namely the first oil shock of 
1973/74, the second oil shock of 1979/80, lower commodity prices throughout the 
1980s (apart from a small increase in 1987), the increase in real interest rates from 
1971 to 1985 and the increase in the US dollar from 1980 to 1985 combined to cause 
further deterioration in current account deficits, increased the gross indebtedness and 
slowed down the growth of output of developing countries. 
In 1989, Solomon's appraisal of the debt situation showed little has changed and the 
debt problem continued (Solomon, 1992). Upon examining the fifteen heavily- 
indebted countries, Solomon concluded that the essence of the debt problem, apart 
from poor domestic policies, had been the negative net outward transfers (net 
borrowing minus interest payments). 
The performance in 1990 and 1991 has been very much affected by recessions and 
slowdowns in the industrial countries. For example, export volume increased only by 
1.3% in 1991 in the fifteen heavily-indebted developing countries compared to 4.9% 
in 1986-1988. The terms of trade of those debtor countries deteriorated to 
-1.7% and 
-3.4% in 1990 and 1991 respectively as compared to +1.3% in 1989 (Solomon, 
1992). 
This chapter attempts to explore the origins and growth of the 1980s developing 
countries' debt 
- 
at the time when debt became a problem leading to iliquidity world- 
wide. We focus on the relationship between external debt, balance of payments deficit 
and growth of output since the late I970s. Although our later findings suggest that 
the causes of indebtedness in general are similar across developing countries, the 
emergence of debt problems seemed to differ in some ways among regions. Some 
comparative analysis between regions will also be discussed. The role of debt and 
non-debt creating flows in financing current account deficits will be highlighted. 
In the next sub-section of the chapter, the economics of debt is outlined. In the second 
section, the origins and growth of developing countries' debt will be presented. In the 
third section, the focus is on the financial and commodity price risks that confront the 
indebted developing countries. The fourth section assesses debt burden and debt's 
association with deficits and growth. In the fifth section, the focus is on comparisons 
1.3 
on financing current account deficits by debt and non-debt creating flows among 
regions. 
1.1.2 The Economics of External Debt 
External debt relaxes the constraint imposed by domestic saving and foreign 
exchange. It allows a country to enjoy a higher standard of living in the short-term 
than it otherwise would have been. The benefits of debt depend on how it is used and 
on the marginal productivity of capital. By borrowing externally, countries are, in 
effect, trading off future domestic absorption (i. e. consumption and investment) in 
favour of current absorption. 
Borrowing initially allows investment to exceed domestic saving, and imports to 
exceed exports. The condition has to be reversed at some future date (in accordance 
with the terms of loans stipulated) in order to service the debt. In other words, the 
savings gap has to he closed in order to generate excess saving to service debt. Since 
external debt has to be serviced in foreign exchange, it is then necessary to convert the 
excess saving into foreign exchange, and to achieve this, exports have to increase 
relative to imports. 
Taking the simplest savings function whereby aggregate saving depends on the level 
of income, saving will increase either when the propensity to save increases or the 
national income increases. For both conditions to occur simultaneously, the marginal 
propensity to save must rise, or the usage of loan causes national income to rise. If 
repayment of the principal could be financed by further borrowing, national income 
will rise provided the marginal productivity of the resources borrowed exceeds the 
rate of interest on borrowing. However, marginal productivity is often difficult to 
determine in developing countries, especially when loan contracted are for 
infrastructural projects. 
Foreign exchange will increase if exports exceed imports or if there is import 
substitution (all in value terms). A shift of domestic resources to the tradable sector is 
thus required. The timing of debt repayments is very important in debt management. 
If the solvency criterion is fulfilled, (i. e. the marginal productivity of resources 
borrowed exceeds the rate of interest on the loan), liquidity problems may still be 
encountered in certain years of temporary shortages of foreign exchange. Liquidity 
problems may end up as solvency problems if lenders become less keen on 
refinancing debt or decide to increase the spreads on loans because of increased risks. 
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Also, borrowers may have to repay debt in certain specific foreign currencies, yet 
their foreign exchange earnings may be in other currencies. Variations in exchange 
rates can therefore create debt difficulties if the earning power of exports fall when 
expressed in the particular currency required. 
We can outline the use of debt by reference to the balance of payments items. Assume 
that the growth of imports of capital goods leads to an increase in investment, and an 
increase in investment further increases the growth of output. Further, assume that the 
growth of output is associated with the growth of capital, holding other factors of 
production constant, any increase in the inflow of capital, used to finance imports of 
capital goods leads to an increase in the growth of output. Thus, firstly, if debt is used 
to finance imports other than imports for consumption goods, the growth of output 
will be sustained. Dornbusch (1987) considers import availability as exports plus 
new borrowings less debt service, and import availability is the constraining factor 
on growth. If new borrowings fall short of debt service payments then export 
revenues cannot fully finance imports, limiting import volume and hence growth. 
Secondly, in terms of the balance of payments items, debt can also be used to finance 
interest payments, principal repayments and capital flight. If debt is used for financing 
these items, then gross indebtedness will increase, output will not grow and the 
current account deficits will rise because more interest will be incurred on new debt 
and any excess imports are not financed. This is the condition that may lead to debt 
problems. 
Thirdly, debt can be used to finance reserve holdings. In this case the gross 
indebtedness will increase without any rise in the growth of output. However, it may 
he associated with an increase in the current account deficit because of growing 
interest payments on debt, but the reserves can then be gradually drawn down if the 
need arises to finance the deficits. 
Debt financing may or may not become a problem. The analysis that follows from 
now on detects how and why debt became a problem in the 1980s, hence, historical 
data especially prior to the debt crisis are important indicators. It will be shown that 
financing by debt in the 1970s is associated with increasing growth of output, 
whereas debt financing after the second oil-shock is the root of the debt problem. 
1.5 
1.2 Origins of Developing Countries' Debt Problems 
The significant growth of developing countries' debt began in the early 1970s when 
there was an expansion of the Euro-currency markets and international bank lending 
in general in that period (OECD Survey, 1983). There was an expansion in demand in 
the industrial countries in 1972 and 1973 which caused increases in commodity prices 
by 13% and 53% respectively. As a result of the commodity price boom, there was an 
improvement in the terms of trade of developing countries in 1972 to 1973 (World 
Economic Outlook, April 1988). The effect was the emergence of a number of 
creditworthy developing countries with healthy balance of payments' positions and 
strong growth potential. Borrowing did not cause a debt problem in the 1970s, in 
that, there was no mass reschedulings or debt defaults. The oil price increase from 
IJS$ 2.70 a barrel in 1970 to US$ 10.00 and above in 1974 and 1975 (World 
Economic Outlook, 1988), had immediate effects on current account balances around 
the world. 
Table 1. l: Current Account Balances, 1973-1988 (US$ bns) 
Year Industrial countries Developing countries Total 
7 largest Others Oil-exporting Non-oil 
1973 12.7 5.0 6.7 
-11.6 12.8 
1974 
-4.9 -8.9 68.3 -37.0 17.4 
1975 22.1 
-4.3 35.4 -46.5 6.7 
1976 7.5 
-9.7 40.3 -32.0 6.1 
1977 7.6 
-12.6 30.8 -28.3 -2.4 
1978 33.9 
-3.5 2.9 -39.2 -5.8 
1979 2.7 
-12.9 69.8 -58.9 0.7 
1980 
-17.5 -26.2 116.4 -86.2 -13.7 
1981 13.0 
-16.7 68.6 -99.0 -34.1 1982 23.5 
-12.5 25.0 -97.0 -61.0 
1983 
-0.9 -2.7 -22.2 -42.0 -67.8 
1984 
-8.8 3.7 -7.6 -26.2 -38.9 
1985 
-7.5 1.3 3.6 -27.5 -30.1 1986 
-2.6 0.5 -32.7 -14.3 -49.1 
1987 
-5.3 -1.7 -10.5 -9.2 -26.7 
1988 
-6.2 -0.8 -4.0 -15.3 -26.3 
Source: World Economic Outlook, 1986,1987,1988 
Table I. 1 shows the current account position of major groups of countries from 1973 
to 1988. The pattern in 1973 is typical of that prevailing before the oil shock, 
surpluses in the industrial countries and deficits in the non-oil developing countries. 
The oil-exporting countries moved from a surplus on their current account of US$ 7 
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billion in 1973 to about US$ 68 billion in 1974. 
The current account surplus of the industrial countries of US$ 12 billion in 1973 
deteriorated to a deficit of US$ 4 billion in 1974. From 1975 until 1978, the surpluses 
of OPEC countries were deposited in the larger industrial countries. Thus, a large 
proportion of the OPEC surpluses were deposited in the international capital markets 
(Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1981). The oil-price rise effects on oil-importing 
developing countries was even greater. Their current account deficits rose from US$ 
11 billion in 1973 to US$ 37 billions in 1974. Meanwhile in 1975, the pressure of 
demand fell in industrial countries which was associated with commodity prices to fall 
by 19% (World Economic Outlook, April 1988). The non-oil developing countries 
incurred larger deficits amounting to US$ 46 billions in spite of slower growth as a 
result of the oil-price increase, thus a reduction in their terms of trade as well as 
developing countries' contraction of imports reduced their exports. 
The second oil shock of 1979/80 led to almost the same balance of payments pattern. 
Prices of Saudi crude oil rose from US$ 13 a barrel in 1978 to US$ 32.50 in 1981 
(World Economic Outlook, 1988). The OPEC nations ran huge surpluses in 1979 and 
1980 which were quickly deposited in the industrial countries because of their low 
absorption capacity. The current account deficits of non-oil developing countries 
increased drastically. Oil as a percentage of import payments in the non-oil 
developing countries was 5.9% in 1973 but rose to 21 % in 1981, and hence became 
the largest and fastest growing item (World Economic Outlook, 1988). Among the 
industrial countries, the current account of the seven largest industrial countries 
shifted drastically towards deficit in 1980 but moved into surpluses again in 1981 and 
1982. Other smaller industrial countries moved slowly towards balance while other 
developing countries had their largest deficits in 1981 and 1982. This was the period 
when the debt "crisis" became evident. After 1982, the balance of payments position 
shows that the oil exporting countries recorded deficits again in 1983 and 1984 with a 
counterpart surplus in other industrial countries (see Table I. 1). The seven largest 
industrial countries record deficits between 1983 and 1984 largely composed of huge 
deficits incurred in the US. The deficits of the non-oil developing countries reached 
their peak in 1981 and 1982 of more than US$ 97 bn. Since 1984, deficits of the 
non-oil developing countries gradually decreased. 
The main source of financing the deficits after the first and second oil shocks was 
external borrowing and the creation of foreign denominated debt. In 1973, that is 
before the first oil shock, non-debt sources in the form of official aid and foreign 
direct investment financed 80% of the deficits of developing countries (IMF Annual 
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Report, 1982), and most borrowings were used to build up reserves. From 1974 to 
1979, non-debt sources provided only one-third to one-half of the much larger 
volume of financing and since then, the ratio has fallen even further. While debt 
became the primary source of financing, the extent to which debt has been offset by 
increases in reserves has diminished rapidly: the ratio of reserve accumulation to net 
external borrowings averaged 45% in 1976 to 1978, fell to 25% in 1979 and plunged 
below 8% in both 1980 and 1981 (IMF Annual Report, 1982). 
The growth of debt financing reflects growth of the recycling role of the international 
banking and capital markets after 1970 
-a characteristic of the deployment of the oil 
exporting countries' surpluses (Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, June 198 1). For 
the oil-importing countries, official reserves can provide at most only a temporary, or 
cyclical financing role. Consequently, the banking system has been required to 
transform its predominantly short term liabilities to oil-exporting countries into longer 
term loans to deficit countries (Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, June 1981). 
1.2.1 Private versus Official Debt 
Table 1.2 shows that the volume of all types of debt 
- 
private or official (except short- 
term debt) grew faster between 1975-79 compared to 1970-74. Total debt stocks 
grew by 212% between those two periods. Public and private long term debt each 
grew at 179% and 108% respectively. The growth of the use of IMF credit is highest 
at 392% in the period between 1970-74 and 1975-79. Between 1975-79 and 1980- 
82, i. e. the years after the second oil-shock and during the occurrence of the debt 
crisis, all types of debt, except short-term debt, continued to grow substantially, albeit 
at a lower rate than from 1970-74 to 1975-79. Short-term debt grew rapidly by 
237%. Between 1980-82 and 1983-86, the growth of all types of debt were 
substantially lower than in the 1970s period. The growth of short term debt declined 
by 14.5% reflecting the refusal of banks to roll-over short term debts as they matured. 
While reliance on loans as a form of financing had become greater, the source of 
credits had shifted from official and concessional loans to bank loans. Official loans 
on concessional terms accounted for over 46% and 36% of the outstanding long term 
debt in 1971 and 1975, respectively (OECD Survey, 1983). Bank loans were the 
source of only 14% and 32% of the total long term debt outstanding in the same 
period. By the end of 1982, however, hank loans were the single largest source of 
long term financing, accounting for about 48% of developing countries' financing 
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(OECD Survey, 1983). Concessional loans accounted only for 19.3% of the total 
long term debt (OECD 1983 Survey). 
Table 1.2: Debt Figures for all Developing Countries (US $hn) 
Year Dcht Stock Long-term 
debt 
Puh]. & 
Publ. 
Guaranteed 
debt 
Private non- 
guaranteed 
Use of IMF 
credit 
Short-term 
debt 
1970-74 97.4 96 73 23 1.4 
- 
1975 304 252 204 48 6.9 45.1 
1979 580 437 362 75 9.4 133 
1980 673 503 407 95 15 155 
1981 752 562 460 102 20.7 169 
1983 815 645 533 III 30.9 140 
1984 851 686 577 109 33.4 131 
1985 962 793 690 103 37.6 131 
1986 1053 894 800 93 40.2 119 
1987 1169 996 905 90 40.2 133 
1990 1518 1210 1010 2(X) 35 274 
1992 1662 1309 1100 190 38 316 
1993 1770 1411 1200 210 39 321 
`% growth bet. 
1970-74 and 
1975-79 
212 162 179 108 392 
- 
`% growth bet. 
1975-79 and 
19xO-K2 
119 98.6 100 88.9 118 237.7 
`% growth bet. 
1980-82 and 
19x3-8b 
37 50.6 58.6 14.7 136 
-14.5 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues. 
In 1983, official-concession al loans accounted for about 19% of total long term debt 
and private loans accounted for about 60% (World Economic Survey, 1989). In 
1986, official-concessional loans were 20% of total long term debt and private loans 
5S%n. 
Bank loans for all developing countries were US$ 127.7 bn in December 1977 and 
have increased rapidly thereafter (see Table 1.3). By June 1982, bank loans 
outstanding reached US$ 343.5 bn before the 'debt crisis' finally slowed the growth 
of flow of funds. Yet loans to developing countries still reached US$ 362.7 bn by the 
end 1982. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the Philippines, South Korea and 
Venezuela accounted for most of this hank debt. Their share, which was at its lowest 
in 1978 at 51.5%, increased continuously to 62.7% in June 1982 and then fell to 
61.7% by the end of 1982. Mexico and Brazil had the largest bank debts outstanding. 
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Table 1.3: Bank Loans To Developing Countries (in US$ bn). 
Country 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Developing Countries 128 174 235 279 327 362 
Seven major developing 69 89 128 166 201 240 
countries 
Argentina 4.9 6.7 13 19.9 24.8 25.7 
Brazil 25 32 38.6 45.7 52.5 60.5 
Chile 1.6 2.9 4.9 7.3 10.5 11.6 
Mexico 20.3 23.3 30.9 42.5 57.1 62.9 
Philippines 3.4 4.2 7.4 9.3 10.2 12.6 
S. Korea 5.2 6.9 12 16.7 19.9 23 
Venezuela 9.1 14 20.8 24.3 26.2 27.5 
Proportion of all 
developing-country 
borrowing (percent) 
Seven major c'tries 54.4 51.5 54.3 59.3 61.6 61.7 
Brazil 19.6 18.2 16.4 16.3 16.6 16.7 
Mexico 15.9 13.3 13.1 15.2 17.5 17.3 
Source: Bank For International Settlement, 1983. 
Clearly banks have concentrated their 1980s lending in a small group of developing 
countries, despite the fact that banks lend to public or private sector borrowers from 
over 120 developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Bank For International Settlement (BIS), 1983). 
As it stands in 1989 and in 1990, hank credits to all developing countries are US$ 
14.6 bn and US$ 13.4 bn respectively (World Debt Tables 1993). Lending are 
confined only to creditworthy borrowers who have not rescheduled. Main receivers 
are China and to a lesser extent the Philippines and Thailand. S. Korea and Indonesia 
reduced borrowings from banks. Latin America's access are limited, however, by 
contrast, it is the major borrower in the international bond market. 
1.2.2 Fixed-interest versus Floating-interest Debt 
The effect of interest rates on interest payments depends on the nature of debt, 
whether the debt is fixed-interest or floating-interest, and on the variability of interest 
rates themselves. Fixed interest rates have been lower than floating interest rates 
because fixed-interest loans have subsidised terms or are channelled through 
multinational lending institutions such as the World Bank. So, fixed interest rates 
tended to be official debt whereas floating rate is commercial debt. The total net 
floating-interest debt) of non-oil developing countries was US$ 49 bn in 1978 but 
increased to US$ 90 bn in 1980 and to US$ 166 bn in 1982 (OECD Survey, 1982). 
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Between end 1979 and end 1982, the fixed and floating interest rates rose (as shown 
in Table 1.4) which, together with the massive increase in borrowing over the same 
period, causing interest payments on long term loans to double from US$ 25 bn in 
1979 to US$ 50 bn in 1982 for all developing countries. For non-oil developing 
countries, the interest payments rose from US$ 17 bn to US$ 35 bn. The annual 
increase in the interest bill was running at around US$ 9 hn on average for all 
developing countries. The bulk of this increase was accounted for by a few major 
borrowers having high floating interest debts. From Table 1.4, it can be seen that 
interest payments grew as much as amortization payments between 1950 and 1982 but 
registered a higher growth than amortization payments in 1983. This indicate the 
increase in interest rates payments was faster than the increase in total borrowings. 
In 1983, interest payments fell slightly as compared to 1982 due to the fall in interest 
rates on floating-interest debt (OECD Survey, 1983). Interest arrears, however, did 
build up in 1983 more than in 1982 and the fall in interest payments recorded in 1983 
reflects that there were arrears in interest payments together with a fall in interest 
rates. 
Table 1.4: Total Long Term Debt Service During 1971-83 (US$ bn) 
1971 1975 1979 1980 1982 1983 1986 1990 
All Developing 
countries 
Total Debt Service 10.5 25 71 82 IN 96 156 176 
cif which: Interest 3.2 8.8 25.5 35.2 50.3 48 74 76 
Amortization 7.3 16.3 45.7 47 57.3 48 82 99 
Non-oil dcv'ping dries 
Total Debt Service 7.2 17.3 48 53.9 72.4 62.5 
of which: Interest 2 5.9 16.9 24.5 35.9 35 
- - 
Amortization 5 11.4 31.3 29.4 36.5 27.4 
Source: OECD Survey, 1993 and World debt Tables, 1993. 
1.2.3 Terms of Trade 
The effect of changes in trade volumes and prices on trade performance of non-oil 
developing countries can he deduced from Table 1.5. The export earnings over the 
period 1974 to 1976 increased by 95.8% compared to the period 1971 to 1973. The 
movements of the unit value of exports index shows an increase from 38.2% in 1971 
to 1973 to 63.4% in 1974 to 1976, i. e. showing an increase of 25.2%. The increase 
in export earnings in 1974 to 1976 as compared to 1971-73 thus reflect a 25.2% 
increase in the prices of exports. The remainder of the increase can he attributed to 
increased export volumes. 
Although exports earnings grew, import bills grew even faster than the growth of 
export earnings in the years 1974-76 as compared to 1971-73, which tended to cause 
deficits in the trade account. The percentage growth is 110.2%. This largely reflects 
the increase in the import hills for oil. 
On average, the change in the terms of trade, which is the price of exports over the 
price of imports, is negative (-3.2%) in 1974-76, showing a deterioration of 2.93% 
from that of 1971-73. The negative change naturally has an adverse effect on the 
average purchasing power of exports in 1974-76, since the purchasing power of 
exports is equals to the volume of exports multiplied by the terms of trade. 
Table 1.5: Trade Indicators For Non-Oil Developing Countries 
Trade Indicators 1971-73 1974-76 1978 1979 1980 1986-88 
Export earnings (US$) 72.6 142.2 209.1 268.8 335.2 trade 
balance 
=213 
Imports (US $ 89.6 188.4 263.4 327.9 424.7 
Export Unit Values 38.2 63.4 77 88.2 100 105.5 
(1980=100 
Import Unit Values 33.1 59.2 70.6 83.9 100 102.5 
(19x0=100 
Perms of Trade (%, change 
-0.27 -3.2 -4.3 -3.6 -4.9 2.3 
over previous car 
Source: International Financial Statistics 1989. 
Export earnings grew by 122% in 1979-81 as compared to 1974-76. This growth is 
higher than the growth of imports which is 112.7% in the same period. However, in 
all the years between 1979 to 1981, import expenditure well exceeded the export 
earnings, causing deficits in the trade balance. 
Export unit values moved favourably until 1980 but declined in 1981, hence, 
constituting a growth of 48.6% in 1979-81 as compared to 1974-76. However, 
import unit values grew faster than export unit values in 1979-81 as compared to 
1974-76, i. e. by 60.6%. The faster growth in the unit value of imports contributed to 
a negative growth in the terms of trade of 5.1 % in 1979-8 1. 
After the outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982, the growth of export earnings fell 
considerably by 12.1 % in 1982-86 as compared to 1979-81 due to lower commodity 
prices in 1981-84. The growth of import bills fell by 0.52% between 1979-81 and 
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1982-86. The growth of unit value exports and the unit value of imports fell by 14% 
and 8% respectively in the same period. The terms of trade deteriorated by 0.04%. 
Given these conditions naturally the trade balance worsened during that period. 
1.2.4 Debt Service Ratio 
Debt service ratio refers to interest payments plus principal payments divided by 
exports earnings. Debt service ratio is increased when there is an increase in debt 
contracted which increases the interest and principal payments; an increase in interest 
rate which increases the interest payments; or a decrease in exports earnings. A 
country with a rising debt service ratio reduces its ability to import and increases its 
vulnerability to fluctuations in export earnings. A higher probability of rescheduling is 
thus anticipated. The debt service ratio for all developing countries rose from 8.0% in 
1975 to 11.7% in 1980 and 20.2% in 1986 (World Debt Tables, 1988/89). Out of 
these figures, interest payments over exports of goods and services was 3% in 1975 
rose to 5.3% in 1980 and 9.8% in 1986. 
To summarize, from the analysis above it can be concluded that the emergence of debt 
financing started after the first oil-shock but grew substantially after the second oil 
shock. Debt financing was mainly used to finance interest repayments in the 1980s 
rather than expansion of imports, reducing their ability to increase the growth of 
output. The increased usage of debt-creating flows in the 1980s was also due to the 
increased availability of credits due to the expansion of the Euro-currency markets as 
well as availability of bank loans in general. Also the higher debt service burden was 
attributed to floating interest-debt contracted by major debtors. The poor trade 
performance in the 1980s caused partly by poor terms of trade also aggravated the 
debt problems. 
In the assessment of debt burden that follows in section 1.4, our focus will be on 
regional-specific factors as well as general factors that are seen to affect the balance of 
payments and the emergence of debt and debt problems. In what follows in section 
1.3, the price risks shall be discussed. 
1.3. Financial and Commodity Price Risks Confronting Indebted 
Developing Countries. 
Fluctuations in international interest rates, exchange rates and world commodity prices 
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can affect the financial situation of indebted developing countries through various 
channels which is explained in the respective sections below. 
1.3.1 Interest Rate Variability 
Since external bank debts of developing countries are often indexed to London 
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), it is of interest to measure the fluctuations in the real 
and nominal LIBOR to show interest rate variability. A large portion of developing 
countries' international borrowing has been denominated in US dollars. Since 1972, 
there have been large fluctuations in both nominal and real international interest rates. 
Nominal interest rates are calculated as the average of the monthly interest rates 
observed over the preceding one or two years. Real interest rates are calculated by 
initially taking the percentage change in an index of the export prices over the 
preceding year, then adjusting LIBOR by this percentage change. From Chart I 
(Appendix I ), it can be seen that there are fluctuations in either nominal or real (with 
very large fluctuations in the real) interest rates in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The interest payments on debts are affected by interest rate volatility, hence affecting 
the current account position. The interest payments portion of the debt service is 
affected through the increased real cost of loans especially during the period 1979- 
1982. Before the mid-1970s, interest rate volatility had little influence on the interest 
payments of developing countries because most debt contracted was at fixed rates and 
from official sources. After 1973, developing countries had become much more 
dependent on private external financing. The consequence was a marked shift from 
non-debt creating flows (official transfers and private direct investment) to debt-- 
creating and interest sensitive borrowing in world capital markets. The cost of 
borrowing is vulnerable to the volatility of interest rates because it is tied to LIBOR or 
the US prime rate plus a margin or a spread. The spread over LIBOR or US prime 
rate will vary according to the perceived risks associated with lending to a particular 
country and with the degree of liquidity in international capital markets. Spreads often 
rise during periods of debt servicing difficulties because of loss of confidence by 
hanks. 
In the period between 1980-85, there was an adverse effect from the change in 
interest rates on the debt service ratio of 0.5% in the developing countries as a group. 
By continents, there were adverse effect in interest rates in Africa (-0.7%), Latin 
America (-24%), and ASEAN (-0.7%) during the same period (Gibson and Thirlwall, 
1989). Between 1982 to 1985, interest rates, on the average, fell reducing the debt 
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service ratio, reflecting some form of debt relief. 
Between the period 1980-1982, the effect of the change in interest rates caused a 
1.1 % increase in the debt service ratio in the Latin American region and 0.3% increase 
in the ASEAN region. In Africa, the effect of the change in interest rate decreased the 
debt service ratio by 0.2%. The fall in the nominal interest rate between 1993-1985 
had its greatest effect in the Latin American region. A one percent change in the 
interest rate contributed to a 4.4% decrease in the debt service ratio (Gibson and 
Thirlwall, 1989). 
This result reflects the fact that the greater proportion of Latin American debt is 
variable interest debt (i. e. about 48.2% of the public debt in Latin America). The 
African and the ASEAN regions experienced an increasing debt service ratio and did 
not benefited from the decline in the US interest rates. This is due to the smaller 
proportion of was at variable interest rate debt for these cases. 
1.3.2 Exchange Rate Variability 
Chart 2 (Appendix I) represents a measure of volatility in the nominal and real 
effective exchange rate of the US dollar vis-a-vis other major currencies. Changes in 
key currency exchange rates are often associated with the increased variability in 
international interest rates. The exchange rate variability has been relatively high since 
1973 which has affected the major currencies of the world. The large fluctuations in 
exchange rates leads to the move to generalized floating in 1973, and the chart shows 
continuous fluctuations in the 1980s. 
Movements in the key currency exchange rates affect the real terms of trade of 
developing countries depending on the types of goods exported and imported. 
Dornbusch (1986) suggests that other things being equal, a percentage point 
depreciation of the US dollar against the currencies of other industrial countries would 
result in a similar percentage increase in the dollar prices of both non-fuel primary 
commodities and manufactures. He also suggests that the effect of dollar depreciation 
on relative prices of various traded goods could be larger at a more disaggregated 
level, since the relative importance of the major industrial countries in the world 
market varies across commodities and manufactured goods. 
Exchange rate variability causes uncertainty about the future prices of exports and 
imports, thus causing difficulties in trade projections unless forward markets are used 
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to hedge against such variability. However, in most cases, the precautionary 
balances required are not available hence, causing the said problem. Since the debt of 
developing countries are denominated in US dollars, a rise in the value of the dollar 
increases repayment problems. Exchange rate movements also affect the terms of 
trade and the value of reserves of developing countries 
. 
Dornbusch (1986) considers the role of exchange rates in stabilizing inflation. Four 
different settings are used to examine that role: 
1. exchange rate overvaluation in the Southern cone. 
2. exchange rate depreciation in transition from high to even higher inflation in Brazil. 
3. exchange rate fixing and the resulting real appreciation during inflation stabilization 
in the 1920s. 
4. real appreciation of the US $ from 1980-85. 
The highlight of Dornbusch's argument is that exchange rate policy can make an 
important contribution to stabilization, but that it can also be misused and will then 
lead to persistent deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP), with devastatingly 
adverse effects. 
In I) above, he dealt with Latin America, drawing attention to the trade and capital 
account effects of exchange rate overvaluation. In 4), he dealt with disinflation, 
focusing on what the impact of exchange rate is on the prices of commodities and 
manufactures, analyzing the macroeconomic channels through which exchange rate 
movements affect relative prices and the inflation process. 
Pertaining to the Latin American experience, in the late 1970s, Chile and Argentina, in 
an attempt to bring down the inflation rates, used fixed exchange rates, or reduced the 
rate of depreciation relative to the prevailing inflation rate. The result is that inflation 
was reduced but at the cost of destructive overvaluation. 
In the Chilean case, exchange rate pegging (to the dollar) was thought to bring 
inflation under control through two channels: 
i) international prices would exert an immediate tight discipline on domestic price 
increases. Trade liberalization had been underway at that time. 
ii) exchange rate pegging would contribute to inflation stabilization by affecting 
expectations, particularly in sectors that are price setters rather than price takers. The 
recognition that the exchange rate would be fixed forever would shift expectations 
from an inflationary setting to a new regime of price stability. 
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The result was that inflation fell from 30% to 0% over a two-year period. But there 
was a disequilibrium: the problem was that wages were indexed backwards, i. e. each 
year's wage was determined by the preceding year's consumer inflation. Wage 
increases exceeded the current inflation rate, which had been held down by the fixed 
exchange rate in 1978-80. As a result, a purchasing power of wages increased sharply 
in terms of traded goods, causing a loss of competitiveness and a deterioration of the 
trade balance. 
The mechanics of overvaluation as explained by Dornbusch (1989) are: 
Pt 
= 
AWt + (1-a)(Et + P*) 
(l. l) 
where, 
P= the rate of consumer price inflation 
W= Wage inflation 
E= exchange rate depreciation 
A= the share of labour in total costs. 
P= world inflation 
The indexing rule is Wt = Pt- 1, and the exchange rate rule is Et = 0. 
Equation (I 
. 
I) becomes: 
Pt 
= 
APt_ I+ (1 
- 
A) P* 
(1.2) 
This equation shows that the wage and exchange rate policies combine to yield a 
gradually declining inflation rate that ultimately converges on the world inflation rate, 
Pý. Thus, exchange rate policy can be used for disinflation and that the openness of 
the economy speeds up and reinforces the disinflation strategy. 
The problem with the strategy is brought out by equation 3, which shows the rate of 
growth of real wage, Wt 
- 
Pt: 
Wt 
- 
Pt 
= 
Pt-I 
- 
Pt 
= (I +A)(Pt-I 
- 
P*) 
(1.3) 
The real wage rises for as long as lagged inflation exceeds the international inflation 
rate. Home inflation gradually comes down but the real wage steadily increases with 
no correction at any stage for the cumulative overvaluation. Thus, there is a serious 
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problem of overvaluation. The trade balance deteriorates, and the loss of 
competitiveness exerts an increasingly adverse effect on employment and profitability. 
Devaluation can be deflationary because it cuts the purchasing power of wages in 
terms of tradables. The same effect is at work in the opposite direction in periods of 
increasing overvaluation. The first impact is to raise the purchasing power of wages, 
and thus create a period of prosperity, which can last only as long as the central bank 
can put foreign exchange on sale. But the income effect of higher real wages comes to 
he dominated by classical substitution away from overpriced domestic labour, and this 
may happen even before the central bank reserves are depleted. 
Substitution effects on the demand and supply sides lead to bankruptcy and 
unemployment, which is always the second stage of an overvaluation experiment. The 
third stage is that external debt has been incurred to finance the overvaluation and now 
needs to be serviced. This call for a trade surplus generated by austerity and sharp real 
depreciation. The adverse substitution effects are reinforced by real interest effects. 
The expectations of devaluation in Chile raises nominal interest rates on peso loans. 
But because the currency is fixed, real interest rates remain high, imposing difficulties 
and the creation of debt for industries. 
The overvaluation, combined with trade liberalization, lowered the prices of imports 
in real terms to an unprecedented extent. Imports overshot in 1980-81. The overall 
consequences in the Chilean case are; devaluation in the end, inflation back to 20%, 
tariffs and quotas are back, the budget has deteriorated, the debt crisis is on, and 
unemployment has been at record levels for a few years. 
In Argentina, the exchange rate was seen as an important instrument for stabilization 
by setting a declining rate of currency depreciation. Inflation however, did not 
decline. The large budget deficit explained it. A huge real appreciation took place 
between 1978 and 1980 and undermined the attempt at disinflation. The system of 
pre-set exchange rates broke down in early 1981 leading to hyperinflation in 1985. 
The important difference between the Chilean and Argentinian cases as noted by 
Dornbusch, is the channel through which exchange rate speculation took place. In 
Chile, trade had been completely liberalized, so capital flight was into importables. In 
Argentina, the capital account had been completely opened, so capital flight was into 
foreign assets. 
Dornbusch concluded that the Chilean and Argentine case teach the same lesson. If 
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rates of depreciation are to be set below the prevailing inflation rate for some period in 
order to achieve disinflation, at least three conditions are necessary for success: I) 
the monetary and fiscal rules must be consistent with the exchange rate target; 2) 
effort must be maximise to have incomes policy consistent with the exchange rate 
policy and not relying on economic slack and expectations to influence the inflation 
rate; 3) speculation in durables or foreign assets must be controlled by the 
government to prevent losses of reserves. Dornbusch suggests that transitory taxes 
on durables can prevent the speculation that occurred in Chile under an open trading 
system; complete capital mobility should not have been a feature of the Argentine 
stabilization plan. Dornbusch concluded that there is not much of a case to be made 
for free capital outflows from a developing country at the best of times, and 
especially during a stabilization period. 
1.3.3 Commodity Price Variability 
Export receipts and the cost of imports fluctuates with the variability in commodity 
prices. Prices of primary commodities were highly volatile in response to shifts in 
both demand and supply factors during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
supply and demand for individual commodities differ, hence commodity prices have 
not always moved together. There are important differences in the behaviour and 
magnitude of swings between prices of different commodities and between these 
prices and the terms of trade of developing countries (see Chart 3, Appendix I ). In 
many cases, these movements have run counter to general inflationary trends in the 
major industrial countries. 
Chart 3 shows commodity price volatility since the early 1960s, which shows an 
overall commodity price index, indices for various sub-groups of commodities and a 
number of individual commodity prices. Commodity price variability moderated in 
the early 1970s but worsened in the late 1970s and in the 1980s. Non-oil commodity 
prices have been affected on the demand side not only by industrial countries' 
exchange rates, but also by the level of economic activity and rates of inflation in 
industrial countries. From 1980 onwards, the sharp appreciation of the dollar caused 
import prices to fall absolutely while domestic prices kept rising. Non-oil commodity 
prices have declined by 46% since 1980 (Dornbusch 1986). The decline hinges on the 
fact, according to Dornbusch, that for commodities as opposed to manufactures, the 
law of one price holds strictly. Letting q and q* be commodity prices in dollars and 
in foreign currency, the law of one price then requires that q= Eq*, where E is the 
nominal exchange rate. But the law of one price does not apply to goods in general. 
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Defining P and P* as the national price levels (measured by GNP deflators), the real 
exchange rate is R=P/EP*. Dornbush's empirical finding shows that aI% increase in 
world industrial production raises real commodity prices by 2%. On the supply side, 
the prices are affected by policies affecting levels of domestic production (particularly 
for agricultural commodities). 
Table 16; Terns of Trade of Non-Oil Developing Countries (1971-1986) 
Nv change per annum) 
YEAR TOT YEAR TOT 
1971 
-5.8 1979 -3.6 
1972 
-0.6 198(1 -4.9 
1973 5.6 1981 
-6.9 
1974 
-5.4 1982 -1.3 
1975 
-9.8 1983 - 
1976 5.5 1984 4.1 
1977 6.2 1985 
-4.4 
1978 
-4.3 1986 1.4 
Source: International Financial Statistics, 1998. 
Variability in the commodity prices affects the terms of trades of developing countries 
and their trade balances, or alternatively, the purchasing power of their exports. The 
fluctuations in the trade balances cause uncertainties in their ability to repay interest on 
debts. The terms of trade of non-oil developing countries shown above, shows 
negative figures in the late 1970s and early 1980s during which the commodity price 
variability worsened. 
Consistent with the expansion of demand in 1972-73 mentioned earlier, the terms of 
trade are positive in 1973. The period after the second oil shock showed deterioration 
in the terms of trade up until 1982. 
1.4. Assessment of Debt Burden by Variables 
The economies of low income sub-Saharan African region are qualitatively different 
from those of the middle income countries of Africa or low income countries of other 
regions. The group that we will analyse is the low income sub-Saharan African 
group. The typical African economy is smaller with very low per capita income and is 
more trade dependent, less urbanized and less socially stratified than its Latin 
American counterpart (Helleiner, 1987). In general, the African countries depend on 
non-oil primary commodities as a source of foreign exchange earnings and on external 
resources for consumption and investment. The debt problem in the sub-Saharan 
African countries predates the 1982 debt crisis in middle income countries. The early 
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emergence of debt problems are due to very poor export performance as a result of 
depressed commodity prices (Helleiner, 1987; World Debt Tables, 1988/89). More 
than half have had debt rescheduling or incurred arrears on debt service obligations 
. 
since 1980. 
In the Latin American region, debt crisis started in August 1992 when Mexico 
announced inability to repay its external debt, followed immediately by a ninety-day 
moratorium. It is by then the largest producer of oil in the region. A systematic debt 
stress soon extended to the whole of the Latin American region which had run up 
heavy liabilities on the interbank market (Thorp and Whitehead, 1987). 
On the IMF estimates, thirty countries in the Western Hemisphere 
-in Latin American 
and the Caribbean- accounted for 42% of the total debt of all 123 indebted developing 
countries in 1984. Seven major borrowers 
-Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, South 
Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines- accounted for 44% of the total debt of all the 
123 developing countries (Table 1.7), the vast majority of it was owed to private 
banks (World Debt Tables, 1987/88). 
'fahle 1.7: The External Debt of Seven Major Borrowers, March 1985 (US$ inns) 
Countries 1985 
Brazil 106,484 
Mexico 96,875 
South Korea 47,159 
Argentina 49,324 
Venezuela 34,693 
Indonesia 35,999 
Philippines 26,190 
TOTAL 396,724 
Total for all Developing Countries US$ 949 hn. 
Source: World Debt Tables 1988/89 
Two of the ASEAN countries, South Korea and the Philippines are categorized as 
highly indebted countries. South Korea ranked the fourth largest debtor among all 
other developing countries after Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in 1982 (OECD 
Survey, 1982). In 1985, it again ranked fourth (see Table 1.7), having tJS$ 47.15 
billion external debt. In 1990, Indonesia and the Philippines remain amongst the 
severely indebted developing countries' group together with Mexico, Brazil, etc. 
The debt problem of some of the major Euro-currency market borrowers facing high 
interest costs are very different from those of the poorer developing countries holding 
mainly official or officially guaranteed debt and with low average interest cost. 
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Examples are the Latin American countries which belong to the former category and 
sub-Saharan African countries which belong to the latter category. Within each of 
those two main groups there exist major differences in the nature and causes of debt 
problems. Moreover, some developing countries do not have debt problems but 
alarmingly increased indebtedness, despite overall deterioration of the world economic 
and financial environment, for example, South Korea. In the 1990s the debt of the 
ASEAN region had a high yen component as opposed to the high dollar component 
of the Latin American and African debts (World Bank, World Debt Tables, I987/88). 
In what follows is an assessment of debt burden. What are the significance of the 
ratios? The external debt to GNP ratio matches the liability to the income of' it 
country. The debt-service ratio is defined as principal plus interest payments divided 
by exports. Thus, earnings from exports help a country to repay past debt and allow 
it to borrow more to finance future growth. The interest to exports ratio shows the 
fixed obligation to repay interest out of exports earnings. The external debt stock to 
exports matches long-run liabilities to foreign exchange earnings through exports. 
The ratio of short term debt to total debt reflects maturity management, the lower 
the ratio the more liquid is the financial position because short term loan has to be 
paid in a very short period of time and is more costly and generate greater risk. 
The variables to be analysed are the growth of output, trade indicators, the size and 
composition of debt, debt and non-debt creating flows financing of debt, debt 
indicators and floating versus fixed-interest debt. These variables are important to 
show how debt situation arises, how debt crisis develops and what the current debt 
, situations are like in the developing countries. In some countries, the growth of 
output deteriorated with the growth of debt which shows unsustainable debt 
situation, while in others the relationship between the two is positive showing 
possibly profitable use of debt. Trade indicators show mainly how external 
shocks/factors affect debt and the balance of payments situations. Debt indicators 
- 
the size and composition of debt 
- 
show how debt grew and how heavy the debt 
burden is relative among countries. Floating or fixed-interest debt shows interest 
rates' risks and its contribution to debt burden. 
1.4.1 The Growth of Output 
Between 1970 and 1979, fifteen of the forty-five sub-Saharan African countries 
experienced declining per capita income. Another nineteen registered per capita 
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income growth of under 1% per year during this period. On average, per capita 
income in Africa declined by 0.4% per year in the 1970s (World Bank, 1981). The 
volume of agricultural exports fell over the decade by 20%. The average growth of 
per capita GDP for Latin America during 1970-1980 was 3% (Chart 4). The South 
and East Asian countries have an average of 4% per capita GDP growth in the 1970s. 
Between 1981 and 1988, real GDP grew at 
-3 % for sub-Saharan Africa (see chart 4). 
Between 1981-88, the growth rates for Latin America was 
-1.6% and for ASEAN, 
about 5% (chart 4b). 
6 
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Chart 4: Real GDP Growth Rates 1970-1980 and 1980-1987 (% change) 
Until 1981, several countries in the Latin American region managed to achieve 
reasonable growth rates in spite of the external shocks. Large volumes of debt were 
contracted to purchase more imports to maintain higher rates of growth than would 
otherwise have been possible. Lever and Huhne (1987) termed this "debt-led" 
growth. Table 1.8 shows positive annual growth of per capita Gross Domestic 
Product between the years 1971-73 to 1979-81. Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay 
recorded average growth rates of 4.8,4.9 and 5.5 respectively. Remarkable declines 
in per capita GDP are noted in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, EI-Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela between the years 1979-81 to 
1982-84. 
The table below supports the view that the IMF's adjustment programmes in 1982 and 
1983 resulted first and foremost in a cut in imports through a cut in aggregate demand 
in debtor countries (among others having this view are Sachs (1987) and Lever and 
Buhne (1987)). The effect is reducing their output. Average annual growth rates of 
per capita domestic products between 1979-81 and 1982-84 became negative for all 
Latin American countries except Panama, Paraguay and Dominican Republic. For 
Latin America Source: World Debt Tables 1987/88 Mediterranean 
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Latin America as a group, the cumulative drop in real per-capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) between 1981 and 1984 was 8.9%. 
Unlike the regions of Latin America and Africa which ran into debt problems at the 
latest immediately after the second oil shock, ASEAN countries continued to perform 
rather well between 1982 and 1984. Besides Singapore and South Korea, the other 
four countries depend heavily on exports of primary commodities: 90% for Indonesia, 
74%% for Malaysia, 62% for Thailand and 33% for the Philippines. On the imports 
intermediate side, more than 40% of the imports by these four countries consist of 
goods (World Development Report, 1985). 
'fahle I 
. 
S: Average Annual Growth Rates In Per Capita Gross Domestic Product. 
1960-2 to 
1971-3 
1971-3 to 
1979-81 
1979-91 to 
1982-4 
1986 1988 
Argentina 2.5 0.3 
-3.7 5.6 -2.5 
Bolivia 3.4 1.6 
-7.3 -2.5 3.0 
Brazil 4.1 4.9 
-1.8 7.6 -0.1 
C'olonihia 2.6 2.9 
-0.3 5.8 4.1 
Costa Rica 3.7 2.2 
-4.7 5.5 3.4 
Chile 1.8 0.7 
-4.1 5.6 7.4 
IkmiinicanRe p. 3.3 3.2 0.8 3.2 0.7 
Ecuador 3.1 4.9 
-1.4 3.1 10.5 
E: l Salvador 2.1 
-0.1 -7.5 0.6 1.6 
Guatemala 2.9 2.5 
-4.0 0.1 3.9 
Haiti 
-0.9 2.0 -2.5 1.0 0.9 
Honduras 2.0 1.1 
-3.3 0.7 4.6 
Mexico 3.7 3.5 
-1.2 -3.7 - 
Nicaragua 2.8 
-2.9 -0.4 -1.0 -13.4 
Panama 4.5 1.9 1.9 3.4 
-15.6 
Paraguay 2.2 5.5 0 
- 
6.4 
1leru 1.7 0.4 
-3.3 9.3 -8.2 
Uruguay 0.4 3.3 
-4.3 8.9 - 
Vcnezuela 2.0 0.9 
-4.2 6.3 6.2 
Source: Alejandro C. D., "The Development Crisis In Latin America", in Thorp 
and Whitehead, Latin American Debt and The Adjustment Crisis, 1997. 
Table 1.9 shows the performance of the ASEAN economy during the oil shock from 
1978-81 and the subsequent global debt problems from 1982 onwards. The average 
annual growth rates of output in the 1970s were very promising with the exception of 
the Philippines which experienced debt difficulties in 1983 and restructured its debt in 
that year. The highest growth rate of GDP in the period between the two oil shocks 
, 
seemed to he in countries with some oil content in their exports. Singapore had an 
average of 1 I% per year and Indonesia and Malaysia had an average of 8.6% each, 
per year. South Korea has a lower average annual growth rate of GDP of 6.8% per 
year. The ASEAN region registered a reduction of about 19% of the average annual 
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growth rate of GDP between 1982-84 as compared to 1979-81. However, the 
Philippines recorded a drop of about 4% to an average annual growth of 1.45%. 
T, ihlo, 1 Q" Avreioa Anniial l: rnwuth Rateec of Grip ('/nl 
Countries 1971-73 to 
1979-81 
1979-81 to 
1982-84 
Malaysia 8.60 7.30 
Philippines 5.70 1.45 
Singapore 11.0 8.65 
"Thailand 6.20 5.65 
Indonesia 8.60 6.10 
South Korea 6.80 6.10 
Source: Calculated from the International Financial Statistics, 1987/89. 
1.4.2 Trade Indicators 
After the oil shock of 1973, prices for a number of commodities produced by the sub- 
Saharan countries (cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar, phosphate and uranium) rose sharply 
and then dropped steeply (International Financial Statistics, 1988). The terms of trade 
in Table 1.10 show sharp increases in 1973 in eight of the countries. Six others have 
declining terms of trade in 1973. 
In 1980, all except two of the countries have negative changes in their terms of t adc. 
In addition, from Table 1.1 1, we can see that, generally, in the 1980s, there were 
declines in the terms of trade of the sub-Saharan African countries. 
'Fahle IID: Terms of Trade for African Countries (% change over previous cx ar ) 
Countries 1973 1974 1975 1976 1980 1982 1986 
Bernie 19.5 
-3.1 -18.5 22.3 -17.4 - - 
Burkina Faso 2.9 17 2 
-12.8 13.2 3.2 -5.3 -26.7 
CoteD'Ivoire 22.7 4.5 
-19.6 16.3 -2.9 -II. I -3.6 
Ethiopia 9.6 
-3.2 -14.8 67.9 -13.9 - - 
Kenya 
-3.4 -11.6 -8.9 16.2 -8.2 4.4 12.9 
Lihcna 
-2.9 -10.4 20.6 7.3 O. 1 2.8 -6.5 
Malawi 
--. 
0 
-6. I -3.6 -2.4 -15.1 1.1 -12.9 
Mauritius 
-10.0 52.5 16.3 -26.9 -5.7 -10.5 30.6 
Morocco 
-3.6 41.9 7.0 -20.7 - 0.3 10.0 
Niger 
-9.3 15.0 21.1 4.9 -11.2 2.3 - 
Senegal 4.0 32.9 
-20.2 -7.2 -2A. 7 -14.3 -3.2 
Sc chelles 23.8 7.4 
-1-9.0 15.0 -20.2 -6.7 - 
Tanzania 10.1 10.2 
-16.3 21.9 1.5 - - 
Togo 4.5 95.0 
-9.7 -35.0 -12.4 1.4 - 
Zambia 31.4 
-3.0 -49. I K. O -30.9 1. I - 
Source: Intonational Financial Statistics 1999-89. 
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On average between 1980 and 1987, the terms of' trade decline by 3% per year. 
Export volumes changed by an average of 2% per annum in the same period while 
import volumes changed by 
-0.03% on average during 1980-1987. This means the 
purchasing power of exports, on average, declined by I% per year over the same 
period and left the current account balance change of 
-0.07% on the average over the 
period 1980 to 1987. 
Table III: Trade Indicators for Sub-Saharan Africa 1969-1987 (Annual changes in '% ) 
Indicate 1969- 1979 1980 198I I982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
79 
I xp rrt 1.3 2.3 0.9 
-2.6 3.5 1.4 4.8 1. I 9.5 3. I 
Vol 
Import 4.0 
-3.4 5.3 0.2 
-3.9 -8.3 -2.4 0.4 6.8 I. O 
vol 
Perms o 0.3 0.5 
-3.3 -4.7 -4.5 1.1 5.9 - I. 6 -8.5 -K. 9 
t ade 
Sourco: International Financial Statistics, 1989/99 
Table 1.12a below shows the foreign trade indicators of* countries in the Latin 
American region between 1971-73 and 1982-1984. The volume of merchandise 
exports did rise (most prominently in Brazil and Mexico with 10% and 14% average 
annual growth rates respectively), in most countries except Bolivia and Venezuela. 
Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela experienced gains in their terms 
of trade, while others suffered losses. The purchasing power oi' exports was higher in 
Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela 
-the oil producing countries- even though volumes 
contracted. 
The volume of merchandise imports, grew at a higher annual rate as compared to 
merchandise exports in Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, Paraguay and Venezuela. Seven 
of the countries had average annual growth rate of the volume of imports greater than 
their purchasing power of exports implying negative trade balances. This situation 
also implies the need for external finance to pay for the excess of imports over 
exports. 
Between the period 1979-81 and 1982-84 (Table 1.12h) several Latin American 
countries experienced severe terms of trade deteriorations. Only Bolivia and 
Venezuela escaped worsening terms of trade. Average annual growth of export 
volumes increased in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay but decreased in Colombia, 
Bolivia, El-Salvador and Venezuela. The combined terms of trade and volume losses 
were severe in all countries except Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. Declining terms of 
trade had greater effects on the purchasing power of exports than export volumes 
'I ahlcl 1. l2a: Foreign Trade Indica ors: AveragcAnnti I Growth Rates 
l wex. n 197 I 
-3 and I982-4 (percent) 
Volume of 
merchandise 
exports 
Terms of 
Iraikr 
Purchasing 
power of merch 
-an disc ex porls 
Volume of 
merchandise 
imports 
Argentina 7 
-4 2 -1 
Bolivia 
-2 5 3 
Brazil 1O 
-5 4 1 
Colombia I 2 3 
Costa Rica 2 
-2 0 -2 
Chile 9 
-7 1 -l 
Dominican Rep. I 
-2 -1 2 
Ecuador 3 7 1() 8 
EI Salvador O 
-2 -2 0 Guatemala 3 
-3 1 2 
Haiti 4 
-1 3 6 Ilonduras 2 
-1 1 3 
Mexico 14 2 16 4 
Nicaragua U 
-5 -5 0 Panama 0 
-6 -5 -2 Paragtta 6 
-3 3 8 
Peru 2 0 2 3 
Uruguay R 
-5 3 3 
Venezuela 
-6 13 6 6 
"1a1>ic I
. 
I2h: f ýýrciEýn Track Indicators Avcr c Annual Pcrccntagc 
'ha gngcs Between 1979-91 and 1982-84 
Terni. c of 
tr(xlce 
Purchasing 
power of nu rchan- 
disc exports 
Volume of 
imports 
Argentina 
-2.5 0.3 - 16.3 
Bolivia 1 
.6 - 5.1 - 
15.2 
Brazil 
- 
6.4 3.7 
-99 
Colombia 
- 
0.7 
- 
5.9 6.9 
Costa Rica 
- 
8.1 
- 
8.6 
- 
14.4 
Chile 
- 
8.6 
- 
3.4 
- 
14.9 
Dominican RC I). 
- 
7.5 
- 
10.0 
- 
5.9 
1. Lta(ior 
- 
5.1 
- 
2.4 
- 
10.6 
NI Salvador 
- 
6.7 
-14.9 - 8.2 (huatcncila 
- 
10.2 
- 
11.0 
- 
13.1 
Ilaiti 
- 
5.5 
-I. 5 -1.9 
lo ldllra. S 
- 
4.9 
-71 - 90 
Mexico 
- 
5.9 H 
.1 -18.7 Nicaraeua 5. O 
- 
12.9 
- 
2.1 
I'anania 
- 
5.0 
- 
10.5 
- 
5.4 
IU'a, tia uaý 
- 
7.1 
- 
5.9 
- 
(). I 
Pau 
- 
8.6 3.7 
Ilrueuav 
- 
3.4 2.5 
- 
16.8 
Vrnciurla (I. S 
- 
5.4 
- 
6.5 
timur k.:: AI ji niio (1), Suiur 1\j ccts of tho Ucý rlýilinicnt ('risis in 
_ 
Latin Amciwa, 1087 
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during this period. Import volumes declined sharply especially in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay. Only 
Colombia had increased import volumes. Most countries had thus shown some 
adjustment to cut foreign exchange outflows via imports. The collapse of import 
volumes was sharp in 1982-84 which exceeded the purchasing power of exports, 
reflecting the reduction of net capital inflows and the repayments of huge interest 
payments (Diaz-Alejandro, 1987, in Thorp and Whitehead). 
Between 1971-73 and I982-84, the growth rates of import volume for most major 
debtors in the Latin American region were lower than the growth of the purchasing 
power of exports. The import volume actually expanded between 1971-73 and 1979- 
81 but dropped during I982-84 far more than the purchasing power of exports. 
A combination of external shocks and domestic influences via the foreign trade 
indicators that affects the ASEAN economies can be deduced from Table 1.13. 
Table I. 13: Foreign Trade Indicators: Avcraº*c Annual Growth Rates 
Between 1971-73 and 1982-84 ("/r, ) 
Volume of 
export 
Terms of trade Purchasing 
power of 
export 
Volume of' 
import 
Malaysia 3.0 
-. 
02 1.0 na 
Philippines 
-0.9 -0.7 -1.6 -1.2 
Singapore 6.7 na na 3.5 
Indonesia 6.3 na na na 
Thailand 2.7 2.9 5.6 7.9 
S. Korea 10.7 0.2 10.8 7.6 
Source: Calculated from International Financial Statistics 1988/89. 
Falling commodity prices in the early 1980s worsened the terms of trade of Malaysia 
and the Philippines. Between the years 1971-1973 and 1982-1984, the terns of trade 
on average deteriorated by 
-2.02% per annum in Malaysia and -0.65% per annum in 
the Philippines. Thailand's terms of trade improved and recorded an average annual 
growth of 2.9%. 
Supply problems, such as had harvest (on sugar cane plantations), prevented the 
Philippines expanding its exports volume (Naya S, 1984); instead it registered an 
annual average growth of 
-0.96% between 1971-1973 and 1982-1984; when 
commodity prices were higher due to high demand. Correspondingly, the world 
demand for primary products slowed in the late 1970s and early 1980s causing 
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commodity prices to fall. The volume of exports and terms of trade effects have 
resulted in the reduction of purchasing power of exports by 1.61 % in the Philippines, 
but the reduction in imports fell slightly short of the reduction in the purchasing power 
of exports (a decrease of 1.13%). South Korea registered the highest export volume 
of 10.6%, hence achieving a very high increase in purchasing power of exports of 
10.8% (despite very low terms of trade), which exceeded the import growth by 3.21yv. 
Thailand's import volumes have higher than the purchasing power of exports by 
2.3%. 
1.4.3 Size and Composition of Debt 
The size and composition of debt of the sub-Saharan region can be seen in Table I. 14 
below. Between 1970 and 1980, their external debt rose by over 21 %a year 
- 
more 
rapid than in Latin America. 
Table I. 14" Debt Figures for Low-Income Africa* US $ hn 
1970 1974 1975 1979 1990 1981 1985 1986 1987 
't'otal debts 4. I 9.0 11.0 29.4 33.1 36.9 51.1 59.4 69.6 
Long-term debts 4.0 8.6 10.4 23.4 27.3 29.9 41.6 48.7 57.9 
Puhlic &Puhl. guaranteed 3.8 9.1 9.8 22.5 26.1 29.9 40.6 47.7 56.7 
Private non-guaranteed 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.0 I 
.0 1.0 1.2 Use of IMF credits 0. I 0.3 0,6 1.3 1.8 2.7 4.7 5.0 5.3 
Short-term debt 
- 
na na 3.6 4.0 4.2 5.4 5.6 6.3 
I)cht Service ratio 
- 
5.7 8.0 11.4 12.6 12.0 12.2 18.6 18.6 
Dcht service payment 0.3 
- 
0.9 
- - 
1.2 1.9 2.5 2. A 
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Debt 'Fahles, various issues. 
*Countries included are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Ethiopia, Ghana, (lamhia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Zaire and Zambia. 
The table indicates a substantial increase both in the stock of sub-Saharan debt and in 
the debt-service levels since 1970. Total external debt has grown from US$ 4. I hn in 
1970 to more than US$ 59 bn in 1986, more than a 140% increase. Over the same 
period their real Gross Domestic Product per capita has fallen by about 10% 
(International Financial Statistics, 1987/88). Total debt service payments on long term 
external debt for these countries are estimated to have grown fron US$ 0.3 bn in 
1970 to US$ 2.5 hn in 1986. The rise in total payments represents an increase in the 
debt service ratio from 5.7%, in 1970 to 18.6 % in 1986. 
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The African countries qualify for a very limited amount from commercial hank 
lending, hence the sources of finance are mostly official and concessional (World 
Debt Tables 1987/1988). Net flows from the World Bank, IDA and IMF credits can 
be seen in Table 1.15 below. 
'fahle I. 15: Net flows cif' World Bank /IDNIMF Credit to suh-Saharan 
Africa 1978-1979 to 1981-1982 (in nins of SDRs) 
Source of credit 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
World Bank 355 285 
-239 236 
IDA 230 304 227 614 
IMF 
-131 350 591 1667 
Sim': Annual Report of the World Bank and IMF. 
Table 1.16 shows that the accumulated current account deficits in 1970 to 1980 
almost fit the amount of net debt at the end of 1980 in all countries except Mexico, 
Argentina and Venezuela. The latter three countries have their accumulated debt at the 
end of 1980 substantially higher than the current account deficits between 1970-1980. 
This may reflect an already significant net debt in 1970. A comparison between 
column (5) and column (6) in Table 1.16 shows the contrast between Argentina, 
Mexico and Venezuela and the rest of the region. 
For most countries, the accumulated current account deficits between 1970 to 1984 
were higher than the increase in gross debt at the end of 1984. For Argentina, 
Mexico, and Venezuela, the opposite is the case, by a large margin. The gap between 
gross debt and accumulated current account deficits suggest very large private capital 
outflows 
-the gap is about US$ 132 bn. During the same period, Brazil recorded a 
debt amount of US$ 10 1.8 hn, the largest amount among all other countries. Diaz 
Alejandro (1981) suggested that the growth of debt is accompanied by the 
accumulation of private assets abroad after 1976. In 1981 to 1984, net factor 
payments by Brazil and Mexico represented 44% of their total gross debt at the end of 
1984. Diaz-Alejandro (1981), deduced that debt accumulation had partly become 
capital flight. 
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'fahle I I6" Accumulated Current Account Deficits and Total Debt Figures 
(Latin America. US $ bn). 
Accumulated 
current a/ 
dclicits 
1970-1990 
Net debt, 
und of 1980 
Accumulated 
current a/c 
deficits 
1981-1984 
Increase in 
gross debt, 
end 1980 to 
end of 1994 
(I)pIus (3) Gross (Icbt 
at the end of 
1984 
Argentina 2.93 17.97 11.65 20.84 14.59 48.00 
Mexico 33.66 45.17 10.53 46.55 44.19 95.90 
Venezuela 
-5.32 13.15 -7.18 7.49 -12.50 34.00 
Sub Total 31.27 76.9 15.00 74.98 46.27 177.90 
Bolivia 1.14 1.67 1.04 1.67 2.19 3.20 
Brazil 63.00 61.48 35.47 33.45 99.47 101.80 
Colombia 0.37 AT 9.79 4.52 10.16 10.80 
Costa Rica 2.90 2.99 1.36 0.87 4.26 4.05 
C'hilc 6.63 6.96 10.22 7.36 16.85 18.44 
Dominican R 2.31 1.56 1.56 I. 0 1 3.87 2.85 
Fcuudor 3.06 3.40 2.67 2.21 5.73 6.80 
1: 1 Salvador 0.5I 0.79 1.1 1 1.12 1.63 2.30 
Guatemala 0.99 0.30 1.41 0.86 2.39 1.91 
Haiti 0.54 0.26 0.86 0.31 1.40 0.60 
Honduras 1.35 1.35 1.07 0.74 2.43 2.25 
Nicaragua 1.31 1.51 2.13 2.32 3.44 3.90 
Panama 2.20 2.09 1.77 1.34 3.97 3.55 
Paraguay 0.96 0.08 1.29 0.70 2.25 1.56 
Peru 4.49 6.79 5.70 3.91 10.19 13.50 
Uruguay 1.86 
-0.25 0.82 2.54 2.69 4.70 
Sul) Total 93.62 90.78 78.27 64.93 171.92 182.27 
Source: Alejandro C. D., "Thc Dcvclopmcnt Crisis In Latin America", in 
I'Ii rrp and Whitehead, Latin American I)eht and The Adjustment Crisis, I9X7. 
Table 1.17 shows the accumulated current account deficits and debt at the end of 
1974,1980 and 1985 for the ASEAN countries. The table shows that, between 1970 
to 1974, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia appear to have used debt to 
finance the current account deficits. The Philippines and South Korea recorded 
surpluses, yet debt accumulation was far in excess of the amount of surplus, which 
implies capital flight or accumulation of private assets abroad. Between 1975 to 
1980, Malaysia and South Korea accumulated current account surpluses and debts at 
the same time. Debt was partly used to finance international reserves (as indicated by 
an increase in reserves in the International Financial Statistics Yearbook, I988), and 
partly presumably goes to purchases of foreign assets or capital flight. 
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Table I. 17: Accumulated Current Account Balancc and Total Debt For 
the Years 1970-1974 1975-I990 and 1981-I985 (US$ non) 
Accumulated 
CA. Bal 
1970-74 
Debt at end 
1974 
Accumulated 
CA. Bal 
1975-8O 
Debt at end 
1980 
Accumulated 
CA. Bal 
1991-95 
Debt at end 
1985 
Malaysia 
-796 11 19 1272 7198 -1 1949 
21150 
Philippines 22O 2465 
-7271 1739O -9295 2619O 
Singapore 
-3331 788 -4198 2071 -3766 
3406 
'Ilhailand 
-610 1161 -7464 8258 -1O143 17528 
Indonesia 
-894 9287 -1458 20888 -16007 35999 
S. Kurca 2366 5116 2659 29490 
-11161 47159 
So : Calculated from World Debt Tables I988/99. 
Between 1981 to 1995, all countries recorded deficits with substantial debt 
accumulation by South Korea and Indonesia. It seems that Malaysia and Thailand had 
quite it late entry in the International Financial market because debt stock as at the end 
of 1974 (and late 1970~) are very low compared to the other countries in the region. 
Only in 1980 onwards that debt started to accumulate in these two countries. 
1.4.4 Debt and Non-Debt Creating Flows Financing Deficit 
The role of debt and non-debt creating flows in financing the current account deficits 
of the three different regions can he seen by looking at the flow figures in Table 
t 
. 
19. In 1981 in sub-Saharan Africa, half of the current account deficits of US$ 12.3 
bn was financed by debt creating flows and the other half by international reserves. 
Such high reserves financing was actually recorded by Nigeria because more than half 
of the current account deficits shown belong to Nigeria. The other low income sub- 
Saharan African countries had about US$ 6 hn current account deficit which was 
financed mainly by long term debt. 
In 1982, the debt creating flows decreased by 30% to US$ 4.1 bn while the size of 
current account deficits remained the same as the previous year. International reserves 
and debt creating flows each financed about one-third of the current account deficits. 
Inadequate funds of about another one-third is reflected in the residual section 
Table 1 18a Financing the Current Account Deficits By Debt and Non-Debt 
Creating Flows 1981-196) (Flow Figures) 
198 1 19S2 19S3 1994 1985 1986 
_1 
198 1-86 "1 O"h. 
Cuncnt At count l)alancc - ý'- - - - 
Soulltcast Asta 
-9175 14381 - 16015 -720-1 -4193 -2464 - 
83492 
Africa 
-123519 1 , 15.16 -7713 -1557 
1486 
-2143 3.494"_' 
Latin Anlctlca 
-386(, 11 zi71? 7 33 2110 -1014 13417 951,11 
DchtCIC-Aunp I-lows 
Southcast Asia 10285 I 1115 2 08 5001 10561 15513 6309 J 
Africa 5913 4108 61 15 1957 9466 18-595 461"4 
Latin Atncnca 47814 34863 24810 162-38 9331 159,70 148026 
of which: " 
a) Long Icon 10.1118 
- 
Soutllcaýt Asia 6.153 9624 9597 4377 11864 18056 59990 
Africa 3510 4771 4034 8.20 9826 16925 39886" 
Latin America 31124 27508 50019 23982 11551 27261 171445 
b) lit-c of IM1- crcdjL% 
" 
Suut1tc:, st A, la lISt) 7h 818 -405 17 77 1177 
Attica 1163 724 8.17 202 784 1 18 3838 
LatinAtncrica 103 1206 56)7 2729 2854 1833 14329 
c)Shon icon loans - 
Sou0icastA: sia 2983 3604 -1810 1029 -1320 -2520 
191,0 
Africa 1240 
- 
1387 1234 935 
-1 144 1552 34±0 
LatinAmcrica 16587 6149 
-3(1816 -10473 -5071 -13134 -36748 
Non-Dcbt crcating flows 
- 
- 
- 
Snuthcast Asia 4710 5284 4935 3632 3363 2492 33.116 
Africa 736 774 623 330 494 485 344' 
Latut Anurica 9-197 8820 3059 2258 2244 1997 27875 
Total (6angc in Rcscrvcs 
- 
minus 61g111ncans Irllrcasc) 
- 
Suuthca"t Asia 
-2U8ß? 960 -70 -5246 -1448 -? 
58 K 146 
Africa 62106 3965 1962 31 
-1152 -1070 I(1' it, 
Latin A, t, ci ica 
-1 1-783 3558 -7598 3291 4329 
141 39 
hcstduals " 
- 
Southca"-t Asia 3737 5015 
-7564 -3679 8283 
12691 
Aft t, a II 1() 9T7 ri'ýt) 7-ib 10353 1" /-I-/ 
i"1 
. 
'tl 
l atni Ait cris 
.. 
1,1 I-I It, I-IS 
-1, 
l 16 1 t(ýOK 13854 t hh l >661u 
Source: Calculated from World [: )cht'fablcs 1988/89 and International Financial Statistics, 1988. 
The bulk of the residuals consist of net errors and omission, very small constitute valuation changes. 
Table 1.18b: Financing the Current Account Deficits By Debt and Non-Debt Creating Flows 
(1981-1986) for the ASEAN Countrics(Flow Figures) 
T 1981 1982 1983 19x4 1985 1986 1981 86 Total 1989 
Current Account Balance 
Malaysia 
-2485 -3603 -3498 -1672 -734 - 795 -12287 -2022 Philippines 
-2125 -3213 -2754 -1257 26 1017 
-8358 -2236 Singapore 
-1378 -12()6 -579 -366 -14 478 4021 
- ThailLmd 
-2574 -1022 -2887 -2107 -1554 226 -9918 -4153 
Indonesia 
-613 -5337 -6297 -1862 -1865 -3895 -19869 - 
Debt Creating Flows 
Malaysia 2346 4072 3280 1352 2020 1731 14801 
-2280 Philippines 3360 3549 
-175 235 1831 2664 11464 
-515 Singapore 192 366 174 487 318 469 2006 
- 
Thailand 2552 1338 1669 1113 2904 1022 10598 1768 
Indonesia 1835 3777 3638 1814 4.47 7040 
, 
22151 2079 
of which : a) Long term loans 
Malaysia 2125 4019 3224 1424 2160 1849 14801 
-2967 
Philippines 1390 1770) 1637 332 2455 5738 13322 
-686 Singapore 148 342 185 537 264 463 1939 
- 
Thailand 1453 1229 1200 983 2669 1414 8948 845 
Indonesia 1336 2264 3341 1101 4518 6006 18566 
- b) Use of IMF credits 
Malaysia 221 53 56 
-72 -140 -118 0 0 
Philippines 105 
-125 109 
-185 295 121 320 84 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
- Thailand 524 4 205 
-1 16 -1 16 -32 577 
-389 Indonesia 0 0 445 
-32 -367 5 51 
c)Short term loans 
Malaysia 0000000 678 
Philippines 1865, 1904 
-1921 88 -919 -3195 -2178 88 
Sin a )re 44 24 
-l1 -50 54 6 67 
- Thailand 575 163 264 246 
-351 -360 537 1312 
Indonesia 499 1513 
-148 745 -104 1029, 3534 
- Non-Debt creating flows 
Malaysia 2396 3201 2671 1800 1030 1153 12251 1161 
Philippines 175 17 112 6 17 140 467 50 
Sin ga arc 1627 1269 1036 1059 984 441 6416 
Thailand 332 
-57 456 555 1057 232 2889 1733 
Indonesia 180 540 660 212 275 526 2393 
Total change in reserves (minus sign means increase) 
Malaysia 129 195 
-141 -591 -686 -436 -1540 1926 
Philippines 
-318 479 1561 442 283 
-1332 231 229 
Singapore 
-1579 -1327 -1242 -1882 -1086 1311 
-5805 Thailand 
Indonesia 
-141 
-177 
11 
1612 
89 
-337 
-571 
-1822 
35 
6 
-627 
826 
-1204 
108 
3396 
Residuals 
Malaysia 2386 3855 2312 889 1630 2153 13225 
Philippines 1092 832 
-1256 
-1458 2105 2489 3804 
Singapore 
-1335 -898 
-611 -642 0 0 
-3486 Thailand 169 634 
-673 -1010 2085 853 2058 
- Indonesia 1225 592 
-2336 -1658 2463 4497 4783 
- 
So r "c: Calculated from World Debt Tables and International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
The bulk of the residuals consist of net errors and omission, very small constitute valuation changes. 
CHAPTER 2: DEBT AND DEFICITS ACCUMULATION IN ASEAN 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1 
With the Latin American debt crisis the world system of development finance nearly 
collapsed in the 1980s. Although the world has stepped back from the brink the debt 
problem lingers on. Consequently the overall financial picture of the developing 
world is rather discouraging. Ever since then, a developing country-wide structural 
adjustment programme has been enforced by the World Bank. Within this picture, 
the ASEAN I region has appeared to be less affected by the debt crisis, but illiquidity 
persists and structural adjustments are enforced. The changing mood among the 
developed countries since the 1980s has also resulted in reduced commitments in 
both trade and finance with the developing countries. Though the fear had been that 
ASEAN might also fall into a vicious circle of slow growth and increasing debt, 
despite such concerns, ASEAN does offer a successful model compared to its Latin 
American counterpart, but the ray of hope is that the region should soon become an 
active centre of economic co-operation within the context of 'NICdom' and fulfil its 
existence. 
Until the mid-1980s, the ASEAN countries continued to pursue an aggressive policy 
of developing their domestic economies and of financing trade deficits generated by 
developing foreign borrowing. Since then, the policy of economic development that 
relied excessively on foreign capital has been switched to stable growth aiming at 
price stability, the reduction of current account deficits and the improvement of 
external balances. Sustainable debt and deficits greatly depends on their ability to 
utilise borrowings effectively to strengthen their economic bases. The effect of the 
policy switch manifested itself at the end of 1980s. Improvements in prices, balance 
of payments and other areas of economic performance have resulted in less demand 
for foreign borrowings but at the same time an increase in the relative importance of 
private external financing in the form of investment. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Firstly; we provide an overview of debt 
accumulation of ASEAN. We then decompose the net increase in debt and provide 
an analysis of the demand for foreign finance and the movements between debt and 
deficits. We then estimate the demand for long-term foreign finance since this 
constitutes the major portion of foreign finance. How the ASEAN countries 
financed their debt or deficit between 1977 and early 1990s is presented. This 
crosses the critical period of the 1980s during which they had to decide whether to 
borrow more in order to cushion themselves against external economic shocks, or to 
resort to adjustment policies that would dampen both their economic development 
and their demand for foreign finance. It is expected that there is a changing pattern 
of demand for and supply of foreign finance in the ASEAN countries in the late 
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1980s due to adjustments and reforms undertaken. We also estimate the supply of 
foreign finance and determine its general trend. We briefly give an overview of the 
how the ASEAN countries financed their government budget balance as well as a 
brief overview of the suppliers of finance in the region. 
To judge the performance of each ASEAN country in controlling debt and attracting 
foreign finance, each element of debt and finance can be analysed using the 
decomposition framework of our modified "absorption approach". Three equations 
shown in the text are important to show the factors that compose a net change in 
debt; the break-down of demand for long-term finance and the supply of long term 
finance. 
Since the 1970s, the ASEAN countries achieved generally impressive economic 
performances, despite rising oil prices, high inflation, mounting interest rates, world- 
wide recession, and rising protectionism. With the exception of the Philippines and 
certain unusual years, most ASEAN countries sustained growth rates of about 5 to 
10 %, as shown in Table 1.1. Between 1985-87 however, many of them have either 
negative or very low growth rates due to recession, except S. Korea. ASEAN also 
suffered deficits in their trade and current accounts, leading to substantial increases 
in their external debt. 
Table 1.1: Growth Rates of real GDP of ASEAN Countries 
Year S. Korea S' ore M'sia Thai Indo Phil 
1975-79 9.7 7.5 7.2 7.8 6.9 6.6 
1980 
-3.0 10.3 7.8 5.8 9.9 4.9 
1981 6.9 9.9 7.1 6.3 7.9 3.8 
1982 5.5 6.3 5.6 4.1 2.2 3.0 
1983 9.3 7.9 5.9 5.8 4.2 1.0 
1984 8.6 8.2 7.8 5.5 6.1 
-6.0 
1985 5.4 
-1.8 -1.0 3.2 1.9 
-4.4 
1986 11.9 1.8 1.2 3.4 3.1 1.1 
1987 12.1 8.0 2.0 6.1 3.2 4.9 
1988 
- 
11.1 8.9 13.2 5.7 6.4 
1989 
- 
9.2 9.2 12.0 7.4 5.9 
1990 
- 
8.3 9.7 10.0 7.3 2.4 
1991 
- 
6.7 8.7 7.5 6.5 
-1.0 
1992 
- 
5.5 8.5 6.5 5.5 2.8 
Source: Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, various eds. 
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Most of these countries attempted to deal with the problems of deficits and debt by 
adjusting their development policies in the period around 1980. Adjustment policies 
include the slowing down of active development plans which narrowed the 
investment-savings gap, the fiscal gap and, accordingly, the current account deficit. 
In order not to increase their future debt repayment burden, some countries also 
reduced their exchange reserves and tried to attract various non-debt finances. 
In general, the main forms of structural adjustments in the ASEAN economies are: 
more aggressive export promotion, import liberalization, exchange rate mechanisms 
and financial sector reforms (mentioned in section 2.1.1), gradually taking effect 
ever since the global debt crisis. In export promotion, the move is towards 
diversification of exports in the manufacturing sector and giving more importance to 
the private sector's role in industrialization. This is especially true in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia, for example, there has been less reliance on 
oil and natural gas as the main source of export revenue at the end of 1980s and 
increasing manufacturing export revenues. Malaysia's aggressive privatisation and 
industrialisation policies since mid-1980s diversified its exports base from 
petroleum and commodity exports to exports of manufactured goods. 
In the import liberalization context, all ASEAN countries have acceded to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 1982 and have participated 
constructively to improve the multilateral trading system. In Thailand, for 
example, a major programme on tariff reduction was implemented in 1982 at a time 
when tariffs were an important source of government revenue. However, due to 
persistent budget deficits, tariffs were increased again in 1985 by 5 percentage 
points for raw materials and 10 percentage points for manufactured goods. As a 
result, effective tariff protection to the manufacturing sector increased sharply. 
Since 1988, when the government budget has been in surplus, applied tariffs on 
many items have been reduced. The average applied tariff was reduced from 13 % 
in 1986 to 11.4 % in 1990. Some import bans were also lifted (Thailand: GATT 
Trade Policy Review, 1993). 
Pertaining to exchange rate management, Thailand underwent an appreciation of the 
nominal effective exchange rate in the early 1980s. Consequently, the Thai bäht 
was devalued in November 1984 by 15% against the U. S. dollar and since then 
Thailand has switched to a more flexible exchange rate regime. The depreciation 
lasted until 1988. As a whole, in the 1980s, the nominal effective exchange rate 
depreciated by about 26%. The real effective exchange rate had a bigger fall due to 
relatively low inflation. The depreciation has contributed to price competitiveness of 
Thai's exports in the late 1980s. In the Philippines, the peso had been floating since 
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the 1970s. In 1983 to 1985, it depreciated against the U. S. dollar as a consequence 
of the balance of payments crisis. It appreciated sharply against the U. S. dollar in 
1991 and continued on until 1992. Since 1984, the exchange rate has been 
determined freely in the foreign exchange market. Exchange rate management, it 
has been claimed, has failed to support its trade policy reforms (The Philippines: 
GATT Trade Policy Review, 1993). The details of the exchange rate management for 
each ASEAN country will be discussed in chapter seven. 
Deregulation of the financial sector is further enhanced, for example in Thailand, 
with the launching of offshore banking facilities in early 1990, the Bangkok 
International Banking Facility (BIBF) which will make Thailand as the financial 
centre of Indo-China and eventually compete with Singapore and Hong Kong as a 
regional banking centre. In the Philippines, illquidity is still a big problem 
- 
IMF 
standby facility of US $ 800 million is secured due to shortfall in government 
revenues. Infrastructure projects for the purpose of facilitating export-oriented 
growth is the main concern. In Malaysia, privatisation policies lead to a financial 
deepening in the capital market with new share issues and other instruments in the 
stock exchange. 
The East Asian NICs and the other ASEAN countries succeeded in attracting foreign 
direct investments in the later years of the 1980s. Capital flight, a serious problem 
in Latin American countries, was of relatively little concern in most of the ASEAN 
countries because of comparatively low inflation rates and overall economic 
stability. The interesting question, however, is how were these ASEAN economies 
able to weather the seemingly cataclysmic storm of the early 1980s while their 
Latin American counterparts were nearly destroyed. 
2.1.1 Why ASEAN? 
Whilst there is a substantial literature on the Latin American debt in the mid-to-late 
1980s, no study has been done on the debt and deficits situation in ASEAN even 
though the situation in ASEAN is no different in terms of debt and deficits 
incurred. The only difference is that debt is perhaps more controllable. Recollect, 
(see Chapter 1) for example, that South Korea ranked fourth in the category of the 
world's heavily indebted developing countries in 1985 
- 
after Brazil, Mexico and 
Argentina. The situation is not much different in the other ASEAN countries where 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are among the top ten in the list of heavily 
indebted developing countries in 1985 (and probably Malaysia as well, had short- 
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term loans been reported for that year). Illiquidity was persistent and as a response 
to the debt burden of the early 1980s, the ASEAN countries resorted to a more 
diverse structural adjustments in the real and financial sector thereafter. The 
existence of the Plaza Agreement in 1985 facilitated development in the industrial 
and trading structures of the economies. As a consequence, such developments have 
led to significant changes in the financial structure, notably the accumulation of 
financial assets in the private sector, an expanded volume of financial transactions, 
and changes in the flow of fund patterns. The recent tide of financial reform in 
ASEAN is an effort to overcome the deficiencies in the traditional financial system 
which lacks responsiveness to interest rates. Financial reform cover a wide spectrum 
of changes in the financial system such as interest rate deregulation; stimulating 
competition among financial institutions; fostering capital markets; exchange rate 
adjustments and the relaxation of foreign exchange control; the contraction of 
informal finance; and, the improved supervision and regulation of financial 
institutions. Taking a country specific example, Thailand, being an importer of oil, 
was very much affected by the oil-price hike of 1979. Adverse economic conditions 
persisted. Stabilisation policies took effect immediately. Fiscal and monetary 
disciplines were imposed, large devaluation took effect in 1984 to promote export, 
policy of enhancing competitiveness (rather than protection) and enhancing 
enterprises were given priority. However, the decline in interest rates and oil prices 
in 1985 and an increase in some commodities' prices helped Thailand's economy to 
recuperate. 
The lack of concern about debt and deficits in ASEAN leads us to question whether 
there is a profitable use of debt in ASEAN? If so, then the question of profitable 
loanable funds are neglected and that the world has focused too much on the debt 
crisis! After all, the U. K. was a very large debtor nation in the 1930 but eventually, 
consistent with economic development, became a creditor nation in 1940 
(Eichengreen 1986). The challenge is then to turn debt as a cost to debt that 
brings in profit! This necessitates the linkage between debt, deficits and the growth 
of output to be examined carefully to understand the said process. Could ASEAN 
then, synchronize its movements from being major debtor countries to major creditor 
countries simultaneously along with its movement towards 'NlCdom' or towards a 
'high-growth' region 
- 
this question should be of major concern. 
2.2 The Demand for Foreign Finance: Deficits and Debt Creation 
The amount demanded for foreign finance reflects the size of the external gap or 
the current account deficits. The means of financing the deficit can be of debt or non- 
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debt creating flows, whereby non-debt creating flows are exogenously determined. 
A country has a control over the amount of debt it demands, hence, endogenously 
determined, but whether the demand is fully fulfilled depends on the amount 
creditors are willing to supply. 
In this section, we match, ex post, the net change in debt and deficits annually. 
Specifically, we look at the change in net debt as the amount of financing needed 
less the financing already available, as will be shown in sub-section 2.2.2. The 
exercise shows either debt and deficits matches, or debt could be greater than 
deficits in some years and lesser in other years. The current account deficits is also 
shown in relation to of the fiscal and private sector deficits. In the next sub-section, 
we provide an overview of the ASEAN debt accumulation since early 1980s. 
2.2.1 Overview of the External Debt Situation 
As the demand for foreign funds increased the absolute amount of the external debt 
of ASEAN countries grew substantially, reaching a significantly large amount 
around 1980. The figures are shown in Table 2.2. In highlighting the important 
features of Table 2.2, consider the year 1982 when the debt crisis first started. The 
ASEAN debt is significantly large, in absolute terms, ranging from US$ 12 bn to 
US$ 37 bn (excluding Singapore which has very little debt and Malaysia where 
figures do not include short-term loans). These figures, in comparison to the Latin 
American standards are not really large (see Table 2.2a) but the debt to GNP ratio, 
as shown in Table 2.3, ranges from 30 to 60 %, an indication of illiquidity 
persisting. 
Table 2.2: External Debt Stock of ASEAN (US $ mn) 
Year S. Korea S' ore M'sia Thai Indo P' pines 
1978 17314 1377 3356 5029 17976 10817 
1979 22886 1730 4024 6625 18526 13307 
1980 29480 2071 5198 8258 20888 17390 
1981 32989 2263 7323 10809 22723 20750 
1982 37329 2629 11343 12198 26500 24299 
1983 40419 2803 14566 338 88 30138 24124 
1984 42098 3290 15991 14981 31952 24358 
1985 47159 3406 18150 17528 35999 26190 
1986 46728 3875 19999 18549 43039 28853 
1987 40459 4491 21675 20710 49738 29962 
1988 35716 na 18567 21664 51415 29023 
1989 32799 na 16278 23432 53494 28508 
1990 34988 na 16063 28208 67011 30424 
1991 39634 na 17780 35828 76110 32224 
1992 42999 na 19837 39424 84385 32589 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues. 
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One year after the debt crisis, in 1983-84, debt increases were dramatic, ranging 
from over 30 % to 45 % respectively. The external debt in absolute terms at the 
end of 1985 is as follows; S. Korea had US$ 47 bn, followed by Indonesia (US$ 36 
bn), the Philippines (US$ 26 bn ), Malaysia (US$ 18 bn) and Thailand (US$ 17 bn ). 
In the world context, the S. Korean debt represented about half that of the 
Mexican or Brazilian debt stock (refer to Table 2.2a). Although the absolute 
amounts were smaller than those of the seriously debt-ridden countries of Latin 
America, the ratios of external debt to GNP ranged from over 36 to 77 %. 
Table 2.2a: External Debt Stock of Latin American Countries (US$ min) 
Year Mexico Brazil Argentina Venezuela 
1980 57378 71012 27157 29344 
1981 92966 98269 
- - 
1982 94822 105254 
- - 
1983 96867 105966 
- - 
1984 100881 113550 
- - 
1985 109460 123121 50946 35334 
1986 100881 113705 52450 34340 
1987 109460 123837 58458 34570 
1988 99204 115711 58741 34738 
1989 93817 111374 65257 32377 
1990 105958 116417 62233 33170 
1991 115291 117350 65397 34046 
1992 113378 121110 67569 37193 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues. 
By 1987, debt stock did not ease in all ASEAN but increased as compared to 
1983. In fact, debt to GNP ratio surged to over 70 % in Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, whereas, South Korea noted a slight decline in the ratio. Table 2.3 also 
shows (with the exception of the Philippines) both the ratios of total debt service to 
exports and total external debt to exports were smaller than the debt-riddened Latin 
American countries. 
In the Philippines and South Korea in the early to mid-1980s, the ratio of short term 
debt to total debt was high 
- 
ranging from above 25 to over 40 %, reflecting 
illiquidity position, hence, short-term loans were needed to service the long-term 
loans. The ratio of concessional debt to long term debt decreased from more than 
30 % in 1975 to about 10 % in 1984 in ASEAN as a group. 
With regard to debt-service ratio, they are comparatively low on average as 
compared to the Latin American countries. On the average it was about 13 % in 
1982 but increased to an average of about 20 % in 1987. The highest debt-service 
Table 2.3: Debt Inr1ir: ºtnrr. fir A cF e NJ 
Coutry Year ED/GNP DSR UX ED/X SD/TD 
S. Korea 1979 
- 
1980 48.8 12.3 5.7 130.6 35.8 
1981 4.9 12.9 6.1 121.0 30.9 
1982 53.8 13.6 6.8 131.6 33.3 
1983 53.2 13.8 6.2 133.0 29.9 
1984 51.1 13.6 6.0 125.1 27.1 
1985 56.3 15.3 6.4 142.4 22.7 
1986 49.1 16.9 5.4 111.4 19.8 
1987 34.3 21.9 3.3 71.9 22.9 
1988 20.7 14.8 4.2 50.5 27.4 
1989 15.5 11.8 3.8 44.3 29.9 
1990 14.4 10.7 3.4 45.2 30.9 
1991 14.1 7.1 3.1 46.6 28.3 
1992 14.6 7.4 3.0 47.1 27.7 
Singapore 1980 18.3 1.0 0.4 8.2 10.7 
1981 17.0 0.8 0.4 7.7 10.8 
1982 17.8 0.8 0.4 8.7 10.2 
1983 16.2 1.3 0.4 9.0 9.2 
1984 17.2 1.0 0.4 10.3 6.3 
1985 18.6 2.4 0.5 11.5 7.6 
1986 21.3 1.4 0.6 13.1 6.9 
1987 21.9 1.4 0.5 12.1 7.3 
1988 na na na na na 1989 na na na na na 1990 na na na na na 
1991 na na na na na 1992 na na na na na 
Malaysia 1979 
1980 27.8 2.5 1.7 44.2 20.7 
1981 37.9 3.5 2.5 66.0 17.7 
1982 52.2 5.6 3.8 93.3 12.9 
1983 63.8 6.4 4.3 110.5 16.9 
1984 59.3 8.5 5.6 111 13.5 
1985 72.3 30.4 9.0 114 12.8 
1986 87.8 21.8 9.3 135.2 12.8 
1987 77.1 21.2 7.9 108.8 10.3 
1988 56.7 24.8 6.7 75.9 8.6 
1989 45,6 15.0 4.6 56.4 14.0 
1990 39.3 10.3 3.5 46.2 11.9 
1991 39.6 7.6 3.1 44.5 11.7 
1992 36.1 6.6 2.4 42.3 18.3 
Thailand 1979 
- 
1980 25.9 5.0 3.1 96.3 
- 1981 31.5 6.8 4.3 116.8 26.6 
1982 34.8 8.5 5.2 129.7 24.9 
1983 35.3 10.2 5.7 150.3 23.8 
1984 36.8 12.0 5.4 143.8 23.7 
1985 47.8 31.9 13.3 171.4 18.3 
1986 45.3 30.1 11.0 153.2 15.3 
1987 44.2 22.0 8.4 128.8 13.1 
1988 35.7 20.2 7.1 99.7 22.2 
1989 32.9 16.3 6.0 87.2 26.1 
1990 33.5 17.0 6.5 90.2 29.5 
1991 37.0 13.1 7.0 94.9 34.9 
1992 36.3 
- 
- - 
37.4 
Coutry Year ED/GNP DSR I/X ED/X SDITD 
Indonesia 1979 
- - - - - 
1980 27.9 7.9 3.7 94.1 13.3 
1981 25.4 8.2 4.0 91.3 13.3 
1982 29.4 10.6 5.4 124.6 18.1 
1983 39.0 12.8 6.3 151.6 15.4 
1984 39.5 14.6 7.3 143.9 16.9 
1985 44.1 19.8 8.1 178.2 14.7 
1986 60.2 27.3 12.7 268.3 14.7 
1987 79.7 27.9 12.0 270.2 12.3 
1988 64.1 40.2 15.6 239 7.9 
1989 59.5 35.4 13.9 209 9.9 
1990 66.4 31.0 12.5 224 16.7 
1991 69.0 32.6 13.1 231 18.9 
1992 67.4 32.1 11.7 231 21.6 
P' ines 1979 
- - - 
1980 49.4 7.1 4.5 212.0 43.4 
1981 54.0 9.7 5.9 234.8 43.4 
1982 61.9 12.3 6.4 294.8 46.6 
1983 70.8 14.4 7.9 290.2 38.9 
1984 77.1 13.7 9.7 301.6 38.9 
1985 81.9 31.6 9.9 326.2 32.7 
1986 95.0 33.6 18.7 328.0 18.6 
1987 91.1 35.7 19.5 317.8 16.5 
1988 77.0 30.8 18.2 262 13.3 
1989 67.8 25.5 16.9 223 13.9 
1990 68.8 27.0 13.3 229 14.5 
1991 70.4 23.0 10.9 218 15.3 
1992 60.7 27.7 8.3 185 13.7 
Mexico 1979 
- - - - - 
1980 30.5 49.5 27.4 259 28.2 
1981 
- - - - - 
1982 
- - 
1983 66.6 51.7 34.8 324 10.9 
1984 57.3 52.1 34.7 291 6.8 
1985 55.2 51.5 34.4 326 5.6 
1986 82.9 54.2 35.1 423 5.8 
1987 82.1 40.1 27.7 363 5.3 
1988 60.3 48.0 27.0 308 7.9 
1989 47.3 41.3 24.7 249 9.2 
1990 44.8 26.3 17.1 243 15.2 
1991 41.2 30.2 18.4 254 19.0 
1992 35.2 44.4 16.3 243 21.6 
Brazil 1979 
- 
- - 
1980 31.3 63.1 33.7 305 19.1 
1981 
- - - 
1982 
- - - 
1983 50.6 55.1 39.8 403.7 14.6 
1984 52.3 46.3 31.3 348.4 10.6 
1985 50.3 38.6 31.5 362 9.1 
1986 44.4 47.0 31.4 452 8.5 
1987 43.8 41.9 26.3 431 11.0 
1988 36.5 48.1 36.0 314 9.4 
1989 25.6 39.9 14.7 287 16.7 
1990 24.9 24.2 6.6 320 20.8 
1991 29.7 24.4 9.8 327 23.0 
1992 31.3 24.4 9.7 311 17.4 
2.8 
Country Year ED/GNP DSR I/X ED/X SD/TD 
Argentina 1980 35.6 37.3 20.8 242 38.2 
1981 
- - - - 
1982 
- - - - 
1983 
- - - - 
1984 
- - - 
1985 61.1 58.9 49.1 493 13.2 
1986 51.9 76.2 48.7 593 8.4 
1987 56.3 74.3 48.3 695 6.0 
1988 48.4 44.2 27.3 517 9.7 
1989 92.9 36.2 17.7 542 13.1 
1990 46.0 40.8 18.0 412 16.8 
1991 35.6 37.6 19.8 443 20.7 
1992 30.1 34.9 19.0 453 23.9 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues. 
Note: 
ED 
= external debt 
DSR 
= 
debt service ratio 
I/X 
= 
interest payments over exports 
ED/X 
= external debt over exports 
SD/TD= short term debt over total debt 
ratio being that of Indonesia reaching 28 % in 1987. As for the Latin America, 
debt service ratio averaged about 30% in 1980 and increased to an average of 60% 
in 1987. 
The ratio of interest payments to exports averaged about 6% in 1983 in ASEAN 
as a whole, but rose to about over 12 % in Indonesia and the Philippines in the late 
1980s. In Latin America, it was 20% in 1980 and rose to about 35% in 1987, on 
average. 
The Philippines' external debt stabilized in 1983, but only as a consequence of a 
unilateral declaration of moratorium on debt service payments. Borrowings from 
international banks did not increase. Debt service became unsustainable and 
rescheduling took place in that year. 
The external debt burden was very high in 1984, debt service was 14 %, interest to 
exports ratio was 9.5 % and the outstanding debt was three times the level of annual 
export earnings and nearly 8% of GNP. More than 30 % of the debt is short term 
and 90 % of the long term borrowing is on non-concessional terms. Negotiating 
relief on the Philippines' debt was inevitable and necessary for economic recovery. 
In short, when interest rates hit historically high levels in the early 1980s and the 
world recession simultaneously reduced exports world-wide, the condition of 
ASEAN debt was naturally affected and deteriorated. 
2.9 
At the end of 1986, S. Korea was the largest ASEAN debtor with a debt of US$ 46.7 
bn, according to World Bank data. However, it managed in reducing its debt in 
recent years through prepayment and restraining new borrowing. The country's 
external debt decreased by about US$ 2 bn in 1986 and US$ 8 bn in 1987. 
Although it relied heavily on foreign savings for its investment in the past, for the 
last three years it has been a net foreign investor and is no longer the largest debtor in 
Asia (Lee et. al, 1989) or one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world. 
Indonesia's outstanding debt reached US$ 43 bn by the end of 1986. The external 
debt situation; as indicated by several debt indicators, deteriorated in 1986. For 
example, the debt service ratio rose to 34.9 % in 1986 from 25.1 % in 1985. The ratio 
of outstanding debt to exports increased to 278 % in 1986 from 178 % in 1985. The 
outstanding external debt increased rapidly in recent years partly due to Indonesia's 
increasing current account deficit associated with the decline in the value of oil 
exports and partly due to the currency composition of its debt. About 60 % of its debt 
was denominated in non-US dollars, hence increasing the dollar value of debt and 
debt service when dollar depreciated. Indonesia became the largest debtor in ASEAN 
in 1987. Since then it aims to minimize short term commercial borrowing. 
Malaysia's external debt increased rapidly in the 1980s, reaching US$ 20 bn by 1987. 
The ratio of external debt outstanding to GNP continued to increase from 22 % in 
1980 to 76 % in 1986, which was the second largest, after the Philippines, among the 
ASEAN countries. However, the ratio of external debt outstanding to exports was 
lower and the debt service ratio was not particularly high. Malaysia continued to 
refinance its debt in 1986 and 1987 in order to reduce its future debt-servicing burden 
and reduced new borrowings. About US$ I bn worth of external debt in 1987 was 
paid in advance before reaching maturity. 
The Philippines was the only ASEAN country which resorted to debt rescheduling in 
the 1980s. Debt burden, as indicated by the debt indicators, seemed unsustainable. 
External debt burden since 1982 was more than three times its exports. In 1986, 
external debt was about 94 % of GDP the highest among the ASEAN countries. In 
1987, the Philippines reached an agreement with commercial banks for a second 
rescheduling agreement for its external debt. For the purpose of converting the 
country's foreign liability to equity, the Philippines approved a debt/equity swap 
programme during the year. More than 130 debt-equity conversions totaling US$ 456 
million were approved in 1987. 
Thailand's external debt increased gradually in 1986. Overall, its debt situation had 
generally improved. The ratio of debt outstanding to exports declined to 154 % in 
2.10 
1986 from 170 % in 1985, and the ratio of debt outstanding to GNP decreased over 
the same period to 45 % from 47 %. However, in 1986 the debt service ratio increased 
slightly to 26 % from 25 % in 1985. The external debt situation improved further in 
1987 as Thailand's merchandise exports increased by more than 30 %. 
In conclusion, in the late 1980s, debt situation in Indonesia deteriorated significantly 
due to a decline in the value of oil exports, and in the Philippines, debt situation 
remained a heavy burden. Debt burden eased slightly as evidenced by; debt/GNP, 
debt-service and debt/exports ratios; for the rest of the ASEAN countries but debt 
stock remained at very high levels. Much of the high growth of the ASEAN 
countries has been financed by their exports to the United States and Japan. In 1985, 
the United States imported 35.4 % of S. Korea's total exports and 21.2 % of 
Singapore's. In contrast, Japan's shares of these countries' exports during the same 
period were 15.5 % and 9.4 %, respectively. Japan has been a more significant 
importer of other ASEAN countries' goods especially from Indonesia; in 1984 it 
amounted to almost 50 %, compared to the U. S. share of 20 % (Direction of Trade 
Statistics, 1987). 
2.2.2 The Composition of ASEAN Debt 
The net annual increase in debt for a country, AD, can be decomposed into several 
elements, based on equation 2.1. 
The balance of payments identity can be rewritten as: 
(M-X) + dR + NEO 
-=AD + DI + ODA + IMF (2.1) 
where, 
(M-X) = the current account balance 
AR = change in reserves 
NEO = net errors and ommissions (including capital flights and valuation 
changes) 
AD = change in foreign debt 
ODA = total ODA loans and grants 
DI = direct investment 
IMF = IMF funds 
2.11 
The I. h. s. of equation (2.1) is the amount of foreign finance needed and the r. h. s. is 
the form of financing the deficits. From (2.1), the composition of the net increase in 
debt can be obtained as: 
AD = ((M-X) +AR + NEOJ 
- 
IDI + ODA + IMF] (2.2) 
or, AD can also be calculated as: 
AD 
= 
(LTD + STD) 1- (LTD + STD)t- / (2.3) 
where, 
LTD = long-term debt 
STD = short-term debt 
Evidence on debt increases is given in Table 2.4. In most ASEAN countries, debt 
increased around 1980 in association with an expansion of the current account 
deficit (M-X), which in turn is related to the expansion of the investment-savings 
gap (I-S) and the fiscal deficit (G-T) according to the national income identity: 
(M-X) = (I-S) + (G-T) (2.4) 
Attributes of Table 2.4 are, therefore; 
i) movements between debt and deficits ) 
ii) movements between external and fiscal deficits discussed in this section 
iii) financing the external deficits ) discussed in section 2.2.4 
iv) other debt-reducing factors ) 
By 1979, both S. Korea and Singapore were in need of foreign finance as evidenced 
by the current account deficits. An important difference, however, is that the 
government of Singapore confined its activity to a comparatively low level compared 
to S. Korea, which was associated with a growing fiscal surplus for the former and a 
sizeable fiscal deficit for the latter. This trend was typical of the early I980s. 
Likewise, the other ASEAN countries were in need of foreign finance in the early 
1980s as evidenced by the current account deficits, with substantial amount in all 
ASEAN. Large fiscal deficits prevailed in Malaysia and Indonesia in 1979-84 in 
connection with the second oil-boom reflecting greater government and private 
sectors' expenditure associated with the greater income generated from oil revenue. 
The fiscal deficit was reduced with the decline in oil prices after 1983. The fiscal 
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deficits and investment-savings gap in Thailand and the Philippines (and to a certain 
extent Indonesia) fluctuated in the period 1979-84. 
In many developing countries excess demand for foreign finance may have 
increased as a result of an outflow of foreign exchange in the form of capital flight. 
There are many causes of capital flight, including expectation of currency 
devaluation and a loss of confidence in the economic and political structure. From 
equation (2.1), net errors and omission (NEO) figures are obtained and they are 
substantial, where part of it is capital flight. 
The following discusses the changing patterns of financial flows in the late 1980s. 
Domestic savings are a primary source of economic growth; the gap between gross 
domestic investment and gross domestic saving needs to be filled using foreign 
capital inflows. Table 2.4 shows improvement in debt demand and its 
decomposition in Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia, in the late 1980s as 
compared to the early 1980s. In general, demand for debt decreased at the end of the 
decade in all ASEAN countries. Decrease in debt demand in those three ASEAN 
countries is the result of improvements in the current account balance (M-X) which 
reflects saving-investment surpluses and a contraction of fiscal deficits. There was a 
sharp drop in the debt of South Korea in the late 1980s due to prepayments made 
possible by surpluses incured in the current account (M-X), matched by surpluses 
incurred in savings over investment and in the fiscal account. Singapore also incurred 
surpluses in the current account in the same period further matched by the surpluses 
in savings over investment throughout the late 1980s, although the surpluses are 
lesser compared to that of S. Korea. Malaysia incurred surpluses in the current 
account in 1987-88 and paid in advance some of its debt in 1988. 
As for the rest of the ASEAN countries, their debt were reduced in 1988 relative to 
that in 1985-86, although debt demanded remained substantial in the Philippines 
during 1985-86 and in Indonesia during 1985-87. The increase in debt was due to the 
expansion of these countries' current account deficits. A general increase in reserves 
in all ASEAN countries also played a role in increasing their debt because reserves 
has to be financed either by current account surplus or debt, except in S. Korea, where 
the increase is financed by current account surplus. Private transfers were still of 
great importance in the ASEAN region, especially in S. Korea, the Philippines and 
Indonesia. 
2.2.3 Estimates of Demand for Long-Term Foreign Finance 
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The annual increment of external debt (AD) in Table 2.4, is not expected to be 
equivalent to the demand for long-term finance (ALT) because (AD) contains other 
types of loans such as short-term loans. The demand for long-term debt is important 
for long-run financing of deficits and maturity management, i. e. matching loan 
maturity with revenue in the long-run so that short term loan is not used to finance 
long-term loan. As equation 2.5 shows, the demand for long-term foreign finance 
can be estimated by adding amortization, A, to the annual increment of debt and 
subtracting short-term finance. In principle, short-term finance should not he 
matched with current account deficits which are long-run obligations otherwise 
short-term loans keep rolling and incur a greater cost than long-term loans. So, the 
change in long-term loan is: 
A(LT) 
= 
AD 
- 
ASTD +A (2.5) 
Assume that the change in debt demand, (AD), is known ex-ante, based on past 
deficits and hence determined exogenously. The amount of amortization for long- 
term debt is predetermined by creditors according to loan terms and conditions. The 
changes in short term debt are predetermined by debtors as means of bridging any 
financing gap. 
or, since AD = ASTD + ALTD; 
A(LT) = ALTD +A (2.6) 
where, 
A(LT) = demand for long-term debt 
ALTD = change in long-term debt 
A= amortization 
ASTD = change in short-term debt 
The estimates are shown in Table 2.5. While amortization obligations of most 
ASEAN countries' were fulfilled in the period 1981-84, Singapore and the 
Philippines (due to rescheduling for the Philippines) reduced theirs in 1984. 
Although the level of short-term foreign finance fluctuated and was negative in 
S. Korea and Singapore in 1983 and 1984, the demand for long-term foreign finance 
by these countries appeared to have steadily increased, reflecting their burden of 
Table 2.5: The Demand for Long-term Finance 
Country Years Demand for 
Long-term 
finance LTF 
Amortization 
(A) 
A/LTF 
Short-term foreign 
STF/LTF 
finance STF 
S. Korea 1981 
- 
998 
- 
2500 
- 
1982 3929 1829 46.6 1998 50.9 
1983 5511 2097 38.0 
-1457 -26.4 
1984 5542 2488 44.9 
-600 -10.8 
1985 
- 
5465 
- 
10732 
- 
1986 9940 8935 89 9256 93 
1987 9025 14305 158 9291 103 
1988 3322 6581 198 9780 294 
1989 1540 5605 363 9800 636 
Singapore 1981 105 107 101.7 44 41.8 
1982 263 121 46.1 24 9.1 
1983 346 292 84.2 
-11 -3.2 
1984 584 188 32.2 
-50.0 -8.6 
1985 
- - - - - 
1986 
- - - 
1987 
- - - -- - 
1988 
- - - - - 
Malaysia 1981 
- 
144 
- - - 
1982 
- 
256 
- 
1983 
- 
285 
- - - 
1984 
- 
514 
- - - 
1985 
- 
3826 
- 
2685 
- 
1986 4108 2229 54 2413 58.7 
1987 4234 3106 73 2026 47.8 
1988 6121 3908 64 2100 34 
1989 209 2813 1345 2738 1310 
Thailand 1981 1649 227 13.8 575 34.9 
1982 1538 308 20.0 163 10.6 
1983 1620 417 25.8 264 16.3 
1984 1967 688 35.0 246 12.5 
1985 
- 
2247 
- 
3200 
- 
1986 4121 2682 65 2840 69 
1987 4723 2297 49 2664 56.4 
1988 2313 2480 107 2964 128 
1989 2822 2645 94 6112 217 
Indonesia 1981 2389 226.9 13.8 575 34.9 
1982 3367 308.1 20.0 183 10.6 
1983 5114 417.5 25.8 264 16.3 
1984 3188 688.5 35.0 246 12.5 
1985 
- 
3491 
- 
6049 
- 
1986 8968 2867 32 6310 71 
1987 12567 3788 30 6417 51 
1988 5833 5713 98 6322 108 
1989 5280 5102 97 7026 133 
P' ines 1981 1730 326 18.8 1865 107.8 
1982 2134 511 24.0 1904 89.2 
1983 2131 613 28.8 
-1921 -90.1 
1984 963 354 36.8 88 9.1 
1985 
- 
852 
- 
9092 
- 
1986 6607 1412 22 5486 83 
1987 5200 1778 34 3792 73 
1988 983 1516 154 3888 396 
1989 488 1181 242 3951 809 
Source: World bank, World debt Tables, various issues 
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amortization. Thailand's short term foreign finance was relatively stable, reflecting a 
well-balanced control of long-term foreign finance, though increasing steadily. 
Table 2.5 also shows that demand for long-term foreign finance increased in all 
ASEAN countries in the late 1980s but decreased gradually in 1988-89 (except 
Thailand and Indonesia). The amortization rate, however, increased in all countries 
by 1989 
- 
reflecting priority given to the policy of repaying debt. The ratio of short- 
term foreign finance to long-term foreign finance increased significantly in all 
ASEAN countries, especially in South Korea and the Philippines in 1989, indicating 
illiquidity problems. 
The following sections, analyses in detail factors that increase or reduce external 
debt and the demand for foreign finance. 
2.2.4 Financing the Deficit by Non-Debt Items (or Debt Reducing Factors 
Equation 2.1 and Table 2.5 give an indication of the factors that help reduce or 
match the demand for foreign finance without creating debt. The analysis divides 
the situation in the early 1980s and that of the late 1980s. In the early 1980s, the 
following non-debt items play their roles in providing foreign funds to the ASEAN 
countries. 
Firstly, private unrequited-transfers were quite important sources of income to 
Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines, as can be seen in column 7 from Table 
2.4. When oil prices were high, the Middle-East absorbed a large number of workers 
from these countries who contributed to unrequited transfers. With the decline in 
the price of oil and the slowdown of the Middle-Eastern economies this source of 
income declined. 
Secondly, official unrequited transfers in the form of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) played an important role in Indonesia. South Korea received a 
relatively constant, though small, amount in the 1980s. 
Thirdly, assets in the form of foreign exchange reserves. A decision to increase the 
foreign exchange reserves of a country can lead to an increase in demand for 
foreign finance, and vice-versa. While the East Asian NICs increased their foreign 
exchange reserves between the period 1979-84, Table 2.4 illustrates that the other 
ASEAN countries used up their reserves during the adjustment period, while the 
Philippines continued to reduce its reserves throughout 1984. 
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Fourthly, IMF credits are regarded as a 'last resort short-term finance'. During the 
early 1980s, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, 
surprisingly, used IMF credits to meet their balance-of-payments needs. Such 
borrowings were completed through the sale of domestic currency to the IMF in 
return for other countries' currencies or Special Drawing Rights (SDR). The 
repayment must be made over a period of time according to the conditions 
established under the particular borrowing arrangement. If a country's balance of 
payments improves sufficiently, it is expected to repurchase its own currency from 
the IMF earlier than scheduled. The credits are, however, subject to IMF conditions, 
example, the imposition of certain economic adjustment policies on the borrowing 
country. In general, since conditions attached to IMF credits are often rigid, the 
IMF funds are used only as a last resort once ability to raise private credit is 
exhausted. Substantial amounts were used by South Korea and the Philippines as a 
result of the financial strains experienced in the 1980s. 
Fifth, non-debt (equity) financing of securities allows a country to raise non-debt 
creating foreign funds while limiting foreign economic intervention at the same time. 
However, only an economy that holds the potential for future profit can attract such 
financial flows. Although stock market deregulation in many ASEAN countries has 
made it easier for foreigners to acquire stocks listed on domestic exchanges, a rapid 
ASEAN-wide growth of foreign-portfolio equity investment is not expected. This is 
partly due to difficulties in obtaining ample and reliable credit information on 
individual companies by foreign investors. 
Sixth, foreign direct investment not only help meet the demand for foreign funds, it 
also brings in technology and provides access to foreign markets. However, foreign 
direct investment may also use up valuable foreign exchange through remittances and 
transfer pricing, although such payments, in principle, usually occur only when 
businesses are earning profits (which may fluctuate with the economic conditions of 
the host country). Table 2.4 reveals a sharp contrast between high levels of foreign 
direct investment in some ASEAN countries as compared to the rest. Examples of 
high investment areas are Singapore and Indonesia in the early 1980s. The source of 
foreign direct investment came mainly from the U. S. and Japan, however, of late, 
they are declining. 
An important feature of private flows to ASEAN in the late 1980s was the rapid 
increase in direct investment, mainly from Japan and other newly industrialising 
economies (NIEs) of the east. In the years 1985-89, foreign direct investment 
played a very important role in financing economic development, particularly in the 
developing ASEAN economies. Between the mid-1980s and late 1980s, foreign 
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direct investment decreased in S. Korea and Indonesia, increased in Thailand and the 
Philippines, increased in Malaysia except in 1987-88. The prospects for direct 
investment are brighter due to strong economic and geographic advantages these 
economies have; the incentives for foreign investment such as low-waged labour, 
land at low cost, infrastructure and management skills; and the need to recycle the 
current account surpluses by Japan and the NIEs. 
In the early 1990s, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia are the largest recipient of 
foreign direct investment in Asia, together accounting for 38 % of all flows into that 
region in 1992. As it stands in 1992, overall foreign direct investment in developing 
countries is concentrated in five countries 
- 
China, Mexico, Argentina, Malaysia 
and Thailand 
- 
together they account for 59 % of flows. And in Asia, China and 
Malaysia accounts for almost three-quarters of all inflows into the region (World 
Bank, World Debt Tables 1993-94). Privatization is the most important channel 
of foreign direct investment entries which allows direct foreign equity participation. 
The NICs are increasingly becoming capital exporting countries as they continue to 
have current account surpluses. For example, S. Korea itself became an ODA donor in 
1989! As for the other ASEAN countries, ODA inflows continue to increase. In the 
mid-1980s, Indonesia and the Philippines relied on ODA as a means of financing 
development due to its concessional nature. IMF funds are heavily used in the 
Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, while its use in the rest of the ASEAN countries 
shows a decreasing trend. 
To conclude, the pattern and composition of financial flows are influenced by the 
stage of economic development in each country. Lower income countries tend to 
rely more heavily on concessional official flows (such as ODA) as a result of limited 
servicing capacity. High income countries rely more on non-concessional private 
flows 
- 
being more creditworthy, they have easier access to funds and can obtain 
more competitive financing from commercial sources. Moreover, they have greater 
scope for joint ventures with developed country firms, hence greater potential for 
attracting foreign direct investment. As a country moves further towards a higher 
stage of economic development, it may become a capital exporter. The NICs are 
good examples of being at the higher stage of development and have become capital 
exporters in recent years. The other ASEAN countries are still at the stage of 
attracting more flows of private investment. 
2.3 The Supply of Long-Term Foreign Finance 
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In the previous section, we examined the creation of external debt and the demand 
for long term foreign finance for the ASEAN countries. In financing debt, factors 
such as foreign exchange reserves, direct investment and short-term finance play 
important roles in financing debt without creating debt-burden. In this section, we 
will discuss the supply of finance pertaining to ODA loans, other official flows 
and debt-creating private funds. The supply of finance thus comes from either the 
international credit markets or other official sources. 
2.3.1 Major Trends in Long-Term Foreign Finance 
The major trends in long-term foreign finance are summarized in Table 2.6. The 
total long term foreign finance is derived by identifying all possible sources of 
funds for the ASEAN countries based on the "Geographical Distribution of Financial 
Flows to Developing Countries (1985), " prepared by OECD. These estimates of the 
total long-term foreign finance are consistent with the increment in debt shown in 
Table 2.4. 
Table 2.6 provides two important observations. Firstly, a pattern emerges in the total 
inflows that reflects economic changes in these countries, especially continued 
investment-savings surpluses and increased fiscal deficits. For most of the ASEAN 
countries, total inflows increase in 1981 and decline after 1981 until 1983. This 
reflects the extent to which the global debt problems in 1981 affect the ASEAN 
economies and a decrease in demand for foreign funds in these countries as a 
consequence of adjustment policies. In 1984, the total inflows to ASEAN return to 
previous levels (except in the case of the Philippines), reflecting a revival of active 
development policies in these countries which is accelerated by low oil prices and the 
recovery of the U. S. economy, being one of the major trading partners. 
Secondly, Table 2.6 reveals sharp differences in the long-term financial structures 
of ASEAN countries. In the NICs, net inflows of ODA loans became mostly 
negative, reflecting the fact that these countries began to act as suppliers of these 
funds rather than users. The shares of net inflows of Other Official Flows (OOF), as 
part of total inflows to the ASEAN countries also decreased. The share of OOF in 
S. Korea, for example, declined from over 60 % in 1983 to less than 25 % in 1984, 
while the share of private finance and portfolio investment increased. 
Table 2.6: Supply of Long-term Foreign Finance in ASEAN 
1 
Ctry 
2 
Year 
3 
Total 
(4+9) 
"tual 
Lend 
(5+6+8) 
5 
ODA 
loans 
6 
Net 
OOF 
7 
OXC 
8 
PXC 
9 
Private 
Fin. 
10 
ortfo- 
lio 
Inv. 
11 
Direct 
Inv. 
S. Kor 1979 2336 1064 94 669 233 301 1272 466 1.2 
1980 1874 1042 97 448 335 497 832 
-53 -208 
1981 3113 1028 297 540 184 191 2085 210 261 
1982 2339 991 
-16 1096 443 
-90 1348 368 107 
1983 1499 469 
-22 922 456 
-431 1030 863 -62 1984 2614 427 
-68 634 200 
-183 2186 1298 246 
1986 1262 684 
-64 -176 na 924 578 114 370 
1987 
-1925 -892 -57 -1415 na 580 
-1013 -1673 828 
1988 
-1436 -586 -64 -1066 na 544 
-850 -1705 754 
1989 
-598 -555 -30 -735 260 210 
-43 -60 339 
1990 1015 
-552 -53 -543 48 48 1567 1436 557 
1991 2771 
-340 -50 -340 53 52 3111 2516 749 
1992 2835 
-159 -46 -313 212 200 2994 3193 37 
Spore 1979 171 170 
-7.4 89 96 89 
- - -11 
1980 387 66 
-5 29 28 41 321 18 570 
1981 228 228 
-1.5 -11 -4.3 239 
- - 
154 
1982 323 323 
-2 2.6 5.7 322 
- - 
288 
1983 
-148 -148 -6.6 -45 -42 -97 - - -99 
1984 82 82 13 46 57 23 
- - 
339 
1986 131 51 
-7 -218 na 276 80 
-511 602 1987 1015 66 
-8.4 -61 na 135 950 371 930 
1988 1738 56 
-9.3 -46 na 111 1682 1 1678 
1989 2247 150 66 
-31 na 115 2097 428 1688 
1990 
-32 155 na 56 2605 643 2006 
1991 
- - - - 
Mal 1979 587 516 65 87 1 363 71 65 77 
1980 507 365 75 82 
-4.6 209 142 22 176 
1981 2011 571 85 115 
-5.6 371 1440 110 252 
1982 2591 531 75 130 
-5.3 326 2060 671 
-43 
1983 1989 524 113 182 71 229 1465 973 234 
1984 2139 474 234 127 66 113 1665 625 90 
19861 4 159 3 19 na 138 
-155 -41 -32 
1987 340 345 230 31 na 84 
-5 -278 384 
1988 526 
-32 -39 -34 na 41 558 
-54 674 1989 524 
-80 7 -172 114 85 604 19 612 
1990 1108 317 55 70 56 95 791 
-182 1038 1991 1643 200 
-32 114 118 118 1443 643 1518 
1992 1742 34 
-24 -11 71 69 1708 84 1578 
Thai 1979 955 556 246 245 89 65 399 205 38 
1980 973 683 240 313 89 130 245 35 217 
1981 1402 995 216 375 52 404 407 159 219 
1982 968 846 204 433 9 209 122 79 128 
1983 766 755 222 599 131 
-66 111 112 200 
1984 1358 569 227 393 38 
-52 789 306 322 
1986 336 344 188 87 na 69 
-8 133 -5 
1987 838 343 181 
-80 na 242 495 117 441 
1988 300 
-51 235 -569 na 283 351 
-167 513 
1989 2133 736 289 51 516 396 1397 
-90 1296 
1990 2481 1084 380 308 867 571 1618 
-135 1512 
1991 2639 1021 310 328 681 383 2619 
-51 1797 
1992 3224 482 355 
-355 566 571 2742 163 1748 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Indo 1979 266 634 439 186 
-22 9 -368 -103 -383 
1980 1096 1127 653 372 22 102 
-31 57 280 
1981 1831 1253 652 261 
-94 340 578 386 2584 
1982 3587 1595 592 673 37 331 1992 423 537 
1983 2021 1808 434 775 233 599 1013 692 303 
1984 3037 2475 347 1163 226 965 562 47 423 
1986 1970 1876 332 747 na 797 94 551 
-581 1987 3387 3663 766 2171 na 726 
-276 429 -570 1988 2958 3363 1083 2001 na 279 
-405 -68 -14 
1989 2479 3496 1252 1884 na 360 1017 
-110 1320 
1990 3159 2901 1034 1551 604 317 249 195 600 
1991 3004 2901 1057 1527 639 317 103 195 517 
1992 5868 4134 1161 2097 1280 876 1734 744 833 
Phil 1979 634 465 156 338 91 
-28 169 246 329 
1980 1151 600 176 230 
-33 282 462 32 125 
1981 1512 1015 230 404 
-23 301 497 
-32 115 
1982 1191 523 170 200 13 65 667 132 125 
1983 1922 1110 170 854 162 94 804 334 
-168 
1984 298 663 141 383 47 140 
-365 -142 130 
1986 623 663 440 176 46 na 
-40 188 60 
1987 433 659 309 304 46 na 
-226 -169 78 
1988 904 883 452 434 
-4 na 22 37 215 
1989 707 922 275 545 102 110 
-215 -448 332 1990 1651 1733 675 904 154 154 
-82 -337 312 
1991 1256 1191 427 626 186 138 65 55 146 
1992 2034 1899 1042 721 169 136 135 76 70 
Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to 
Developing Countries, variou issues. 
2.18 
Some of the ASEAN countries had been dependent on ODA loans, although the 
ratio of ODA loans to total net inflows, with the exception of the Philippines, 
decreased between 1979 and 1984. In Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, the 
ratios of ODA loans to total net inflows in 1984 were approximately 17 %, 11% and 
11 % respectively. Net ODA loans amounted to 47 % of the Philippine's total 
inflows in 1984, from 15 % in the early 1980s. 
In the case of Other Official Flows, the experiences of these countries were diverse. 
Malaysia reduced its dependence on OOF from almost 15 % in 1979 to under 6% in 
1984. Indonesia's and Thailand's shares of the OOF were generally around 30 % 
to 40 % for the same period. The Philippine's OOF grew to 128.63 % of its total 
net inflow of long-term foreign finance, reflecting the debt problems in the 
country. 
Turning to the role of private export credit, in Malaysia, it declined from nearly 62 
% of total long-term foreign finance in 1977 to less than 6% in 1984. Indonesia 
experienced the opposite; its private export credit as a percentage of long term 
foreign finance increased from around 3% in 1979 to over 31 % in 1984. In 
Thailand, private export credit declined and became negative in 1983 and 1984. In 
the Philippines, the share of private export credit fluctuated greatly from nearly 25 
in 1980 to less than 5% in 1983, and increased again to over 46 % in 1984. 
Export credit is a form of assistance developed countries can extend to developing 
countries which explains the increase in the Philippines and Indonesia. 
In summary, the data in Table 2.6 reveals important trends. Firstly, private 
finance plays an increasingly important role in the economic development of 
ASEAN. Secondly, it shows the beginning of securitization. The percentage of 
long term foreign finance that is private has been increasing steadily in the first 
half of the 1980s as compared the 1970s in S. Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines. In Indonesia, the percentage of private finance fluctuated but remained 
substantial in 1984 at over 18 %. Private finance in the Philippines reached a high 
level of over 56 % of long-term foreign finance in 1982 but became negative 
(over 
-120 %) in 1984 due to the extraordinary financing required as a result of 
its debt problem. 
The evidence demonstrates clearly how the NICs have "graduated" from their 
dependence on official flows. Among developing ASEAN countries, Malaysia 
appeared comparatively less dependent on official flows, while the Philippines 
and Indonesia continued to rely relatively more on ODA and OOF. It can be 
deduced from Table 2.6 that for the East Asian NICs, net inflows of official finance in 
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1984 accounted for only 0.48 % and 0.75 % of the GNP of Singapore and South 
Korea, respectively. But in the developing ASEAN countries, such inflows 
accounted for 4.42 %, 2.42 %, 2.09 % and 1.51 % of the GNP of the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. 
The situation in the late 1980s, reveals three important points. Firstly, a very 
interesting development is the negative supply (and demand) of total long-term 
foreign finance in S. Korea since 1987. This reflects the higher stage of economic 
development that S. Korea has been undergoing. In addition, the prepayment of loans 
has been taking place, thus avoiding the incidence of short term debt financing long- 
term debt. It reflects the net supplier of official finance and net foreign investment. 
The supply of total long-term foreign finance has been slightly reduced in countries 
with non-reliance on official loans, but remains substantial in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. 
Secondly, private finance is more important in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, 
which reflects the importance of direct investment as a supply of long-term foreign 
finance. There is a reduction in private finance in South Korea (since it is moving 
towards being a net foreign investor), and in the Philippines mainly due to political 
instability. Thirdly, private export credit remain an important source of finance in 
most ASEAN countries. 
In the early 1990s. foreign direct investment plays the most important role as a form 
of financing (apart from debt) development of the ASEAN countries. In early 1993, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia agreed to establish a growth triangle (with a 
combined population of 21 mn) to promote economic development by encouraging 
trade and investment flows. Together, these three countries account for 38 % of all 
flows into Asia in 1992. Similar growth triangle with similar objective has been 
established by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in 1989. 
2.3.2 Overview of the Suppliers of Finance 
According to Table 2.7, Japan supplied 87 % of total bilateral flows to the 
developing ASEAN economies in 1987. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
provided about 27 % of total multilateral flows, while the World Bank supplied most 
of the remaining multilateral flows. Tables 2.7a and 2.7b show the different types of 
flows, in aggregate form, to ASEAN from 1970 to 1987. There is a big increase in 
Table 2.7a: Financial Flows to the Developing ASEAN Economies (in US$ mn) 
1970 1980 1981 1985 1986 1987 (%) 
Official Flows 729 2803 3159 3414 3382 4763 (96) 
ODA grants 213 658 718 949 1392 1396 (28) 
ODA loans 399 1148 1184 850 963 1494 (30) 
Other OOF 118 996 1257 963 1028 1873 (38) 
Private Flows 407 1754 5208 148 
-140 198 (4) 
Direct Invest. 196 887 3169 
-519 -588 355 (7) 
Port. Invest. 56 145 623 506 831 99 (2) 
Export credit 156 722 1416 161 
-382 -257 (-5) 
TOTAL 1137 4557 8336 3652 3243 4961 (100) 
Bilateral Flows 1049 3338 6789 2055 2024 3312 (67) 
Japan 420 1246 3172 1342 1049 2878 (87) 
USA 312 627 1161 
-468 322 -379 (11) 
Europe 281 1251 2236 1008 460 341 (10) 
Multilateral Flows 86 1218 1576 1507 1219 1649 (33) 
ADB 4 238 276 346 376 443 (27) 
IBRD 45 530 1034 935 629 1013 (61) 
IDA 3 46 92 53 24 18 1 
Source: OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows 
to Developing Countries, various issues. 
Table 2.7b: Financial Flows to the Newly Industrialising ASEAN Economics (in US$ inn) 
1970 1980 1981 1985 1986 1987 
Official Flows 535 1050 1154 
-192 -699 -3364 ODA grants 153 74 65 84 102 120 
ODA loans 161 86 304 
-58 -82 -67 
Other OOF 221 890 784 
-218 -720 -3417 
Private Flows 357 1875 4230 
-207 -897 4784 
Direct Invest. 80 979 2417 389 2236 5142 
Port. Invest. 
-32 -338 626 
-499 -2921 -468 
Export credit 308 1234 1157 
-97 -212 109 
TOTAL 892 2925 5384 
-399 -1597 1420 
Bilateral Flows 813 2674 5030 
-530 -1471 2006 
Japan 470 628 1372 1173 1561 1602 
USA 153 609 2149 
-2493 -4418 -344 
Europe 184 1260 1359 934 1363 550 
Multilateral Flows 78 251 355 131 
-125 -587 
ADB 6 70 103 41 
-1 -165 
IBRD 52 170 243 81 
-140 -433 
IDA 1 
-1 -1 -2 -2 -2 Source; OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows 
to Developing Countries, various issues. 
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the supply from Japan in 1987 as compared to 1981, when Japan's contribution was 
only 21 %. The ECs contribution was greater in 1981 at about 30 %, but decreased in 
1987 to 10 %. As for the NIEs, the United States contributed the highest bilateral 
flows in 1981 at 44 % but the supply has become negative since 1985. The supply 
from the EC has also decreased since 1985. The supply from Japan has showed an 
increasing trend, i. e. 28 % in 1981 and 80 % in 1987. 
As the East Asian countries need to recycle their surpluses, direct foreign investment 
becomes increasingly an important source of finance for ASEAN. After declining in 
1984 and 1985, Japan's direct investment rises again in 1986-87 (Lee et. al, 1989). 
S. Korea and Indonesia are the largest recipients of Japan's direct investment, 
receiving US$ 647 mit and US$ 545 mit respectively, or 11.2 % and 13.3 % of total 
Japanese investment to ASEAN. Investors have been shifting their investment 
increasingly to ASEAN, reducing their formerly heavy investments in Latin 
America. 
The World Bank estimates over 80 % of cumulative investment outflows in the past 
20 years took place in 1985. Developing countries account for a small share of 5% 
of the world-wide investment outflows, which is a recent phenomena. In the 1990s, 
most of these outflows come from China, Korea and Brazil (World Bank, World 
Debt Tables 1993-94). 
2 
.4 Financing the 
Government Budget Deficits 
The general trend in the ASEAN countries is moving towards greater reliance on 
private sector development and industrialization. Government investment has been 
declining since the late 1980s due to tightening of fiscal policy. The declining 
government budget deficits (or improvements in government budget balance) 
released domestic resources for use by the private sector between 1988 to early 
I990s. In Thailand, for example, the level of public investment remains the same 
in 1990 as that of the 1985 level, and public sector external borrowings has an 
annual ceiling level of US$ 1.5 bn, hence contributing to budget surplus since 1988 
(Thailand: GATT Trade Policy Review, 1991). The release of public sector resources 
however, is not enough to meet the demand by the private sector, thus, the gap 
between private investment and savings increased rapidly, which further contribute to 
sharp increases in current account deficit since 1987. In Malaysia, the government 
has been following broadly a balanced-budget policy since 1988. Thus, in the early 
1990s, borrowing requirements are small and the source is from domestic market. 
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The early 1990s observes a financial deepening in the capital market which become 
an increasingly important source of funds. In the Philippines, the situation is rather 
different than the rest of the ASEAN. Chronic fiscal deficits existed throughout the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s with government expenditure persistently above 
revenues. The government budget deficit is 3.5 % of GNP in 1990. Efforts are made 
to increase tax collection efficiency. Tax revenues made up the major portion of 
total revenue 
- 
accounting about 82 % and 84 % of total revenue in 1986 and 1990 
respectively (Treasury Economic Report, Malaysia, 1992/3). 
Trade taxes are important in financing the government budget balances of the 
ASEAN countries. In Thailand, both import and export taxes' revenues decline over 
the years but import taxes still play an important role. The share of export and 
import tax out of total tax revenues, in 1963, made up 35 % and 15 % 
respectively; in 1970 - 30 % and 7% of total tax revenues respectively; in 1980 - 
22 % and 4% of total tax revenues respectively; and in 1990 
- 
25 % and zero % 
respectively (Thailand: GATT Trade Policy Review, 1991). In the Philippines, out 
of total tax revenue, import tax and taxes on income and profits are most important 
- 
making up 25.5 and 24.7 % respectively, in 1990 (Philippines: GATT Trade Policy 
Review, 1991). In Malaysia, import tax is still an important source of tax revenue 
accounting for about 10 % of total tax revenue in 1990. Income tax account for about 
40 % of total tax revenue in the same year (Treasury Economic Report, Malaysia, 
1992/3). In S. Korea, the export tax had been zero since the mid-1980s. 
Money creation or seigniorage is another form of financing government budget 
balance. In Malaysia, the money supply increased slowly since the late 1980s. In 
1989 onwards, the Central Bank took a step to reduce excess liquidity due to the 
financial deepening in the capital market. The monetary aggregate, M2, grow at an 
average of 14 % annually in the early 1990s. The broader aggregate, M3, grows at 
about 15 % in the same period, the growth mainly comes from the external sector and 
lending to the private sector while the government takes a contractionary policy. 
M3 is expected to remain strong due to inflows of foreign capital. Narrow money, 
M 1, which include currency in circulation and demand deposits of the private sector 
rises sharply by 6.2 % in 1993 compared to a growth of 1.7 % in 1992 due to the 
bullish stock market (Malaysia: Treasury Economic Report, 1993/94). 
2.5 Conclusion 
The debt stock of ASEAN remain very high in recent years indicating financing of 
privatisation and securitisation is through increased indebtedness while the 
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economies continue growing. Due to the growth of output, the debt burden has 
eased however ( see debt/GNP ratios in Table 2.3 for example). rendering the debt 
more sustainable. ASEAN did also move towards yen credit from the mid-1980s, 
hence, helping in easing the illiquidity. 
As the world economic growth becomes increasingly centred in the ASEAN region, 
(partly reflecting its comparative advantage from low-waged labour and availability 
of raw materials), in order to meet this international challenge, economic co- 
operation among countries in the region within ASEAN and within East Asia 
should be strenghthened. This is to take advantage of not only abundant labour 
supply but also to make full use of the surplus that has to be recycled by the 
surplus countries to the counttries with heavy debt such as Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Intra-ASEAN or Intra-East Asian trade will also be enhanced and 
comparative advantage in raw materials will also be exploited. With the move 
towards privatization and securitization, ASEAN opens a large door to the inflow of 
foreign private funds, hence, improving the attractiveness of their capital markets. 
At the same time, the industrialised neighbouring countries should also facilitate the 
flow of private funds through measures such as a liberalizing their own capital 
markets. 
Diversion in the source of finance is noted in ASEAN with Japan and other NICs 
playing a quantitatively increasing role in the development of ASEAN in the late 
1980s. 
Project financing is becoming more important, however, in the Philippines, political 
instability had a tremendous effect on adverse economic growth. More attention 
should therefore be paid to how official finance can benefit the majority of the people 
and thus contribute to the social and political stability of the region. 
High interest rates in the U. S. and the high value of the dollar in the first half of the 
1980s left the ASEAN countries with increasing liabilities, but world recession in 
the 1980s was cushioned by a temporary recovery of the U. S. economy in 1984 and 
1985. Devaluations of the currencies of many of the countries against the U. S. dollar 
has stimulated exports. In 1985 when protectionism in the U. S. gained momentum 
and world primary commodity prices, including oil, fell with uncertain prospects had 
adversely affected all of the ASEAN countries, forcing the ASEAN region to have a 
more aggressive economic cooperation among themselves. 
The developing ASEAN countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, had 
been inflicted because of their relatively heavy dependence on exports of primary 
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products in the early 1980s, while the East Asian NICs, being resource poor, seemed 
to have gained in their manufacturing exports. Thailand which has no oil, suffered 
from lower prices of major agricultural exports but gained from lower oil prices. 
Any appreciation of the yen against the U. S. dollar leads to two effects on the 
ASEAN economies 
- 
increased competitiveness of their manufactured exports 
against Japanese exports; and, higher cost of yen credits. Both effects were 
experienced in 1985. The late 1980s and early 1990s divert ASEAN's market to 
concentrate more within the Pacific region. 
In March 1986, interest rates fell worldwide, easing the liquidity position of the 
ASEAN countries. As a result, profits and profit expectations in these countries 
increased. In turn, this attracted an increased flow of private funds. Bank loans 
connected with syndicated loans became more important, and access to private 
finance became greater. 
I The selected ASEAN countries in the study consist of Singapore, Malaysia, S. Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Although South Korea is not actually an ASEAN member, it is included in 
the study because of its unique debt experience (in the East) which could he a model for the other 
ASEANs. With the inclusion of S. Korea, the term NIC's or NIE's in this study refers to Singapore and 
S. Korea, unless otherwise stated. 
PART II : MACROECONOMIC MODELLING OF DEBT 
CHAPTER 3: THE TWIN DEFICITS AND DEBT LITERATURE 
3.1 
3. TWIN DEFICITS AND DEBT 
Our findings from the ASEAN countries in chapter two suggest some co-movements 
between government budget deficits and private sector spending, with current account 
deficits and increased indebtedness. There are similar movements too in many other 
highly indebted developing countries (see Chapter 1 where there are co-movements 
in debt and deficits in the Latin American countries). In the US, the notion of the twin 
deficits has been given a new importance. The increase in both the fiscal and trade 
deficits to unprecedented levels in the United States in the 1980s sparked debates on 
their causal linkage. Economists' analyses of the deficits problem focused upon two 
broad intellectual divisions. One school of thought gives new importance to the 
twin deficits notion, typically associated with Keynes: This holds that budget deficit- 
financed tax cuts raise disposable income thereby stimulating aggregate demand. As 
a result 
, 
the budget deficit leads to higher real interest rates and crowds out private 
investment. Gordon (1990) revived this issue. The other school of thought holds that 
taxpayers see through the intertemporal veil and realize that taxes depend only on 
government spending, not on the timing of these taxes. The budget deficits, 
therefore, do not stimulate aggregate demand and have no real effects. This is 
associated with Ricardo as revived by Barro (1974). 
On international debt issues, there is a large literature that points to a general 
consensus that the international debt crisis was caused partly by declining export 
prices for the indebted countries, high world interest rates, the second oil-price shock 
and sluggish growth in the industrial countries (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1986; Thorpe 
and Whitehead, 1987; Warner 1989; Solomon 1991). There is however, less 
attention paid to domestic policies or internal issues that might have some influence 
on increased indebtedness. We, therefore, aim to investigate the details of the 
linkages between the government budget deficit and private sector spending with 
current account deficits and increased indebtedness. This necesitates a systematic 
evaluation of the factors mentioned. 
A standard analysis to the macroeconomic effects of a budget deficit was brought 
about by the Keynesian revolution (Easterly and Fischer, 1990). The presumption was 
that the budget should be balanced during peacetime, or generate surpluses to pay-off 
government debt during wartime. The Keynesian framework emphasizes fiscal 
policy and the deficit as components of aggregate demand. There was no need to 
balance the budget during recession and the norm for fiscal behaviour follows the 
business cycle, i. e. surplus during booms and deficit during recessions. 
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Easterly and Fischer (1990) theorized on the means of financing the changes in debt 
to control debt dynamics. A formal empirical work by Enders and Lee (1990) relates 
government financing policy to switches from taxes to debt, and concludes there is 
no effect on the trade balance deficit. Warner, (1988) investigates whether the debt 
crises causes the crowding-out of investment and shows that it is not debt crisis that 
crowds-out investment but the world economic situation, i. e. it is the terms of trade 
and the world real interest rates that cause investment decline in the developing 
countries. 
In this chapter, firstly, we present the twin deficits notion as a central concept of 
our thesis, and then review the conceptual aspects as revived by Gordon (1990). 
Secondly, we present critically two alternative schools of thought on the twin 
deficits concept. In the third sub-section we present studies on debt issues that have 
relevance to our hypothesis of the linkages between debt and deficits. 
3 
.1 The 
Twin-Deficits Literature: Theoretical Aspects 
Gordon (1990) theorized the twin deficits as follows: expansionary fiscal policy or 
increased government deficits raise real interest rates which induce capital inflows 
and force the real exchange rate to appreciate. The consequence of appreciating the 
exchange rate is crowding out of net exports and enlarging the trade deficit. Hence, 
the budget deficit interacts with trade deficit through the interest rate and foreign 
exchange rate. Since the mid-1980s, many U. S. economists have believed that 
increased government deficits are the primary cause of the massive trade deficits 
experienced in the 1980s and early 1990s. Studies that have relevance to the twin 
deficits include those by Feldstein (1986), Evans (1987), Abell (1990), Enders and 
Lee (1990), and Rosensweig and Tallman (1993). Though the twin deficit notion has 
been given new importance the posited causal relationship does not gain universal 
acceptance. 
Gordon (1990) reviews the accounting links of (G 
-T ) =S -l + (M-X) 
, 
i. e., 
government budget balance is equal to the excess of private savings over private and 
foreign investments, and "...... after puting in figures (in US $ bn) to the definition 
above, learned that the U. S. government budget deficit is financed very differently 
in 1989 (a year typical of the 1980s) and 1992...... " (Gordon, 1990). 
1989: 1.6 (G -T)=-15.8 (S )-16.0 (I)-(-1.8 )(M-X) 
1992: -T)=-15.6) 
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He concludes that in 1989, savings almost equals investment leaving the deficit to 
be financed by foreigners (foreign trade deficits or foreign borrowings). In 1992, 
however, the larger government deficit is financed not by trade deficits but by a 
decrease in domestic investment. Thus, international crowding out in the 1980s is 
replaced by domestic crowding out in 1992. 
The budget deficit is caused by two factors; the effect of a business cycle and the 
effect of a discretionary fiscal policy, that is, changes in real income and changes in 
government spending or tax rates. Crowding out of net exports by expansionary fiscal 
policy is one of the leading macroeconomic issues in the 1980s in many countries in 
the world. In the U. S., Gordon argues that rising expenditure combined with 
reductions in some tax rates created a substantial increase in the federal government 
deficit, crowding out of net exports occur when higher interest rates pushed up the 
value of the foreign exchange rate between 1980 and 1985. 
The second aspect conceptualised by Gordon is the link between the government 
budget deficit and foreign trade deficit which is determined by the impact of 
discretionary fiscal policy actions on interest rates. In a closed economy, the normal 
effects of a fiscal stimulus are higher interest rates and a crowding out effect and he 
illustrated these effects using the IS-LM framework. If there is no change in money 
supply and the price level is held fixed, the LM curve remains stationary while the IS 
curve moves rightwards. If government expenditure increases, the IS curve shifts 
rightwards as shown below: 
Fig. 3.1: The Effects of a Fiscal Stimulus 
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Source: Gordon, 1990 
3.4 
Two approaches can be used to analyse the effect of a fiscal policy stimulus, i) fix 
the interest rate and control the money supply and, ii) coordinate monetary and 
fiscal policy hence the interest rate becomes a policy instrument to maintain actual 
output at the level of natural output. In the first case, the money supply changes 
whenever there is a shift in the IS curve. The LM curve shifts rightwards and the 
equilibrium is now at E6. There is no increase in the interest rate so there is no 
crowding out. 
Since in a government stabilization policy, the main objective is to dampen the 
business cycle by maintaining the level of actual real GNP (real income) equal to 
natural real GNP, actual real GNP can be raised to make it equal to the natural real 
GNP by expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. Increasing the money supply 
(expansionary monetary policy) will shift the LM curve rightwards; equilibrium 
shifts from EO to E I. An increase in government expenditure will shift the 
equilibrium from point Ep to E5. The interest rate increases as a result of the 
expansionary fiscal policy but decreases with expansionary monetary policy. 
Point E5 has a lower real money supply and a higher interest rate in order to keep 
money demand equal to money supply. This is described as 'tight money, easy fiscal' 
position. Point EI is the 'easy money, tight fiscal' position, with a higher real money 
supply and a lower interest rate to stimulate a demand for money equal to the supply 
of money. The higher interest rate at point E5 cuts planned private autonomous 
spending, both investment and consumption, below that at point E 1, to make room for 
the government spending. Induced consumption is the same at both E1 and E5. 
At point E 1, investment is higher, thus, the economy's rate of productivity growth is 
likely to be higher which will benefit society in future years. At point E5, government 
spending is higher than at point El 
. 
Government purchases may be currently 
consumed government services (such as national defence, health, etc) or 
government investment (highways, etc. ). The choice is between faster output 
growth at point E1 or a higher level of public services of point E5, depending partly 
on society's preference for public versus private goods and partly on its taste for 
present goods and services versus those deferred to the future. 
Expansionary fiscal policy by itself without accommodating monetary policy raises 
the interest rate and 'crowds out' domestic spending that is interest-sensitive, 
particularly private domestic investment. In an open economy, the international 
crowding out effect occurs when an economy is open and operates under a system of 
flexible rather than fixed exchange rates. One of the major determinants of the 
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foreign trade deficit is the foreign exchange rate of domestic currency. An 
appreciation makes a country's exports more expensive in terms of foreign currency 
and makes imports cheaper. Thus, an appreciation cuts net exports while depreciation 
boosts net exports. Gordon concerns himself with the role of fiscal and monetary 
policy in causing the changes in the exchange rate which has a further effect on net 
exports and the foreign trade deficit through the following model. Fluctuations in net 
exports cause fluctuations in income and vice-versa, through the national income 
identity: 
Y=C+I+G+(X-M) (3.1) 
The determinants of the fluctuations in net exports are real income (Y) and the 
exchange rate (e) ; 
(X 
-M)= f(Y, e) 
The effect of real income is through the equation below: 
(X-M)=(X-M),, 
-MY 
where, 
(X 
- 
M)u = autonomous component of net exports 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
m=a parameter reflecting a fraction of the change in real 
income spent on imports 
Taking into account the effect of the exchange rate, the equation above is rewritten as: 
(X 
- 
M) 
= 
(X 
- 
M) 
- 
inY 
- 
µe (4) 
where µ is a parameter and e is exchange rate (Gordon, 1990, pp 138). 
Gordon explains that "the connection between the interest rate and the real exchange 
rate establishes a link between fiscal policy and the value of domestic currency. When 
the real money supply is held constant, a fiscal policy stimulus (for example, increase 
in government expenditure) raises both real income and the interest rate. Higher 
interest rates will attract foreigners to buy domestic securities, increasing the value 
of domestic currency. Another factor that can cause the appreciation of domestic 
currency is restrictive monetary policy which shifts the LM curve to the left as the 
real money supply is reduced" (Gordon, 1990, pp 139). 
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A sharp appreciation of domestic currency would then accompany a shift in the 
policy mix from 'tight fiscal, easy money' at point E I, to 'easy fiscal, tight money' at 
point E5. 
Gordon concludes that an increase in the domestic interest rate should cause an 
appreciation of the domestic currency, and a decrease in the interest rate causes a 
depreciation. He gave evidence that the real exchange rate and real interest rate in 
the US during the years 1970 to 1989 shows 'close' relationship between the two 
variables. 
3.1 1 International Crowding Out in the IS-LM Model 
Assuming that the LM curve is unaffected by the openness of the economy and by 
the exchange rate regime, the slope of the IS curve depends on the multiplier (k, the 
inverse of the marginal leakage rate) and on the interest responsiveness of planned 
autonomous spending. In a closed economy, the marginal leakage rate is the after-tax 
marginal propensity to save [s(l- t) + (t )], where t is the income-tax rate. In an 
open economy, the marginal leakage rate adds an additional fraction; [s( I -t) + (t 
)+ (x)], where (x) is a fraction of GNP spent on imports. Thus, in an open economy 
with a fixed exchange rate, the IS curve is steeper, the crowding out effect is smaller 
and the fiscal policy multiplier is larger than in a closed economy. 
When an open economy shifts from a fixed exchange rate system to a flexible 
exchange rate system, the opposite effect occurs. A fiscal policy stimulus creates 
both domestic and international crowding out effects as shown in the diagram below. 
Assuming an increase in the interest rates the crowding out effect can be examined 
along the new IS curve: 
The distance B to C denotes the crowding out effect resulting from an increase in the 
interest rate from ro to r 1, with a fixed exchange rate. BC indicates the response of 
private autonomous spending as a result of higher interest rate. With a flexible 
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Fig 3.2: The IS curve in an open economy with fixed 
and flexible exchange rates. 
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Source: Gordon, 1990. 
exchange rate, a higher interest rate also causes an appreciation of the exchange rate 
and a reduction in net exports. This impact on net exports is shown by the distance 
AB. 
Open economy 
IS (fixed xr) 
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3.1.2 Observations on the Conventional Twin Deficits Notion 
The first and most fundamental point is that Gordon asserts causality and exogeneity 
too soon 
- 
data plugged into the accounting identity (1) shows crowding out of 
domestic investment as well as net exports. While the accounting identity holds, it 
does not provide any theoretical underpining/explanations as to causality and 
exogeneity, at best it only shows that the deficits are linked. Beneath the identity, 
there could be a host of variables that determine its existence. A more systematic 
evaluation of causality and exogeneity is needed. 
The second point has relevance to the first. After postulating causality, Gordon 
theorized that in a closed economy, real income and interest rates are the 
determinants of the budget deficits while exchange rates and real income are the 
determinants of foreign trade deficits. Having these variables as the determinants, 
Gordon posit causal linkage between interest rates and exchange rates. Thus, the 
variables taken are rather ad-hoc and the causality posed is rather simplified. 
There are deeper theoretical explanations for any accounting identity and this has to 
be investigated systematically to build a full structural model. However, we do not 
deny the importance of the role of the exchange rate and interest rates in determining 
the twin deficits. They could be two of the many other variables affecting the 
deficits, hence, forming a basis to start the twin deficits story. With this argument, 
we can't be sure that interest rates is the factor that crowds out domestic private 
investment and exchange rate crowds out net exports as yet. 
An obvious development is to use the IS-LM model after postulating interest rates, 
exchange rates and income as the determinants. Some assumptions have been made 
pertaining to the money supply, thus, the crowding out effects are based on that 
assumption. However, the assumption falls short of money balances analysis because 
the inflation consequences are likely to differ as between the different equilibrium 
points between E1 and E5 in Fig. 3.1 - no account of this has been made. 
One of Gordon's views is that having a policy mix of tax cuts and tight money 
achieves a higher interest rate at point E5 in Fig. 3.1, which would stimulate 
private consumption but crowd out private investment. Presumably private 
investment is crowded out due to the rise in interest rates. However, had savings 
been considered, then foreign savings may be raised through the credit market, 
counteracting the domestic crowding out effects. Also at point ES government 
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expenditure is not clearly distinguished, should it be government investment 
, 
if so 
of what is the nature of investment 
- 
should it also include government consumption, 
if so of which type? If Gordon's hypothesis is crowding out of private investment, 
then the implicit assumption at point E5 is that the government expenditure takes 
the form of investment that substitutes for private investment and not investment 
which is infrastructural or complementary in nature. 
Regarding the foreign trade deficit, Gordon suggests that the foreign exchange rate 
is the most important determinant whereby appreciation crowds out net exports while 
depreciation boosts net exports. We are concerned with the effects on export 
revenues which we feel are ambiguous because of the presence of price efects and 
quantity effects on revenues, and it is revenues that are relevant for the deficits. 
Finally, a close relationship between the movements of interest rates and exchange 
rates are noted but how close it is or the correlation between them is not clear. It is 
also worth noting that the corresponding effect of high interest rates and exchange 
rates is a rising burden on debt repayments for indebted developing countries during 
those years since debts are denominated in U. S. currency. The fundamental point is 
what is the size and magnitude of the effect of interest rate differentials on the 
exchange rates? 
Notwithstanding these points, Gordon's theory of the twin deficits nevertheless 
forms a good basis for further formal investigation into causality and exogeneity and 
the determinants of the twin deficits' relationship. It is hoped that a more extensive 
analysis is done in this exercise while postulating our own thesis about debt and 
twin deficits. 
In the following section we review competing theories on the twin deficits issue and 
discuss opposing views of the twin deficits notion. 
3.2 Competing Schools of Thoughts on the Twin Deficits 
There are two alternative schools of thoughts on the twin deficits notion: 
(i) the Mundell-Flemming framework which provides some theoretical justification 
to the twin-deficits relationship. 
(ii) the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis which expects no causality running from 
government budget deficits to trade deficits. 
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The Mundell-Fleming framework implies that an increase in the government deficit 
via for example, a tax cut, raises aggregate demand 
- 
essentially implying that a 
fiscal shock is not fully offset by an increase in private savings. The increased 
demand forces the domestic real interest rate to rise which further induces net 
foreign capital inflows resulting in an appreciation of the domestic currency's real 
foreign exchange value. The real appreciation stems from an appreciation in the 
nominal exchange rate in a flexible exchange rate regime, and from an increased 
domestic price level under a fixed exchange rate regime. The appreciation relies on 
an assumption that there is sufficient capital mobility to outweigh direct domestic 
demand effects worsening the current account. The relatively more expensive 
domestic currency pushes the trade balance towards deficit. Thus, this model implies 
that increased government deficits ultimately widen the trade deficits, under both 
flexible and fixed exchange regimes although the transmission mechanisms differ. 
Under a fixed exchange regime, the trade deficit deteriorates because of an income 
effect as well as the real appreciation. 
3.2.1- The Mundell-Flemming Framework 
On the problem of achieving internal stability and balance of payments (b. o. p) 
equilibrium with the assumptions made are that the exchange rate is fixed and there 
are no trade controls, Mundell suggests that monetary policy ought to be aimed at 
external objectives and fiscal policy at internal objectives. The theory implies that 
when stabilization measures are limited to monetary policy and fiscal policy 
,a 
surplus country experiencing inflationary pressure should ease monetary conditions 
and raise taxes (or reduce government spending), and a deficit country suffering 
from unemployment should tighten interest rates and lower taxes (or increased 
government spending). 
In the Mundell framework, the conditions for equilibrium are: 
I) Internal balance requires that aggregate demand for domestic output be equal to 
aggregate supply at full employment. During transitory disequilibrium periods, it is 
assumed that inventories are either running down or accumulating in excess of 
desired changes, according to whether the disequilibrium reflects a state of 
inflationary or recessionary potential. 
2) External balance implies that the balance of trade equals (net) capital exports at 
the fixed exchange parity. If the balance of trade exceeds capital exports, there will 
be a balance of payments surplus and a tendency for the exchange rate to appreciate, 
which the central bank restrains by accumulating stocks of foreign exchange. And 
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likewise, if the balance of trade falls short of capital exports, there will be a balance 
of payments deficit and a tendency for the exchange rate to depreciate, which the 
central bank prevents by dispensing with stocks of foreign exchange. 
The following assumptions are made; all foreign policies and export demand are 
given; the balance of trade worsens as the level of domestic expenditure increases; 
and, capital flows are responsive to interest-rate differentials. Then, domestic 
expenditure is assumed to depend only on fiscal policy (the budget surplus) and 
monetary policy (the interest rate) at the full-employment level of output. The 
complete system is summarised in the diagram below. 
Fie. 3.3: Equilibrium in the internal balance and the balance of wments 
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Source: Mundell, 1969 
The foreign balance schedule, FF, shows the combinations of interest rates and 
budget surpluses (at a given income level with full employment) along which the 
external balance is in equilibrium. An increase in the interest rate, by reducing 
capital exports and lowering domestic expenditure and hence imports improves the 
external balance, so the negative slope. An increase in the budget surplus, by raising 
domestic expenditure and hence imports worsens the balance of payments. Thus, in 
any point on the schedule an increase in the rate of interest would cause an external 
surplus, which has to be compensated by a reduction in the budget surplus to restore 
equilibrium. Points above and to the right of the schedule refer to balance of 
payments surplus, while points below and to the left of the schedule represent 
balance of payments deficits. 
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The internal balance schedule XX 
, 
shows the combinations of interest rate and 
budget surpluses where full employment equilibrium in the market for goods and 
services continues. Along the schedule, full employment output is equal to aggregate 
demand for output, or in another sense, home demand for domestic goods is equal 
to full employment output less exports. The negative slope implies a negative 
relationship between interest rates and the budget surplus so as to maintain domestic 
expenditure constant. 
The above analysis is not appropriate when the exchange rate is flexible because 
equilibrium in the balance of payments is automatically maintained by variations in 
the foreign exchange rate. For an open economy to be in equilibrium, two conditions 
must be met: the demand for goods and services must equal the supply of goods and 
services, and there must be equilibrium in the balance of payments. The first 
condition necessitates output to be equal the sum of domestic expenditure and the 
trade balance, and the second condition necessitates the trade balance deficit equal 
net capital imports. 
The set of assumptions made are capital imports and exports depend on interest rates 
at home and abroad (monetary policy); that foreign incomes are given in the period 
under consideration; and that output at home is perfectly elastic up to the point of full 
employment. With these assumptions Mundell reduces the system to two equlibrium 
conditions in two variables - the level of output and the exchange rate. 
The XX curve below traces the combinations of exchange rates and output. Along 
XX the demand for goods and services is equal to the supply of goods and services. 
Mundell argues that an increase in output must be associated with an increase in the 
price of foreign exchange for equilibrium to be maintained. This is because an 
increase in output gives rise to an excess supply of goods and services, whereas an 
increase in the price of foreign exchange gives rise to an excess demand for foreign 
goods, hence the positive slope. 
The FF schedule traces the points between exchange rates and output, and FF 
achieves equilibrium in the balance of payments. This curve also has a positive 
slope because an increase in the price of foreign exchange improves the balance of 
payments, while an increase in income worsens it, hence equilibrium position 
requires an increase in the price of foreign exchange to be accompanied by an 
increase in output. 
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The relative steepness of the two slopes is determined by considering the conditions 
of dynamic stability. It follows that income rises or falls depending on whether there 
is excess demand or excess supply in the market for goods and services, and that the 
price of foreign exchange rises or falls depending on whether there is a deficit or 
surplus in the balance of payments. The slope of the internal balance schedule 
exceeds the slope of the foreign balance schedule for stability in the system. 
Fig. 3.4: Stable Internal-External Equilibrium 
Exchange 
rate 
v: A 
F 
(ID 
Output 
Source: Mundell, 1968 
The four quadrants denote different conditions of excess demand or supply in the 
goods and foreign exchange market. Quadrant B has excess demand in the goods 
market and a balance of payments surplus; quadrant D has excess supply in the 
goods market and a balance of payments deficit. The exhange rate and the level of 
output to move in the directions indicated by the arrows in each quadrant. A 
necessary condition for stability is the slope of XX exceed the slope of FF. Mundell 
describes that fiscal policy will significantly affect only the position of the internal 
balance schedule. 
At the initial exchange rate and level of output, a budget deficit will not change the 
balance of payments, but will create an excess demand for goods and services. To 
correct the excess demand, the level of output must increase or the exchange rate 
must fall. The XX schedule thus shifts to the right, achieving a new equilibrium at 
a higher level of output and an increased foreign exchange rate. 
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Fig. 3.5: The Effect of Fiscal Policy on Employment. 
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The change in output given by the multiplier is y/y2 which is the increase in income 
necessary to eliminate the excess demand caused by the change in spending at a 
constant exchange rate. But at the point P there is a deficit in the balance of 
payments. Since Mundell had argued that the variations in exchange rate ensures an 
automatic balance of payment's equilibrium, under the flexible exchange rate system, 
the deficit will be eliminated by a depreciation. Excess demand in the goods market is 
created and thus inducing successive rounds of income increases and exchange rate 
changes until point Q' is reached. 
Mundell concludes that a budget deficit mainly affecting spending on home goods 
will create an expansion of output equal to that indicated by the Keynesian foreign 
trade multiplier plus an additional amount due to the elimination of the foreign 
imbalances by the depreciation of the exchange rate. Fiscal policy is therefore, 
more effective in improving employment under a system of flexible exchange rates 
than under a system of fixed exchange rates, under the assumption of capital 
immobility. In the case of capital mobility, fiscal policy would be more effective 
under the fixed exchange rate regime. 
3.2.1.1 Comments on Mundell's Framework 
Like the twin deficits notion revived by Gordon, Mundell's work implies interest 
rates and exchange rates as the main linking pins between the deficits and that 
X x' 
11 
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aggregate demand is raised by fiscal expansion. However, the essence of Mundell's 
work is to have a stability in the internal and the external balances. In a flexible 
exchange rate regime, the exchange rates and output adjust to maintain an 
equilibrium in the external balance as well as the internal balance. The relevant 
assumptions made on interest rates, foreign incomes and output are as on page 15. 
We, however, have some reservations with regard to Mundell's hypothesis that a 
change in the price of foreign exchange improves the balance of payments 
automatically. There are two effects of a change in the price of foreign exchange - 
price and quantity effects. Assuming that an appreciation of the exchange rates 
decreases the price of imports and increases the price of exports, or simply the terms 
of trade improves, then the balance of trade also improves. If, however, an 
appreciation reduces the quantity of exports relative to quantity of imports, then 
there will be a worsening of the balance of trade. If the quantity of exports does not 
change relative to imports, the balance of trade will improve. 
Though it can be concluded that the existing (we term them conventional from now) 
twin deficit literature is quite rich theoretically, there exists two fundamental 
loopholes. For one thing, there still exists a controversy on the link between 
government deficits and exchange rates making the Mundell-Fleming type model 
not universally accepted by some other existing literature. Branson (1988) suggests 
that increased U. S. government deficits are the prime determinant of the the dollar's 
appreciation. Feldstein (1986) also supports the link whereby increased 
government deficits appreciate the dollar. Conversely, Evans (1986) finds evidence 
that increased deficits depreciate the dollar. Enders and Lee (1990) suggest, 
empirically, the twin deficits are not even "distant cousins"! The other aspect is as 
had been discussed in section 3.1.3, no study had touched on a full structural model 
ever before, and we intend to investigate systematically the twin deficits notion to 
build a full structural model which we will give the term 'new twin deficits' model. 
322 The Revival of the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis 
Unlike the Mundell-Fleming model, a model incorporating Ricardian Equivalence 
suggests that a substitution of debt for taxes by the government increases the fiscal 
deficit, but the increase would be offset by an increase in private savings, rather 
than an increase in net foreign borrowing (trade deficit). However, changes in 
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temporary government spending behaviour can affect trade deficits in this 
framework. 
Barro (1974) revived the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH) in that 
government expenditure financed by tax is is no different than if financed by bonds 
because bonds represent a future tax liability. We have noted that the conventional 
wisdom view an increase in tax directly reduces the budget deficit and induces a 
reduction in private sector spending. The REH implies that raising tax to retire 
government debt without changing the level of government spending will not affect 
private spending or the current account balance; changing the means of financing its 
expenditures does not affect private sector spending. However, increases in 
government spending, regardless of the means of finance can be expected to induce a 
current account deficit. 
Barro argues that the view whereby expansionary fiscal policy increases aggregate 
demand hinges on the assumption that government bonds are perceived as net wealth 
by the private sector. This assumption is important in demonstrating the real effects of 
shifts in the stock of public debt and establishing non-neutrality of changes in the 
stock of money, thus, the assumption plays an important role in theoretical analyses 
of monetary and fiscal effects. The assumption that government debt issues, at least 
in part, leads to an increase in the typical household's conception of its net wealth is 
crucial for demonstrating a positive effect on aggregate demand of "expansionary" 
fiscal policy, which is defined as a substitution of debt for tax finance in Barro's case, 
for a given level of government expenditure. In a full employment, the basic 
argument according to Barro, follows Modigliani (1961) where an increase in 
government debt implies an increase in perceived household wealth; hence, an 
increase in desired consumption (a component of aggregate demand) relative to 
saving; further, an increase in interest rates; and finally, a decline in the fraction of 
output which goes to capital accumulation. In a non-full employment context it 
remains true that the effect of public debt issue on aggregate demand (and hence, on 
output and employment) hinges on the assumed increase in perceived household 
wealth. 
The first part of his paper deals with the effect of government bond issue on the 
calculus of individual wealth in an overlapping-generations economy with physical 
capital and where individuals have finite lives. The key result is that, so long as there 
is an operative intergenerational transfer, there will be no net-wealth effect and, 
hence, no effect on aggregate demand or on interest rates of a marginal change in 
government debt. 
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The second part of his paper deals with the existence of imperfect private capital 
markets. It is shown, to the extent that public debt issue entails a loan from low- 
discount-rate to high-discount-rate individuals, a positive net-wealth effect results if 
the government is more efficient than the private market in carrying out this kind of 
loan. If the government is more efficient only over a certain range, and if the public 
choice process determines the amount of government debt issue in accord with 
efficiency criteria, it is again true at the margin that net wealth effect of government 
bond issue is nil. 
Barro's observations on the aabove issues are that if the government is really more 
efficient than the private market in the lending process (presumably because of 
economies of scale and the ability to coerce outweigh the problems of government 
incentive and control), it may limit the loan recipients to high-discount-rate 
individuals. Secondly, if the government is more efficient than the private market 
only over a certain range with a sufficiently large value of government debt, the net 
wealth effect of government bonds at the margiin would be zero despite the 
continued existence of "imperfect private capital markets. " 
In summary the paper focuses on the question of whether an increase in government 
debt constitutes an increase in perceived household wealth. The effect of finite lives 
is examined within the context of an overlapping generations model of the economy. 
It is shown that households would act as though they are infinitely lived, and 
hence, there would be no marginal net wealth effect of government bonds so long as 
there exists an operative chain of intergenerational transfers which connect current to 
future generations. 
The basic conclusion is that there is no persuasive theoretical case for treating 
government debt, at the margin, as a net component of perceived household wealth. 
If in fact, the marginal net-wealth effect are negligible, the implications for 
monetary and fiscal analysis would be far reaching. In particular, in the case where 
the marginal net-wealth effect of government bonds is close to zero Barro argues 
that, "(1) the Metzler-type argument for non-neutrality of changes in the stock of 
outside money would be valid, (2) a change in the stock of government debt would 
have no effect on capital formation, and, more generally, (3) fiscal effects involving 
changes in the relative amounts of tax and debt finance for a given amount of 
public expenditure would have no effect on aggregate demand, interest rates and 
capital formation" (Barro, 1974) 
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3.2.2.1 Comments on the REH 
The intergenerational issue concerns a long-run aspect of fiscal policy, hence, a 
deficit policy may have effects on long-run capital accumulation/stock. As to the 
question of increase in perceived household wealth, it is true only in the short-run 
even in a non-full employment context (as opposed to Barro's view as to non-full 
employment case see page 19). In chapter 1 we argue that debt allows a temporary 
acquisition of higher standard of living than could have otherwise been, but debt has 
to be repayed in accordance with the contracts agreed or at least be settled before the 
maturity date expires. Hence, the short-run applicability of increased perceived net 
wealth and in the long-run, debt has to be repaid, hence, the applicability of future 
tax libility, even in the case of non-full employment. 
Bernheim (1987) evaluates the Ricardian Equivalence in detail (which are mostly not 
relevant for our purpose) pertaining to issues such as inter-generational transfers, 
redistribution effects, and permanent postponement effects, having mostly negative 
criticism on all these aspects; rather than evaluating on those aspects where the 
REH may and may not hold in real life (see Bernheim 1987 for details). Basically, 
he argues in favour of changes in consumption patterns if tax is postponed and 
replaced with debt financing, hence, changes in aggregate demand follows. For 
example, he considers the issue of redistribution policies with respect to 
postponing of taxes which may alter the tax incidence; thus, suggesting that real 
debt effects mostly arise from this kind of redistributions. Another example is when 
the distribution of future taxes is not known. If consumers save more as a 
precautionary motive, deficits may actually crowd-in investment, though he agrees 
that this is difficult to assess. 
3 
.3 Comparing and 
Contrasting Both Theories 
The contribution of both studies has to be addressed firstly; both provide a good 
basis for a formal investigation into the twin deficits story and it's applicability in the 
developing countries which no study had been done on it ever before. The 
departure of the REH from the conventional wisdom opens another important issue 
which happens in reality in the 1980s. Had the developing countries been RE, in the 
first place, debt would not have been accumulated. 
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We believe that the validity of any conclusive policy issues depend on whether 
one is concerned with short-run or long-run issues. In the short-run, stimulation 
of aggregate demand within a standard Keynesian setting is undoubtedly correct. 
Whereas, in the long-run, intergenerational issues do play a dominant role, especially 
on capital accumulation and capital stocks, hence, the REH forms a basis for a 
policy course of action. The focus should be on investigating the nature and 
magnitude of the economy's departure from the idealized REH model. 
The Mundell-Flemming framework is quite rich conceptually relative to Gordon's 
work, though the backbone runs from interest rate to exchange rate mechanisms of 
transmission which is the standard conventional twin deficits notion. The external 
deficit is explicitly related to the internal balance through exchange rate and income 
changes after having made some assumptions about interest rates, still being able to 
consider the monetary policy aspect (refer to graph 4, for example), whereas it is 
implicit in Gordon's work. The output and exchange rate changes affecting both 
balnces would be useful in our context later in chapter 5. 
Both frameworks, however, did not systematically investigate the many variables 
that affect the linkages, instead, considering variables as had already been 
theorized which are hypothesised to be the most important determinants. As had 
been said, they are rather taken ad hoc. The following reviews the empirical 
literature on the two competing theories. 
3.4. The Empirical Literature 
The followings discusses the empirical literature on the Mundell-Fleming type of 
analysis followed by the literature on the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis. 
34.1 The Mundell-Flemming Type 
In investigating the popular debate on whether increased government deficits cause 
dollar appreciation, and whether fiscal deficits lead to higher trade deficits, Tallman 
and Rosensweig (1993) include a measure of federal government purchases to 
distinguish between government purchases and government balances as the potential 
sources of the twin deficits correlation. Using U. S. quarterly data (1961: Ito 
1989: IV), they employ five variables namely government purchases, government 
balance, trade balance, real interest rates and real exchange rates in their non- 
structured model. They estimate the model using vector autoregression techniques 
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(VAR). They specify causal ordering that runs from the trade balance to exchange 
rate to interest rates to government balance and finally to government purchases. 
The results suggest that government balance innovations are associated with the 
trade balance variance at 90 percent posterior probability which is well above the 
10 percent required using the Bayesian approach. This is consistent with the twin 
deficits notion implying a significant effect of fiscal balance on the trade balance. 
An innovation of the trade balance explains a low 8 percent of the variance in the 
government balance. The direction of causality is concluded to be running from the 
government fiscal balance to the trade balance as evidenced by the low percentage of 
association between them. 
An impulse response function shows the dynamic pattern and signs of effects of 
significant variables whereas a variance decomposition does not indicate these 
features except indicating causality. It is shown that a positive shock to the federal 
government balance to GNP ratio leads to an unambiguous increase in the trade 
balance to GNP ratio. Thus, the impulse response and variance decomposition results 
provide strong support for the twin deficits relationship. Also it is shown that the 
budget deficits are associated with an appreciating real currency which is consistent 
with the twin deficit story on the link between trade balances and the dollar in the 
U. S. 
We view the study by Rosensweig and Tallman as a stereotype of the twin deficits 
notion theorized by Gordon. The choice of variables is therefore favours towards 
the twin deficits notion although an effort is made to include government purchases 
which is the only variable that is supposed to show a different story - the Ricardian 
story. As such, the empirical literature too, seems to lose sight of the twin deficits 
identity that includes the private sector's role. However, this is not surprising 
because of the choice of variables taken are according to 'theory'. 
The interest rate effects on exchange rates is not clear and had not been discussed 
in their empirical findings. Presumably, it follows as what had been theorized as 
well. 
Also, the use of aggregates in estimation to measure the effects of deficits may be 
misleading. Studies using aggregate time-series data almost uniformly support the 
view that deficits significantly stimulate aggregate demand in the short-run, yet they 
often fail to identify systematic short-run relationship between deficits and either 
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interest rates, prices or other nominal variables. Few (if any) studies have attempted 
to measure long-run effects directly. 
Other studies which support the twin deficits notion are Abell (1990) and Evans 
(1986). Abell uses a multivariate time-series to examine the linkages between the 
U. S. federal budget deficits and merchandise trade deficits. Using a vector- 
autoregressive model, he found support for the notion that budget deficits influence 
trade deficits indirectly rather than directly. Evidence is obtained through causality 
testing and impulse response functions that the twin deficits are connected through 
the transmission mechanism of interest rates and exchange rates. Abell argues the 
model indicates that reducing the size of the budget deficit proves to he as 
effective as exchange rate intervention for the purpose of reducing the size of 
merchandise trade. 
Feldstein (1986) found that the rise in expected future deficits in the budget of the 
U. S. government had a powerful effect on the exchange rate between the dollar and 
the German mark in the period 1980 to early 1985 
. 
We conclude that the empirical literature that emphasizes the twin deficits 
relationship relies upon the interest rate-exchange rate mechanisms of transmission. 
The budget deficits cause changes in the value of the dollar through the interest rate 
linkage and budget deficits cause changes in the trade deficits through the exchange 
rate linkage. However, these studies are short-run studies covering the period when 
deficits and value of the dollar surged in the U. S. 
3.4.2 The REH Type 
The following studies assess the REH. Enders and Lee (1990) outline the "orthodox 
view" 
- 
that government expenditures financed by tax collections affect the economy 
in distinctively different ways than government expenditures financed by bond issues. 
The view of the "conventional wisdom" presumes that budget deficits are 
responsible for the current account deficits in the U. S. The standard policy 
prescription is to increase taxes; which will then reduce the budget deficit and induce 
a reduction in private sector spending. The expenditure reduction, i. e. reducing 
imports and increasing the net supply of goods for exports, will improve the current 
account deficit. 
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Enders and Lee then develop a two-country micro-theoretic model consistent with 
the REH. It implies that raising taxes without changing the level of government 
spending will not affect the current account deficit, and thus, the means of financing 
the government expenditures will not affect private sector spending. Given the 
levels of public and private spending, a tax increase reduces the budget deficit but 
the external deficit is unaltered. 
Their model is highly aggregative in that they assume there is a single commodity 
which can be used for private or government consumption. The formulation of the 
hypothesis considers the maximisation of a utility function of a U. S. resident 
- 
the 
expected utility being conditioned on real private consumption and real 
government purchases set at time t. In their equation, there is an inclusion of 
measures of the degree of relative risk aversion, the discount rate, and a "share" 
parameter measuring the degree to which real government spending contributes to the 
individual's utility. 
In highlighting the REH, the budget constraint faced by the individual is based on the 
assumption that government debt is the only "store" of value. One unit of bonds is 
issued to pay for one unit of output. The individual's budget constraint is the sum of 
the following; the discounted dollar value (real) of U. S. one-period bond purchased 
at time t; the discounted foreign currency value (real) of foreign issued one-period 
bond purchased at time t; the real private consumption and the real lump-sum 
taxes. The sum of these must not exceed the sum of real output, domestic and 
foreign bonds. 
The individuals optimization problem in each period t is to choose real consumption 
and the sum of domestic and foreign bonds so as to maximize his utility subject to 
the budget constraint. The government's budget constraint comprises net 
government purchases (government purchases less taxes) which is equal to the 
discounted values of the sum of the real domestic bonds and the real quantity of 
foreign purchases of US government bonds less the values of the two bonds in the 
previous period. 
They then incorporated the REH by substituting the government's budget constraint 
into the individual's budget constraint and obtain the discounted values of the sum of 
consumption and government purchases less output which must be equal to foreign 
bonds of previous period less foreign purchases of U. S. bonds of previous period. 
The resulting equation is the hallmark of the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis for an 
open economy, that is, the discounted value of the U. S. consumption stream must be 
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financed from the income stream plus U. S. net claims on foreigners less the 
discounted value of U. S. government spending. 
Given that the main concern of the study is the issue of debt versus taxes and the 
individual's lifetime budget constraint does not include taxes, Enders and Lee suggest 
that real interest rates be introduced through a foreign optimization behaviour to 
explain the determinants of interest rates. They assume that the foreign optimal 
consumption programme is the same as in the U. S. It comprises foreign discounted 
expenditure stream (consumption plus government purchases less output) not 
exceeding foreign domestic bonds less foreign bonds, both from the previous period, 
then satisfy the lifetime budget constraints of foreign governments combined with 
the private sector. Enders and Lee conclude that given the real interest rates and 
foreign governments expenditure stream, substituting foreign taxes for foreign debt 
will not alter consumption possibilities. Real interest rates are determined by the 
condition that world output equals world demand as in equation (3.4). 
Agents are assumed to form rational expectations concerning output and government 
purchases. Consumption depends on the existing level of net U. S. claims on 
foreigners and on expectations concerning the sequence of real discount factors. 
The real interest rate is thus determined independently of government budget balance. 
yr +V, 
*= CrQ + ci#O+ g, + g, (3.4) 
where; y= output; co = consumption function; (g) = government purchase and 
with the asterisks are the corresponding world variables. The direct implication, 
according to Enders and Lee is that the so-called 'twin deficits' are not even 'distant 
relatives' as evidenced by their equation for net export (nx), where, net export is 
equals to output (y) less the consumption functions (CO less government purchases 
(g ), all at time t. 
n. xr =Yr -c10-9, (3.5) 
Given output and government purchases at time t and the invariance of the 
consumption functions to debt issue, they argue that the balance of goods and 
services deficit cannot be caused by the federal government budget's deficit. 
However, a temporary increase in government spending can be associated with an 
external deficit. 
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The vector autoregression technique (VAR) is used to examine the relationships 
between government purchases, tax or debt policies, real consumption, the current 
account balance, exchange rate and the real interest rate. The technique does not 
require exogeneity restriction a priori. Variables included are in accordance with 
the theoretical model set. They use quarterly US data over the sample period 1947: 11! 
to 1987: 1. What the VAR does is to forecast error variance of a variable that is 
attributable to every variable in the system. 
Their first result without any restrictions shows: i) innovations in government 
expenditure explain 15.9% of the balance of goods and services and 8.5% of 
consumption, consistent with the interpretation that government spending changes 
are temporary; ii) innovation in debt shows an increase in debt explains 12.9% of 
the variance in trade balance. It explains a small fraction of the variance in 
consumption (5.2%) and the real interest rate (5.5%). The unrestricted VAR seems 
to show inconsistency with the REH and is consistent with the conventional wisdom. 
That is, an increase in the outstanding stock of government bonds and a 
comensurate decline in taxes should not have any real effects on the current account, 
real consumption or interest rate. Enders and Lee argue that this is due to a set of 
constraints has to be imposed on the data. The innovation in interest rates explains 
less than 4% of the forecast error variance of any of the variable in the system. This 
is consistent with their contention that the inclusion of nominal exchange rate does 
not affect the behaviour of the real variables. 
The REH is again tested by imposing the optimal consumption rules on the data, if 
the optimal consumption rule cannot be rejected, then REH cannot be rejected. The 
condition for an interior solution requires the expected discounted expenditure 
streams to be equals to where ß measures the discount rate. The expenditure 
streams consisting of consumption in the next period divided by consumption now 
plus government purchases for the next perod divided by government purchases now, 
and both variables have restrictions in terms of relative risk and a share parameter 
(their relative shares in the equation). They take the rate of change of the variables 
(except net exports and the interest rate), and their logarithmic form. 
Their null hypothesis requires the expected discounted expenditure stream to be 
2 
equal to -in 0- 2-, where 
62 denotes the variance of the expenditure stream. 
The assumption derived is that individuals can borrow and lend unlimited amounts at 
the given real interest rate. It is shown that the government spending can affect 
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consumption behaviour to the extent that private and social spending are substitutes. 
A borrower faces liquidity constraints if the capital market is imperfect so 
consumption is equals to output less domestic and foreign borrowings as well as the 
limit set on borrowings. 
Given the values of output, domestic and foreign borrowings, an increase in current 
taxes must induce a reduction in current consumption regardless of the use of tax 
revenue. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then the empirical importance of 
the liquidity constraint should be rejected. Enders and Lee tested the restrictions 
embodied in their new equations using the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
procedure developed by Hansen (1992). 
Their estimated results shows that the restrictions are binding and the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance indicating that the 
REH is consistent with the U. S. experience. The point estimates of the parameters 
of the utility function are consistent with the theoretical restrictions and it indicates 
that government purchases are poor substitutes for private sector spending. 
To conclude, the direct implication of the result is that substitution of taxes for 
government debt issues does not result in a current account deficit. The data are 
consistent with the REH. Equation (3.5) clearly shows that the external balance or 
net export is determined by output less consumption and government purchases, 
which is independent of government budget balance. 
Enders and Lee admitted that there are some limitations to their study; in that, there 
might be some other variables which could significantly explain some portion of 
consumption variability like alternative measures of government debt and all foreign 
country variables. Also, they avoid estimating a full structural model of the current 
account to avoid the difficult issue of obtaining reasonable measures for the "rest of 
the world's" variables. Their behavioural assumption of purchasing power parity 
could be questionable. 
3.4.2.1. Comments on Enders and Lee's work 
An interesting finding from Enders and Lee's work is that when the restrictions are 
not imposed in their equations, the result seems to be consistent with the conventional 
wisdom that government spending causes an increase in the trade balance deficits. 
This findings seems to be valid in the short run, however in the long run the result 
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does not hold. Also with the restriction imposed their result are consistent with the 
REH. 
Interest rates and net exports are considered endogenous variables in Enders and 
Lee's work, which is a step away from theory. 
One puzzle with the study is that what happens to the foreign variables are not 
discussed. Presumably they are used only for the purpose of showing how interest 
rates enter the model; it is not exogenous and determined by fiscal policy but 
determined by world output and demand. 
Aschauer (1985) investigates the effects of fiscal policy on private consumption 
and aggregate demand within an explicit intertemporal optimization framework. 
The following 'familiar' questions are investigated: Whether consumption is 
sensitive to the choice of tax versus debt financing of current government 
expenditure and to what extent, if any, does government spending directly substitute 
for private consumer expenditure. His approach exploits restrictions placed on data 
by the first order necessary conditions for intertemporal optimization in 
consumption. The consideration of the choice of consumption in the adjacent 
periods t, t+1 leads to an Euler equation. It states for the individual to choose an 
optimal (interior) time path for effective consumption, it must be the case that he 
cannot improve his welfare standing by reducing effective consumption in one 
period and increasing in another. 
Variables used are consumption, defined as per capita consumer expenditure on 
non-durables and services; and per capita net deficit of the total government sector, 
in a two equation system - one for private consumption and the other for government 
consumpion. He uses FIML to estimate the equations. A cross equation restriction is 
imposed to mark the rational expectation approach and restricts the way in which past 
government expenditure and past government deficits may influence present 
consumption expenditure. 
Aschauer failed to mention which dataset he is using apart from mentioning data are 
quarterly. The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of rational expectations 
and Ricardian equivalence as well as of the proposition that goverment spending 
substitutes poorly for private consumption in utility. Holding the level of 
government spending fixed, private consumption expenditure follows a random walk 
process. The finding that government spending substitutes poorly for private 
consumption implies that increases in government purchases of goods and services 
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will have important expansionary effects on aggregate demand. Rises in government 
spending will only induce a partial ex ante crowding out of private consumption. 
The temporary effect of government spending on output arise from the attempt by 
economic agents to smooth effective consumption levels over time. This attempt 
will induce reallocation of resources from other periods to the present which, in turn, 
will increase rates of return and cause an intertemporal substitution of work effort 
and a contemporaneous expansion of output. 
3 
.3 Comparing and 
Contrasting the Empirical Literature 
The empirical literature has a clear divide, either following the twin-deficit notion 
or the REH, hence, standard variables belonging to either type of the hypothesis 
are used. Standard variables in the twin deficit context are government deficit, 
interest rates, exchange rates and external deficits. Standard variables for the REH 
are all of the four variables just menationed and government debt. Departure from 
the standard REH variables is found in Enders and Lee's study; they endogenise 
interest rates and net exports, and foreign borrowings enter the model through a 
foreigner's budget constraint. 
All of the empirical work involves short-run analysis is consistent with the 
theoretical underpinings. No attempt has been made to include changes in capital 
stock in an intergenerational framework. 
3.4 Debt Literature 
The work of Easterly and Fischer suggest that there are well known refinements to 
the Keynesian concept. They belief that, for a given deficit, an equal increase in 
government spending and revenue increases aggregate demand, that is, the deficit 
does measure the effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand. Also, the budget 
deficit is itself endogenous, affected by and affecting the economy. 
Easterly and Fischer focus attention on the effect of fiscal policy on the 
components of demand rather than on level of aggregate demand, given by the 
saving-investment identity, or the resource constraint facing the economy: 
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Budget deficit = (private saving 
- 
private investment) 
+ current account deficit. (3.6) 
The national income accounts budget deficit identity highlights association between 
the deficit on domestic savings, investment and the current account. It is assumed 
that the economy is at full employment and given the savings rate, the equation 
implies a crowding-out problem; an increase in the budget deficit will be associated 
with either a decrease in investment or an increase in the current account deficit. 
Easterly and Fischer argue that it is wrong to say the link between budget deficit and 
trade deficit is one to one because of the fact that there are two terms on the right- 
hand side of the budget identity. They also point out that Balassa (1988) finds a high 
correlation between the budget deficit and trade deficit in the industrial countries but 
not in the developing countries. Another example taken is the U. K. case in 1988-89, 
where trade deficit was large but a strong fiscal position was maintained. 
A more sophisticated model of saving behaviour, according to Easterly and Fischer, 
is the one that emerges from the life-cycle and permanent income theories of 
consumption of Franco Modigliani and Milton Friedman. Easterly and Fischers' 
argument centers around the link between the budget deficit and saving; that no focus 
has been made on the link, and that, the standard Keynesian analysis takes saving 
rates as determined by the level of disposable income. Whereas the life-cycle and 
permanent income theories both relate current consumption to a measure of 
permanent or lifetime disposable income. Therefore, a temporary change in taxes 
other things remain equal, does not change or reduce current consumption. Hence, 
temporary tax changes have smaller effects on consumption than permanent tax 
changes. The implication is that expectations about the permanence of the budget 
deficit influences spending behaviour. 
Easterly and Fischer postulates four ways of financing the budget deficit and term it 
as debt dynamic (equation 7), which serves as a long-run constraint on fiscal policy. 
The macroeconomic imbalances associated with each are: printing money excessively 
gives rise to inflation, excessive use of foreign reserves causes balance of payments 
crises, excessive foreign borrowings cause debt crises and too much domestic 
borrowing increases real interest rate leading to crowding out of private investment. 
Budget deficit = money printing + (foreign reserves use 
+ foreign borrowing) + domestic borrowing. (3.7) 
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Printing of money greater than its demand at current price level increases the price 
level. Initially, a stock of real money may reduce the interest rate. Historical records 
show an average rate of seignorage of about 1% of GNP for industrial countries and 
less than 2.5% of GNP for developing countries for the government to maximise 
revenue. Reliance on seignorage revenue can lead to hyperinflation. An example 
given is Bolivia in 1984-85 where inflation reached 11,000% in 1985 although 
revenue from currency creation fell to 8% in 1985 from 14% of GDP in 1984. 
The use of foreign exchange reserves ameliorates inflationary effects, however, 
slowing down inflation so as to slow down exchange rate depreciation is not viable 
unless fiscal policy is made compatible with the lower inflation. Expectation of 
reserves draining may shift private sector's behaviour in investing their assets 
overseas, thus creating capital flight since exhaustion of reserves is associated with 
depreciation of the currency. 
The use of foreign borrowing tends to cause appreciation of the exchange rate, 
'damaging' exports and encouraging imports. Excessive reliance on external 
borrowing to finance the budget deficit and of having large budget deficits are 
illustrated by the debt crises. Most of the countries that developed debt-servicing 
difficulties run huge public deficits so that past over-borrowing and the perception 
that they are not credit-worthy have resulted in credit rationing. 
Easterly and Fischer noted that the budget deficit and the trade deficit are not 
necessarily linked. Budget deficits can be financed by printing money and by 
domestic borrowing. But they believe in some developing countries where the 
domestic capital markets are thin and domestic borrowing possibilities are limited, the 
connection between the budget deficit and external borrowing is more likely to be 
close. Fiscal adjustments through cutbacks in expenditure has substantially reduced 
the current account deficit. Or, in other words, a decrease in external financing forces 
either fiscal contraction or inflation in some debtor countries. 
Domestic borrowing is used to avoid inflation and external crises. But if excessively 
used, the danger is that government borrowing will reduce availability of credits to 
the private sector, hence pushing the inflation higher. Examples are Colombia and 
Turkey. In 1987, real domestic lending reached 50% in Turkey. Domestic borrowing 
leads to credit rationing and crowding-out of private sector investment. Government 
borrowing domestically tends to push private sector borrowings abroad. The link 
between fiscal and external deficits will also be especially close when the "capital 
account is highly open. " 
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Easterly and Fischer examine the long-run effects of running deficits using the 
identity in equation (3.8). The debt factor is now taken as a ratio to GNP (d) and 
includes both domestic and external debt: 
Change in d= (primary deficit/GNP) 
- 
(seignorage/GNP) 
+ (real interest rate 
- 
growth rate) *d (3.8) 
Equation (3.8) shows that the change in debt ratio (d) is equal to the non-interest or 
primary deficit of the total public sector, minus the part that is financed by printing 
money, plus the current debt ratio (d) times the average real interest rate on the debt 
minus the growth rate of GNP. This means that the non-interest deficit in excess of 
the amount of money created by the central bank has to be financed with new debt. 
Nominal interest expenditure has to be financed with new debt, too. The debt ratio 
will fall if inflation rises or if real GNP grows in the absence of borrowing since the 
denominator is nominal GNP. 
The difference between the real interest rate and the growth rate of GNP affects debt 
dynamics and the sustainability of deficits. If the real interest rate on debt exceeds the 
growth rate of GNP, the government cannot run a primary deficit larger than the 
amount of seignorage, otherwise, the debt to GNP ratio will continue to rise without 
limit. This is presumably for long-run sustainability. The deficit will have to be 
reduced when the public recognizes that the government's fiscal policy is 
unsustainable, and that is the starting point when the government will not be able to 
sell its debt. We observe one interesting implication of the debt dynamic in equation 
(3.8) as pointed out by Sargent and Wallace (1981); that if government tightens 
monetary policy by reducing the rate of printing of money but increases its debt 
increases current and future inflation rates. When debt increases, in future the 
deficits will be higher or more printing of money has to be carried out. If deficits 
are to be held constant in future, then the printing of money raises inflation in future, 
and expectations of future inflation raises current inflation. 
Easterly and Fischer suggest if the condition is such that the real interest rate is lower 
than the growth rate of GNP, debt will be eroded through growth through time, so that 
primary deficits in excess of seignorage are sustainable. Real interest rates are very 
low when the inflation rates are very high. 
They also suggest that the sustainability of the budget deficit depends on its size and 
the rate of growth of the economy. A higher rate of growth will enable the 
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government to earn more revenue by printing money and reduce the last term of 
equation (3.8). Rapid growth therefore permits a larger deficit. Examples cited by 
Easterly and Fischer are countries like India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, who 
have growth rates at 5% or above in 1980-86 had been able to run sizable deficits, 
while inflation was in single digits. Whereas Brazil and Argentina had no growth, 
they had inflation adjusted deficits and four-digit inflation rates. 
Easterly and Fischer suggest a method of determining whether a given fiscal policy 
is sustainable by looking at projections of the future course of the debt/GNP ratio, 
through equation (3.8). However, assumptions are needed as to the demand function 
for money, the desired inflation rate, the real interest rate and the growth rate of the 
economy. It is suggested that if the analysis shows a continous raising of the 
debt/GNP ratio, fiscal policy has to be changed. This is quite a loose argument in the 
sense a single ratio cannot translate the intensity of the 1980s debt problem, a 
combination of debt ratios that indicate debt burden is preferable. Also, what fiscal 
policy has to change has to be outlined. 
In sum, Easterly and Fischer argue that the microeconomics of fiscal deficits has an 
impact on the macroeconomics of the deficits. Having excessive budget deficits are 
associated with the following problems: inflation, exchange rate crises, external debt 
crises and high real interest rates, with implications for the real exchange rate, the 
trade account and investment. None of the links are automatic for there are choices in 
the methods of financing and lags in the effect of money printing and borrowing on 
inflation and interest rates. 
Small deficits can be financed without creating excessive inflation, exchange crises or 
an excessive build-up of debt. If the interest rate is greater that the rate of growth of 
GNP, any primary deficit smaller than the maximum amount of seignorage revenue 
the government can obtain is sustainable. Sustainability depends on debt to GNP ratio 
projections. 'Sustainable' does not mean it is optimal. A fiscal deficit may crowd-out 
private investment and it may well be desirable to reduce debt/GNP ratio to crowd-in 
private investment. Similarly, it may not be optimal to collect the maximum possible 
revenue from seignorage. 
3.4.1 General Comments on Easterly and Fischer's work 
While specific comments have been dealt with as we discussed the literature, some 
general points are relevant. Easterly and Fischer have made a contribution on the 
financing aspect of the deficits. The link between the budget deficit and saving has 
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been neglected and that, the standard Keynesian analysis takes saving rates as 
determined by the level of disposable income. The life-cycle and permanent income 
theories both relate current consumption to a measure of permanent or lifetime 
disposable income. Easterly and Fischer suggest, therefore, a temporary change in 
taxes, ceteris paribus, does not change or reduce current consumption. Hence, 
temporary tax change have smaller effects on consumption than permanent tax 
changes. This thought which is associated with Friedman's permanent income 
hypothesis gives support for the REH. 
However, equation (3.8) reflects government budget deficit financing (primary 
deficit refers to the public sector's) and not total economy-wide deficit financing. As 
such, one should not expect a total reflection of debt and deficits in the model. 
Equation (3.7) can include asset revaluation as a means of financing debt or deficits, 
for example, privatisation - the popular, somewhat standard, policy prescription by 
the World Bank to middle-income countries during the illiquidity situation of the 
1980s. 
Buiter (1988) analyses the role of fiscal policy in stabilisation and structural 
adjustment, and the focus is on developing and new industrialising countries. The 
external transfer (or changes in the current account balance) is associated with the 
internal fiscal and real resource transfer (internal reallocation of real resources). They 
use the concepts of national and public sector solvency to evaluate the consistency 
and feasibility between fiscal, financial and monetary plans. Some attention is 
given to the links between the fiscal deficit and inflation and the inflation tax. 
In analysing fiscal policy in stabilisation and structural adjustment, Buiter uses what 
he term as "economy-wide financial balance identity" of private savings-investment 
gap plus public savings-investment gap that equals the current account balance: 
S', 
-1 
" +S ' 
-1 
G= CA (3.9) 
From there, he distinguishes between private and public external debt through the 
private savings and public savings equations: 
PB *ED#1' p S =Q-J-T +i--i -C PP (3.1 Oa) 
EA B*E 
.cc SG =J +T + -i --i -(D -R )-C PPP (3.1Ob) 
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where, 
Q= income 
J= cash return on public capital stock 
= nominal interest rate 
I= foreign nominal interest rate 
T= net taxes 
C= private consumption 
C= public sector consumption 
D 
= private external debt 
D 
= public external debt 
E= nominal exchange rate 
A= net foreign aid 
P= GDP deflator 
R= foreign exchange reserves 
Buiter argues that the distinction between the private debt and the public debt is 
important and that "the debt crisis since 1982 has been a recent reminder of the 
fact that many de jure or formally private liabilities are de facto publicly 
guaranteed" (Buiter, 1988, pp 5). This fact has bearings that private liabilities or 
assets often escape fiscal considerations. Probably this is why studies on the twin 
deficits missed out on the role of the private sector in determining the external 
deficits? Another consequence is that the tax base beomes narrower. Buiter argues 
that this implies the need for higher tax rates on the remaining tax base, increased 
recourse to seigniorage (the inflation tax) or increased borrowings. 
Buiter went on to use the trade balance (TB) identity in his analysis. Eventually, the 
final equations point to the determinants of the current account (CA) and the balance 
of payments: 
CA =Q + -i 
E(D 
*-R *)-(C" 
+1" +C G +I'; ) 
PP (3.11 a) 
TB =Q-(C"+1' +Cý' +1(') (3.1 1 b) 
From (3.10) and (3.1 1), Buiter concludes that an improvement in the current account 
balance requires an increased in both public and private sector "financial surpluses" 
or equivalently, an increase in national income relative to domestic absorption. This 
serves as Buiter's central argument that underlines the link between the fiscal 
dimension and the current account dimension. 
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Buiter assumes that public revenue increases or spending cuts do not lead to an 
increase in private capital formation, fiscal tightening reduces national absorption 
relative to national income. Equation (3.11 a) shows that income increases are 
desired to achieve a current account improvement rather than reduction in absorption. 
Buiter forwards three channels potentially available for this: (a) increased domestic 
output (b) increased foreign aid (c) a reduction in foreign interest obligations. 
Equation (3.1 ]a) also emphasises a reduction in absorption, be it public or private 
spending. 
The fiscal dimension of a current account improvement, according to Buiter, 
requires intertemporal reallocation of resources. Intertemporal relative prices such as 
the interest rate, rate of return on other assets and, in repressed financial systems 
with widespread credit rationing, both the cost and availability of credit; will play a 
central role in the transmission mechanism between the policies. When the 
domestic financial market is not well intergrated in the international financial market, 
bond-financed fiscal tightening will lower domestic real interest rate or less severe 
credit rationing. 
In the short run, given the foreign interest rate, the net stock of external debt and 
the aid flow, a current account improvement is the same as trade balance 
improvement which requires changes in the exchange rate. If the country has 
international market power, it also requires the improvement in the terms of trade. 
In short, at the given initial interest rate, a fiscal tightening would reduce aggregate 
demand, barring debt neutrality, some of which falls on non-traded goods. 
Buiter emphasises the effects of fiscal policies on non-traded goods whereby the 
quantity of non-traded goods produced is a decreasing function of the real 
exchange rate and the quantity of traded goods produced is an increasing function. 
Private consumption is also an increasing function of the real exchange rate. Fiscal 
contraction shifts resources out of the non-traded goods sector into the traded 
sector thus, increasing production of tradeables. 
The solvency of the public sector is also given emphasis on the justification that the 
external transfer is mediated through the public sector. It requires the value of 
future streams of trade balance surplus plus other net inflows be equal to the 
current net external debt, and this is termed as the primary surplus. The primary 
surplus is the excess of domestic income over national absorption. In this process 
the exchange rate is corrected for inflation. More specifically, it involves a 
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consideration on the budget identity, which in its reduced form, refers to the public 
sector's net debt to GDP ratio, being expressed as four components; the first is the 
basic public primary (non-interest) current deficit; the second is the real interest 
payments on debt corrected for the growth of real GDP, as a proportion of GDP; 
the third is any additional interest losses; and, the fourth is real seigniorage (or the 
increase in nominal high-powered money stock over GDP). These four components 
determine the size and magnitude of net debt to GDP ratio. His argument on the 
solvency constraint of a nation and the public sector implies that fiscal tightening 
now requires fiscal relaxation in future. 
The effect of seigniorage, briefly, can be divided into two components: the growth 
in nominal money demand due to inflation at a given velocity; and the increase in 
real money demand due to a declining velocity. Higher actual inflation increases the 
growth in nominal money demand and higher interest rates or higher expected 
inflation tends to increase the velocity. Both leads to an increase in seigniorage 
revenue. Or seigniorage can be decomposed into an inflation tax rate and an inflation 
tax base. A higher inflation tax rate, given the tax base, will raise seigniorage 
revenue. If the expected inflation is raised then the velocity also rises and reduce the 
tax base, revenue decreases. 
3.4.2 Comments on Buiter's work 
Many issues pertaining to debt are discussed, the basic line of argument focuses 
on the internal-external transfer issue or simply, in the twin deficits context, issues 
running from the government budget to the external balance, paying attention to the 
private sector's role. The latter is expressed in terms of private savings function that 
contains private debt as one of the determinants. The internal resource transfer 
reallocation involves mainly the switch from non-tradables to tradables to raise 
revenue. Siegniorage as a source of revenue is also considered, as an inflation tax. 
All these issues are relevant to the study of the linkages between the deficits and 
debt. However, in Buiter's own words, the paper is a non-systematic perusal of 
the key issues. Future studies can focus on these key issues and examine each 
issue more systematically. 
At one point, Buiter barred the debt neutrality issue hence deducing the conventinal 
wisdom of increasing aggregate demand as a result of fiscal tightening. All in all, 
his analysis of the deficits is more towards the conventional wisdom but with a 
deeper insight into the debt issue. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Some fundamental points can be drawn from this literature review. One important 
lesson is to combine both the schools of thoughts and make use of relevant 
hypotheses, while incorporating aspects of debt issue, in our aim to develope a 
systematic full-fledged twin deficits thesis (and not excerpts of it like all the other 
studies in the sense of choosing variables on a rather ad hoc basis). The basis to start 
is naturally the accounting identity, with systematic evaluation of each of the 
expressions in the identity. 
Another lesson to be drawn is the issue of government borrowing or more 
specifically public and publicly guarateed debt (as categorised by the World Bank), 
is possibly reflected in the government account and then reflected in the current 
deficits. The question as to who uses and eventually who benefits from the 
borrowings should be carefully scrutinised so as to exert identity between the 
deficits, because, as Buiter (1988) argues formally private liabilities are defircto 
publicly guaranteed. Then policy targets should be aimed at causing changes to the 
specific sector. The following are our general comments on the literature as a 
whole. 
The 'conventional-wisdom' empirical literature suggests that causality runs from 
government budget deficits to interest rate to exchange rate and eventually is reflected 
in the external deficit, so the deficits are called twins. While we avoid repeating 
comments on the variables chosen, we feel consideration should at least be given as 
to whether the link is temporary (or short-run) or a long-run situation. Considering 
the period understudy is a section of the 1980s decade, it may be the case that this 
link holds in the short run. There may be other factors than that postulated that 
affects the linkage in the short-run. In the long run, there may be some form of 
changes, for example adjustments in income, that may render the relationship 
postulated not true. 
The consideration of inter-generational transfer at least gives an alternative for a long 
run issue between debt and deficits to be considered although the REH world is a 
perfect world on the basis of the assumptions made. Above all, debt could bring 
wealth effects if and only if debt contracted is profitable, (profitability as measured 
by the streams of discounted rates of return on its usage exceeding its streams of 
discounted cost). This requires either the government or the private sectors efficient 
usage of capital. 
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because the residuals comprise of the balance of the current account deficits that are 
not being financed by debt creating flows, non-debt creating flows and reserves taken 
together. 
During the period 1981 to 1982, non-debt creating inflows made up only about 6(/'(, of 
the total financing. In 1984, the current account decreased sharply by six-times the 
amount in 1983. Debt creating flows also decreased substantially to an amount just 
enough to cover the current account deficits. The simultaneous substantial reduction in 
the current account deficits and the debt creating flows could possibly reflect some 
form of debt relief, either in the form of rescheduling, when the interest repayments 
are postponed; or debt forgiveness whereby the interest repayments are written o11'. 
The reduction in interest payments causes the current account deficits to be reduced. 
Non-debt creating flows were reduced by half the previous year's amount. A current 
account surplus was recorded in 1985, (which comes from the oil exporters of Algeria 
and Nigeria), at the same time debt creating flows increased by 4.8 times the amount 
in 1984 to US$ 9.5 bn. The reserves build-up contributed about 10% of the debt. 
Residuals increased by thirteen times in 1985 to US$ 10.3 bn, showing an excess of 
financing by debt creating flows, non-debt creating flows and reserves taken together, 
of that amount. Debt creating flows were higher in 1986 (US$ 18.6 bn) which is 
almost twice the amount of 1985. 
From Table 1.18, the role of debt and non-debt creating flows in financing the deficits 
for the Latin American region can also be deduced. The current account deficits for 
this region were massive in 1981 and 1982, at the outbreak of the debt crisis. On 
average, current account deficits were US$ 39 bn for that period. The amount of 
debt creating flows of US$ 47.8 bn were able to offset the deficits in 1981, and 
reserves increased to US$ 1.2 bn. Non debt creating flows comprised 24% of the 
deficits in 1981. Net errors and omissions appear to be massive recording an amount 
of US$ 17.43 bn. This may be indicative of capital flight that is said to have taken 
place in 1981 to 1984 (Alejandro, 1987)2. Alejandro estimated that the surplus net 
factor payments were excessive in Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico (with 19%, 46% 
and 40% of their current account deficits) which indicates net real resources outflows 
between 1981-1984. 
In 1982, debt creating flows were slightly less than the deficits incurred. Non-debt 
creating flows remained at US$ 9 bn; while the usage of reserves was enormous 
- 
an 
amount of US$ 11.7 bn. In 1983, the current account deficits decreased drastically, 
by more than five times the 1982 figure. Capital inflows decreased by 24% of the 
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previous year's amount; reflecting a cutting-off of credit supplies by creditors. The 
current account balance moved towards a surplus of US$ 2 bn, more likely due to the 
reduction in import expenditure. Between 1985 and 1986, the current account deficits 
enlarged again due to a decrease in export earnings. After 1984 credit was greatly 
reduced due to a lack of confidence by creditors. 
Non-debt creating inflows decreased from 1983 onwards due to panic in the banking 
system. The region as a whole managed to build international reserves in 1984 but 
they fell in the following years. As had been mentioned earlier, capital flight indicated 
by the large amount of net errors and omissions were extensive up till 1985. 
The pattern of capital flows and their role in financing the current account deficits for 
the ASEAN region can be also seen in Table 1.18. The current account deficits grew 
between 198 1 and 1983 as a result of deterioration in the terms of trade and in export 
volume. The average deficit was US$ 13.2 bn. Debt creating flows averaged 
approximately US$ 10.7 bn, which is about 81 % of the current account deficits. The 
gap between the deficits and debt creating flows was bridged by 3% of international 
reserves and 38% of non-debt creating flows. This leaves a residual of 15% of the 
current account deficits, which comprised of positive residuals in 1981 to 1982 and an 
inadequate financing in 1983 when the Philippines ran into debt problems. Between 
1985 to 1986, the current account deficits decreased due to improvements in export 
prices and reduction of imports as an adjustment measure by Indonesia and the 
Philippines. 
Debt creating flows soared because of increased confidence by creditors. Non-debt 
creating flows decreased by 41 % from 1981 to 1983 
. 
Reserves built up by US$ 853 
mit between 1985 to 1986 and residuals increased to US$ 12.7 bn in 1986. 
1.4.5 Debt Indicators 
As for the sub-Saharan African countries, at the end of 1970, debt represented 14% of 
their GNP and 60% of their export earnings. Between 1980 to 1985, the debt burden 
was heavier, which made up about 40% of their GNP (World Debt Tables, 1987/88). 
At the same time, debt service obligations more than doubled, reflecting both the debt 
incurred in the second half of 1970s and continued borrowing since then. In 1987 
the debt service ratio represented about 19% of export of goods and services. 
However, rising interest rates in the early 1980s had less effect on the sub-Saharan 
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debt repayments due to the predominantly official character of their debts. 
Table I. 19: Interest Payments as a percentage of Export of Goods and Services 
1979-80 1981-82 1983-84 end 1992 
Argentina 17 43 55 19 
Bolivia 21 40 53 15 
Brazil 33 49 40 10 
Colombia 12 23 22 12 
Costa Rica 15 30 37 4 
Chile 18 42 43 
- 
Dominican Republic 15 17 24 12 
Ecuador 16 27 29 5 
El Salvador 6 10 15 9 
Guatemala 4 8 6 
- 
Haiti 3 3 5 
- 
Honduras 10 19 18 16 
Mexico 24 34 37 16 
Nicaragua 13 24 19 13 
Paraguay 13 15 22 16 
_ Peru 15 23 33 II 
Uruguay 10 18 30 12 
Venezuela 8 17 23 12 
Source: World Debt Tables 1987/88 and 1993 
Table 1.19 shows interest payments as a percentage of exports for the Latin American 
countries. The percentage does not seem threatening in 1979 to 1980 but soared 
between 1980-1981 and 1983-1984. During this period, the percentages were more 
than double the 1979-1980 figures, especially in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Chile, El Salvador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Table 1.20: Interest Payments as Percentage of Export 
1979-80 1981-82 1983-84 1985-86 1992 
Malaysia 2.50 4.40 6.39 8.48 2 
Philippines 7.26 10.13 11.30 13.49 8 
Singapore 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 
- i ailand 5.19 7.60 8.11 8.69 
- 
Indonesia 5.91 6.50 8.42 11.81 12 
S. Korea 6.55 8.03 7.48 7.51 3 
Source: World Debt Tables 1988/99 and 1993. 
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Interest payments, which are fixed obligation out of export earnings for the ASEAN 
region, is shown in Table 1.20. The general trend is an increasing ratio of interest 
payments to export earnings from 1979 through 1986, which is consistent with the 
increased indebtedness. South Korea and the Philippines have higher interest to 
export percentage in 1981-1982 following the increase in LIBOR. 
As noted earlier, a I% increase in LIBOR will lead to an increase of US$ 155 million 
of net interest payments at the end of 1982, because South Korea had US$ 15.5 
millions of floating-interest debt in 1982. In short, the trend of interest to exports ratio 
in all countries follows the trend in LIBOR in 1982, with a greater effect on the 
countries having floating-interest debt. Between 1983 to 1986, the ratio of interest to 
exports fell slightly in South Korea, consistent with the slight fell in LIBOR during 
that period, and the ratio in other countries increased. The increasing trend in other 
countries is consistent with the increased borrowings, not with changes in LIBOR. 
146 Floating vs Fixed Interest Debt 
Since the effect of rising interest rates manifests itself essentially on the net floating 
-interest debt, 
increases in LIBOR rates during 1978 to 1982 dramatically hit 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Nicaragua. These countries had the largest 
amounts of floating interest debt. Table 1.21 below shows very sharp increases in 
floating-interest debt and permits sensitivity analysis of changes in the LIBOR. For 
example, in 1982 the estimated net floating-interest debt of non-oil developing 
countries is US$ 166 bn. A one percent change in the LIBOR would have increased 
net interest payments by US$ 1.66 bn (which are US$ 593 millions for Mexico, US$ 
455 millions for Brazil and US$ 205 millions for Argentina). The net floating 
- 
interest debt to total net debt shows the relative vulnerability of individual developing 
countries to LIBOR changes. This ratio which amounted to 41 % in 1982 in non- 
OPEC, non-OECD developing countries, was the major contributor to the rise in net 
interest payments. Mexico, Chile, Argentina and Brazil had ratios of 78%, 74%, 
66% and 62% respectively in 1982 (Table 1.21, column I). 
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Table 1.21: Estimated Total Net Floating-Interest Debt of Non-oil 
Developing Countries as a Pcrcenta c 
1978 1980 1982 
Total I II Total I 11 Total I 11 
US$ % % US$ % %, US$ % %, 
bn bn hn 
Non-OECD LDCs 49.2 23.5 5 90 32 7 166 41 9 
of which: 
Argentina 0.8 12 I 9.4 58 7 20.5 66 10 
Brazil 18.5 50 10 30.9 57 13 45.5 62 18 
Chile 1.5 31 10 3.8 54 14 9.9 74 29 
S. Korea 1.2 11 3 6.1 36 11 15.5 55 17 
Mexico 19.9 60 22 32.3 70 20 59.3 78 23 
Peru 2.3 35 20 1.0 18 6 4.4 42 17 
Philippines 2.0 32 8 2.7 32 7 5.6 43 II 
Others 3.0 na na 3.8 na na 5.3 na na 
Source: OECD, external liebt of Developing Countries, 1982 Survey. 
na = not available 
By knowing the net floating-interest debt to GNP ratio enables estimation of the 
changes of GNP as a result of a percentage change in LIBOR. For example, in 1982, 
a I% increase in LIBOR would have caused a 0.09% increase in the net-floating - 
interest debt in terms of GNP in non-oil developing countries; with the impact being 
0.29% for Chile, 0.23% for Mexico, 0.18% for Brazil and 0.17% for South Korea 
and Peru. 
The increase in the volume of floating interest-debt together with the sharp rise in its 
cost, largely explains the major increase in interest payments in some of the countries 
in the ASEAN region. Between (end) 1978 and (end) 1982, South Korea's net 
floating-interest debt increased from US$ 1.2 billion to US$ 15.5 billion (refer to 
Table 1.18 ). 
Net interest to total net debt had increased from 11% to 55% while net interest to 
GNP increased from 3% to 17% during the period 1978 to 1982. The net floating 
interest debt in the Philippines increased from US$ 2 billion to US$ 5.6 billion during 
the same period. Net floating interest debt to total net debt increased from 32% to 
43% while net floating interest debt to GNP increased from 8% to II% (Table 1.21). 
By 1982, the major borrowers had their net floating-interest debt amounting to more 
than 40% of their total net debt. The World Bank estimated that only a quarter of the 
debt owed by the Latin American countries was still at fixed interest rates in 1980. 
In summary, the above analysis suggests that the sub-Saharan African balance of 
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payments will deteriorate further and growth of GDP decline further if no financing 
on concessional terms or aid is forthcoming. The current account deficits can be 
reduced by halting the outflow of foreign exchange in the form of interest payments 
on debts 
-and this is possible only by writing-off debts by the creditors. Due to the 
insufficient export earnings, imports would need to be financed by aid or 
concessional loans to help the economy to grow. An alternative is to increase the 
prices of exports of primary commodities by the importers. Given the need for real 
import growth to allow a recovery in real output per capita, the ratio of total debt to 
exports of 292% in 1987 (World Debt Tables 1988/89) suggests that the region as a 
whole is far from being able to meet forthcoming debt service obligations without 
continuing debt relief on a more massive scale. 
All the indicators for the Latin American region showed clearly that this region was 
suffering a "debt crisis". This reflects over-borrowing after the second oil shock and 
excessive lending by banks. The effects of debt financing was higher growth in the 
mid 1970s till 1981, higher current account deficits (due to higher interest payments), 
negative net transfers (due to principal and interest payments), massive capital flights 
prior to and after the debt crisis and a draining of reserves in 1980s. 
By 1982, the process of financing development had become unhealthily dependent on 
the debtors ability to obtain new loans to service the old. This means borrowing used 
will not generate income or growth. During that period, the creditors reacted by 
applying credit rationing to the region. 
1 
.5 
Comparison on Financing the Current Account Deficits Among 
Regions (1980-1985). 
The African and Latin American regions had their highest current account deficits 
between 1981 and 1982, while the ASEAN countries had their highest between 1982 
and 1983 (see Table 1.18). The terms of trade effects and interest rate effects seem to 
have a slower impact on the ASEAN region. Improvements in the current account in 
Latin American and the African countries were registered in 1984 and 1985 but 
worsened in 1986. In the ASEAN region, improvement took effect gradually from 
1984 through 1986. The cumulative current account deficits were highest in the Latin 
American region, followed by the ASEAN and the African region through the years 
under study. 
I. 37 
Debt creating flows had an increasing trend in the African region because of official 
support from World Bank, IMF and other bilateral government agencies in financing 
imports and attempts at smoothing consumption. The Latin American region 
experienced a decreasing trend instead because of credit rationing. The ASEAN region 
experienced high debt creating flows in 1981 to 1982, lower flows between 1983 and 
1984, which increased again between 1985 and 1986. The 'trough' in 1983 and 1984 
was probably due to moratoriums and rescheduling undertaken by the Philippines, 
soon after it ran into debt problems. The 'peak' between 1985 and 1986 shows 
perceived creditworthiness by creditors and marked the beginning of new lendings in 
Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, especially from yen credit. Debt 
creating flows remained the main form of financing the current account deficits in all 
of the three regions. The African and the Latin American region had total reliance on 
debt financing from 1981 through 1986. Debt financing became more relied upon by 
the ASEAN region after 1985. The cumulative debt creating flows are in excess of 
cumulative current account deficits in all regions, with the greatest excess in the Latin 
American region (which is 1.56 times the deficits figure). 
Out of debt creating flows, long term loans played the most important role as a means 
of financing in all regions. Apparently, there was a sudden reduction in 1984. Latin 
America had the highest proportion of cumulative long term loans out of cumulative 
total debt creating flows 
, 
i. e. 115% (cumulative total debt is lower because 
cumulative short term loan is negative), ASEAN had 95% and sub-Saharan Africa 
had 86%. The use of IMF credits are greatest in the Latin American region and the 
African region, which accounted for 9.6% and 8.3% of total cumulative debt creating 
flows, respectively. The cumulative short term loans was highest in the African region 
(5.3%), whereas an outflow of 24.6% was observed in the Latin American region 
between the years 1981 and 1986. 
From 1981-86, non-debt creating flows formed quite a high proportion of financing 
current account deficits in the ASEAN region, which was 46% of the current account 
deficits. The Latin American region had 29% and the African region had 9.8% of non- 
debt creating flows financing their current account deficits. 
The ASEAN region recorded reserves accumulation of 15% of cumulative current 
account deficits or 12.9% of the cumulative debt creating flows from 1981 through 
1986. The other regions recorded usage of reserves, the highest being in Africa who 
used all reserves enough to finance only 30% of the current account deficits. 
The cumulative residuals were very high in all regions, the highest being in the Latin 
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American region which had one to one ratio with the current account deficits. In 
Africa and ASEAN, the ratios were about 0.72% and 0.43%, respectively. A 
substantial portion of the residuals consist of net errors and omissions which may 
reflect the high amount of capital flight. 
1.6 Conclusion 
It can be concluded that debts incurred in the 1970s was mainly used to finance 
imports for the growth of output. In the 1980s it was mainly used for repayment of 
interest and principal payments falling due, at the same time imports were curtailed 
hence, growth was unsustained. It can also be concluded from the regional analysis 
that the nature of debt problems vary according to regions. Debt problems in the Latin 
American countries emerged because of over-borrowing from commercial sources at 
high floating interest rates and depressed export markets. Debt problems in the 
African region were more a consequence of commodity dependence, with very 
sluggish growth and low export earnings. The debt of this region is mainly from 
official sources on concessional terms and the amounts are minor in world terms. As 
for the ASEAN region, debt in general does not pose a major constraint to growth and 
development, except in the Philippines, in which debt problems arose due to the 
political turmoil in 1983. 
Unlike the Latin American region where debt has a very high dollar component, the 
debt of the ASEAN region has a high component of yen, especially from 1985 
(World Debt Tables 1987/88). The Latin American countries, the Philippines and 
Nigeria had converted substantial private debt to public debt, as liabilities were taken 
over by the government through the rescheduling processes. Private non-guaranteed 
debt fell as a whole in developing countries from US$ 101.2 bn to US$ 90.3 bn in 
1986 (World Debt Tables, 1987/88). Net repayments were greatest in ASEAN and 
Latin America. 
Clearly the 'debt crisis' has been about the inability of debtors to maintain the rapidly 
mounting interest payments in conditions characterised by high real interest rates, 
falling terns of trade and stagnating world trade, against a background of massive 
borrowing in the same period, and in some cases, significant capital flight. 
Debt problem thus posed three issues; liquidity, equity and solvency. Illiquidity 
arises when current assets exceeds current liability (strictly an accounting sense); in 
the case of a country, it means inability to service debt now as scheduled and in full 
amount. And clearly there was a problem of illiquidity in the 1980s. Equity refers to 
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who should bear the burden of debt 
- 
debtors or creditors; and the generation now or 
the future generation. Solvency means the liability of a country exceeds its ability to 
pay at any time. Eaton and Gersovitz (1987) believe that a country will not go 
insolvent while Dornbusch (1987) believes that it involves depressing economic 
activity and living standards to get out of insolvency. 
I Total net floating-interest debt is defined as short term plus long-term floating-interest liabilities 
minus floating-interest asset (OECD Survey, 1982). 
2 Different writers often use different concepts when discussing capital flight. According to one 
definition, capital flight would consists of all short-terns private capital outflow plus "net errors and 
omission" item in the balance of payments account, that is, the item that cannot he otherwise 
accounted for (Khan and UI Haque in Finance and Development, March I987). 
CHAPTER 4: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON THE 
MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1 
Inspired by our findings in Part I- the background chapters 
- 
that debt and deficits 
seem to have some co-movements, we reviewed the literature on twin deficits and 
debt-deficits related issues. We found the gist of the twin deficits notion is a 
posited causal linkage that links government budget deficits to external deficits via 
the interest rates and the exchange rates mechanism of transmission. Debt versus 
taxes and financing of deficits by four sources of finance are other related issues that 
has connection with the issue of increased indebtedness. The debt-deficits related 
literature follows somewhat the twin deficits line of argument, though in a slightly 
different context whereby the analysis uses the term external and internal transfers. 
Our main aim in Part 2 of the thesis is to establish a thesis on debt and twin deficits. 
Specifically, we try to link internal policy issues to the external sector and 
eventually to increased indebtedness. However, there are some problems in 
establishing the applicability of the literature on domestic policies that might have 
some influence in enhancing trade deficits and increased indebtedness to our 
framework of linkages between them. Our framework of the linkages involves three 
aspects: 
(1) the linkages between twin deficits and increased indebtedness. 
(2) the details of internal policies that have effects on the twin-deficits and 
increased indebtedness. 
(3) the linkages between debt, twin-deficits and growth. 
In the absence of a satisfactory guideline for our analysis of all the said linkages, we 
sought to analyse variable by variable from the macro-economic identity below: 
(M-X)=(G-T)+(1-S) (4.1) 
Our main purpose is to clarify the determinants of each variable, then establish cause 
and effect relationships between them so as to be able to answer the questions we 
posed. The following is a survey of the literature on the macroeconomic aggregates of 
equation (4.1). 
4.2. Investment Determinants 
There are many competing specifications on the determinants of private investment 
in developed countries. There had also been an increasing interest in the 
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determinants of investment for developing countries. Adopting the specifications 
used for developed countries has now become a common practice, however, for 
these specifications to be applicable in the developing countries some specific factors 
in the developing countries must be considered. Basically, there are two mainstream 
investment models; one is the income accelerator that considers the changes in 
aggregate demand and the other, profitability which considers the role of the relative 
prices of capital and labour. 
Based on his survey of studies of investment determination as applied to the 
developing countries, Rama (1990) suggested four other variables relevant to the 
developing countries should be considered. These specific factors are; financial 
repression, foreign exchange gap, lack of infrastructure and economic instability. 
The economic instabilities so far investigated are exchange rate fluctuations, credit 
availability and aggregate demand. Rama, however, did not try to take into 
consideration a debt variable to address the possibilities that debt might he 
associated with private investment. The inclusion of the economic instability variable 
normally takes the form of a dummy variable, which we feel is too general a 
specification. 
Investment models generally have the objective function of maximizing the increase 
in the market value of products. There are two constraints to the maximization 
problem 
- 
technological and economic. The technological constraints refer to the 
changes in capital stock and production function whereas the economic constraint 
refer to the structure of the market and the use of direct foreign exchange allocation. 
The structure of the market refers to monopolistic competition, perfect competition 
(the 'true' neoclassical case), effective demand (neoclassical model), credit rationing 
and foreign exchange shortage. Each of these has its own model and apart from 
these, there is also Tobin's q model (see Appendix 1 for the models listed). 
There are adjustments made to the models including the inclusion of time lags and, 
aggregation factors, i. e. the optimization problem of a single firm, and economic 
instability characterizing most developing countries. Rainas survey of the twenty- 
five recent studies that deal with private investment determinants in developing 
countries shows there is a general consensus that private investment is determined 
by aggregate demand. Pure neo-classical models in which there is no income 
accelerator may not be appropriate to the developing countries. Conclusions on the 
role of public investment suggest that public investment crowds out private 
investment. Out of the twenty-five studies, only one-fifth suggests that public 
investment provides an externality to private investment. Relative factor prices, are 
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often not taken into consideration, but if they are, according to Rama, they are either 
not defined properly or large varieties of proxies are being used. Rama suggests that 
this may be due to the structure of the goods market whereby the variety of goods 
available are low and goods are weak substitutes. Credit availability seems to be one 
of the determinants for private investment in many developing countries. Foreign 
exchange availability is taken into account in only five of the studies. This variable 
is significant in the determination of private investment. Only six studies include 
dummy variables reflecting economic policy changes or uncertainties. In all cases, 
these are significant. 
Rama (1990) concludes that the determinants of private investment in the developing 
countries are not necessarily the same as in developed countries. Some key 
exogenous variables such as the user cost of capitals are measured in a misleading 
way. 
Bleijer and Khan (1984) develop a model which is a variant of the flexible accelerator 
framework and consider the issue of what variables systematically affect private 
investment in developing countries. Their model establishes a relationship between 
government policy; that is, variations in bank credit and government expenditures; 
and private capital formation. Sundarajan and Thakur (1990), derive a private 
investment function by modifying the neo-classical theory of investment, hence, 
incorporating some of the channels through which public investment influences 
private investment. The neoclassical theory suggests that private investment is 
positively related to the expected output level and negatively related to the relative 
price of capital, that is, the user cost of capital relative to the wage rate. Both models 
therefore, emphasize the response of output to the capital stock; and Sundarajan and 
Thakur make use of the neoclassical principle that an optimal set of inputs is 
dependent on their relative prices. Public investment is treated as exogenous so the 
focus is on public investment multipliers. 
Bleijer and Khan (1984) conducted a study for twenty-four developing countries for 
1971 to 1979. They consider resource constraints, both financial and physical, faced 
by private investors in developing countries, and at the same time, incorporate all 
explicit role for monetary and fiscal policies. In their long-run representation of the 
accelerator model, the desired capital stock is assumed to be proportional to expected 
output. The assumption is that the underlying production function has fixed 
proportions among factor inputs, hence, factor prices do not enter into the 
specification. Incorporating lags, that is; time to plan, build and install new capital, 
necessitating capital stock in the previous period to adjust to the desired capital in 
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period t. The model is for net private investment, whereas data on investment are 
available only in gross terms, including depreciation. They transform the model into 
gross investment terms, defined as equal to net investment plus depreciation of the 
previous capital stock, which also permits the elimination of the private capital 
stock variable from the specification. The advantage of the model is that it does not 
require information on net investment or on the stock of capital, making it readily 
applicable to available gross investment data in developing countries. 
The response of private investment to the gap between desired and actual investment, 
as measured by a coefficient, ß, assumed to vary systematically with economic 
factors that influence the ability of private investors to achieve the desired level of 
investment. They hypothesise that the response of private investors depends on three 
main factors; the stage of the business cycle, the availability of financing and the 
level of public sector investment. The phenomenon of crowding out is captured 
through the speed of adjustment rather than through directly changing the desired 
level of real private investment. Private investors are expected to respond more 
rapidly to changes in desired investment during the expansionary phase of the system 
where demand conditions are more buoyant. If public and private investments are 
substitutes (crowding out), the coefficient of adjustment of private investment is 
expected to be smaller as the rate of public investment increases. The trend level of 
real public sector investment represents the long-term or infrastructural component 
and the variable should have a positive effect on gross real private investment. 
Deviations of real public sector investment from trend are assumed to correspond to 
non-infrastructural investment. 
Sundarajan and Thakur (1990) believe that public investment provides a significant 
stimulus to private investment, hence, serving as a powerful instrument of 
stabilization and growth policy. In this context, they examine the relationship 
between public and private investment in developing countries by postulating a 
dynamic model of investment, savings and growth for two countries 
- 
South Korea 
and India. The role of interest rate policy is also examined and its effect on 
investment and economic growth is determined. The framework used is a growth 
model designed to highlight the role of public investment. The model consists of 
relationships explaining the behaviour of private investment, savings, and growth, 
incorporating several channels through which public investment influences private 
investment. Firstly, where they compete for scarce physical and financial resources, 
in the short-run, government investment exerts a negative influence on private 
investment. Secondly, if government investment complements private investment, 
private investment requirements per unit produced are reduced. Thirdly, increased 
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public investment raises the demand for output in the private sector, thereby 
influencing output expectations and investment requirements of the private sector. 
Finally, public investment raises aggregate output and savings, supplementing the 
economy's physical and financial resources, thus offsetting at least a part of any initial 
crowding-out effects on private investment. 
Also, excess demand for investment in these countries exists, stemming widely from 
widespread financial repression, therefore, actual investment in fixed capital is 
constrained by the availability of savings. These features are built into the model by 
specifying a separate aggregate domestic savings function and by postulating a direct 
linkage between savings and the speed of adjustment of the fixed capital stock to the 
desired level. 
Sundarajan and Thakur also consider that the effect of public investment is 
crowding-out in the financial market and the market for real resources. According to 
them, in most developing countries, crowding-out of private investment occurs 
through non-price rationing mechanisms rather than through the price mechanism. 
The immediate crowding out effect of private investment by public investment is 
measured by the coefficient of the variable S- IG/PI. This variable, which measures 
the resources available to the private sector, is the difference in real terms between 
aggregate savings and total public sector investment. Its coefficient measures the 
effect of resource availability on the speed of adjustment of the actual capital stock to 
the desired level. 
Bleijer and Khan take into account the clear consensus that one of the principal 
constraints on investment in developing countries is the quantity, rather than the cost, 
of financial resources. The amount of investment by private investors is limited by 
available bank financing. Any effect exerted by the rate of interest on private 
investment is not direct within this rationing framework, but occurs via the channel of 
financial savings. The capital markets in the developing countries are normally 
sluggish, limiting the financing of private investment to the use of retained profits, 
hank credit and foreign borrowing. The effects of hank credit and foreign borrowing 
is to increase investment because of increased savings. The principal instrument of 
monetary policy in developing countries is usually to control total bank credit 
through varying the composition of credit between the public and private sectors. In 
this way the government can affect the speed and ability of private investors to 
respond to achieve their desired levels of investment. Monetary policy can thus have 
a desired influence on the rate of private investment. In a similar way, private 
investment can be influenced by interest rate and exchange rate policies that cause 
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changes in private capital flows, which augment or reduce financial resources 
available to the private sector. 
The change in bank credit to the private sector and net private capital flows have 
positive and significant effects indicating, for a given overall quantity of financial 
resources, that any attempt by the government to increase its share of either domestic 
or foreign financing at the expense of the private sector would lead to crowding out 
and a decline in private investment. Since the control over the credit of the banking 
system remains the principal tool of monetary policy, the results show some 
importance for the broader issue of real sector's response to changes in monetary 
policy in the developing countries. Their estimates indicate that about one-quarter of 
any change in real credit to the private sector shows up in changes in real private 
investment in the short run. Similarly, they presume that interest rate and exchange 
rate policy can also have a significant influence on private investment through their 
effects on private capital flows. 
The principal conclusion in Bleijer and Khan's study is the direct empirical link 
established between government policy variables and private capital formation. 
Private investment in developing countries is constrained by the availability of 
financing, and the fact that monetary policy can directly change private investment 
decisions by varying the flow of credit to private sector. 
As the basic equation is expanded, the results show that the level of public sector 
investment has a positive effect on private investment, whereas the change in 
government investment has a negative effect. On the basis of this particular result, 
they argued that it is not the level of public investment that crowds out private sector 
investment, rather, it is the change in public investment that appears to have a strong 
crowding-out effect. 
The effect of public sector investment on private capital formation depends on 
whether public investment is infrastructural or long-term in nature or short-term 
investment. Public infrastructural investment seems to complement private 
investment and short-term public investment tends to be a substitute for private 
investment. The policy implications suggested about monetary policy is that 
tightening it would have an adverse effect on the level of private investment, hence 
leading to a reduction in economic growth. If the public sector absorbs it larger share 
of domestic financial resources it tends to crowd out private investment. If the total 
supply of foreign financing is limited, and if public sector borrowing increases thus 
limiting the available credit to the private sector, crowding out will also occur. 
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However, this type of crowding out is said not be quantitatively large as compared to 
domestic financial crowding out. In broad terms, they believe public investment 
crowds out private sector investment if it uses the scarce physical and financial 
resources that would otherwise be available to the private sector, or if it produces 
goods that compete with private sector output. Financing public sector investment 
through taxes, debt or inflation reduces the resources available to the private sector, 
thus reducing private investment. Public investment in infrastructure and the 
provision of public goods can be complementary to private investment, raising the 
productivity of capital, increasing demand for output due to the increased demand for 
inputs and augmenting resources available by expanding aggregate output and 
savings. 
Bleijer and Khan claimed that the results obtained are most interesting from the point 
of view of the empirical relationship between public and private investment in 
developing countries. Their estimates indicate that the trend component of real public 
investment exerts a positive influence on the level of real private investment, whereas 
deviations from the trend have the opposite effect. Their results are consistent with 
the maintained hypothesis that public infrastructural investment is complementary to 
private investment, whereas other kinds of public investment tended to be substitutes 
for private investment. Provided that its trend level were not affected, an increase in 
real public investment would lead to a fall in real private investment in the short run, 
but the degree of substitutability is by no means perfect because the coefficient is 
significantly less than unity. 
Concerning private investment and output, Sundarajan and Thakur's results show 
that the major determinants of output are the capital stock and the rental-wage ratio. 
The rental-wage ratio, which measures the relative price of capital and labour, has a 
significant impact on capital-output ratios in both countries. Private investment is 
significantly influenced by output (which is a proxy for output expectations), the 
resources available to the private sector, and the initial private sector capital. The 
rental wage ratio has a strong negative influence on investment in India but not in 
Korea. 
It is shown in the Sundarajan and Thakur study that (through the variable S-IG/PI) a 
larger proportion of the increase in the resources available to the private sector has a 
greater influence in fixed capital formation in India than in Korea. This has the 
implication of an immediate crowding out effect which is stronger in India than in 
Korea. However, the existence of a net crowding out effect cannot he determined on 
the basis of this coefficient alone, since public sector investment also has a positive 
4. H 
effect on output, output expectations, and savings, and these effects may offset the 
immediate crowding out effect operating through the resource constraint variable. It is 
suggested that a complete analysis of the effect of public investment on private 
investment requires the computation of impact and dynamic multipliers of public 
sector investment. 
A test of the neoclassical principle is provided by the rental-wage ratio which has a 
significant negative substitution effect on investment and significant efficiency effect 
on output. The relative price effects occurred with a lag, suggesting that an increase in 
the interest rate and hence, the rental price of capital, tends to depress investment 
demand, reflecting the substitution of capital for labour. The coefficient for the rental 
wage ratio in the production function is significant, supporting the hypothesis that an 
increase in interest rates and hence, the rental price of capital increases the overall 
efficiency of capital. Though the public sector capital stock are not significant, it is 
retained for simulation. 
The general conclusion on the simulation result is that, in India, the long-run 
multiplier effect of increased public investment is weak. The effect on overall 
investment is weak because there is a crowding out effect. The effect on overall GDP 
is weak because the greater incremental-capital output ratio in the public sector than 
in the private sector implies increases in public sector output are not enough to offset 
the loss in private sector output in a considerable length of time. In Korea, the result 
is different. There is a negative crowding out effect so the long-run multiplier of 
increased public investment is strong. The difference between the capital-output ratios 
of the public and private sectors is not a significant factor. 
Different savings behaviour is noted in the two countries. In India, the real interest 
rate had a significantly positive direct effect on total savings (average propensity to 
save increases) while in Korea, the direct effect of the real interest rate was not 
significant. However, interest rate has a strong positive multiplier effect. This shows 
the higher interest rate raises the efficiency of capital and thereby stimulates 
economic growth which, in turn, stimulates savings. Hence, the channels through 
which it affects savings is different. Savings are related to permanent income in 
India while it is related to both permanent and transitory income in Korea. 
4 
.3 Export 
Demand Function 
Income and price elasticities for exports of developing countries play an important 
role in the determination of policy response to deteriorating export earnings and 
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increased indebtedness. The conventional way of specifying export supply and export 
demand functions is by a single equation incorporating the variables representing 
foreign demand (the real GDP of a foreign country) and the competitive position of a 
country's exports (the ratio of unit labour costs in a country relative to that in other 
countries) is used. Single equation estimation is appropriate in the case where the 
results are affected only by changes in foreign demand but assumed not to be 
affected by domestic supply. 
According to Goldstein and Khan (1985), there are two general models of trade that 
have dominated the empirical literature, that is, the imperfect substitutes and the 
perfect substitutes model. The two are seen as competing specifications due to 
aggregation in exports (imports) in trade studies. Goldstein and Khan see the 
possibility of the two specifications being complements to each other once 
disaggregation is admitted. We make use of the imperfect substitute argument in this 
chapter, while details of the trade equations are covered in Chapter 7. The 
imperfect substitute model assumes neither exports nor imports are perfect substitute 
for domestic goods; it follows the law of one price does not hold either within a 
country or across countries. The structure of exports and import specifications takes 
the form of simultaneous equations which is necessary for indicating changes in the 
prices and the volume of exports in response to changes in the exchange rate. 
For the ASEAN countries, many of them may influence the prices of their exports. 
Therefore, both the domestic price elasticity of export supply and the foreign 
price elasticity of export demand will be relevant. However, we assume that 
ASEAN countries at this stage (although in Chapter 7 we relax this assumption) are 
not able to influence the prices of the goods they export; the responsiveness of 
these exports to changes in the exchange rate will be determined by the foreign 
price elasticity of export demand. 
For industrial countries, the long-run price elasticities for both export and import 
demand typically exceed one signifying that relative prices play a strong role in the 
demand for total imports and exports. The estimates by Balassa et. al (1987), are 
between 1.8 and 2.3 for Greece and Korea and 5 for Hong Kong. It implies a strong 
potential contribution of expenditure-switching policy instruments (exchange rates, 
tariffs and subsidies) to trade balance adjustments. Short-run price elasticities are 
smaller. 
Income elasticities of demand for both exports and imports fall in the range of I to 2 
for a representative industrial country which implies a rising share of imports and 
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exports to GNP over time, in the absence of a secular increase in the relative price of 
imports. 
The supply price elasticity for total exports for a representative industrial country 
ranges from I to 4. However, there is no conclusive implications from the figure 
given because different countries have different supply elasticity responses to 
different trade policies such as subsidies, degree of openness, size of GNP, etc. 
In Latifah and Ariff (1992), an export supply and export demand function using a 
simultaneous equation, details as shown in Chapter 7, are estimated simultaneously 
so as to eliminate any bias arising from a two-way relationship between export 
quantities and export prices. Latifah and Ariff's estimates of the domestic price 
elasticity of export supply for the ASEAN countries ranges from +1.27 to +3.98. 
The estimated coefficient of the export demand function is positive and 
significantly different from zero in all countries, implying a positively sloped supply 
function for exports. 
The estimated price elasticity of export demand for the ASEAN countries points 
to the important role of relative prices in determining the world demand for these 
countries' exports. Singapore and South Korea have estimated price elasticities 
exceeding unity which implies a fairly large response of exports to changes in 
relative prices. 
Goldstein and Khan (1978) include lag effects of export demand and allow for 
adjustments, whereby exports are assumed to adjust to the difference between 
demand for exports in period t and the actual flow in the previous period t-l. 
Starting at a disequilibrium level where exports this period adjust to the unfulfilled 
demand of last period: 
Alog X, = y[iog'X, `' 
- 
logX, 
-r1 (4.2) 
where 
,Y 
is the coefficient of adjustment (assumed positive) and A is the first 
difference operator, Alog X1= log'X, - logX, 
_, 
Equation (4) is an adjustment of the quantity of exports, when there is an excess 
demand in the rest of the world then the price of exports is determined in the 
exporting countries. In the export supply function, the price of exports adjusts to 
excess supply: 
4. II 
Alog PX, 
=A [logX, 
- 
logX, ` ], A>0 (4.3) 
where, is the coefficient of adjustment. An increase in excess supply lowers the 
price of exports and vice-versa. 
Using the Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method of estimation, it is 
shown that in six of the eight countries under study have an estimated price elasticity 
of export demand greater than unity. This implies a fairly large response of exports to 
changes in relative prices. Conclusive evidence points to the important role of 
prices in determining the world demand for these countries' exports. 
The short-run price elasticities of demand are significant and smaller than the 
equilibrium income elasticities. The coefficient on lagged exports is significant 
implying a degree of dynamic adjustment for six of the eight countries. The average 
time lag for exports to adjust ranges from one to five quarters. 
In the disequilibrium export supply results, the coefficients for exports are significant 
in all eight cases. Domestic prices have a positive and significant effect on export 
prices in six countries. Productive capacity has a significantly negative effect in all 
countries. The coefficient of lagged export prices is quite large and highly significant 
in all equations suggesting that this variable is capturing a good part of the dynamics 
of changes in export prices. 
The estimates of the price elasticity of supply ranges from 
-0.1 to +3.9. In two of the 
countries, the supply price elasticities are higher in the disequilibrium model than in 
the equilibrium model. The estimates for the other countries have the opposite values. 
Goldstein and Khan's overall assessment of the model is that they are not clear as to 
which model is more superior. From the point of view of conventional statistical 
grounds they justify that the models seem to be equally well specified as the R2 are 
similar. 
43 Import Demand Function 
In the simple import demand function, the quantity of imports depends on the ratio of 
import prices to domestic prices and the level of income (see for example, 
Houthakker and Magee (1969), Khan (1974), Goldstein and Khan (1976), Goldstein, 
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Khan and Officer (1980), Melo and Vogt(1984) and Arize (1991)). The underlying 
assumption is that domestic goods are imperfect substitutes for foreign goods. 
Consistent with the conventional demand theory, the consumer is postulated to 
maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. In the simple model, only current 
income matters for import demand and no distinction is made between secular or 
cyclical income movements or between transitory and permanent income. The simple 
equation takes the form: 
Log M, wj + al LogP, + u2 Log Y, + (4.4) 
where, 
d M 
= quantity of import demanded 
P= ratio of import prices to domestic prices (Pm /Pd) 
Y= level of gross national product in constant prices. 
= error term. 
a/ and 02 are the relative price and the real income elasticities of imports. 
al <_0, a2 >0. 
Other models include lagged values of either the dependent or independent variables. 
Including the lagged value of the dependent variable implies a geometric time path of 
adjustment and restricts adjustment to previous income and price changes to be 
identical. Such specifications are used by Khan (1974) for example. The model takes 
the form: 
LLog M, =g LLogM, d_ login, `r1 
where 
0<g<l 
(4.5) 
This type of adjustment implies that the price of imports relative to the domestic price 
level is exogenous to the importing country, usually being determined in the overseas 
market, with quantities being adjusted domestically. Substituting equation (4.5) into 
(4.4) yields: 
LogM, gap + gal LogP, + ß, 1a2 LogY, + (1 
-g )LogM, 
-I + gý, 
(4.6) 
where, gal and g«2 are the short-run price and income elasticities, respectively. 
Goldstein and Khan (1976) estimated the average lag in import demand to he between 
two and four quarters for a group of seven industrial countries. 
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Houthakker and Magee (1969) specified the model to include lagged values of both 
the dependent and independent variables. 
LogM, `' = gaj + gal (Loge - LogP, 
-1 )+ gut (Log Y, + Log Y, -1 ) 
+(I 
-g )LogM, 
-1 + gýr (4.7) 
Still other models include only the lagged values of the independent variables. 
There can be two basic differences in the models: one splits income into its cyclical 
and trend components, the precise formulation used being that of Goldstein, Khan and 
Officer (1980), which includes trend income and income relative to trend. The other 
relaxes the implied assumption of other models that demand is homogenous of 
degree zero in income and prices. 
With regards to the trend and cyclical income, Goldstein and Khan (1985) postulated 
that when trend (or potential) real income and cyclical real income are included in 
the import demand equation at the same time, both usually appear positive and 
statistically significant; the same applies when real income and capacity utilization 
appear jointly. There is some tendency that the cyclical elasticities exceed the secular 
elasticities, but there are exceptions. 
Modern consumption theory distinguishes between current income and "permanent or 
life-cycle" income but little attention has been given in the specification of the 
aggregate import demand function. Goldstein and Khan feels there is a potential in its 
application in the import demand function. The fact that the greater slope of the long- 
run consumption function found in the U. S. compared to the short-run function and 
the fact that most trade studies find a higher income elasticity for imports from 
cyclical income than from trend (potential) income, suggests that cyclical non-price 
rationing effects predominate over permanent/transitory consumption differences. 
With regard to simultaneity bias in the single equation models, i. e. simultaneity 
between quantities and prices whereby the estimates of the price elasticities of 
demand and supply can be weighted averages of the "true" demand and supply 
elasticities, hence biased downwards, the problem seems more serious with export 
demand and supply functions rather than import demand function. Presumably the 
price variable in the import demand equation can be treated as exogenous. Thursby 
and Thursby (1984) tested the reliability of simple single equation specifications of 
import demand using the technique RESET (regression specification error test) and 
concluded that the single equations which include dynamic behaviour through lagged 
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values of the dependent variable proves to be more acceptable than models without 
lagged adjustments. As to the simultaneous equation model, techniques of estimation 
such as the full-information maximum-likelihood and the two-stage least square 
methods were used (see Khan, 1974, for example). 
As to the simple equation estimates, four broad conclusions stand out as indicated by 
Goldstein and Khan (1985). Firstly, the sum of the long-run price elasticities of 
demand for imports exceed one. The estimates suggest that relative prices play a 
powerful role in the demand for total imports leading to a suggestion by Goldstein 
and Khan that the expenditure-switching policy instruments to trade balance 
adjustment seem strong. Secondly, short-run price elasticities of demand for imports 
are considerably smaller than the long-run elasticities. Goldstein and Khan suggested 
that this difference carries two policy implications: one is that devaluation leads to a 
J-curve response of the trade balance. The trade balance worsens in the short-run as a 
result of devaluation because of low short-run price elasticities of demand and the 
tendency for import prices to rise more rapidly in local currency terms than export 
prices. In the long-run, export prices will catch-up with the import prices reducing 
the deterioration in the trade balance. Another implication of the low short-run price 
elasticities is that the short-run changes in a country's trade balance will be 
dominated by real domestic and foreign income movements. For a period up to one 
year in length, the sum of income elasticities for imports and exports is between two 
to four times larger than the respective sum of price elasticities. 
The third aspect suggested by Goldstein and Khan is that income elasticities of import 
demand for a representative industrial country fall in the range of one to two. The 
implication is that in the absence of secular increases in the relative price of imports, 
the share of imports and exports are expected to be rising over time. Another 
implication is that if the income elasticity of demand for imports is significantly 
larger than the income elasticity for exports, the choice a country has to make is 
whether to grow at the same rate as its trading partner and accept a secular 
deterioration in its trade balance or to have an external balance and accept a slower 
growth rate than its trading partners. 
The fourth broad conclusion by Goldstein and Khan concerns the inter-commodity 
differences in income and price elasticities which implies the differences in the 
commodity structure of trade can lead both to differences across countries in price 
and income elasticities for their total imports (and exports) and to differences in 
elasticities between the exports and imports of a single country. 
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Studies on the import demand function in the developing countries show that the 
estimated price elasticities are generally high, hence indicating that relative prices 
have a significant effect on the imports of developing countries. The estimates by 
Khan (1974) using the simultaneous equation method show the price elasticities range 
from 
-0.8 to -2.7. The same study shows that the income elasticities are generally 
very low. Arize (1987), by using the simultaneous equation method, obtains 
estimates for the African countries that generally show import prices do have a 
significant effect on the quantity of imports demanded. Our estimates by the simple 
single equation method (in a later chapter) shows the estimated income elasticities fall 
in the range of 1.07 to 1.35 in Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea. The income 
elasticity of demand for the Philippines and Thailand are relatively low 
(approximately 0.15 and 0.90 respectively). As a comparison, the income elasticities 
of demand for a representative industrial country fall in the range of I to 2 on both 
import and export sides (Goldstein and Khan, 1985). 
4 
.4 Savings 
The survey by Mikesell and Zinser (1974), show that the absolute income hypothesis 
of the Keynesian savings function is specified as: 
S=ao+ajY (4.8) 
where 
S is gross domestic savings, Y is gross national product, tit is the 
constant marginal propensity to save (MPS). tO <0 and 0< 111 <1 so that 
the average propensity to save (APS) rises as income rises. 
Improvements to the above absolute income hypothesis had been; 
S= b0 + bl LnY (4.9) 
and, LnS = co + cl LnY (4.10) 
where h/ is increasing at a decreasing rate (h/ >0) and L'/ is the constant 
income elasticity of national saving. 
Still other studies in the Keynesian tradition, according to the survey, show that the 
average saving rate tends to be proportional to per capita income under conditions of 
steady growth but the saving rate is positively associated with the rate of growth of 
GNP. Deaton (1989) points out that at best there is only a very weak relation between 
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saving and growth perhaps because it is the productivity of investment that is crucial, 
not its volume (given that there is a high correlation between saving and investment 
so that the link between growth and either saving or investment would not be any 
different if either parameter is used). 
The non-Keynesian saving function have taken three alternatives: 
a) the Dusenberry "Relative Income" hypothesis 
b) the Friedman "Permanent Income" hypothesis 
c) the Modigliani-Brumberg-Ando (MBA) "Life Cycle" hypothesis. 
Whilst there is no support for the first hypothesis (Mikesell and Zinser 1974), at least 
for the developing countries, many studies have been in the permanent income 
hypothesis tradition. The simplest form for the permanent income hypothesis is: 
S= cup + al Yp +a2 YT (4.11) 
where }' is permanent income and }'r transitory income which is further 
being developed to the asset adjustment model and the growth rate of income model. 
Permanent income is defined in terms of a long-run expectation over a planning 
period, and transitory income is the difference between actual income in any period, 
and permanent income. 
Friedman's hypothesis is that individuals consume virtually no transitory income 
(MPST=1). This implies a heavy reliance on past behaviour as a determinant of 
consumption spending; but changes in transitory income will immediately lead to 
changes in the level of saving. Most studies of this kind support the hypothesis. 
The life-cycle income hypothesis states that the individuals plan their life-time 
consumption by accumulating enough savings during their earning years to maintain 
consumption during retirement years. The model implies stationary population and 
income, there is no aggregate net savings since the dis-savings by the retired are 
exactly offset by the savings of the employed. However, in a growing population and 
growing per capita income, aggregate net personal saving is positive, and the larger 
the current per capita income, the higher will be the savings since the individual seeks 
to equalize consumption over his remaining life span. The life-cycle theory thus 
relates aggregate saving with the rates of population and income growth. 
Deaton (1989) approaches the study of savings in the developing countries by 
developing a model of households, with no borrowings, who attempt to smooth their 
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consumption to face volatility in income, rather than using the approach of the 
relation between saving and growth. The analysis is within the framework of the 
standard life-cycle permanent income model but delivers the result that is far from 
the standard "consumption equals permanent income" of the literature. Deaton uses 
the maximization of a utility function of the household subjected to a budget 
constraint, which in turn yields an Euler equation when dynamic programming is 
applied to the two functions. Deaton (1989) and Summers and Carroll (1989) 
challenge the life-cycle theory; that whatever produces the positive correlation 
between saving and growth cannot be life-cycle saving. They point out that the life- 
cycle explanation assumes common preferences across countries, but differences in 
economic growth generate differences in the relative lifetime economic standing of 
young and old in different countries. Lahiri (1989), using the life-cycle approach and 
taking into consideration rational expectations 
- 
permanent income hypothesis, found 
much of the diversity in savings behaviour in eight countries in Asia (over time) is 
explained by two important determinants - growth and demography. Lahiri further 
argues that inflation and adverse movements in the terms of trade are two additional 
factors that depress the propensity to save. His specification of private consumption 
behaviour takes the form: 
Act 
= 
ßO + ßl ct 
-1 
+ /32 Yi + ß3 y, 
-1 + 
/34 PR, 
+QSAPR, +036nr+ß7AT +ß8x, +ý, (4.12) 
where, 
C and Y= the natural logarithms of per capita real consumption and income 
PR and APR = the percentage of population aged 15-64 and the change in 
that percentage respectively, 
n= the rate of inflation, 
AT 
= the change in terms of trade, 
x= the ratio of exports to GNP. 
With regards to the effects of foreign capital on domestic savings, Landau (1969) and 
Chenery and Eckstein (1970) found that net capital inflow are negatively correlated 
to savings rate. The relevant regression equations include: 
S =lei +hl Y +h2F (4.13) 
S/Y= do + dl Log (Y/ Pop) + d2 (F/ Y) (4.14) 
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where F is the ratio of net capital imports to gross national product. Areskoug 
(1969) argues that since foreign borrowing finances domestic consumption and 
investment, future savings might not be able to counterbalance amortization 
payments. Mikesell and Zinser (1974) conclude that net capital imports reduce gross 
domestic savings if there is no simultaneous increase in gross investment. This is due 
to the fact that in the national product accounts, gross domestic saving is equal to 
gross domestic investment less capital imports. 
Studies of the effect of taxation on saving have reported mixed results. Sonne studies, 
according to Mikesell and Zinser, found that taxation causes an increase in 
government saving and more than offset the decrease in private saving, while others 
found a decrease in private but an increase in public consumption. 
In a detailed investigation of the effect of interest rates on saving Brown (1971) on 
the Korean monetary reform shows average private saving rates having the highest 
degree of correlation with interest rates. The financial repression literature implies 
that low interest rates keep down the cost of domestic borrowing and enable 
governments to monopolise the sale of financial securities since there is a lack of 
alternative borrowers. Low interest rates and lack of investment opportunities are then 
held responsible for low domestic saving (Deaton, 1989). This view stresses that 
financial liberalization is crucial to raise saving ratios and growth. There is a 
substantial agreement that saving is positively associated with exports (Mikesell and 
Zinser, 1974). 
45 Taxation and Development. 
Our main aim is to trace how taxation relates to development, in particular, how 
taxation plays a part as a source of revenue in an economy. This requires it 
knowledge of tax structures; tax buoyancy and elasticity; and tax 'effort' and tax 
'capacity'. In Gemmell's survey of the literature (1987), tax buoyancy is defined as 
"the realized increase in tax revenues in association with an increase in GDP. 
Whereas tax elasticity measures the 'automatic' change in revenue for a given tax 
base as GDP rises". Gemmell suggests that tax elasticity could be decomposed 
into: (I) the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the relevant tax base, and (2) the 
elasticity of the tax base with respect to GDP. This can help to identify the extent to 
which the overall tax elasticity can be attributed to structural changes in the economy 
affecting the base-to-GDP elasticity, or to the properties of the tax schedule which 
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affect the tax-to-base elasticity. Elastic taxes imply that additional revenue can be 
raised more readily. Tax 'effort' and tax 'capacity' refers to an assessment of how 
successfully countries are tapping available tax resources. 
Past studies surveyed (see surveys by Gemmell (1987), Ahmad and Stern (1987), 
Burgess and Stern (1992)) reveal that developing countries tend to rely on domestic 
taxes on goods and services, foreign trade taxes and income taxes, in that order of 
importance, as opposed to the developed countries whereby the reverse order of 
importance applies. In Gemmell's survey of the literature, the general picture given 
of income taxation in developing countries is that they have complicated structure, 
'schedular' in nature 
- 
having a variety of thresholds and rates, complicated in 
definitions, measurement, and assessment of income as well as administration of tax 
collection. Thus, indirect taxes (domestic and trade) are more greatly relied upon. 
Ahmad and Stern (1987) suggest that the relatively small role for the income tax in 
developing countries can be attributed to costs of administration rather than data non- 
availability and difficulty in assessment of the incidence of changes in income taxes. 
The most important reason for the prominent role of corporate taxes according to 
Ahmad and Stern (1987) is as a means of taxes on personal income, especially where 
domestic personal income taxation is weak and easily evaded. As for indirect taxes 
such as sales taxes, there are more complex set of consumption and commodity- 
specific taxes, the presence of subsidies has to be considered and some developing 
countries do follow a VAT system (Gemmell, 1987). 
To study how the changes in tax structure relate to development (as normally 
measured by per capita income levels), Gemmell (1987) postulates two areas of 
particular concern: 1) to identify whether total and individual tax revenues as it 
proportion of GDP rise as per capita income increases; (2) to investigate how the 
shares of tax components in total revenue change with per capita income. Gemmell 
further points out that tax 'buoyancy' and 'elasticity' account for the two aspects 
above. Previous studies identifying a simple relationship between tax ratios and per 
capita income point to the conclusion that there is clear evidence that trade or 
indirect taxes are related to increases in per capita income (Chelliah et al. 1975, Tait 
et al. 1979, and Greenaway 1980,1984), but there is no clear evidence on the 
relationship between tax revenue shares of GDP and per capita income. 
Per capita income is not particularly good in explaining the level of taxation (Burgess 
and Stern, 1992). Tanzi (1991b) identified the the share of imports in GDP and the 
share of foreign debt in GDP as having a positive impact on tax levels, and the share 
of agriculture as having a negative impact. 
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Tax effort, i. e., the extent to which tax authorities have exploited available tax 
capacity, is taken as the difference between the predicted tax ratios as obtained from 
the result of a regression equation (see Chelliah et al. 1971,1975 and Tait et al. 
1979) and the actual tax ratios of a particular country. Strong tax performance is 
associated with high tax effort index. 
In Chelliah et al. (1971,1975) it was hypothesised that the average level of income, 
the degree of openness of the economy, and the composition of GDP would each have 
a bearing on the taxable capacity of a country. The study noted that tax ratios for 
developing countries have an increasing trend, for 1969-7 I, the average tax ratio was 
15.1 % compared to 13.6% for 1966-68. Tait et al. (1979) confirms that the trend also 
continue for the period 1972-76 whereby the average tax ratio was 16.1 %. In fact, the 
increase was more pronounced in that period and hold the 1974-75 world recession 
responsible. The five regression equations used in Chelliah et al. (1971,1975) - of 
various combination of factors - take the form: 
TI Y =a+ Yl, + F/ Y (4.15a) 
TI Y= u+ (YY, 
-X) + NY +X 'Y (4.15b) 
TI Y =a +(Y1, -X1, )+XY (4.15c) 
TI Y =a+ Ny - Av +XY (4.15d) 
T/ Y =a+ Ny - Ay (4.15e) 
where; 
TI Y 
= tax ratio (excluding social security contributions) 
Yi, 
= per capita GNP in US dollars 
F! Y 
= the ratio of imports plus exports to GNP 
ýYi, 
- 
Xr) 
= per capita non-export income in US dollars 
NY 
= the share of mining in GDP 
AY 
= the share of agriculture in GDP 
X)' 
= the export ratio 
X, Y = the export ratio excluding mineral exports 
The results in Chelliah et al. (1975) and later, Tait et. al (1979) concluded that: 
I) in general, countries that have about 15 percentage points (above average) of 
tax ratios have tax effort indices that are above unity and vice-versa. 
2) the share of mining emerges as an important determinant of tax ratios. 
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3) the share of agriculture is very important in determining tax capacity and the 
willingness to tax. It is said that many developing countries found it politically 
difficult to tax the agricultural sector. 
Chelliah et al. (1975) justify that tax effort indices are useful information in judging 
the scope for more taxes if considered together with other relevant factors such as the 
existing level of taxation, the buoyancy of the tax system in the recent period, the 
content of increases in public expenditure, etc. 
The relative decline in the importance of foreign trade taxes and the increase in 
importance of domestic indirect taxes with economic development is a well 
established finding (see Greenaway (1980,1984), Gemmell (1990), and Tanzi, 
(1991)). Using a cross section data for 70 countries, Greenaway's results show: 
I) There is an inverse relationship between dependence on trade taxes and economic 
development for an aggregate sample of 70 countries. Proxies of economic 
development used are either nominal income per head, real income per head, 
share of agriculture in GDP and share of manufacturing in GDP. It is found that 
the relationship holds irrespective of which parameter is being used as the proxy. 
2) For sub-samples, the said relationship in (1) holds only for middle-income 
countries but not for low and high income sub-groups. Greenaway argues that 
there are economic reasons for this. In the case of low-income countries, 
although there is clearly a greater 'absolute dependence' on trade taxes, the first 
best source of tax revenue is the share of agriculture in GNP which serves as the 
best proxy for economic development. As for the industrialized countries, there 
are no administrative constraints to resort to the first best source of tax revenue 
after a certain stage of development has been passed. 
3) When trade taxes are divided into import and export taxes, the inverse relationship 
holds stronger for import taxes denoting the decline in importance of the revenue 
motive as development proceeds. 
4) The time-series analysis of individual countries suggest a large number of 
developed and developing countries have become less reliant on trade taxes as a 
source of revenue. 
With regard to tax elasticity and buoyancy in developing countries, Gemmell (1997) 
concluded on previous studies that: 
the typical estimates of tax buoyancies exceed elasticity estimates denoting the 
presence of discretionary tax increases and/or improvements in collection, 
administration, etc. 
income and domestic consumption tax elasticities tend to be higher than trade 
elasticities. 
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indirect tax elasticities can be highly variable across commodities, indicating 
opportunities to raise revenue by taxing 'elastic' commodities more. 
income tax elasticities tend to fall in association with income increases. 
particularly for indirect taxes, base-to-income elasticities may be high relative to 
tax-to-base elasticities, so that automatic revenue increases result mainly from 
structural changes such as the changing composition of domestically produced 
goods and imports in consumption. Low tax-to-base elasticities for imports result 
from shifts towards low-rated intermediate imports from high-rated consumer 
goods (Gemmell, 1987). " 
4 
.6 Government 
Expenditure 
In a macromodel, government expenditure is taken as comprising two components: 
government investment and government consumption. 
G= Iý; + C(; 
While government investment ('G ) is assumed to be fixed/predetermined, 
government consumption has a fixed component 
(C(; ) 
and a component which 
varies proportionately with income, 
(c DY ), 
where c is the marginal propensity 
to consume and rD is the interest repayments on past government debt stock. 
Ic = Ic 
r-i 
C(; = Cý; +c AY + rD where 
D- 
ýI 
(G 
-T )ý 
Hence, the interest repayments feed through future government deficits. In the 
short-run, government investment and consumption are assumed to be exogenous: 
Let G= II; +Q + rD (4.16) 
If government expenditure is comprised of investment expenditures such as 
infrastructure, education, defence, hospitals, etc., these generate a future rate of 
return. The return might not take the form of monetary benefit but benefits to society 
now and in the future created by the projects. If government expenditure is for 
consumption goods, there will be no future rate of return, instead government has to 
finance the consumption goods either by issuing bonds or borrowing externally 
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which in both cases creates interest payments on debt. On the other hand, if 
government financed its consumption by seigniorage at a given level of the 
government deficit, the inflation rate will rise. 
The absorption of resources by the public sector means that the opportunity cost of 
these public expenditures is the forgone output of other sectors. These argument 
underlie the crowding-out debate. If government expenditure is financed by bonds, at 
less than full employment, ceteris paribus, this will cause an increase in interest 
rates unless there is an accommodating monetary policy. If private sector investment 
is interest elastic then a bond-financed increase in public expenditure may crowd out 
private sector activities via its impact on capital market. 
In the long-run, government expenditure behaviour over time may be observed. 
Brown and Jackson (1990) examine three models that categorize the time pattern of 
public expenditure. First, the development model of public expenditure growth; 
secondly, the model based on Wagner's law of expanding state activities; and third, 
Peacock and Wiseman's classic model of public expenditure growth. Gemmell 
(1993) outlines Wagner's Law and the Musgrave hypothesis and assess problems of 
interpretation and testing. Both studies suggest one most important point, that all 
three models have one thing in common, although the underlying reasons are 
different 
- 
that public expenditure does vary with GNP or income over the long- 
run. 
Development models of public expenditure growth are best represented by 
Musgrave and Rostow. In the early stages of economic growth and development, 
public sector investment as a proportion of the total investment of the economy is 
found to be high. The public sector is seen as providing social infrastructure, law 
and order, etc and human capital investments necessary for take off stage. In the 
middle stages of growth, the government continues to supply investment goods but 
these are complementary to the growth of private investment. Along the way 
government is expected to deal with market failures. 
Musgrave argues that over the development period, if the ratio of total investment 
to GNP rises, the relative share of public investment falls. Rostow argues that at 
the maturity stage, government expenditure concentrates on education, health and 
welfare rather than being infrastructural. These are generalized approaches to 
development. 
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Wagners' Law concerns with the share of public sector to GNP. Growth of the 
relative size of the public sector and state activities are considered as fiscal expansion. 
But expansion is constrained by revenue. However, in the long-run this constraint 
can be overcome somehow. It gives insight to the idea of market failure and 
externality. As industrialization progresses, Wagner recognizes that markets become 
more complex, necessitating public sector intervention and regulation. Public sector 
services will rise. Public expenditure grows further with the provision of education, 
health, welfare etc.; the growth is explained in terms of income elasticity of demand. 
As real income in the economy rises, public expenditure on these services rise more 
than proportionately, thus resulting in a higher proportion of public expenditure out of 
GNP. However, Wagner's law is not a well articulated theory on public choice and 
has drawbacks. One of which is that the growth of income results in the growth of 
public sector which negates the theory of public choice. The growth of income may 
also be associated with a shrinkage in public sector if the choice is to have more 
private goods via privatisation for example. 
The Peacock and Wiseman Analysis is one of the best known analyses on the time 
pattern of public expenditure. The foundation of theory is a political theory of' public 
expenditure determination that recognises government likes to spend, that citizens 
do not like to be taxed, therefore, government should give consideration to citizen's 
wishes. The solution to the analysis of public expenditure is voting. When 
decoding on the expenditure keeps a close watch over electorates reactions to the 
implied taxation. Some level of taxation acts as a constraint for government 
expenditure. 
As the economy and thus income grow, tax revenue, at constant tax rates, would 
rise, thereby enabling public expenditure to grow in line with GNP. In normal 
times, therefore, public expenditure will show a gradual upward trend, even though 
within the economy there might be a divergence between what people regarded as 
being a desirable level of public expenditure and a desirable level of taxation. During 
periods of social upheaval, however, this gradual upward trend in public expenditure 
would be disturbed, instead it requires a rapid increase in public expenditure. 
Taxation is seen as acceptable to be raised during this period. 
Government expenditure as a whole has an effect of raising interest rates as well as 
aggregate demand. In most developing economies, government expenditure in the 
form of transfers such as social securities and medicare are minimal. Government 
expenditures on national defence and grants and subsidies are also at low levels 
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compared to the developed countries. However, due to the effects of accumulated 
debt expenditure, interest payments are at historically high levels in the 1980s. 
To simplify the analysis a little, in the foregoing work we assume that government 
expenditure is exogenous. In a later section we address the issue of the variation of 
government expenditure with respect to income. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Based on the above survey of the literature, we summarize some important issues 
relevant to building stylized facts about each macroeconomic aggregates for the 
purpose of modelling our twin deficits and debt in the next chapter. Our aim is to 
build the simplest model for each aggregate. 
CHAPTER 5: DEBT AND TWIN DEFICITS MODELLING 
FOR ASEAN 
5.1 
5.1. A Simple Model of Debt and Twin Deficits 
Having outlined our main aim in Part II in the previous chapter and recognising that 
there are two sides to the right hand-side of the macroeconomic identity of (4.1) fron 
chapter 4, we concern ourselves in investigating causality and exogeneity between 
debt and deficits. The three linkages outlined are important issues in developing 
countries, especially in ASEAN, given the active role of the private sectors in 
development towards 'NICdom', debt and deficits should he 'sustainable' and not 
increasing proportionately with the growth of output. Instead, output, in a given time 
frame, should eliminate debt and deficits simultaneously turning them into profitable 
investments. 
The major contribution in Part II is our model for debt and twin deficits for ASEAN 
specifically, and is applicable to all developing countries in general. We name our 
model the 'new twin deficits' model. 
511 The National Income Identity 
Rewriting the simple national income accounting identity of (4.1); 
(M-X )=(G-T)+(1-S ) (4.1) 
in other words, the current account imbalance will be equal to the sum of any private 
sector surplus or deficit, and any fiscal surplus or deficit. Thus, if government follows 
a balanced budget policy, (ex post) any private sector deficit or surplus will he 
reflected in a current account deficit or surplus. Alternatively, if the private sector is in 
balance, any government surplus or deficit will match the current account surplus or 
deficit. 
Suppose we think of the change in the current account deficit as equivalent to the 
change in net foreign indebtedness. 
(N1 
- 
x) = AD' (5.1) 
Can we then construct a simple model which yields insights into the economic 
relationship between these macroeconomic aggregates'? This is an important issue since, 
as it stands, equation (4.1) is an identity which tells us nothing about the mechanics of 
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the underlying relationships. In investigating this, our approach is to draw on the 
empirical literature on the determinants of J, S, X, M, T and G in developing 
countries to develop a stylized model. In this section, we evaluate the determinants of 
each in turn, then use this to investigate the inter-relationships between the aggregates. 
512 Determinants of the Macroeconomic Aggregates: A Review of the 
Literature 
To inform the construction of an estimating model, we firstly review the literature on 
imports, savings, investments, exports, taxes and government expenditure. 
5.1 2 a) Government Expenditure 
In our macromodel, government expenditure is taken as consisting two components; 
government investment and government consumption. 
G= I(; + Cc; 
Government investment (1 ) is assumed to be fixed/predetermined. Government 
consumption has a fixed component 
(CG%) 
a component which varies positively 
with expected income n1 
' and another component with current income 112 Yi 
where 11 is the marginal propensity to consume, and , which is the interest 
repayments on past government debt stock that feeds through future budget deficits. 
The purpose of varying the components for the two types of income is to have a 
counter cyclical policy. It has the effects of maintaining basic government 
expenditures in normal times following an upward trend, while allowing for 
adjustments in its movement such as a decrease in expenditure in times of high 
growth to allow for private sector's participation and increase expenditure during 
recessionary periods. Hence, we have the following formulation: 
Ic = 1c 
C(; 
= nj Yn+ n2 Y, + pl rD D=I (G -T) 
where i =00 
In the short-run, government investment and consumption is assumed to he 
exogenous: 
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Let G =I(; + n1 
Y Yr +pJ rD (5.2) 
Equation (5.2) assumes that future government deficits are financed by debt and that 
the interest repayments on debt feeds through the deficits. Crowding out via the effect 
of higher interest rates on interest-sensitive components of aggregate demand such as 
investment. If interest rates have negative correlation with inflation, then raising 
inflation either through devaluation or through higher money growth, is likely to be 
associated with lower interest rates. Then, this implies inflation may be the channel out 
of debt accumulation (Dornbusch, 1987). 
If government expenditure is comprised of investment expenditures such as 
infrastructures, they generate a future rate of return which may not take the form of 
monetary benefits but benefits to society now and in the future created by the projects. 
If government expenditure is for consumption goods, there will be no future rate of 
return, instead government has to finance the consumption goods either by issuing 
bonds or borrowing internally or externally which, in both cases create interest 
payments on debt. On the other hand, if government financed its consumption by 
seigniorage at a given level of government deficit, the inflation rate will rise. 
The absorption of resources by the public sector means that the opportunity cost of 
these public expenditures is the forgone output of other sectors. These argument 
underlie the crowding-out debate. If government expenditure is financed by bond, at 
less than full employment will, ceteris paribus, cause an increase in interest rates 
unless there is an accommodating monetary policy. If private sector investment is 
interest elastic, then a bond-financed increase in public expenditure may crowd out 
private sector activities via its impact on capital market. 
In the long-run, government expenditure behaviour over time shows variation with 
income. Brown and Jackson (1990) examine three models that categorize time 
pattern of public expenditure. First, the development model of public expenditure 
growth; second, the model based on Wagner's law of expanding state activities; and 
third, Peacock and Wiseman's classic model of public expenditure growth. All three 
confirms that public expenditure does vary with GNP or income over the long-run. In 
the short run, it is taken as exogenous. 
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5.1 2 b) Private Investment 
Part (a) of Table 5.1 summarizes the theoretical models on the determinants of private 
investment which are monopolistic competition, neoclassical model, keynsian 
model, Tobin's Q model and models using credit rationing or foreign exchange 
shortages (Rama 1990). 
A general consensus with regards to the determinants of private investment points to 
changes in aggregate demand as being very important. It follows that models with no 
inclusion of an income accelerator may not be appropriate for developing countries 
which leads us to adopt the income accelerator specification. However, Rama (1990) 
cautioned the interpretation on the income accelerator less aggregate output may 
merely act as a time trend in empirical work. Although there is no study that attempts to 
overcome this problem by separating trend output and cyclical output thus far, we 
shall make the distinction between them in our investment model. 
Following the flexible accelerator model we construct a simple investment function 
for developing countries. Assuming Ir is net investment at time t, It is a 
function of capital stock. 
Ir =. f (K ) (5.3a) 
Since it is generally impossible to obtain capital stock data in developing countries, 
we assume that the desired capital stock is equivalent to output this period and 
expected output in the long-run; 
K *=_f(Y, Y e) (5.3b) 
1-1 
Yn=d ßJ ! -j 
And, j =0 (5.3c) 
Substitute for Y, 
r-1 Iß1Y1 lý 
I 
=0 (5.3d) 
Private capital formation is affected by public sector investment depending on whether 
the public investment is infrastructural (long-term investment) or short-term investment. 
it can complement or substitute private investment. If infrastructural, public 
investment can raise its marginal productivity. If the public sector absorbs a larger 
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share of domestic financial resources private investment tends to crowd out if there is 
no insulation from foreign finance. 
If the total supply of foreign financing is limited as may be generally expected, and if 
public sector borrowing increases, thus limiting the credit available to the private 
sector, crowding out will also occur. However, it should be noted that publicly 
guaranteed borrowings are normally for private sector usage in developing countries 
since sovereign borrowing seems to be generally preferred by creditors rather than 
borrowing without government's surety/guarantee. 
We take the variable government investment 1(; as a proxy for crowding-in or 
crowding-out of private investment. 
Interest rates affect investment directly. In developing countries, interest rates are often 
characterized by administered rates which are set at "low" levels with consequent 
direct credit allocation for the benefit of some sectors of production (Rama 1990). 
Such a policy choice which characterizes financial repression is due to the weakness 
of capital markets, which restrain firm's access to additional equity capital. Our 
approach is to treat ASEAN countries as having undergone financial liberalization. 
Interest rates had been liberalised since the 1970s in most ASEAN countries. The 
variable r denotes the interest rate. 
Private investment is influenced by interest rate changes which cause changes in 
private capital flows, which augment or reduce financial resources available (credit 
availability) to the private sector. 
The financing of private investment is normally through the use of retained profits, 
bank credit and foreign borrowing because domestic capital markets are restrained. We 
assume that there is no credit constraint in the ASEAN economies because capital 
markets are quite developed (and developing). Spillover effects from neighbouring 
surplus countries also contribute towards inflow of investment in the region. The 
effects of bank credit and foreign borrowing increases investment because of increased 
savings. There is also no credit rationing as far as international credit markets are 
concerned. 
In summary, we have the following specification for private investment in a general 
form: 
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=f(Y, ßjYt 
-j Ic,, r) 
i=0 (5.3) 
where, 
I= private investment 
G= government investment representing crowding-in or crowding-out 
variable. 
r= domestic interest rate, where r= rr if there is financial repression 
Y" 
-i j =0 = weighted average of past output 
Yr 
= output at time t. 
From now on and on equations (5.2), (5.3), (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6), the positive 
or negative signs on top of the independent variables mean the independent 
variable is either positively or negatively related to the dependant variable. For 
example, in the above equation, income is positively related to investment. If 
there are positive as well as negative signs appearing together, it means the 
relationship can either be positive or negative depending on the arguments about 
each of the independent variables. 
Interest rates in our simple investment equation plays the role of influencing the level 
of investment and, if applied in a general case (not specific to ASEAN), would reflect 
credit rationing if interest rates are controlled at a certain level. 
If the availability of credit rather than its cost imposes a constraint on investment in 
developing countries, then investment should be equal to or less than the credit that is 
available and be formulated as follows: 
/, <F, (5.3e) 
where 
FI 
represents the sum of internal financing available to firms, net credit and 
additional equity-capital available. In our case we treat domestic interest rates as a 
sufficient alternative indicator for credit availability. If the interest rate is repressed it 
only reflects a credit constraint in the internal market. 
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5.!. 2. c) Private Saving 
Evidence of previous studies suggests that the decision to save (or to consume) 
depends mainly on income, though diversity in savings are also attributable to the 
growth of output, population growth, etc. Inflation and adverse movements of the 
terms of trade depress the propensity to save. 
The Keynesian tradition relates savings to income in its simplest form as shown in part 
(a) Table 5.1 (part (a) shows the theoretical models). The permanent income 
hypothesis states that consumption depends on permanent income and not current 
disposable income. Permanent income can then be thought of as the expected income 
which is a summation of past income. Only if people believe that a rise in today's 
income is likely to be sustained as a higher future income stream will they believe that 
their permanent income has significantly increased. Only then would a large rise in 
current income be matched by a large rise in consumption. If the rise in current income 
is believed to have no significant effect in raising future permanent incomes, people 
will save most or all of what is perceived as temporary extra income to smooth future 
consumption. 
The life-cycle hypothesis states that individuals plan their life-time consumption by 
accumulating enough savings during their peak earning years to maintain consumption 
during retirement years. In a growing population and with rising per capita income, 
aggregate net personal saving is positive, and the larger the current per capita income, 
the higher will be the savings since the individual seeks to smooth consumption over 
his remaining life span. Thus, the life-cycle theory relates aggregate saving with the 
rates of population and income growth. Both of these are 'normal' income theories 
which emphasize the importance of deviations from trend, and smoothing. The basic 
idea enjoys a great deal of support in the empirical literature, and we shall follow this 
approach by separating trend income and cyclical income. 
The interest rate is also taken as a determinant for savings because of the presence of 
some correlation between savings and interest rates. Low and administered interest 
rates reduces savings whereas high real interest rates leads to an increase in savings 
(Mikesell and Zinser, 1974). This raises the question as to whether the savings rate 
increases with interest rate liberalization in most of the ASEAN countries. 
In a study by Brown (1971) on the Korean monetary reform, he uses three forms of 
national saving (private, household and domestic), three average saving rates with 
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GNP as the denominator, three average saving rates with disposable income as the 
denominator and three marginal saving rates as dependent variables. He included two 
income measures, GNP and disposable income, and the real rate of interest payable on 
long-term time as independent variables. With the exception of the marginal saving rate 
equations, the results were statistically significant, and average saving rates show the 
highest degree of positive correlation with interest rates. 
In the Malaysian case, a study by Lin See Yan (1992) shows that household savings 
increased with increases in interest rates in certain years, but with the stock market 
becoming well developed with privatisation of government projects encourages 
investment from households, leading to a decrease in household savings. 
On the basis of the above arguments our simple savings function takes the form: 
+rI++ 
Sr 
=f (Y' 
' 
(x. / Y, 
-i ' r) 
1 =0 (5.4) 
where, 
S= savings 
r= domestic interest rates, (r) if liberalised or (r, ) if repressed (If 
is unusually high it denotes financial deepening). 
Yr 
= 
income at time t. 
r+ 
aj Yr 
-i 
i =0 is a weighted average of past output. 
5.1 2 d) Tax Revenue 
The average level of income, the degree of openness of an economy and the 
composition of GDP each have a bearing on the taxable capacity of a country (Chelliah 
et. al. 1971,1975). Gemmell (1987), Ahmad and Stern (1987) and Burgess and Stern 
(1992) seem to have a consensus in their view on the sources of developing countries' 
tax revenue which is mainly from domestic taxes on goods and services, secondly from 
foreign trade taxes and finally, income taxes. The first kind of tax refers mainly to sales 
taxes comprising consumption and commodity-specific excises. Our approach in 
modelling these is to take taxation as a function of income, z Yt. 
. 
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It should, however, be noted that there is a relative decline in the importance of' trade 
taxes and an increase in importance in domestic indirect taxes with economic 
development (Greenaway 1980,1984, Gemmell 1990 and Tanzi 1991). Gemmell 
(1987) concludes that income and domestic consumption tax elasticities tend to be 
higher than trade tax elasticities, and that income tax elasticities tend to fall as income 
increases. Greenaway (1984) suggests that the time-series analysis of individual 
countries shows less reliance on trade taxes as a source of revenue. Indirect tax 
elasticities are highly variable across commodities, indicating opportunities to raise 
revenue by taxing 'elastic' commodities more. 
Evidence shows that trade taxes, which comprise export and import taxes, are related to 
changes in income (Chelliah et. al. 1975, Tait et. al. 1979 and Greenaway 1980) 
. 
In 
its simplest form export taxes are determined by export tax earnings. Exchange rate 
affects tax revenue in domestic currency terms. This means that an appreciation 
(depreciation) of the exchange rate reduces revenue for export taxes at a given export 
tax rate but increases import tax expenditure at a given import tax rate. 
Like export tax revenue, import tax revenue is also determined by its tax rate, exchange 
rate as well as import expenditure. The tax rates for income, exports and imports are 
obviously policy variables, i. e. at government's discretion. Higher fiscal deficits must 
result from changes in some combination of those exogenous and policy variables. 
Our equation for tax revenue is then taken as a function of tax rates, income, exports, 
and imports, and exchange rate affects tax revenue through its effects on exports and 
imports as follows: 
T =f(, rYY, +rxX. e+TMM. e) i=Y, X, M. (5.5) 
where, 
Ti 
= tax rate (for the respective tax base ) 
Y, 
= 
income at time t 
X= exports 
M= imports 
T= total tax revenue 
e= exchange rate whereby for exports it will be local for foreign 
rates whereas for imports, foreign for local rates apply. 
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For empirical purposes, wherever tax rates are known, Ti will he used, otherwise a 
linear form of tax rate will be approximated using the formula Ti - 'o + )LI (i ) 
where i is the respective tax bases of 
Y, X and M The coefficients for both 
should he the same so that it is implicit that income tax rates in developing countries 
are either fixed or change very slowly with changes in income and it is the change in 
income that constitutes major changes in income tax revenue. 
For middle-income countries, there is an inverse relationship between dependence on 
trade taxes and economic development, whereas for low-income countries, the first 
best source of tax revenue is still the share of agriculture in GNP. Import taxes denoted 
a decline in importance as a source of revenue as compared to export taxes (Greenaway 
1984). 
5.1.2. e) Exports 
Income and price elasticities for exports of developing countries play an important role 
in the determination of policy responses to deteriorating export earnings and increased 
indebtedness. Estimates on the basis of a single equation assume that supply price 
elasticities are at least large if not infinite (see for example, Houthhakker and Magee 
(1969) and Bahrnani-Oskoee (1984)). Khan (1974) and Goldstein and Khan (1978) 
suggest the use of a simultaneous equation model to estimate the price elasticities. In 
small open economies such as the ASEAN countries, prices of exports are taken as set 
by the world market, thus enabling a simple single equation of the export demand 
function to be used. 
Table 5.1 (part b) shows the variables used in standard log-linear disequilibrium 
specifications of demand for exports and in a supply model for the simultaneous 
specification. There appears not to have been a major change in the size of elasticities of 
exports (or imports) over the years as revealed by the results of estimation using the 
single equation method in the studies by Houthakker and Magee (I969), Hickman and 
Lau (1975) and Goldstein and Khan (1978). 
World income is a measure of effective world purchasing power, taken to he the 
average of income of the major trading partners of a country. The imperfect substitute 
hypothesis that says domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes for goods 
produced in other countries shall be maintained, requiring the price of exports for 
domestically produced goods relative to the world price of exports be used. 
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We specify our export function as below, relating the world demand for an individual 
country's exports to the relative price of exports to the price of world exports, the real 
income of the world economy and the exchange rate: 
X =. f (Px 
, 
PxW 
, 
e, Y W) (5.6) 
And, Px = Px 
W (l +s ) 
where, 
X= quantity of exports demanded 
Px 
= price of exports 
Px W= average export prices of the country's trading partners 
YW= world income 
e= foreign exchange rate 
S= subsidy 
The price of exports of country i, 
Px 
, 
relative to the prices of exports of its major 
trading partners which proxies the world price of exports, Px 
w, is an important 
determinant of export demand. One difference between the two prices is due to export 
tariffs. There is conclusive evidence that points to the importance of the role of prices 
in determining the world demand for a country's exports 
- 
the estimation results by 
Goldstein and Khan (1978) for example, show many countries have estimated price 
elasticity of export demand greater than unity. This means that a percentage point 
increase in the relative price ( Px /'X w) raises the export volume by more than one 
percentage point 
The exchange rate plays a role in affecting Px 
w in domestic currency terms. An 
appreciation of the exchange rate of country i makes the world price of exports more 
expensive in domestic currency terms, hence reducing the ratio of relative price of 
exports of country i to world price of exports and eventually raising the volume of 
exports of country i. The reverse situation happens when depreciation of the 
exchange rate occurs. 
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5 12 f) Imports 
In small open economies, the simple single equation import demand function that 
relates quantity of imports to price of imports and income gives satisfactory estimation 
of price and income elasticities of imports (Houthakker and Magee, 1969 and Goldstein 
and Khan, 1978). The usefulness of price elasticity of import (or export) demand is to 
see whether relative prices do play a role in the demand for total imports (or exports). 
If they do, the potential contribution of expenditure-switching policy instruments (the 
exchange rate, tariffs and subsidies) to trade balance adjustment would be significant. 
The income elasticities of demand for imports (exports) carry two implications. In the 
absence of secular increases in the relative price of imports, the share of imports and 
exports in GNP (in real terms) could rise as income rises if the income elasticity 
exceeds I, or falls if less than 1. The second implication is that if the income elasticity 
of demand for a country's import is larger than that for its exports, in the absence of' 
relative price adjustments, then the country is faced with a choice: either grow at the 
same rate as its trading partners and accept a secular deterioration in its external balance, 
or opt for external balance and accept a slower growth rate than its trading partners. In 
its simplest form and consistent with economic theory is a specification that relates the 
quantity of imports demanded to the price of imports relative to the price of all other 
domestically produced goods and an income or activity variable. In Table 5. I (part b) 
nine variants of such specification from previous studies is presented. 
Model I is the simplest form of specification. All other models introduce dynamic 
behaviour by including lagged values of either the dependent or independent variables. 
Models 2 and 4-6 include the value of the dependent variable lagged one period. This 
implies a geometric time path of adjustment and restricts adjustment to previous income 
and price changes to be identical. Models 5 and 7-9 are less restrictive in this regard. 
Model 5 is the Houthakker-Magee specification which includes lagged values of both 
the dependent and independent variables. Models 7-9 include only lagged values of the 
independent variables. There are two other differences in the models. Models 5 and 6 
split income into its cyclical and trend components, as in Goldstein, Khan and Officer 
(1980). Models 4,5 and 9 relax the implied assumption of the other models that 
demand is homogenous of degree zero in income and prices. 
An area which has been given little emphasis in the trade equations according to 
Goldstein and Khan (1978), is the modern consumption theory that distinguishes 
between current and permanent or life-cycle income. Our specification considers this 
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issue. The relative price of imports to domestic prices implies that domestic goods are 
imperfect substitutes for imported goods, thus creating a price differential between 
those goods, and hence plays a crucial role in determining the quantity of imports 
demanded. Exchange rates influence imported prices in domestic currency terms. An 
appreciation of the exchange rate of country i increases the purchasing power of that 
country, ceteris paribus, makes imported goods relatively cheaper, hence raising the 
import volumes. 
In its simplest form, our import demand function is: 
M=f(PM, PD, e, Y) 
And, P. =PMw (1 +T) 
where, 
Y= actual income 
M= quantity of imports demanded 
1'M W= world price of imported goods 
PM 
= price of imported goods 
PI) 
= price for domestically produced goods 
e= local exchange rate 
T= tariff rate 
(5.7) 
The import demand function above not only captures the time series behaviour of 
quantities and prices of merchandise imports and focuses on the role played by income 
and prices in the determination of the trade variables, it also portrays the impact of 
expenditure-switching policy of exchange rate changes on a country's trade balance. 
5.2 Our Model 
Using a simple linear form to represent the above equations (5.2), (5.3), (5.4), (5.5), 
(5.6) and (5.7), in summary, what we have then is: 
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G, 
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The above equations are demand functions and government investment is assumed to 
be exogenous. To answer the question on the movements of the deficits and 
indebtedness, we need to further substitute the equations into a deficit system, and 
introduce an external debt variable to show its role in affecting the different sectors. 
Ideally, incorporation of a supply function completes the system of equations. 
Following substitution, we shall discuss on the response of the supply-side and 
substitute the supply function into the deficit system of equations rather than the single 
equations above. This is mainly due to interest in the deficits and debt which shall be 
reflected in the deficit system. 
Drawing the stylized facts about the determinants of the macroeconomic aggregates 
shows that each aggregate may have many variables as its determinants. Hence, the 
presence of similar sized deficits in the national income identity does not imply that the 
movement in one deficit causes commensurate changes in the other deficit because each 
macroeconomic aggregate can move or change in different directions and magnitudes. 
Also, simply looking at the identity tells us that there are two terms on the right hand 
side which naturally, both may have some kind of influence on the external deficit. 
The twin deficits theory that gained new importance in the U. S. due to huge fiscal 
deficits and increased debt to an unprecedented level shows only exchange rate and 
interest rate as the linkage between the two deficits 
- 
trade and fiscal (Gordon, 1990), 
which we shall further argue is rather an over-simplification, in the later part of this 
section. 
Substituting equations (5.2') to (5.7') into the three separate expressions in the national 
income identity results in a system of deficit equations which clearly shows that the 
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three expressions are linked in one way or another, by one or more common variables 
apart from exchange rate and interest rate. The suggestions that two of the deficits are 
twin may not be true because of the presence of the third expression. However, to 
answer the questions of whether the foreign trade deficit and fiscal deficit are twin or 
whether there are three of them, the question as to how the deficits are linked together 
and eventually the question of cause and effect between the three deficits and 
international indebtedness could be determined following discussions after the 
substitution. 
The purpose of this exercise is to find causal relationships embodied in the popular 
twin-deficit theory. Another major concern in this exercise is the relationship between 
internal policy matters and increased indebtedness, hence, extending the twin-deficits 
theory to its linkages with increased indebtedness. Whilst a lot had been said about the 
external factors/shocks that are alleged to be the cause of increased indebtedness in 
developing countries in the 1980s, very few studies are concerned with the issue we 
address. Unsustainable external deficits tend to be associated with (both statistically 
and causally by previous studies on the US data) an unsustainable public sector deficit. 
Enders and Lee (1990) suggest a reduction of the external deficit requires a reduction 
of public sector deficit, which can be achieved either through cuts in public spending or 
through an increase in public sector current revenues: taxes, income from tariffs, public 
sector fees and charges. Our examination of the determinants of each of the 
macroeconomic aggregates suggests there are more variables that affect each aggregate. 
In order to understand the linkages between the twin deficits and debt, we firstly 
present how we should account for indebtedness in our system of deficit equations. 
How we model the two debt components is important so as to show their role in the 
deficits system. Debt has four components as shown in the diagram below. 
Debt Components 
Domestic Foreign 
Public 
Private 1 I) 
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Public domestic and public foreign debt (quadrants A& B) appear jointly as a 
determinant for public sector deficit, however, public foreign debt also appear 
jointly with private foreign debt (quadrants A& C) in determining the external sector 
deficit. In order to avoid duplication of the role of public foreign debt and also to be 
consistent in the thesis which, in general, focuses more on foreign debt, we treat all 
foreign debt in aggregate i. e. public and private sectors' foreign debt (quadrants A& 
C) taken together as (N ) affecting the external deficit (equation 5.10' below). This 
is because in a deficit systems of equation, the interest repayments on past external debt 
appears in the invisible imports, thus it is part of the deficit equation (see also page 17 
for further information). This is also consistent with the fact that publicly guaranteed 
foreign debt are mostly for private sectors' usage given the active role of private sector 
in the region. This is in fact the characteristics of debt contracted by many developing 
countries in the 1980s. 
Quadrant B enters our model as (D) in equation (5.8). If governments of ASEAN 
financed their deficits mainly through the domestic private market (quadrant D), hence 
competing with the private sector, then the magnitude and sign of 
P3 
, 
the crowding 
in 
- 
crowding out variable in equation (5.3') or (5.9') becomes important. If there is 
no competition between the sectors whereby private sector is financed mainly through 
quadrant C, 
03 
would have a positive sign, i. e. no crowding-out may occur and 
vice-versa. 
Substituting equations (5.2') to (57) into our macroeconomic framework will show 
the key variables and how these variables affect the external, fiscal and private sector 
deficits simultaneously. Whether the three expressions are behaviourally independent of 
each other will also be revealed. 
Substituting equations (5.2') and (5.5') into (G -T) we get equation (5.8) for 
our fiscal (government budget) balance: 
+C(,, +PI t1, }-{TyY, +TXX,. e +TMM,. c' } 
Substituting for equations (5.6') and (5.7) to replace M und X gives equation 
(5.8'), and including the variable component for government consumption: 
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r-i + I I(; +nl I Ili Yi-i +112Y, +µI'D, }-{z}Y, +261( ) 
i =0 Yx w. c+Tx 
Q2 Y, + TM YI ()+ TM 72 Yt } 
i-I 
(G 
-T), = {Ic +nl 
ý, 
n1 Y1-i +PI rD, +(n2 
- 
(Ty +rM Y2 ))Y } 
j =0 
PM w. c' 
-{ zx 6I ( 
Px, 
) +Tx ß'2 Y, w+ tM YI ()} 
w Px, 
.e pl), 
Substituting equations (5.3') and (5.4') into (I -S) gives equation (5.9') which is 
the savings-investment gap or the private sector balance: 
(I-S), =fß1Yr+ß2 
-1 al Y, +aý 
ßi Yr 
-j + ß3 + #4 r} J 
=0 
r-I 
a; Y, 
_i +a3 r} j =0 
r- I 
(PI 
-al )Y, +(ß2 
-a2) I (ß-a)1 
j =0 
+03 Ic, + (ß 4- a3 )r (_5.9) 
Finally, substituting equations (5.6') and (5.7') into (M -X) we get the external 
deficit equation (or the current account balance). 
W 
(M-X), ={Y1(PP )+Y2 Y, 
Pw )+6zy, W} 
n Px, 
.e (5.10) 
Note that the definition of 
(G 
-T), (M 
-X) and (I - S) are the current 
account balances on government account, external account and private sector account. 
In the current account balance, interest repayments appear as part of the current 
expenditure. While we had allow interest repayments on public domestic debt as part of 
government expenditure in the government equation (5.2'), we have to account for 
interest repayments for external debt in the external account. Interest repayments on 
past foreign debt stock is a component of invisible imports in the external account 
hence, it should he accounted for in the deficit equation for the external account. As 
such it affects the current account of the external sector balance and therefore, is a 
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determinant of the external account and it should be introduced in equation (5.10) as 
ý" N as follows: 
ýI 
(M-X), ={y1(PM 
e)+Y2Y, }-{6j( PX' )+Q2 Y, w}+r4N 
w P) PXe (5.10') 
As for equation (5.10'), the first term on the r. h. s explains the determinants of 
imports, the second term explains the determinants of exports, and, the third terns is 
the interest repayments on past debt stock, where N, is defined as past external debt 
.I 
N, 
- 
Y, (M 
-X )i 
stock j =0 r is the international interest rate on debt 
depending on where the debt is contracted, for example, if it is contracted in the euro- 
currency market, then LIBOR is applicable, if in yen credit market as the case with 
ASEAN, then the Japanese prime rate is applicable. 
The identity as in equation (4.1) (rewritten as (5.1') below), serves as a constraint so 
that fluctuations in either the right-hand side or the left-hand side variables of equations 
(5.8'), (5.9') and (5.10') will result in zero residual when either sides are added 
together. 
(M 
-X )= (G-T) + (1-S) (5.1') 
The model becomes deterministic because of the fact that the identity hold all l. h. s. as 
well as r. h. s. variables to sum to zero. 
The constraint says that if the government budget is in balance, the private sector 
balance will be reflected in the external account. Similarly, if the private sector's 
budget is in balance, the government account balance will be reflected in the external 
account. 
5.2.1 Properties of the model 
The model is essentially a long-run equilibrium model, achieving equilibrium at all 
points through time as indicated by the constraint in equation (5. I'). Given that the 
central issue of our thesis is indebtedness, we model the effect of the past stock of 
public debt through the variable 
'r in the government account, that is, hast debt stock 
feeds through future government deficits. While all external debt enters the model 
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through r *N in the external account, that is, past external debt feeds through future 
external deficits. 
The model which comprises a simultaneous system of' deficit equations of' (5.9'), 
(5.9'), and (5.10') taken altogether is essentially a form of aggregate demand 
function having an implicit assumption that prices are fixed, i. e. it implies a flat long- 
run aggregate supply curve. This issue will be addressed in the following sub-section. 
There are two variables to the left-hand side so that any changes in any of the variables 
or combination of variables to the right-hand side of equations (5.9'), (5.9') and 
(5.10') should affect both of them unless some assumptions are made that either of 
them do not change. 
One r. h. s. variable which we need to recognise may not be fully exogenous is Yt 
. 
Its presence in all three expressions may cause cyclical effects in the system, where for 
example, Y, =. f (G ), or G =. f' (Y, ), Yt = f* (T ), or T= 
. 
/'(Y, ), etc. However, 
we shall model Yt to address the supply-side response and to eliminate remaining 
endogeneity in the next sub-section. There are also several exogenous variables 
appearing together in the three theoretical expressions, which will be dealt with in the 
role of the demand-side sub-section. 
We address the most important property of the model which is the endogencity of 
Y1 in the immediate sub-section that follows while the rest of the properties will he 
dealt with in sub-section 5.2.3 and 5.4. 
522 Supply-side Response 
We address the supply-side response to solve the problem of' endogeneity in the 
system of deficit equations that signifies the aggregate demand function. 
We specify a linear production function, adopting the specification by Frenkel and 
Raizin (1987) who linked the initial output to output in period one (in a two period 
framework) as YJ _ ? 't +F (Jo ). Unlike Frenkel and Razin, we formulate the 
production function for multi-periods, and we assume the economy has an initial 
sequence of endowments, 
F, 
-I cwd F, 
, 
in corresponding periods. This initial 
endowment may he consumed or invested. Investment will alter inter-temporal 
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outputs. Output in period one, Yt 
, 
is linked to the initial endowment in the last 
period, 
p', 
-I 
, 
through the production function: 
Y, =Y, +F(It I) (5.1 Ia) 
where, 
y I= initial endowment for period t already taking into account 
Yr 
= output in period t 
It 
-I = private investment in the last period. 
Equation (5-11 a) states that output this period constitutes an initial endowment for this 
period (which has taken into account initial endowment for the last period) plus the 
impact of investment from the last period. The assumption of the function above is that 
it exhibits positive and diminishing marginal product and in the absence of investment 
output cannot he augmented, 
F (0 )=0 
We formulate an investment function for the last period and substitute it in the equation 
(5.1 I a). Following the flexible accelerator investment function specified in the last 
section (equation (5.3)), the investment function for the last period is: 
/-2 
++ 
ß5 Y, 1 ß6 ßj Yt j+ P7 1G, 
--I 
+ /8 
j 
=1 (5.12x) 
Investment in the last period is a function of last period's output, a weighted average 
sum of past outputs, a depreciation of output lagged two periods, government 
investment in the last period and interest rate in the last period. The first term which is 
output in the last period can be put together in the sum of past outputs so that equation 
(5.12) is more applicable: 
i- /+f 
1i= ß6 
1 Pl Yr 
-. 
i + 07'(,, 
-1+ 
08 rr 1 
j =0 (5.12) 
Substituting (5.12) into Y, 
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Y, 
= 
Yr + (DI (Di Yr 
-i + D2 1(; + fi3 Y, 1 i =0 (5.1 1) 
Output in period one is a function of an initial given output or endowment in that 
period, a weighted average of the sum of past outputs, depreciation lagged two 
periods, government investment last period and interest rate last period. 
523. The Role of Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply 
The aggregate demand side may comprise either all six demand equations on page 
5.13 or our system of three deficit equations of (5.8'), (5.9') and (5.10'). Equation 
(5.11) addresses the supply-side function and equations (5.8'), (5.9") and (5.10") on 
page 5.23 are the complete system of aggregate demand and aggregate supply 
equations. Equation (5.1) as a constraint closes the system of equations. 
Consider the demand-side equations firstly. Prices are initially rigid or slow to adjust, 
aggregate demand shifts leftwards or rightwards depending on the movements of either 
(M 
-X) or (G - T) and (1 -S)- increasing or decreasing, but the implied 
supply curve is flat which means supply merely accommodate demand changes. 
Consider the supply-side (equation 5.1 1) only. Output is a dynamic function of 
investment in the previous period added to an initial endowment. By virtue of past 
period's investment, output has adjusted to a distributed lag of past outputs, 
government investment in the previous year and interest rates in the previous year. All 
theta coefficients are actually coefficients of adjustments. With the inclusion of (5. II), 
it implies output adjusts to the shifts in aggregate demand, hence, shifting (a vertical) 
short-run supply curve leftwards or rightwards. However, total output can be 
considered as composed of a potential output component and a small component that 
deviates from the potential output in the short run and fluctuates. We illustrate it as 
a. Fig. 5.1 
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Dornbusch (1990) believes that the short-run component out of total output that 
fluctuates is demand-determined. The new classical economists believe however that 
further, out of the short-run output that fluctuates, a certain portion is the potential 
output itself that fluctuates along with the short-run fluctuations. As such, Dornbusch 
suggested that a more sophisticated theory is to combine these two effects, that a small 
component of the potential output is also fluctuating and demand-determined. Tile 
result is we allow for a slightly kinked aggregate supply curve in the short-run as 
shown below. Fig. 5.1 below illustrates the short-run aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply curves. 
Fig. 5,1: The Implied Aggregate Demand and p121y Curves, (Fixcd pricce) 
Price 
N 
S S' 
Fig. 5.1 a: Components of output 
u 
YO Yl Output 
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In the following, we analyses the situations if, in a short-run period, prices 
adjust and allow for some adjustments in the aggregate demand and aggregate supply 
curves. This is possible by virtue of evidence showing that prices appear as common 
variables in either of the three balances, thus causing co-movement in the balances 
(Table 5.2 page 5.33). Such adjustments may come from various sources. 
Firstly, what happens if prices of domestically produced goods vary, contributed by 
higher inflation rates. The effect would then be on the government balance and the 
external balance. Increase in prices of domestically produced goods is induced by an 
increase in domestic expenditure 
- 
example, increase in government expenditure, we 
show this in Fig. 5.2a. An increase in government expenditure shifts the aggregate 
demand curve from AD to AD', equilibrium achieved at a higher price P 1. In a longer 
run period, the supply curve response to the increase in price and shift rightwards, 
denoting an increase in output. Hence, price is reduced to P2. The higher domestic 
prices leads to an excess supply and a reduction in output demanded. It also reduces 
the price of imports, relatively, hence improving the terms of trade, ceteris /)uribi,,, 
and the external balance. 
Fis 5.2a: The effect of variable domestic prices on aggregate supply and aggregate demand 
Domestic 
Price 
PI 
P2 
PO 
We show the effects of variable domestic prices in terms of the internal (I) and 
external (E) balances in Fig. 5.2b below. The I curve refers to internal balance and 
traces the locus of domestic prices and output where the aggregate supply equals 
aggregate demand. It has a positive slope because an increase in domestic price results 
in an increase in demand for foreign goods at a cheaper import price, and an increase 
in output induces excess supply. The E curve traces the locus of domestic prices 
and output along which the external balance is in equilibrium. It also has a positive 
YO YI Output 
5.24 
slope because an increase in domestic prices makes the import price relatively 
cheaper hence improving the external balance. The arrows show movements towards 
stable position. 
Fig. 5.2b: The effect of variable domestic prices on the internal and external balances 
Domestic' 
price 
r 
excess demand 
external surplji 
cx1ess supply 
external deficit 
Output 
Source: Adapted from Mundell, 1968, as per Chapter 3. 
Secondly, the exchange rate fluctuates according to market-clearing conditions and 
inducing some adjustments in the export and import prices, further, inducing changes 
in relative prices and eventually, import and export earnings Hence, exchange rate 
adjusts and allow for adjustments in not only the savings-investment function, but also 
in the other two functions. Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3 explains the dynamics of these 
adjustments in graphical presentation, so we do not deal with it in this section. 
Thirdly, domestic interest rates can adjust to bring savings and investment to their 
desired levels since domestic interest rates are determined by market-clearing 
conditions. The government budget balance can also adjust in response to adjustments 
in interest rates. Domestic interest rates appear in both the private and the government 
equations. The response of government balance to interest rates is embodied in the 
conventional twin deficits literature. Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3 is thus applicable in 
terms of graphical presentation of budget balance, interest rates, external sector and 
internal sector at a fixed exchange rate. If exchange rate is flexible and allows for 
adjustments in the external as well as the government sectors, hence, the existence of 
inter-link between interest rates, exchange rates, government sector and external sector 
hypothesised by the conventional twin deficits notion. In this case, Figure 3.5 in 
Chapter 3 is applicable. However, in terms of aggregate demand and aggregate supply, 
the diagram can be shown as below: 
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Figure 5.2: The Implied Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply Curves 
(Achieving equilibrium at variahle exchange and interest rates) 
Exchange 
rate 
AS higher interest rate 
external surplus 
4, 
excess dei and Al) 
IV 
excess supply 
11,11, L4 1 
Il 
lower interest rate 4-2 external deficit 
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A higher interest rate is associated with higher exchange rate. An increase in interest 
rate reduces expenditure in the form of capital export and domestic expenditure which 
may improve external balance (Quad 1). An increase in output creates an excess supply 
of goods and services (Quad I and II) and an increase in exchange rate creates an 
excess demand (Quad I and IV) for foreign goods. Therefore, an increase in output 
must be accompanied by an increase in the exchange rate to eliminate any excess 
demand and to achieve equilibrium (hence, the negative slope for AD). The condition 
for stability requires output and exchange rate to move in the direction of the arrows 
shown. 
Now consider the system of equations (5.8"), (5.9") and (5.10"). All of the above 
adjustments are applicable. With the inclusion of the production function in the 
system of equations, aggregate demand generates a dynamic process because the 
output and investment adjust to changes in capital stock. 
In the long-run, the dynamics of the system lies in its ability to adjust to changes in 
capital stock and changes in labour. In the longer-run, relative prices of exports to 
world price of exports and the relative prices of world imports to prices of domestically 
produced goods adjust inducing responses from the external balance and the 
government balance. There will also be adjustments in the individual macroeconomic 
aggregates, for example, savings adjust to its desired level and exports adjust to the 
difference between demand for exports in period I and the actual flow in the previous 
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period t-/ (see Goldstein and Khan, 1978). More important government expenditure 
also adjusts in the long-run; equations (5.8') and (5.8") show the inclusion of it 
variable signifying the change of government consumption with respect to income. 
Government investment can either increase or decrease through time; Musgrave (1974) 
suggested that government investment decreases with it higher stage of economic 
development, while the Wagner's law suggested that public investment varies in 
association with GNP and economic and political situation. 
The resulting effects would be a dynamic system of long-run aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply which adjust to adjustments in output and full employment as well as 
to prices. 
Further analysis in the variables that contribute to the role of aggregate demand and 
supply are discussed later in sub-section 5.5. 
524 The Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply System of Equations 
Substituting (5.1 1) into the deficit equations system of (5.8'), (5.9') and (5.10'): 
r-I 
((; 
-T )r = {1ý; + ri/ rtj Y, 
_1 + p/ nDr +012 -(Ty + TM Y2 )) j =0 
Y+ 
rý 
fi Yt 
-i +I+ (1)3 r j =0 
PX, wpw. c' 
-{ T QI (W)+ Tx U2 Y, + TM Yi ( PX, e PI), 
(ßl 
- 
cxr) I Y, + (1) i (t' Yr 
-i + (1'2 1(;, ,+ (1)3 r, -j i =0 
r-1 
+(ß2 
- 
a2 (ß 
-a). i Yr 
-i + 
ß3 Ic + (ß4 
- 
a3 )ý- 
i =0 (5 9") 
pMwýý 
_ti (M 
-X )i = {}'1 (l+ 72 1}'r + (I) (bj Yt-j +(1)2 f(, 1 +(I)3 P, ), j =0 
-{6/( 
PX, )+62Yrw}+P2r*N 
w PX c' (5.10" ) 
(M-X )_ (G-T) + (1-S) (5.1) 
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5.2.3. a A Summary of the Variables 
The following categorises the variables of the system. There are 4 endogenous and 
exogenous (including 3 predetermined) variables. 
1. Endogenous variables: 
(M 
-x ), = current account balance on external account 
(G 
-T )r = current account balance on government account 
(1 
-S )ý = investment-savings gap 
Yt 
= output 
2a Exogenous variables: 
(PM, W 
"el j), = relative price of imports with respect to price of domestic goods 
w (Px IP 
.e = relative price of exports with respect world price of exports 
YW= world income (income of major trading partners) 
r "N, = interest repayments on external debt stock 
interest debt repayments on government debt stock 
ºý = domestic interest rate, where r= 'rr if there is financial 
repression. 
1, 
_1 = gross private investment last period 
r-1 
h'J 
Yr 
-j 
j =0 =a weighted average of the sum of past outputs 
2h. Predetermined variables: 
government investment 
C(-, 
= government consumption 
Y= initial endowment (output) 
5.3 Description of the Model 
In discussing the role of the demand side of our model, we need to identify signs and 
ºnagnitude of each of the coefficients so as to identify their influences on the twill 
deficit and debt. In describing the magnitude and signs of each coefficient, an 
assumption has to be made with regard to which of the variables on the l. h. s. that each 
coefficient affects because there are two variables on the I. h. s. and both change as the 
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l. h. s. variables change. The signs and magnitudes of variables in the aggregate 
demand model (5.8'), (5.9') and (5.10') are discussed and considering the effects of 
output and investment adjustments in the full aggregate demand-aggregate supply 
model (5.8"), (5.9") and (5.10"). 
5.3.1 Fiscal Balance 
Consider equation (5.8'). Expansion of the expression shows that the fiscal balance is 
the difference between a predetermined government expenditure and a sung of tax 
earnings as government's revenue. Equation (5.8') takes government expenditure 
I(,, annd CG, as exogenous and predetermined, in order to simplify the analysis a 
little, i. e., in the short-run.. 
We saw earlier that total expenditure comprises of government investment and 
consumption and repayment of interest on past governments' public debt. Past 
r- 
D, (G 
-T )i 
government debt stock is defined as j =0 which enters our model 
through equation (5.8) or (5.8'). 
Government revenue comprises of collections from direct taxes on income and indirect 
taxes on tradables. The sources of tax earnings are from: income, exports (export tax 
rates multiplied by the export demand function), imports (import tax rates multiplied by 
the import demand function) and exchange rate which affects import tax and export 
tax, hence, indirectly affecting tax revenue. 
Taking each variable at a time and holding all other variables on the r. h. s. constant from 
now on, we analyse each variable to determine its effect on fiscal deficits. The analysis 
is made simpler in this section because government expenditure is predetermined, hence 
can be regarded as constant throughout the analysis. The effect of changes on the 
r. h. s. variables are on government revenues only. 
An increase in interest repayments on past debt stock will have a direct effect on 
increasing government expenditure and at the same time reducing government revenue 
so that a fiscal deficit is either created or enlarged. 
Increases in income or output has a direct effect in raising the tax revenue and 
reducing the fiscal deficit thus having a negative relationship with the fiscal deficit. If 
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government expenditure increases at the same time as increases in revenue, the net 
effect is ambiguous, the fiscal deficit can either rise, fall or does not change at all. 
Tax rates and government expenditure are policy variables, hence are predetermined. 
Government can influence its budget balance by using these policy variables if the other 
variables on the right hand side do not change. A tax cut on income for example, ceteris 
paribus, creates a fiscal deficit. Likewise, an increase in government spending, ceteris 
paribus, will raise the fiscal deficit. However, taking those two variables as 
predetermined, there are four other variables in the equation that can cause changes in 
the government deficits, namely, 
Pxr /Px, w 
, 
PM, /Pn, 
, 
Y, w, 
and e1 
. 
The exchange rate could also be a policy variable if it is fixed by the government rather 
than according to market clearing conditions. In the case of most of the ASEAN 
countries exchange rates are pegged against a composite basket comprising the 
currencies of major trading partners, as is the case with Malaysia, (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, Annual Report 1990). Therefore, these are not policy variables but are 
market-determined. Exchange rate changes have two types of effects - price and 
quantity effects. It has direct effects on import and export tax revenues, and an indirect 
effects on tax revenue in total, through its price effects and a direct effect on exports 
and imports through its quantity effects. An appreciation of the exchange rate causes the 
relative price of exports to fall, increasing tax revenue because exports are relatively 
cheaper hence reducing the fiscal deficit. On the other hand, quantity of exports might 
fall leaving an ambiguous net effect (can either be positive, negative or having no 
change). A depreciation causes the relative price of' exports to rise, however, export tax 
revenue increases in domestic currency terms if quantity of exports does not change, 
thus, reducing fiscal deficit. The coefficient x 61 can he either positive or 
negative. 
By contrast, an appreciation of the exchange rate causes import prices to he relatively 
cheaper, reducing the relative price of imports to prices of domestic goods 
simultaneously increasing the quantity of imports, hence, resulting in increasing import 
tax revenue in domestic currency terms. The net effect of the elasticity of' import tax 
revenue, 
TM 71 
, 
is to reduce the fiscal deficit. A depreciation causes import tax 
revenue to decline because relative prices and quantity of imports adjust, however, the 
value of import tax in domestic currency terms rises, the net effect being to increase the 
fiscal deficit. 
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Based on the above discussions, we can conclude that the expected signs and 
magnitudes of the coefficients are: 
(zr+ZMY2)<0; zx61 >0; Tx (72 >0; TM Y1 <0; P1 >0. 
5.3.1 a Output and Investment Effects 
Consider the full equation as in (5.8"). The effects of initial output, past output and 
past investment operate through the elasticity of import and income tax revenues and 
income elasticity of imports. 
There are two output variables that affect fiscal deficits. Both should have a positive 
relationship with tax revenue as well as raising imports. They both reduce the fiscal 
deficits. 
Past investment also affects revenue in a positive manner through the elasticity of tax 
revenues for imports and income as well as through the income elasticity of imports. 
5.2.2 Saving-Investment Gap 
Equation (5.9') states that the private sector balance is a function of the determinants of' 
investment and savings which comprise income at time t and a sum of past income 
with weights declining exponentially, government expenditure and interest rates. 
Government investment is predetermined, as in (5.8'). Both income at time t and past 
weighted average income and interest rates appear as common variables in private 
investment as well as private savings. An increase in income raises both investment 
and savings; the strength of 
01 
versus "I (or vice versa for the case of past 
output) will determine whether investment rises faster than savings (or vice-versa), 
either reducing or enlarging the savings-investment gap. 
An increase in interest rates causes a reduction in private investment. Whereas 
savings would increase with an increase in interest rates. The overall effect on private 
sector balance is not clear - whether the rise in savings offsets, worsens or improves 
the saving-investment gap. This clearly depends upon the relative magnitudes of 
P4 
and a3 
, 
i. e. the relative interest sensitivity of savings and investment. 
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The variable 
'G, 
proxies the competing credit availability between the public and the 
private sector; the sign for 
ß3 depends on whether public investment crowds-out or 
crowds-in private investment. If 
03 is positive and significant, it signifies 
crowding-in of private investment, if it is negative and significant, it signifies 
crowding-out of private investment. 
The coefficients are therefore, expected to have the following signs: 
0 ß(ßI-at)<1; 0i(ß2 
-a2)<1; ß3 <0; (94-0.1)<0. 
5.3.2. a Output and Investment Effects 
Initial output, output in the previous periods and investment in the previous period all 
have their effects on the savings-investment gap through 
f3i 
'111" "1 
. 
The effect 
of each of these variables depends on the relative sensitivity of savings and investment 
towards them. 
5.3.3 External Balance 
Equation (5.10') shows the external balance is determined by the determinants of 
export and import demand functions as well as interest repayments on past external debt 
stock. The relative domestic price of exports to the world price (proxied by the export 
prices of major trading partners), exchange rate and the world income (also proxicd by 
income of major trading partners) determine the export demand function. Whereas the 
relative price of imports to prices of domestically produced import substitutes, the 
exchange rate and permanent and transitory income of the importing countries 
determines the import demand function. These two functions in fact appear in equation 
(5.8') which exhibits similar properties between the fiscal and the external balances. 
Incorporating the role of interest rates on foreign debts, however, results in great 
differences between the two deficits. Firstly, the interest rates on foreign debt is the 
world interest rate and secondly, interest repayments are in the form of foreign 
exchange as opposed to internal interest rate and interest repayments in domestic 
currency terms as shown by domestic interest repayments in the fiscal balance. 
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As discussed earlier, an increase in the ratio of the relative price of exports either as a 
result of a decrease in world export prices or a depreciation in the exchange rate leads 
to a decrease in export volume and reduces the net exports. The effect of an increase 
in world income is to increase export volumes, hence increasing net exports. An 
increase in the relative import price ratio reduces import volume leading to an increase 
in net exports. An increase in income raises the import volume and reduces the net 
export balance. An increase in interest repayments on past external debt will reduce 
net exports. 
5a Output and Investment Effects 
Adjustments in initial output, weighted average of the sum of past outputs and 
investment in the previous period operate through the income elasticity of' import 
demand, which is unambiguously positive. 
The estimated coefficients are expected to have the following signs: 
Y' ? O; 72 < 0; 7.3 < 0; (TI < 0; Q2 > 0; N2 >0. 
5.4 A Discussion on the Model 
The following highlights several important points about the three theoretical 
expressions which have various exogenous variables appearing together: 
(a). The presence of Y, in all three aggregate demand equations causes cyclical 
effects in the system, where 
', 
=. 
i (6 ), 
or G =. t (Y, ), Yr =. l (T ), or 7' =f (Yr) 
. 
However, if Yt i, treated as Supply- 
determined (as discussed earlier), so endogeneity of Y: may not he it serious 
problem. 
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(b). As a result of (a) above, "i is replaced by all determinants affecting it. Stich 
are initial output, a weighted average of the sum of past outputs, government 
investment in the previous year and domestic interest rate in the previous year which 
naturally appear in all three equations making-up a system of' aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply equations. The effects of these variables had been discussed earlier 
but further insights into the role of output to reduce deficits and debt need to he 
addressed in more detail in a later sub-section. 
(c). In two of the expressions 
- 
the fiscal balance (G 
- 
7' ) and the external balance 
(X 
- 
M) PX, / PX W, PMW / PI), Y, W und el are common variables. lt is 
thus expected that there are forces tending towards some common movement between 
the two balances. 
(d). There are no other common variables present between the private sector balance 
(1 
-S) and the external sector (X -M) balance. 
(e). Interest rates r and government investment I(;, appear in both 
(/-S) and (G-T). 
Table 5.2: Common variables (in *) 
Identity (M 
- 
X) (G 
- 
T) (I 
-S Variable 
y r * * * 
r- 
Y1_j 
=o 
Px /Px w * 
w /PPM ) * * 
YW * * 
1G 1 * * * 
z2 * * 
e * * 
r * * 
r 
r-1 
* * * 
(f). The interest rate r appears in both I (111(1 S 
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The role of prices and exchange rate in (c) and the role of interest rates in (f) above 
in terms of adjustments had been discussed in sub-section 5.2.3 earlier. Table 5.2 
summarizes the details of common variables. 
5.4.1 Implications of the model 
Several implications can be drawn from the properties of the model as discussed 
below: 
5.4.1. a Channels of Transmission 
(i) The most important channel of transmission between fiscal deficits and external 
deficits is through output and determinants of output. 
(ii) The four variables mentioned in (c) above, i. e. 
Px / Px IV PM, / P, 
, 
Y, 
, 
unel eI are the channels of transmission between 
the government budget balance and the external balance, thus there is it tendency for 
co-movements in the two balances. 
(iii) The variable 'G links the private and the public sectors' balances and may 
cause co-movements in these two balances. 
(iv) Between savings and investment themselves, there appears to he a correlation due 
to interest rates. 
(v) Differentiating some of the variables give further insight into the relationship 
between the three deficits. 
541h Further Insights into the Aggregate Demand Model 
Differentiating (5.8'), (5.9') and (5.10') with respect to Yt is essentially finding the 
response of the endogenous variables to a change in output. The following reflects 
inter-temporal changes in the deficits with respect to changes in output, where output is 
defined as in equation (5.11). The following analysis only holds if, by assumption 
x=X, Y=Y, G = G, where a bar means constant. 
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6(G-T)/6Y, 
=(iy+Tm72) (5.13) 
S(1-S)/SY, 
= 
(ßi 
-(x1) (5.14) 
S(M 
-X )/SY, = y2 (5.15) 
Assuming 'zr sind iM are constants since they are policy variables taken as given. 
Equation (5.13) gives a coefficient for the marginal effect of a change in income to it 
change in the fiscal deficit. Equation (5.14) gives a coefficient for the marginal 
propensity to save or the marginal effect of a change in income to it change in the 
private sector deficit, and equation (5.15) gives a coefficient for the marginal propensity 
to import or the marginal effect of a change in income to a change in the external deficit. 
Rewriting the meanings of the coefficients as follows: 
Ty 
= marginal effect of income tax revenue on total tax 
TM 
= marginal effect of import tax revenue on total tax 
Y2 
= marginal effect of income on import demand 
ßl 
= marginal effect of income on investment 
al 
= marginal effect of income on savings 
Equation (5.15) is quite straight forward to interpret, that is, ii income rises imports 
will also rise hence, 72 is unambiguously positive. This also means that exports 
rise at a slower rate or remain at the same level. 
As for equation (5.13), (Ty +TM Y2 ) taken together constitute the marginal effect of 
income on the fiscal deficit, or it unit change in income will cause a 
(Ty +T i 72 ) change in fiscal deficit. The sign is unambiguously positive but the 
magnitude of (Ty +zM 72 ) depends on the magnitude of 72 
. 
If Tr (1/1(1 TM are left 
to he variable, the marginal effects of income tax and import tax revenues is negative 
on the fiscal deficit as income increases because of increased income tax and import tax 
revenues. Given that 
('rY +TM Y2 ) is positive, this means that government spending 
(G = I(; + G; + rD ) (with the assumption that government consumption is fixed) 
is rising at a faster rate than the rise in total tax revenue, as Income increases. 
The coefficient in equation (5.14) affects both sides of the private sector balance 
identity. While Qº affects private investment decisions, ai affects private savings 
decision. Al income rises, both the marginal effect of income on investment and the 
marginal effect of income on savings have positive effects on the private sector deficit, 
i. e. they move together. Hence, a unit increase in income will raise investment of 01 
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unit and at the same time raises savings with a/ unit. Individually both 
Pl 
and 
XI rises, but whether the overall effect on the fiscal deficit is positive depends on 
the strength of 
P1 
versus aI 
. 
If P1 > (X/ 
, 
the overall effect would he 
positive, i. e. the fiscal deficit or savings-investment will enlarge as income rises; if on 
the other hand 
01 , al 
, 
the overall effect would be negative, i. e. the savings- 
investment gap will narrowed as income rises. 
But ex-post, 
6 (M 
-X)/ SY, = 8(G - 7')/ 8Y, +S (l -S)/ SY, 
So (Y2) _ (Ty + TM 72 )+ (P/ - a1 ) 
or 
(zr+TM Y2)=al 
-Q1 +Y2 (5.16) 
Ex-post, the marginal change in the external sector balance equals both the marginal 
changes in the government budget plus the private sector balances, all with respect to 
changes in income, so the result is equation (5.16). It demonstrates the behavioural 
interdependence between tax revenue with savings-investment gap in which both have 
interdependence, though in a different manner, with imports entering through the 
marginal propensity to import. If the assumption on government consumption is 
relaxed and the variable component is considered in the government balance, then 
equation (5.16) will be (n2 - (TY + iM 72 )) _ (XI - 
01 + Y2 
, 
demonstrating the 
interdependence between government consumption and tax revenue. 
The r. h. s. of equation (5.16) demonstrates the compatibility of net import behaviour 
with savings behaviour through the magnitude and signs of the marginal propensity to 
import and the marginal propensity to save. This highlights the compatibility of the 
behaviour of the external sector and the private sector balances. The I. h. s. show, 
import tax revenue dependence on the marginal propensity to import, the bigger the 
marginal propensity the bigger will the import tax revenue he because import tax 
revenue gets bigger. The government sector balance is thus behaviourally 
interdependent with the external sector too. Both tax revenues move together to 
affect the identity with the movement of savings and net imports. 
The relationship between the three identities in terms of signs and magnitudes according 
to equation (5.16) depends mainly on the strength of the marginal effect of income on 
saving versus the marginal effect of income on investment. IF "1 > 
01 
, 
the three 
derivatives would have the same sign (positive), i. e., rising together with the increase 
in income. If however, al ý 01 
, 
the government sector balance would increase 
together with the external balance, but the private sector balance will decrease instead. 
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This is the situation whereby the external deficits and the fiscal deficits seem like 
'twins'. 
Where the case of the coefficients of the three deficits having the same positive signs, 
increased indebtedness (i. e. the external deficit rising) is associated with a rising fiscal 
deficit and private sector deficit. In the second case where the external deficit moves in 
the same direction as the fiscal deficit, increased indebtedness would then be a result of 
increase in the external deficit which is caused by the increased in fiscal deficit, though 
the private sector deficit decreases. 
The magnitude of marginal effects of income changes on tax revenue can actually he 
obtained only by estimating the values of a/ - ß1 + Y2 
, 
and with these values 
further, the inter-relationship between the three deficits can then he determined 
according to equation (5.16). 
Similarly, differentiating equations (5.8') and (5.10') with respect to P'</ /Pxr" 
Pmt /Pier w 
, 
and yr gives the following results, which are short-run effects: 
ö(G-T)/5( hP ; )=T (3-1 
PX (S. 17a) 
S(M 
-X )/S( 
PX 
= Qý 
PX (5.17b) 
PMW + 
S(G-T)/S( )=tMY/ 
P) 
W 
(5.19a) 
S(M 
-x)/ ö(pm )=Yi PJ) (5.19h) 
S(G-7')/SYW 
=rxQ2 (5.20a) 
S(M 
-X ) /SYW =62 (5.20b) 
Equations (5.19a) and (5.19b) demonstrate the indirect inter-dependence between the 
government deficit and external deficit through 191 
, 
the price elasticity of' export 
demand. An decrease in the ratio of relative prices causes a zY Q1 
, 
the revenue 
elasticity of export tax, decrease in the fiscal deficit due to increased export tax 
revenue. An increase in the ratio of relative export prices has a negative direct effect on 
the external deficit through 6j 
. 
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Equations (5.20a) and (5.20b) demonstrate the indirect inter-dependence between 
fiscal and external deficits through 71 
, 
the price elasticity of import demand. An 
increase in the price elasticity of import demand increase the import tax revenue, hence 
improving the fiscal deficit while simultaneously worsening the deficit on external 
account. 
Equations (5.20a) and (5.20b) demonstrates the indirect interdependence between the 
two deficits through 62 
, 
the world income elasticity of' export demand. An increase 
in world income increases the export tax revenue and improves the fiscal account while 
simultaneously worsening the external account. 
Differentiating (G -T) and (I -S) with respect to r: 
s(G-T)/Sr=p 
8(I-S)/8r=(ß4 
-a2) 
(5.2Iä) 
(5.21h) 
Equation (5.2Ia) and (5.21b) shows the interaction between the fiscal balance and the 
private sector balance through the interest rate. Assuming functions are taken in log- 
linear form, u1 shows the interest rate elasticity of public domestic debt that affects 
the fiscal balance. A percentage increase in the interest rate will cause an increase in the 
fiscal deficit of N1 percentage point. (ß4 - (X2 ) is the total interest rate elasticity 
of the savings-investment gap. The sign of the total interest rate elasticity and the 
magnitude of the savings-investment gap change depends on the strength of 
04 
versus a2 
. 
If ß4 > a2 
, 
investment decreases at a faster rate than the change 
in savings, enlarging the savings-investment gap. If on the other hand 
04 
'5 (X2 
, 
savings will rise at a faster rate than the change in investment hence improving the 
savings-investment gap. 
5 
.5 
Comparisons on the External, Private and Government Sectors' 
Balances: A Simple data Evaluation 
5.5. La) Measurement 
To measure the three sectors' balances, we use the following accounting identity 
used by Bank Negara Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 1990), also 
used by Buiter (1988) as a start to analyse the role of fiscal policy in stabilisation and 
adjustment (Buiter, 1988, pp 4). 
5.39 
(Sp-Ip)+(SG-IG)=CA 
Equation (5.22) simply means what is as tabulated below. 
(less) Public Gross domestic capital formation (or 
development expenditure) 
Public Savings ( Balance on government current 
account) 
(a) Deficit/Surplus (Overall Balance) 
(less) Private Gross domestic capital formation 
Private Savings 
(h) Deficit/Surplus (Private sector balance) 
(less Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
Gross National Savings 
(c) Balance on Current Account 
(5.22) 
Row a) measures the savings-investment gap in the public sector and row b) measures 
the same gap in the private sector. These two gaps equal the external sector gap. By 
this, we eliminate the problem of having inconsistent data on private savings, by 
tracing back private savings data with all the others available. 
The graph (Graph I) shows the time path of the three sectors' balances. 
55I 
. 
b) Description of the Three Balances. 
The graph shows fluctuations and movements of the three balances about the x-axis 
indicating equilibrium is achieved at all points. The external sector shows fluctuations 
and follow the business cycle. The private sector balance closely mirrors the external 
sector balance. Ex-ante, when import is greater than export, investment in the private 
plus the government sector should be greater than savings in both sectors, and vice- 
versa. The movement of the savings-investment gap and the import-exhort gal) is thus 
consistent with this, whereas the government sector shows deficit in its savings- 
investment gap, with the highest level of deficit in 1982, closing-up the gap and by 
1988 reaches close to zero and broadly follows a balanced budget policy since then. 
The fluctuations in the external and private sector are smaller in the 1960s, become 
bigger in the 1970s and are further amplified in the 1980s. This pattern reflects the 
growing activity taking place in the economy over the years under study. As it result 
of the second oil-shock, the current account balance plunges to its biggest deficit. 
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There are four distinctive exogenous and endogenous shocks that affect the economic 
system of Malaysia as depicted by the graph. In 1976 and 1977, the external sector is 
in surplus inducing an increase in private savings following the first oil-shock of 1974- 
75 and the commodity boom of the early 1976. 
In 1979 again the external sectors has increase sharply as a result of the second-oil 
shock of 1979-80 and savings is greater than investment as depicted. Lagged one year 
after that the government sector increases its development expenditure tremendously to 
the highest level of deficits in 1981. Presumably expenditure is made possible due to 
confidence in increasing petroleum royalties. 
In 1982, the Latin American countries experience a debt crisis and the African 
countries having debt problems at the same time resulting in the world international 
financial sector becoming unstable due to a draining of credits in most creditor 
countries. However, Malaysia is not affected at the time in terms of having a debt crisis 
but affected in terms of enlarging deficits in all the three sectors. The world recession 
in the early 1980s seems to have some lagged impact on the smaller economies in the 
east since they experienced recession much later, i. e. in the mid-to-late 1980s. In 1987- 
88, Malaysia undergoes a recessionary period as a result of poor world economic 
performance that induces reductions in terms of trade of most commodities exported. 
Exports is in a big surplus over imports which is reflected in an equal savings surplus 
over investment. 
There is again an oil boom in 1990, but the government was more cautious during this 
time as evidenced by the balanced-budget policy undertaken. The private sector 
plunges into its biggest deficits, reflecting the boom in investment especially in the 
manufacturing sector which is reflected as the biggest excess of import expenditure 
in 1991 in the external sector. The contribution of the manufacturing sector to total 
merchandise exports increased to 64.1% in 1991 as compared to 59% in 1990, in 
nominal terms. Agricultural commodity exports improved and increased by 1.1 % in 
1991 compared to a decrease of 9.9% in 1990. Oil export earnings decline due to a 
decline in prices of crude petroleum. Imports expanded rapidly between 1989 and 
1991 attributable mostly to investment and intermediate goods imports, which together 
account for about 83% of the gross imports of goods in 1990 (Malaysian Economic 
Report, 1992/3). 
Government finance in the early 1990s recorded strong growth both in revenue and 
expenditure. Revenue growth was mainly attributable to petroleum royalties, however, 
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operating expenditure includes a policy of payment of petroleum subsidies to offset 
the increase in petroleum prices in 1991 as a result of the Gulf crisis. 
To confirm the correlation between the private sector and the external sector balances, 
we run a correlation matrix and the correlation coefficient of -0.78 confirms that there is 
a strong negative correlation between them. The correlation coefficient between the 
government sector and the external sector balances is -0.45 indicating a relatively 
weaker negative correlation. Finally the correlation between the private sector and the 
government sector is -0.21 indicating a very weak negative correlation between them. 
We further identify factors that are common in contributing towards correlation 
between the three sectors and we deal with them as follows: 
(i) correlation between the external and private sectors: 
We say earlier on in the model section that there are no other common variables 
between the two sectors that can affect their balances simultaneously except for the 
income/output variable. We propose here that output plays the most important role in 
affecting their opposite co-movement. We should then treat 
AY 
=f A (K, L) 
where, A I' is the portion of the deviation in income which is not demand-determined 
(discussed earlier) and AL is change in labour. So we say the changes in capital 
stock and labour that gives rise to the change in income/output as the main cause of 
negative correlation. If this holds, the relationship is a long-run dynamic relationship. 
(ii) correlation between the external and government sectors: 
We found earlier that there are many variables in common to these two balances 
J /J W, P, 1Pm, 1' W, and e, 
namely that may result in opposite co-movement 
between them besides output. We have yet to determine which influence is greatest in 
a future empirical work. Of all these variables, in the Malaysian case, it may be that 
the relative prices, since it is assumed that a small economy is a price taker, and the 
change in income are the most influential variables. 
(iii) correlation between the private and government sectors: 
The weak correlation between the two sectors is expected as the common variables 
between them is interest rates r and IG as had been said in the model section. We 
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expect this a priori because in the Malaysian case the interest rates have minimal 
influence on government decisions to invest, and government investment is 
infrastructural in nature, hence, are less likely to crowd out private sector investment or 
net exports. 
Our long-run equilibrium model of debt and twin deficits addresses the three issues 
stated in Chapter 4 section 4.1. The model is timely for ASEAN given the 
continuous accumulation of debt with the inflow of foreign direct investments is 
uncertain at present. The existing investments have to have their rates of return 
matched the maturity of debt. The model should be a guide for internal policies to be 
undertaken. 
The role of the private sector is very much reflected in and negatively correlated with 
the external sector in the case of Malaysia. The government sector has weak correlation 
with the external sector and does not follow the business cycle but increased spending 
only after the second oil-boom. 
PART III: ASPECTS OF DEBT MANAGEMENT 
CHAPTER 6: DEBT SERVICING CAPACITY USING 
LOGIT ANALYSIS 
6.1 
Debt servicing difficulties became a subject of interest after the first oil shock and 
since then have become a growing concern especially after the second oil shock in 
1979/1980. The magnitude of funds involved and the increasing number of defaults 
have focused attention on the topic of measuring and forecasting debt servicing 
capacity. The normal sequence of debt servicing difficulties is when a country runs 
current account deficits due to internal and external factors, and at the same time is 
illiquid and unable to borrow enough funds to finance the deficits (Cline, 1984). The 
problem of liquidity is not just a lack of reserves as mentioned in Cline's analysis 
(1984) but also a question of the drying up of the use of IMF credits (McKenzie, 1987) 
and of short term supplier credits (Homi Kharas, 1981). 
There are varying degrees of response to debt servicing difficulties that range from 
temporary moratoriums on principal repayments to outright repudiation (Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1981), Cline (1984)). For the purpose of this analysis, debt rescheduling is 
used as representative of debt servicing difficulties. 
The term moratoriums on principal repayments means stopping of repayments on 
principal temporarily or for a fixed period of time as a result of official agreement. 
Outright repudiation means direct refusal of any form of repayments. Rescheduling 
means a borrower applies for postponement of repayments of interest and principal and 
the result is an explicit agreement between lenders and borrowers to modify the 
schedule of such repayments. A loan is in default when a creditor declares that the 
borrower has failed to comply with some stipulation of the loan agreement. It may be 
temporary and consistent with the loan agreement. 
The main objective of this chapter is to show that it is the foreign exchange scarcity that 
leads to the demand for rescheduling by debtors. It also seeks to show the effects of 
combining both the macroeconomic variables derived from the balance of payments 
which reflect the availability (scarcity) of foreign exchange, with financial variables 
derived from the balance sheet which reflect the cash flow position, in determining 
rescheduling decisions. In this study, it is hoped that the effects of the heterogeneity of 
regional debt problems be explored by identifying different determinants of debt 
servicing difficulties being significant in varying degrees in different regions. Logit 
analysis and significance tests are used to determine the importance of the determinants 
6.2 
of the probability to reschedule debt. To make full use of the logit results, the 
magnitude of the determinants in terms of their marginal effects and elasticity effects 
will be calculated. The elasticity effects could provide guidelines as to which variables 
should be focused upon to deter rescheduling. 
The contributions of this chapter (in terms of originality) are in four areas. Firstly, the 
part of the theoretical framework that identifies debtors' difficulties i. e. the foreign 
exchange scarcity that leads them to demand for rescheduling. And this leads to the 
second aspect in which the macroeconomic and the financial variablesl are country- 
specific factors which relate to the international financial environment, as opposed to 
supply factors, as determinants of debt rescheduling. By this, the focus of the research 
that is, on the foreign exchange scarcity and the demand for rescheduling that arises 
from the debtors, is reinforced. The debtors macro-economic difficulties are recognised 
apart from their illiquidity position, as shown by the cash flow items. This study 
shows the two types of variables are important determinants of the probability of 
rescheduling. Thirdly, the study takes a lead in capturing the effects of the 
heterogeneity of regional debt problems that lead to different determinants being 
significant in different regions. Fourthly, by presenting the magnitudes of the 
determinants, especially the elasticity effects facilitate policy decisions as to which 
determinants are to be improved to reduce debt servicing difficulties-cum-debt 
rescheduling. 
The flow of this chapter is as follows. In Section 6.2, a literature review on previous 
studies will be presented. In Section 6.3, we build our theoretical framework that 
identifies debtors reactions (ie. demand for rescheduling) towards the scarcity of 
foreign exchange and it also facilitates creditors in tracking credit-worthiness (ie. for 
the supply of credits and rescheduling). In Section 6.4, the logit model and the 
variables hypothesised as the determinants of the probability of rescheduling are 
presented. Section 6.5 presents the estimated results for the overall sample, the African 
region, the Latin American region and the Southeast Asian region. In section 6 we 
present the comparisons of the results among regions and in section 6.7 comparison of 
the results with previous studies will be presented. Some tentative conclusions are 
derived in the last section. 
6.3 
This section is divided into two parts. The summary of the individual studies and 
comments on them will first be presented. The second part seeks to compare and 
contrast previous studies. 
One of the first studies of the factors affecting a country's balance of payments, and 
hence its ability to service external debts, was that by et al. (1968). This study 
undertook a "systematic examination" of both short term and long term factors which 
determine the ability to service external debts. Their work is qualitative in nature and 
suggests that short term indicators related to liquidity aspects of a country's ability to 
service its external debt dealt with general balance of payments vulnerability. The short- 
term liquidity aspect was separated into three components: fluctuating, offsetting and 
rigid variables, which consists of the following variables; (1) the growth rate of export 
volume; (2) the ratio of debt service payments to exports, and (3) the ratio of foreign 
exchange reserves to imports. The long-term indicators emerged from the analysis that 
sought to determine the conditions under which economic growth financed in part by 
foreign capital can succeed and thus provide for continuous servicing of external debt. 
The variables are; (1) the growth rate of GDP; (2) the ratio of investment to GDP; (3) 
the ratio of exports to GDP, and (4) the rate of price increases. 
The more formal quantitative approach to the study of debt servicing capacity was 
pioneered by Frank and Cline (1971) using discriminant analysis. Drawing on the work 
of et al. (1968), Frank and Cline used the following variables: 2 
(1) debt service ratio (+). 
This defined as the principal plus interest divided by the export earnings of goods and 
services. The debt service is a fixed obligation and must be paid in foreign exchange. 
(2) export fluctuations (+). 
This is measured by taking the deviation from a rising trend, whereby higher index 
indicates "instability" and thus "higher risks". 
(3) compressibility of imports 
This is the fixed portion of the total imports of a country, for example expenditures on 
foodstuffs. There arises a difficulty in measurement in this ratio because a country's 
compressible imports differ from each other. 
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(4) imports to GNP ratio (+). 
The share of imports in GNP reflects a degree of rigidity since a substantial cut in 
imports implies a considerable level of unemployment. Even if most non-essential 
industries are affected, unemployment is still a cost not easily accepted. Therefore, it 
seems that a higher import to GNP ratio would lead to a higher probability of default in 
the short run. 
(5) imports to reserves ratio (+) 
Foreign exchange reserves serve as a buffer against exchange earnings fluctuations. 
The reserves to imports ratio is taken because it can be controlled internally to some 
limit, and hence act as a balance against fluctuations which are caused by factors 
beyond the control of the economy. With a larger ratio of imports to reserves, one 
expects lower debt servicing capacity. 
(6) amortisation to debt ratio (-) 
This shows the average maturity of debt. The argument is that a predominantly long- 
term debt implies that debt service burden cannot be alleviated in the short run by 
reducing the amount of borrowing. While this is true, we also feel that the longer the 
maturity, the less is the annual commitment of a country, hence, the less would be the 
debt problems or rescheduling. 
. 
(7) per capita GNP (-) 
(8) growth of exports (-) 
In the longer term, the growth of the export sector is considered to be an important 
element in debt servicing capacity since, if the economy is not stagnating, its import 
expenditures are bound to increase. A growth of exports is thus necessary for 
countering these developments. Presumably, a country with a high rate of export 
growth is less likely to reschedule. 
The sample size was 145 observations covering 26 countries (of which 13 were 
rescheduling cases) for the years 1960 to 1968. The results showed that debt service 
ratio; debt-amortisation ratio, and ratio of imports to reserves were important 
determinants of debt servicing capacity: 
However, there are shortcomings in the use of discriminant analysis. Due to violation 
of the normality assumptions, the t-statistic could not be used to test the statistical 
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significance of the explanatory variables (Maddala, 1986). Maddala also pointed out 
that when the independent variable is not normally distributed, the discriminant-analysis 
estimate is not consistent, whereas the logit Maximum Likelihood Estimate is consistent 
and therefore more robust. Another shortcoming is the discriminant analysis lacks any 
behavioural underpinnings. Feder and Just (1977) discovered that the problem with 
discriminant analysis is that it assumes two different groups/components in which a 
rescheduling country suddenly becomes a member of another specie, i. e. non- 
rescheduling. To them, it should be a discrete event taking place after the combined 
effect of certain economic variables reached some threshold level. 
Dhonte (1975) uses principal component analysis to examine economic indicators 
containing debt information that affect debt servicing capacity. However, he provides 
no rationale for the selection of the variables. This technique, however, is not a 
quantitative method. It condenses the amount of information contained in a set of 
variables and forms another new sub-set of variables out of the original set. This 
means there is no systematic method of eliminating the variables because the 
significance of the variables are not known. This new sub-set of variables contains a 
very high percentage of information but with smaller dimensionality (McDonald, 
1981). 
The use of logit analysis was pioneered by Feder and Just (1977) to determine the 
importance of determinants of debt servicing capacity. They reexamined the 
significance of the variables that had been studied by Frank and Cline covering the 
period from 1965 to 1972. The sample size was 238 observations on 30 countries 
including 21 rescheduling cases. Two models are used in estimating the logit results. 
In the first mode, nine variables are included and the rationale for their usage are the 
same as in Cline's study, namely: - 
(1) debt service ratio (+), (2) imports to reserves ratio (+), (3)amortization to debt 
ratio (-), (4) income per capita (-), (5) capital inflow to debt service ratio (-) - this 
ratio is not taken from Frank and Cline's study. Capital flows in the form of loans, 
grants, direct investment and transfer payments- are important source of foreign 
exchange receipts which can be used for debt service. Higher capital inflows is 
associated with lower probability to reschedule. The ratio is taken as debt service 
payments to capital inflows, (6) GDP growth (-) - this is also a variable justified by 
Feder and Just, (1977), as the most important factor that affect debt servicing capacity 
in the long run but is not included in the study by Frank and Cline (1971), (7) export 
growth (-), (8) imports to GNP ratio (+) and, (9) export fluctuations (+). 
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In the second model, amortization to debt ratio was excluded owing to doubts about the 
causal relationship between average debt maturity and the probability of default. 
However, both the models were mis-specified when export fluctuations and imports to 
GNP ratio were included. Thus, the final form of equations in the first model excluded 
these two ratios and in the second model, the amortization to debt ratio was excluded. 
In the first model, six variables are significant at the 5% level whilst GDP growth is 
insignificant. The likelihood ratio index is 92%. The error rate is lowest at a cut-off 
probability of 0.4 with one type I error and 5 type II errors. In the second model, all 
the six variables are significant at the 7.5% level, with a likelihood ratio index of 90%. 
The cut-off probability chosen from the best model is 0.4 which has the lowest total 
errors with 3 type I errors and 6 type II errors. 
The main contribution of the study by Feder and Just (1977) is the use of logit analysis 
which enables the systematic elimination of insignificant variables according to the t- 
statistics. To gain further insight one should consider the following hypothetical 
situation: for each of the observations in the study above, the predicted probability of 
rescheduling is known 'a priori' while it is not known whether a rescheduling will 
indeed happen. Suppose further that the following rule of thumb is adopted: given a 
critical probability value P*, all countries with probability greater than P* are denied 
credits while all others are granted loans. Then for any given P*, there are two possible 
types of errors: 
Type 1 error refers to the case where a country has a predicted probability lower than 
P* but actually defaults/reschedules. 
Type II error refers to the case where a country has a predicted probability higher than 
P* but does not default/reschedule. 
By estimating its type 1 and type 2 error, the predictive capability of the model could be 
determined and this proves to be useful as guidelines to determine whether credits are 
obtainable by debtors or can be given by creditors at a certain critical probability 
threshold. 
Although all the studies mentioned above rationalized their choices of variables they 
lack formal theoretical underpinnings. Feder and Just (1977) and Frank and Cline 
(1971) for example, reject variables on 'a priori grounds' when the variables sometimes 
have relevance in causing the probability of default. For example, both studies reject 
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their statistical finding that the variability of exports lowers the probability of default 
based on 'a priori' grounds, apparently confusing high variability of exports with a low 
value of exports. Due to the absence of rigorous theoretical discussions of the previous 
studies, Cline (1984) and Lloyd- Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987), improve on 
them by outlining a structured explanation of rescheduling decisions. 
Cline (1984) assumes that borrowing more funds is the alternative to rescheduling. He 
conceptualizes rescheduling as a breakdown in the foreign capital market equilibrium 
because of credit rationing. He uses the theory of credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981)) to explain why lenders are unwilling to lend at a certain level of the rate of 
interest. The level of interest rate that a borrower is willing to pay is perceived as an 
informational proxy for the severity of the borrowers' position. The process of credit 
market breakdown is illustrated below: - 
Interest 
rate 
i* 
ie 
fie; Cline, 1986 
In the figure above, the credit market is in equilibrium at the amount K. and interest 
rate, ie since supply of capital is equal to the quantity of capital demanded at below the 
ceiling interest rate, i*. At interest rate i*, supply of capital becomes totally inelastic 
i. e. no more than the amount of K* will be supplied regardless of how high an 
interest rate a country offers. The demand curve shifts outwards when countries 
demand more foreign borrowings due to scarcity of foreign exchange. The supply 
curve may also move leftwards due to credit rationing. Thus, the credit market is now 
in disequilibrium as shown below: 
0 Ke K* Capital 
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0 Ks Kd Capital 
Source: Cline, 1986 
The gap (G) between the quantity supplied KS and Kd and quantity demanded Ks 
and Kd must be dealt with in a non-market solution, eg. rescheduling. Cline notes that 
the demand for rescheduling is an induced demand that exists when a country is in 
disequilibrium. He then uses the logic model to analyse the probability of rescheduling 
as an outcome of demand and supply side explanatory variables. 
Implicitly, we can categorise the macro-economic variables used by Cline (1984) as 
derived from national income accounting and from the international transactions of a 
country. The variables used are of two types; one that affects the demand for 
rescheduling and secondly, variables that affect the supply of rescheduling. The 
variables that influence the demand for rescheduling cause a shift in the demand curve 
in fig.! outwards to the right and influence the supply of rescheduling by causing a 
shift in the supply curve leftwards. Either way, the probability of rescheduling is 
raised. The reduced form equation incorporates ratios that are common to both the 
supply of and demand for rescheduling. The following are explanation of the variables 
in the reduced form equation: 
(a) the debt service ratio (dsr) affects both the demand and the supply side of 
rescheduling. The debt service ratio affects the demand for rescheduling by raising the 
probability of rescheduling when the ratio increases. Whilst the maximum probability 
of rescheduling is one, according to Cline (1984), the debt service ratio can exceed 
100% if the interest and principal repayments on short-term debt are also included. 
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We found that the poorer countries of Africa rescheduled their debt even when the debt 
service ratio was very low. For most countries in that region the debt service ratio 
hardly reached 40 %. The graph above shows the probability of rescheduling is greater 
when the debt service ratio increases but in reality the debt service ratio can be very 
low, yet the country reschedules. This is true with most low income African countries. 
On the supply side, creditors tend to see the debt service ratio as a form of claim on the 
debtor's earnings. The higher the claim, the less credit-worthy is the debtor, hence the 
greater the likelihood of rescheduling. 
(b) the reserves to imports (rsm) ratio reflects the liquidity position of a country. The 
higher the reserves the less the likelihood of a country to demand rescheduling because 
export shortfalls can be financed by reserves. 
(c) Using the the absorption approach, Cline argues that the greater the growth of 
output (gr), the greater is the export surplus because the trade balance equals to output 
less absorption. 
(d) the level of per capita income (Y) determines whether a country can sustain a cut in 
the level of consumption in times of foreign exchange scarcity. Austerity programs that 
cut consumption, according to Cline, will have less effect on poorer countries. 
(e) the greater the ratios of the current account deficits to exports 
, 
the greater is the 
likelihood for the demand curve to shift further to the right, causing a disequilibrium in 
the credit market, hence the greater the likelihood of rescheduling. 
All of the above ratios affect the demand side (except the debt service which affects 
both the demand and the supply side), and the ratios that follow affect the supply side. 
(f) the net debt (gross debt minus reserves) to export ratio measures the debt burden of 
a country. The higher the ratio the greater is the likelihood of rescheduling. 
(g) Higher inflation has two effects on debt; first is that the real value of debt is eroded, 
and second nominal interest rates will be higher. The net effect in the short run is a 
cash flow squeeze because of the higher interest payments. However, in the longer run 
period, the real long term burden of debt will be overstated because of a high nominal 
interest rate and rising debt service ratio (Cline, (1984)). Cline believes that bankers 
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view inflation as a factor improving the balance sheet because the debt burden is very 
much lower than what is stated. 
(h) Given a certain debt service ratio, a higher amortization to debt ratio reflects two 
situations ; either the reduction of a country's liability will be faster relative to others or 
the total debt is lower relatively or both situations apply. Higher debt to amortization 
ratio thus means that the debtors are able to repay their debts. 
The arguments above are perfectly plausible and show the need for a regional analysis 
to be conducted because of the wide variation in amortization rates among countries in 
one region and the countries of another region, for example, the higher income 
countries of Latin America and the lower-income countries of Africa. 
(i) A country with a lower per capita income is perceived by bankers as having a 
greater likelihood to be in the foreign credit disequilibrium and debt rescheduling. 
(j) The higher the savings to GNP ratio the more likely that a country will have a sound 
financial position and be less likely to reschedule However, we found that in the 1980s, 
savings are negligible in most of the countries under study. 
(k) Higher growth rate of exports naturally reflects the ability of a country to earn 
foreign exchange, hence the ability to service debt. 
(1) According to Cline, the abundant supply of credit in the mid 1970s helped countries 
in sustaining their debt servicing levels in the late 1970s. The shrinkage in the global 
credit supply in the early 1980s precipitated debt problems in the developing countries. 
We feel there is a problem of measurement for this ratio. What Cline has taken as total 
net debt could be overstated because of the stock concept of total net debt. Hence, the 
amount will show the accumulated amount for every year and not the availability of 
credit supply for each year. 
The variables found to be significant and of the expected signs are the debt service 
ratio, the reserves to imports, the amortization rate, the current account to exports, the 
growth rate of per capita GDP and global credit abundance. In the second model, the 
net debt to exports ratio is also significant. Insignificant variables are inflationary 
erosion of debt, savings rate and per capita income. The choice of a threshold 
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probability is P=O. 14 with 12% type I error and 14% type II error. The method used is 
minimising the total number of errors subject to a balanced distribution of each type of 
error. 
Cline's main contribution in the study of the probability of rescheduling is by having a 
theoretical framework that recognizes the behaviour of both debtors and creditors in 
rescheduling decisions. This is a major departure from previous studies although his 
theoretical framework implies only countries with excess demand for credits will 
demand rescheduling. However, most of the arguments for the use of the variables 
above justify the need to conduct a regional analysis since countries in one region seem 
to have somewhat similar characteristics but they differ between regions. The variables 
used incorporate both the demand and the supply of rescheduling. Also, a low cut-off 
probability threshold will favour the creditors. Countries with a predicted probability 
of 0.14 or less only will be given credits (refer to general comments on section 6.2.1). 
A more recent study by Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987) attempts the use of 
consumer theory in analysing rescheduling decisions. Debtor countries are seen as 
attempting to maximise their utility by obtaining a particular distribution of net cash 
flows through time. Utility, which is a function of cash flow in a shorter term future 
and a longer term future, is maximised subject to two cash flow constraints. These 
cash flow constraints are basically new credits minus debt service for existing debts 
(which are debts in period 0 and period I (or short term future)). The first cash flow 
constraint is a constraint for the utility function under what is termed "normal debt 
servicing arrangements (DSA)". Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas argue, that "a 
new possibility may have been brought to the surface because the debtor sees other 
countries using this method (rescheduling) of raising their short term cash flows", and 
thus introduces a second constraint under the rescheduling agreement. The second 
constraint is new loans minus existing debt service, in which the new loans are lower 
than in the first constraint of lower credit rating of debtors after rescheduling 
- 
as seen 
by bankers. The debt service in the rescheduling period (Period 1) is higher than the 
debt service in Period 0, i. e. the period when the demand for rescheduling started but 
pending negotiations. 
The indifference map takes the shape as below: 
- 
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Fig. 6.2: The Indifference Map 
X 
Y 
Source: Lloyd-Ellis et. al, 1987 
XX refers to the constraint under normal debt servicing arrangements (or DSA). The 
debtor will maximise utility at point A under normal debt servicing arrangements. YY 
is the constraint under the rescheduling agreement. The cash flow F2 in period 2 here 
is lower than F2 under DSA because new debts will be lower and debt service for 
period 1 will be higher due to perceived risks. 
Since the debtor will derive greater satisfaction at point A than point B, it will choose 
not to reschedule and continue with normal debt servicing arrangements. 
Alternatively, if the indifference curves are the solid lines in the graph above, point C 
gives greater satisfaction than point D. The debtor will then choose to "break-off' 
from normal debt rescheduling agreements and reschedule its outstanding debt in period 
I instead. The indifference curve EE is considered to be the "critical state" whereby 
the debtor is indifferent between normal debt servicing arrangements and rescheduling. 
The explanatory variables that explain the probability of rescheduling are chosen from a 
country's balance sheet because they are capable of characterizing any evolving crisis. 
They believe that using macro-economic variables only does not provide a 
comprehensive picture of a borrower country's balance sheet position. They also 
believe that the variables chosen from the balance sheet provide a better picture of a 
country's potential cash flow position than the conventional macro-economic 
indicators. They gave an example of having a high ratio of debt service to exports may 
0Xx 
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be perfectly acceptable if there exist current account surpluses which enable the debt 
service to be met. The five financial variables are: 
(1) reserves to IMF quota ratio (RESQUOT (+)). The higher the ratio, the greater is the 
country's liquidity andhence the lower the probability of any debt restructuring. 
(2) use of IMF fund credits (UFC (+)). The greater the IMF credits being utilised the 
greater is the cash flow difficulties because this form of credit is normally a last resort 
due to the conditions attached. The greater the cash flow difficulties, the greater is the 
probability of restructuring. 
(3) undisbursed credit commitments to a country divided by total bank lending to that 
country. (UT (-)). A decline in this ratio would be associated with a deterioration in a 
country's liquidity and hence a higher probability of restructuring. 
(4) short term debt to total debt ratio. This ratio signals the willingness of banks to 
make medium to long term commitments to a borrower country. The higher the ratio, 
the higher the perceived risk and hence the higher the probability that restructuring will 
occur. 
(5) the proportion of each country's debt relative to total bank lending for the sample. 
(-). This variable should reflect variations in the country specific component of lending 
risk. The greater the share of total bank lending to a particular country, the lower the 
probability of restructuring. If this variable does not play any role, the situation is seen 
as one where variations in the systematic risk affecting all countries are dominant. That 
is, variations in TIT will not have a significant impact on restructuring. 
In addition, Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas argue that, "if the number and value 
of reschedulings should be relatively large and/or the terms involved should be 
improving, countries may perceive that they need to join the band wagon". The 
following variables which are called the 'herd variables' are used to proxy these effects: 
(1) the number of reschedulings (2) value of reschedulings (3) weighted average of the 
maturities of reschedulings (4) weighted average of the interest rates on the rescheduled 
debts (5) LDC debt as a proportion of Bank for International Settlement (BIS) 
Reporting Area assets. 
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Logit analysis and Type 2 Tobit involving Heckman's method and Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood techniques are used. Initially, a logit model which contains the 
set of financial variables along with four macro-economic variables which are the debt 
service ratio, GDP growth, export growth and the import to reserves ratio is estimated 
for twenty-seven largest debtor countries only. The period of estimation is 1977-1981, 
annually. Only four variables are significant and have the anticipated signs, of which 
three are the financial variables. Only short term debt is significant in explaining the 
quantity of rescheduling. By using the Type 2 Tobit enable them to use the probit 
method to determine the determinants of rescheduling along with a regression equation 
to determine the determinants of the quantity of rescheduling. By this result, Lloyd- 
Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987) argue that financial variables as opposed to the 
macro-economic variables is proven. They then conduct a logit analysis on 59 countries 
covering the period from 1977 to 1985 - for semi-annual data only. The results show 
the significant variables which are : (1) undisbursed credit commitments divided by 
total bank lending (2) reserves to quota 
- 
both (1) and (2) are from the set of financial 
variables defined earlier. All the "herd" variables, except the weighted average of 
interest rate spread over LIBOR, are significant. Two variables which are not 
mentioned in the "a priori" expectations are also shown and are significant, one of 
which presumably refers to total bank borrowing relative to bank deposits. As for the 
results of the regression equation, the ratios of short term debt to total debt, reserves to 
quota and weighted average of maturity period are significant in explaining the quantity 
of rescheduling. With regards to the error rates, no cut-off probability is chosen on the 
grounds that there are "costs" attached to each type of error. 
The main contributions of this study are the use of financial variables and the use of 
semi-annual data. The financial variables reflect the liquidity position of a country and 
is capable of signaling any evolving crisis. The use of semi-annual data provides robust 
results because of more number of observations could be included. These aspects are a 
major departure from previous studies. With regard to the quantity of rescheduling, 
this study also shows some financial variables are useful in determining the quantity of 
rescheduling. Another most important aspect of the study is the recognition of the cost 
attached to each type of error. Previous studies chose the critical threshold probability 
that minimizes the total error rate subject to a balanced distribution of the two types of 
error. By this, the cost of making type I error will be greater than the cost of making 
type II error. With regard to the underlying theory, it implies that debtors have free 
choices to rescheduling decisions , hence enabling them to reschedule whenever they 
feel that they could maximise their utility by having a greater cash flow. In practice 
6.15 
however debtors have to demand rescheduling and the final decision as to whether to 
reschedule or otherwise lies in the hands of the creditors through the process of 
negotiation (see also Cline, 1984). 
On the use of statistical techniques, the logit analysis proves to be a better tool in 
explaining a binary-valued dependent variable equation rather than discriminant 
analysis, component analysis or the probit method. The logistic distribution of the error 
term is very close to the cumulative normal distribution, except at the tails. The t- 
statistics can thus be used to determine the importance of individual explanatory 
variables, unlike discriminant analysis. 
The results of the previous studies assume common determinants of rescheduling 
across countries. This is a strong assumption given the heterogeneous nature of the 
sample countries. As had been found out in chapter one the characteristics of debt and 
debt problems differ among regions. In Latin America, debt problems reached their 
limit and they arose because of excessive borrowings after the second oil shock. Debt 
contracted is mainly of floating-interest debt and obtained from the private international 
capital market, which are more costly than official loans. The low-income countries of 
Africa have debt problems because of very low export earnings although the bulk of the 
debt contracted is official and concessional in nature. The inability to earn foreign 
exchange caused these countries be unable to service their debts. Debt in the Southeast 
Asian region have high yen components as of mid 1980s. At least different behavioural 
patterns among different regions should be detected, hence some different factors are 
expected to affect the debt servicing capacity of different regions. Based on the 
differences in experience between regions, our study will go beyond the overall logit 
analysis by having regional logit analysis. 
The periods of study by Feder and Just (1977) and Cline (1984) include lesser number 
of reschedulings as compared to the semi-annual data analysed by Lloyd-Ellis, 
McKenzie and Thomas (1987). This is especially true because the number of 
reschedulings are more in the 1980s decade. The semi-annual data used by the latter 
study is a major departure from previous studies and hence will have a greater number 
of observations in the sample. Their use of Tobit type 2 enabled them to determine the 
determinants for the quantity of rescheduling. 
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Whilst the three studies above rationalize their choices of variables, only Cline (1984) 
and Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987) provide extensive theoretical 
framework as a basis for the logit analysis. On the variables used, there had been a 
major deviation in the studies by Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987) from the 
other previous studies. The financial variables reflect the cash flow position of debtors. 
With regard to the error rates, the choice of a critical probability threshold that 
minimizes the total error are of limited use in forecasting. One reason as had been 
pointed out by Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987) is that there are costs 
attached to each type of error, with greater cost attached to type 1 error. Considering 
that type 1 error is when a country has a predicted probability lower than P* but 
actually defaults/reschedules, the cost associated with type 1 error should be the cost of 
making a bad loan. And type 2 error is where a country has a predicted probability 
higher than P* but does not default/reschedule, the cost associated with a type 2 error 
will then be the cost of not making a loan to a credit-worthy borrower. Another 
reason is that the threshold probability is very low, eg. Clines' has P''=0.14 and this 
tends to favour the creditors. This means that only countries with P`=O. 14 or less will 
be granted loans and the rest will be denied of credits. 
The framework for analysis is based on the following sequence of prior to 
rescheduling (i. e. similar to Cline (1984)) : debtors normally continue to incur current 
account deficits, draw down reserves for the repayment of principal and interest due 
and run arrears when reserves are lacking and are unable to borrow enough funds to 
finance the deficits. This was the sequence of events in Mexico in August 1982 when it 
ran out of foreign exchange , announced a ninety day moratorium on repayments of 
principal due on its external debt, and soon the moratorium was extended into 1983. 
Mexico was then forced into a series of drastic remedial measure: severe devaluation, 
unprecedented exchange controls, nationalisation of private banks and an emergency 
agreement with IMF (Thorp and Whitehead, 1987). The financial crisis of that year 
extended to the whole of the Latin American region because of the interconnection of 
the international banking system. Though of smaller scale, a similar sequence of events 
is observed in the Philippines in 1983. Against this sequence of events, the underlying 
theory that follows will reflect the debtors reaction to the scarcity of foreign exchange 
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and the creditors decision about the supply of loans and rescheduling - over time and 
across countries. 
The ability to pay principal is a central issue in identifying the determinants of the 
demand for rescheduling as well as the supply of rescheduling. What determines the 
ability (inability) to repay debts is the availability (or scarcity) of foreign exchange. We 
conceptualize that the debtors demand rescheduling to overcome the scarcity of foreign 
exchange and to halt its outflow in order to finance its debt repayments and hence its 
deficit on current account which is caused by variability in external earnings. When 
foreign exchange shortage is acute and deficits prolonged, the debtors will declare 
inability to pay and apply for rescheduling which may or may not be supplied by 
creditors. 
Against the background of foreign exchange scarcity, rational debtors upon their 
demand for new loans, would expect that the present value of expected future net cash 
inflows must be greater than or equal to zero. This means that the present value of 
future net cash inflows depends on the difference between the present value of 
disbursement (or new loans) and the borrowing requirements. We conceptualize that 
the Net borrowing requirements are equal to the resource gap which comprises of a) the 
current account deficit (which includes the interest payments), and b) the principal due 
on existing loans. 
Niehans3, as discussed by Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987), hyphothesises 
that it is the prospect of negative transfer that triggered off the debt crisis. (Net transfer 
refers to new loans minus principal and interest). "If and when negative transfer 
appears on the horizon, the debtor will threaten to default unless some restructuring 
agreement is offered (Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas, 1987, p20). However in our 
analysis we argue that the debtors problems are deeper than mere anticipation of 
negative net transfer that leads to the threat of default. We stress the scarcity of foreign 
exchange a reflection of the resource gap mentioned above (i. e. the current account 
deficits including interest payments, the principal due, all at time t ), which has to be 
financed by new loans 
- 
if this new loans could not finance the entire resource gap will 
lead to the demand for rescheduling by debtors. We attempt to formulate our view as 
below: 
NPV(1)=NPV(D-B)z0 (6.1) 
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This means the net present value of cash inflow (I) at time t must be equal to the Net 
present value (NPV) of disbursements (D) minus the borrowing requirements (B), 
both at time t, which must be greater than or equal to zero. And, 
B=CA(-)+PZO (6.2) 
Which means the Borrowing Requirements (B) is equal to the Current Account Deficit 
CA(-) plus Principal due (P) 
, 
all at time t. Substituting (6.2) into (6.1) we get; 
NPV(I)=NPV(D-CA(-)-PZ0 (6.3) 
If the net present value of future cash inflow is less than zero, the resource gap will not 
be covered and the debtors will run arrears on its debt repayments. Once debtors 
declare inability to pay and demand debt rescheduling, creditors will allow some form 
of debt relief , eg. moratoriums on principal repayments as an initial measure. However 
depending on the severity of the case, rescheduling is normally granted especially to 
avoid moratoriums on interest repayments which are more severe. 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argue that "if all components of the net benefit could be 
calculated precisely the probability of default then would be one if the net benefit was 
positive and zero otherwise. As one cannot hope to measure the net benefit perfectly, 
there is merely a positive relationship between the probability of default and the net 
benefit of default as actually measured. " This is true, however, the cost of default is 
severe to debtors since they could be excluded from future borrowings. The exclusion 
from future borrowings is a severe form of punishment to the debtors and the cost will 
be inability to enter the credit market forever, confiscation of overseas assets and 
sanctions on international trade. On the question of the net benefit of rescheduling to 
the debtors, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argued that the net benefit is the difference 
between the gross benefit of rescheduling and the cost of rescheduling; each of which 
has an immediate or long run component. For instance export performance 
unexpectedly below trend in a particular year may be viewed as an immediate cause of 
default. But if such a performance goes on for several years, it can be viewed as a 
long run cause of rescheduling. Similarly, if interest payments are tied to the London 
Interbank offer Rate (LIBOR) and this rate changes unexpectedly, debt service may 
be higher than anticipated 
. 
Thus, the debt service ratio serves as one index of the 
short-run benefit of rescheduling. The ratio of total debt to exports may be viewed as a 
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long run benefit because rescheduling merely postpones repayment without increasing 
the total -debts (the interest cost will increase but not the principal). 
Our theoretical framework thus identifies the debtor's behaviour in their demands for 
rescheduling to reduce foreign exchange scarcity and to overcome debt problems. It 
also serves to enable creditors to predetermine debtors' behaviour by examining their 
foreign exchange position and equating the disbursements with the amount of foreign 
exchange scarcity. 
Previous studies that have relevance to our theoretical framework are the studies by 
Cline (1984) and Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987). As had been mentioned 
earlier, Cline (1984) conceptualizes that there is a credit market disequilibrium whereby 
there exists a gap between the supply and demand of capital because lenders are 
unwilling to supply credits at a certain level of interest rates. In other words, credit is 
rationed and interest rates are used as an informational proxy for the severity of the 
borrowers financial position. The gap between the supply and demand of capital must 
be dealt with via a non-market solution such as rescheduling. 
We disagree with the basic point that the interest rate is useful as an informational proxy 
about a debtor's financial position or more specific, their debt problems. Because 
markets are characterised by credit rationing, interest rates do not fully reflect all the 
information which is important to lenders. In particular the individual lender will have 
to know the total debt of the potential borrower, regardless of the interest rate offered 
on a loan. Otherwise the lender could not ascertain the strength of the borrowers' 
incentive to violate loan commitments. 
Also Cline's model implies that it is the excess demand for credits that leads to the 
probability of rescheduling. As such, only countries with excess demand will be 
considered for rescheduling purposes. We argue that it is the new loans that do not 
match debtors foreign exchange scarcity that leads to the demand for rescheduling. 
Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987) conceptualizes that debtors have two 
choices - reschedule or continue to service debt under the normal debt service 
agreement. 
Firstly, we argue that the debtors do not have a free choice but their demands for 
rescheduling will be considered by creditors through the process of negotiation, often 
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the Paris Club for public and publicly guaranteed debt. The expected utility approach 
above implies the debtor countries will want to reschedule in the immediate future only 
1. Philippines 
2. Argentina 
3. Bolivia 
4. Brazil 
5. Chile 
6. Costa Rica 
7. Ecuador 
8. Mexico 
9. Panama 
10. Peru 
11. Uruguay 
12. Venezuela 
13. Central African Republic 
14. Cote d' Ivoire 
15. Gabon 
16. Liberia 
17. Mauritania 
18. Morocco 
19. Niger 
20. Nigeria 
21. Sierra Leone 
22. Somalia 
23. Sudan 
24. Togo 
25. Zambia 
1983,1985 
1982,1985 
1981,1983,1986 
1983,1984,1985,1986 
1983,1985 
1983,1985 
1982,1983,1985 
1982,1983,1985,1986 
1985 
1980,1983,1984 
1983,1986 
1986 
1981,1983,1985 
1983,1985,1986 
1986 
1980,1981,1982,1983,1984 
1985,1986 
1983,1985,1986 
1983,1984,1985,1986 
1983,1986 
1984,1986 
1985,1986 
1981,1983,1984,1985 
1981,1983,1984,1985 
1983,1984,1985,1986 
Source: Word Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues 
if it increases its expected utility. We feel the unsustainable debt problems of Latin 
America and Africa in the 1980s forced them to demand for rescheduling; and in many 
cases rescheduling occurs a few times repeatedly for a few consecutive years. Finally, 
we felt the two cash flow constraints mentioned above equals the net transfer i. e. new 
loans minus debt service for existing debts. We take a slightly different approach 
whereby we stress the foreign exchange scarcity which is equal to new loans minus 
current account deficits and principal due. 
Our sample size consists of 301 country-year observations covering 43 countries for 
the years 1980 to 1986. Out of the 301 country-year observations 
, 
69 are rescheduling 
cases (22.92%). The regions covered are Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. 
Logit analysis and significance tests are used to determine the importance of the 
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determinants of the probability to reschedule debt in the overall 301 sample and the 
regional samples. Data are obtained from the World Bank-World Debt Tables 1988/89, 
the International Financial Statistics 1988/89 and the Balance of Payments Yearbook 
1988/89. Rescheduling cases are presented in Table 6.1. 
6.4 The Logit Model and the Variables Used 
641 The Logit Model 
Due to the shortcomings of the discriminant analysis such as violation of normality 
assumptions, lack of behavioural underpinnings, etc; as well as the component 
analysis as described earlier, logit analysis is used in this study. It overcomes the 
disadvantages of the other approaches, especially when the logistic distribution is 
almost similar to the normal distribution except at the tails, t-statistics are applicable in 
determining the importance of the explanatory variables. The logit model proves a better 
quantitative behavioural model that affords a summary measure to the examination of 
creditworthiness over time and across countries. The model takes the form: - 
y*=ßxi+µ (6.1) 
y* is the latent variable representing the probability of default and is hypothesised to 
depend on particular observable characteristics of the country in question. What is 
observed is a dummy variable y, where, 
y=I if y* >0 (i. e. reschedule) 
y=0 if otherwise (i. e. not reschedule) 
The probability of rescheduling is therefore: 
Prob (yi = 1) = Prob (µi > -ßx1) 
Prob (yi =1) =1- F(-ßxi ) (6.2) 
Where F is the cumulative distribution for pi. If the cumulative distribution is 
logistic, the functional form F is: 
- 
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F(-ßxi) = exp(-ßxi 
) 
1- exp(ßxi ) 
F(-Qx`) 
1- exp(Qxi ) 
1- F(-ßxi) 
- 
exp(ßxi ) 
1+ exp(ßxi ) 
The likelihood function can be written as: 
- 
L_ ýn ( )1-yi ( exp(ßxi) )Yi 11 1+ exp(/3xi) 1+ exp(ßxi ) 
or in logarithms; 
L=I(1-yi)log(l+exp(Qzi))+yilog(l+ex(P(ßxi)) (6.3) 
The parameters ß are non linear in terms of the xi and therefore an iterative method 
such as that of Newton-Raphson is used to maximise L with respect to P. The 
standard errors are obtained from the variance-covariance matrix of /3 which is the 
inverse of Fishers information matrix: - 
logL)-1 
I(ß)-1 = E( 
d2 
dfidA 
As the log likelihood function for the logit model is concave, convergence is assured 
from any starting values to the maximum. 
The estimated parameters are not straightforward to interpret. We thus calculate the 
effect of a change in any of the explanatory variables on the probability of rescheduling, 
ceteris paribus, by: - 
aPl 
_AP(1-P) dxi 
i. e. the marginal effects. 
(6.4) 
Thus, the effect of a percentage change in x on the percentage change in P, ceteris 
paribus, is given by: - 
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aPi 
Pi 
_ 
aPi 
* 
xi 
oýxi axi PI 
(6.5) 
x 
i. e. the elasticity. 
In order to obtain a parsimonious model representation of the determinants of the 
probability of rescheduling, insignificant variables will be dropped. Any zero restriction 
imposed will be tested aagainst the original model using the likelihood ratio test: 
- 
2((log L (no restrictions)) 
- 
(log L (with restrictions))) 
- 
xk 
where k is the number of restrictions. 
4.2 The Variables4 
Implicitly, we can categorise the macroeconomic variables used by Cline (1984) as 
derived from the national income accounting identity and from the international 
transactions of a country. The variables used in the reduced form equation that affects 
both the supply and demand for credits are: the debt service ratio (dsr), reserves to 
import (rsm), growth per capita (g), per capita income (Y), current account deficits to 
export (cax), net debt to export (dx), inflationary erosion of debt to export (pD), 
amortization rate (A), savings rate (S), exports growth (xg), and global credit 
abundance (L). 
We focus on the significant macroeconomic variables that are derived from the balance 
of payments and therefore reject the insignificant variables and the variables that come 
from the national income accounting identity (ex. savings rate). As for the amortization 
rate we felt that it has been captured in the debt service ratio. We will not include the 
global supply of lending variable because we concentrate only on country specific 
factors rather than on supply side factors. Also, the regression equation describes 
rescheduling according to the underlying theory in section 6.3 and no direction 
of causation has been tested. 
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Of these, Cline found the following variables to be significant: total debt to exports, 
debt service ratio, the reserves to import ratio, the current account deficit to export 
ratio, amortization to debt ratio and global borrowings.. 
Based on Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987), we will use three of the 'herd' 
variables. This is because we focus only on country-specific conditions as mentioned 
earlier rather than the supply-side condition. 
The variables hypothesised to affect the probability of rescheduling are derived from 
the current account, the capital account and the balance sheet 
. 
The variables derived 
from the current and capital accounts reflect the longer term macroeconomic problems 
of debtors. The financial ratios are taken from the balance sheet and reflect the shorter- 
term liquidity problems. By taking the following variables, debtor-country specific 
conditions are taken into consideration in determining their demand for rescheduling. 
(a) Debt service ratio (dsr (+)). The debt service ratio is the amount of interest plus 
principal due divided by the export earnings of goods and services. It is expected that 
an increase in the debt service ratio leads to an increase in the probability of 
rescheduling. This ratio is included because it had been proven to be an important 
determinant for the probability of rescheduling by previous studies 
- 
among them are 
Feder and Just (1977), Frank and Cline (1971), and Cline (1984). 
(b) Current account deficits divided by exports of goods and services (CAX(+)). 
Current account deficits are a major part of the resource gap mentioned earlier. They 
reflect foreign exchange scarcity. This ratio is included because of the massive current 
account deficits accumulated in the 1980s by the developing countries as had been 
discussed in chapter one. They are divided by exports because only exports can bring 
in foreign exchange to finance imports, interest and other services. The greater the 
current account deficits, the greater is the probability of rescheduling. 
(c) Growth rate of export earnings (xgro(-)). An increase in export earnings raises the 
availability of foreign exchange to finance the resource gap. We argue along Cline's 
(1971) justification that this variable is important in the longer term horizon because it is 
necessary to counter the developments in import expenditure if imports are not 
stagnating. The faster the growth rate the lower is the probability of rescheduling. 
Feder and Just (1977) found this variable to be significant. In the 1980s, export 
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growth was found to be negative and if the aggregate figure is large enough, it should 
be significant but will have a negative sign. 
(d) Total debt to export (TDX(+)). Exports are the only source of foreign exchange 
earnings to service debts or to finance the non-interest current account balance. If total 
debt takes up a substantial proportion of export earnings, the likelihood of 
rescheduling will be greater. Unlike Cline's study which takes net debt rather than total 
debt 
, 
we believe total debt is more appropriate because the total debt will proxy 
information about to the strength of the borrower's incentive to service debt. 
(e) Reserves to IMF quota (resquot) (-). Reserves are the most liquid form of a 
country's asset. The higher the ratio the lower is the probability of rescheduling 
because a country will still be perceived as liquid. By including this ratio, we will be 
able to know the role of IMF quota on reserves in ensuring liquidity and deterring 
rescheduling. 
(f) Reserves to imports (RESM) (-). This ratio reflects import cover whereby the 
tradition is to use reserves to finance imports when foreign exchange is scarce. 
Although the critical ratio varies, banks have perceived three months import cover as 
indicative of a country being fairly liquid. The greater the ratio in this case, the more 
sizable is international liquidity and hence the lesser the likelihood of rescheduling. 
However, the accumulation of reserves may also be a result of the availability of 
external borrowings. This was especially true before 1981. If this is the case, it can 
also raise the probability of rescheduling because of greater debt accumulation. 
(g) Use of IMF credits divided by IMF quota (UFC) (+). The use of IMF credits is 
normally a last resort form of financing deficits due to the conditionality attached. 
Borrowing larger sums relative to quota means submitting to higher conditionality, 
which requires the country to design a specific programme to reduce the deficits as 
agreed by the IMF. Such usage signals greater debt servicing difficulties, hence the 
greater the likelihood of rescheduling. In the 1980s, the use of IMF credits soared in all 
regions. However, Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas(1987) do not find it significant 
presumably because of the period of study that included the period between 1977-1981 
when the usage was very low might have cancelled the effect for the period from mid- 
1981 to 1987. 
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(h) Short-term debt divided by total debt (ST) (±). Short term debt is defined as debt 
that has an original maturity of one year or less. When a country faces the resource gap 
problem, short term debts become highly demanded. The growth of short term lending 
was rapid in the late 1970s and this helps precipitate rescheduling (Dale and Mattione, 
1983). Short-term debt can cause debt servicing problems because of bunching of 
maturities when countries borrow more short-term debt to repay interest and principal 
due. After 1982, short-term debts were not being rolled over in many countries and this 
lead to an increase in the probability of rescheduling. The sign can either be positive or 
negative. 
6.5 The Results 
In what follows are presented various results estimated for the overall sample, the 
African region, the Latin American region and the Southeast Asian region. Then a 
comparison among the regional results will be presented followed by a discussion on 
the comparison with the results of the previous studies. The tables for each of the 
results show the significance level of the variables, the marginal effects (i. e. the effect 
of increasing variable x by one unit on the average probability of rescheduling, ceteris 
paribus), the elasticity (i. e. the effect of a percentage point increase of variable x on the 
average probability of rescheduling), the overall significance test and the critical 
probability threshold which by the conventional method is P*=0.5 
. 
It implies if the 
predicted probability is greater than or equal to 0.5 , rescheduling should be predicted. 
Since this conventional approach results in an extremely unbalanced distribution of 
errors because of the small percentage of occurrences of rescheduling relative to total 
sample size, the critical probability threshold that minimizes the error is preferred and 
discussed. 
651 Results For The Overall Sample 
The estimated results broadly confirm the a 'priori' expectations set in sub-section 
6.3. Table 6.2 presents the results for both the unrestricted and restricted models. 
Unrestricted means all the variables hypothesised to affect the probability of 
rescheduling are included in the logit equation. Restricted means all significant variables 
from the unrestricted results will be included in the final logit equation. 
Unrestricted Model Resrticted Model 
Variables ß estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
nstant 
-2.7892 2.7579.. 
re not 
-0.1936 -0.0342- -0.7760 -0.1835 -0.0324 -0.7348 (0.1302) (0.1224) 
pX 2.2689 0.4008 0.5365 2.2311 0.3942 0.5276 
(05722) (0.5674 
uc 0.0070*** 0.0012 0.6225 0.0075 0.0013 0.6744 (0.017) (0.0017) 
sr 0.0163 0.0029 0.2079 (0.0180) 
TDX 0.0040 0.0007 0.8069 0.0043*** 0.0008 0.9223 
(0.0013) (0.0012) 
T 
-3.2634 -0.5765 -0.3662 -2.9430 -0.5199 -0.3303 (2.3443) (2.2617) 
M 0.0420 0.0073 0.4602 0.0447 0.0079 0.4981 
(0.0213) (2.1561) 
xo -0.4541 -0.0802 -0.0148 - (-0.7278) 
Number of observations = 301 Rescheduling cases = 69 
o likelihood function 
- - 
-114.173 
tionr iTpM ) Log of likelihood func 
-162.044 -162.044 
Likelihood ratio test 95.742 
o correct predictions 81.73 
Pseudo- R2 
P 0.2292 0.2292 
p<0.5 p>_0.5 p<0.5 pz0.5 
0 214/232 1 8/232 0 212/232 
y = 92.24 =7.7 y = 1. 
1 
- 
6 1 34/69 
=47. T t=5.17 = = 50.72 
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The reserves to quota ratio has the correct sign and is significant at the 97.5% level of 
confidence. The elasticity value is relatively high and ranked second highest among 
other variables, in which a percentage increase in it will lead to a 0.7% decrease in the 
average probability of rescheduling (see table 6.3). 
Overall sam le Africa Latin America Latin Amer ica ASEAN 
Var. E Var E Var E Var E Var E 
TDX"` 0.92 TDX"' 0.67 Dsr*** 1.17 TDX"' 1.88 Dsr" 0.08 
res uot -0.73 u c"` 0.56 ST' -0.92 ST`" -1.16 ufc' 0.02 
uc 0.67 res uot" -0.54 u c"' 0.79 
-0.82 
CAX*** 0.53 CAX"" 
-0.49 RESM* 0.56 
. 
 ufc 0.66 
RES 0.49 RESM" 0.47 CAX" 
-0.52 
ST' 
-0.33 
Note: 
"' Significant at the 99 % level of confidence 
" Significant at the 97.5 % level of confidence 
* Significant at the 90 % level of confidence 
The current account deficits to exports ratio has the correct sign and is highly significant 
at the 99% level in both the restricted and unrestricted model. An increase in this ratio 
will increase the probability of rescheduling. The elasticity value ranked fourth amongst 
other variables. The use of fund credits over IMF quota also has the correct sign and 
is significant at the 99% level of confidence in both models. The use of IMF credits 
was highly resorted to by Latin America after 1981 when private credits were rationed, 
and by Africa since 1980. Table 6.4 shows the use of IMF credits by continent. 
Continents 1980 
1 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Latin America 1.31 1.55 2.94 8.80 11.51 14.5 16.3 
Africa 1.97 3.42 3.99 5.09 5.26 6.01 6.35 
East Asia 1.73 3.71 3.63 4.04 3.82 3.78 4.51 
Euro 2.60 3.36 4.36 5.53 5.83 5.59 4.47 
TOTAL 7.611 2.04 14.92 23.46 26.42 29.88 31.63 
Source: World Debt Tables 1988/89. 
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The elasticity value ranked third, i. e. a percentage increase in the variable will lead to a 
0.67% increase in the average probability of rescheduling. 
The debt service ratio is not significant. As had been pointed by Gibson and Thirlwall 
(1989), the reasons for this are: a) the vast bulk of the African countries' borrowings 
are official on concessional terms, hence the interest rates are subsidised and the 
maturity is longer and, b) the debt service ratio is calculated based on interest and 
amortization payments actually paid out in a particular year as opposed to debt service 
payments falling due in that year, which causes the ratio to be understated especially in 
the case when a country is having debt servicing problems. However, the second case 
applies to all countries and therefore it should not affect the direction of our analysis. 
The total debt to exports ratio has the correct sign and is significant at the 99% level of 
confidence in both models. It has the highest elasticity value (E =0.92%). As had been 
mentioned elsewhere earlier, the total debt is important to ascertain the borrowers' 
incentive to repay. The short term debt to total debt ratio is significant at the 90% level 
and has a negative sign. There are reasons for this. Dale and Mattione (1983) point out 
that the rapid growth in the volume of short-term lending since the mid 1970s until the 
first half of 1982 helped precipitate rescheduling in many countries. For example, short 
term loans to Mexico increased sharply from US$ 8.3 bn in 1977 to some US$ 32 bn 
in mid 1982. This exacerbated Mexico's funding problems and helped in causing 
default. Mexico's default led to doubts about the ability of the Latin American 
borrowers to meet their obligations. Bankers' behaviour in the second half of 1982 
was not to roll-over short-term loans. In other words, short-term loans were being 
rationed. The World Bank estimates shows the decreasing trend in short term loans to 
developing countries plus a rescheduling of an amount of US$ 45 bn short term to long 
term debt between 1983 to 1986 (World Bank, World Debt Tables 1987/88). It may 
then be argued tentatively that the estimated result picks up the trend from 1982 
onwards. The consequence of short-term debt not being rolled-over in many countries 
after the second half of 1982 leads to a decrease in their volume which will then cause 
an increase in the probability to reschedule, hence the negative sign. 
The reserves to import ratio is significant at the 97.5% level of confidence and has a 
positive sign. It can be conjectured that; 1) some countries raise their reserves through 
external borrowings (BIS Report, 1988 and Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)), hence 
increasing their credit-worthiness to obtain more loans and, 2) the import component 
of the ratio had decreased sharply due to some countries undergoing adjustments on 
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imports (BIS Report, 1988) thus causing the reserves to import ratio to be larger. The 
BIS report also state that the size of debt at the end of late 1970s, although it does not 
measure the extent to which increases in countries' foreign exchange reserves during 
the preceding years had resulted from external borrowing. Both debt and the holding of 
international reserves represent part of a country's overall portfolio allocation decision. 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) state that an increase in debt is initially reflected in an 
increase in reserves which are drawn-down later. Therefore, reserves and debt 
decisions will be related to the same group of country characteristics. The export 
growth variable has the correct sign but is not significant. 
To measure the overall statistical performance of the model, concentration will be on 
the likelihood ratio test and the percentage correct predictions. With regards to the 
overall statistical performance of the model for the overall sample, it shows a very 
good performance indeed as indicated by the high percentage of correct predictions 
which is 81 %. The likelihood ratio test is another indicator for the overall significance , 
which is above 94 in this model and is well above the value required to indicate overall 
significance at the I% level which approximates 17. 
Using the conventional approach to indicate the performance of the model in predicting 
the occurrence and absence of rescheduling, at a critical probability threshold (P*) = 
0.5, the model correctly explains about 92% non-rescheduling cases and above 47% 
rescheduling cases. Using the alternative approach of minimising the error subject to a 
relatively balanced distribution of errors and focusing on minimum possible type 1 
error 
, 
the choice of P* is at 0.3 
. 
At P* 
= 
0.3 
, 
the model correctly explains about 
85% of non-rescheduling cases and above 81% of rescheduling cases. This means that 
only countries with P* < 0.3 will be granted loans and the rest will be denied credits. 
The overall results show a combination of the macroeconomic variables and the 
financial variables are important in determining the determinants of the probability of 
rescheduling 
. 
We have seen that three of the macroeconomic variables which are; the 
total debt to export ratio , the reserves to import ratio and the current account deficits to 
exports ratio, (which is in line with Cline's (1984) study); and three of the financial 
variables which are; the reserves to quota ratio, the short-term debt to total debt ratio 
(which are in line with Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas's study), and the use of 
IMF credits over its quota as significant determinants of the probability of rescheduling. 
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Our result thus shows the importance of the scarcity of foreign exchange as shown by 
the macroeconomic variables and the cash flow position shown by the financial 
variables are important in rescheduling decisions. 
65 Results For The African Region 
Broadly speaking, the results for the African region (refer to table 6.5) reflect the 
overall results in terms of the variables that are significant The reserves to quota ratio 
has the correct sign and is significant at the 97.5% level of confidence. The current 
account deficits to exports ratio is highly significant at the 99% level. 
The use of IMF credit to quota is significant at the 99% level of confidence. Because 
the African countries can qualify for only a very limited amount of finance from 
commercial banks based on perceived credit ratings, they are led to seek credit from the 
IMF at an earlier stage, that is since 1979/1980. Latin American countries sought this 
type of credit after 1981. Similar to the overall result , the elasticity ranked second. 
The debt service ratio has the opposite sign and is not significant, the insignificance is 
presumably due to the concessional nature of the vast bulk of loans contracted and 
simultaneous financing by official creditors taking place. 
The total debt to exports ratio is significant at the 99% level of confidence. This variable 
has the highest elasticity amongst other variables in the region, hence indicating its 
importance in affecting rescheduling decisions. Short term debt to total debt is not 
significant which indicates the non-access of the region to short term debt in the private 
capital market. Where countries have access to short term debt in the private market 
such as Gambia, Nigeria and Somalia, the short term debts had been restructered to a 
longer term debt with concessional terms in 1986 for the first two countries and in 
1985 for the third country (see World Debt Tables, 1988/89). 
The reserves to import ratio has a positive sign and is significant at the 97.5% level of 
confidence. The curtailing of imports which has taken effect since 1980 caused the 
increase in the ratio. 
The results show a good overall statistical significance with a percentage correct 
prediction of about 79% and a likelihood ratio test of 39 which is significant at the I% 
Table 6.5: Logit Estimation for the Probability of Rescheduling for the 
African Region. from 1980 to 1986. 
nrestn Me Restdcted Model 
es ß estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
ß estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
nstant 
-2.2187 2.2876-- 
re not 
-0.4027 -0.0785 -0.5500 -0.3953 -0.0771 -0.5402 (0.2351) (0.2144) 
1.8892 0.3682 -0.4896 1.8819 0.3668 
-0.4877 
(0.7211) (0.7247) 
ilk 0.0054 0.001 1 0.5601 0.0055' 0.001 1 0.5601 
(0.0021) (0.0019) 
sr 
-0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0052 (0.0286) 
0.0031 0.0006 0.6724 0.0031 0.0006 0.6724 
(0.0014) (0.0013) 
Z' 
-0.3212 -0.0626 -0.0252 - - 
(4.8784) 
0.0680** 0.0133 0.4871 0.0664 0.0129 0.4725 
(0.0338) (0.0324) 
xo -0.7069 -0.1378 -0.0162 (0.8786) 
Number of observations = 147 Rescheduling cases = 39 
oe function -65.270 -65.625 
oe function 
-85. 
ee ratio test 39.548 
ctions % co rest Fre 78.91 
Pseudo-R 2 0.2438 
p 
0.2653 -1 0.2653 
p<0.5 p2t0.5 p<0.5 pz0.5 
-0 96/108 12/108 0 100/108 8/108 
88.89 
_ 
i 
= _ 
y y 
1 709 1 17/39 
=5 = = 56.41 1 _ 
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level 
. 
As to the predictive capability of the model, using the conventional approach at 
P* = 0.5, the model correctly explains above 89% of non-rescheduling cases and above 
49% of rescheduling cases. By the alternative approach of error minimization, P* is at 
0.3 which results in the model correctly explaining 79% of non-rescheduling cases and 
82% of rescheduling cases. 
In conclusion, the ratios of current account deficits to exports, total debt to exports and 
the use of fund credits play important roles in determining the probability of 
rescheduling in this region. The effect of falling export earnings raised the first two 
ratios just mentioned. This is suggestive of a need for reappraisal of export policies in 
this region, especially a call for stabilisation of export prices of primary commodities 
by importing industrial countries is needed urgently. Although debt is mostly official 
and on concessional terms for this region, the significance and elasticity value for total 
debt to exports indicates that it contributed the most to the probability of rescheduling. 
This means bilateral and multilateral debts from official creditors do not ease debt 
problems in this region at all. Unless part of the total debt and IMF credits are written- 
off 
- 
the debt problems, smoothing of consumption and export earnings could hardly 
have improved. 
In the case of the Latin American region we present two models: one includes the total 
debt to exports ratio (model 1) the other the debt service ratio (model 2). The reason for 
this is the high correlation between these two variables (the correlation coefficient is 
0.628). Tables 6.6a and 6.6b show the results for the Latin American region. Taking 
the variables one at a time indicates that both are important determinants of the 
probability of rescheduling. Based on theory, the debt service ratio increases rapidly 
with the amount of increase 
in total debts. This is empirically proven for this region 
before 1982 (Lever and Huhne, 1985) but part of the increase in the debt service ratio 
was also due to the increase in interest rates in 1978 to 1982. Although the increase 
was slower after 1982, the region had reached the limit of its debt servicing capacity in 
the early 1980s as shwon in the tables in chapter 2. 
Table 6.6b: Results of the Restricted Model: With and Without Debt Service Ratio: 
for the Latin American Region 
nrestricted Model Restricted Model 
V es ß estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
ß estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
nstant 3.4644 - - 3.2139 
re not - CAX 2.3257 0.4079 
-0.5209 3.6276 0.6363 -0.8126 
(0.8585) (1.1353 
ur 0.0096 0.0017 0.7984 0.0078 0.0014 0.6586 
(0.0037) (0.0040) 
sr 0.0706` 0.0124 1.1739 
(0.0305) 
- - 
0.0093 0.0016 1.88 
(0.0027) 
-6.7303 -1.1806 -0.9209 -8.4861 -1.4886 (4.4296) (4.8540) 
xkzm 0.0359* 0.0063 0.5609 -1.16 (0.0208) 
xgro 
- 
- - - 
Number of observations = 119 Rescheduling cases = 27 
oe unction 
-40.58 
oe function 
-63.723 
Likelihood ratio test 46.286 49.766 
% correct predictions 85.71 84.03 
Pseudo R2 0.3730 
. 
0.3906 
0.2269 U. 2269 
I= I2e 
p<0.5 pz0.5 p<0.5 pz0.5 
o 13M 7/92 0 85/92 7/92 
y = = y 92.39 TV- 
1 10/27 17/27 1 1 
= 
37.03 = 62.96 1 = 97.04 1 _ 
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The results of the two models are presented in tables 6.6a and 6.6b. We discuss first 
the model which includes the debt service ratio followed by the model including the 
total debt to exports ratio. 
6.5 z1 Results For Model 1 
The results show the reserve to quota ratio is not a significant determinant. The fact is 
that reserves had been drained in the period under study to compensate the financing of 
the debt problems in the region. The current account deficits to exports ratio and the 
use of IMF credit over it's quota are significant at the 99% level of confidence. Before 
1980 the use of IMF credits was negligible but increased sharply after 1980. Table 6.7 
below illustrates three countries in the region that had exceeded their quota from 1983 
onwards. The elasticity value is higher than the overall sample or the African region 
and ranked third. 
Table 6.7: Use of IMF credits over IMF quota (mns of SDK's) 
Countries 1980-1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
pr entina 0/803 0/803 1121/1113 1121/1113 2105/1113 2241/1113 
Brazd 0/998 499/998 2526/1461 4270/1461 4205/1461 3680/1461 
Mexico 0/803 201/803 1204/1166 2408/1166 2703/1166 3319/1166 
Source: International Financial Statistics, 1988/89 
The debt service ratio is highly significant at the 99% level of confidence and has the 
correct sign. The elasticity value is highest among all other variables. This implies any 
policy decision to reduce the probability to reschedule should have a main focus on this 
variable. Also the individual components (see for example Gibbon and Thirwall, 
(1989)) of this ratio should be carefully examined in order to bring effective changes in 
the probability of rescheduling. In their study, the debt service ratio is disaggregated 
into five components namely the effects of: (i) a change in the volume of debt, (ii) a 
change in the rate of interest, (iii) a change in the rate of amortization, (iv) a change in 
the volume of exports and, (v) a change in the price of exports. Their findings show 
that there is an increase in the debt service ratio by 7.6 percentage points in the 
developing countries taken as a group in the period 1980 to 1985. This increase had 
been contributed by the increase in the debt volume itself and the falling export 
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earnings. Interest and amortisation rates had decreased and without their decrease 
would have increased the debt service ratio by 8.7 percentage points. In the Latin 
American region, the growth of debt increased the debt service ratio by 15.9 percentage 
points, however the joint effect of falling interest rates (by 2.4 percentage points), 
amortisation rates (by 9.5 percentage points), and increasing export earnings (by 2.0 
percentage points) caused the debt service ratio to increase by 4.7 percentage points 
altogether. As such a measure to decrease the debt service ratio so as to deter 
rescheduling should focus on the growth of debt itself in the period under study. As a 
comparison, the debt service ratio in Africa increased by 8 percentage points 
. 
This is 
due to the contribution of 5.8 percentage points from the debt volume, 1 percentage 
point from the increasing amortization rate, 3.1 percentage points from falling export 
earnings and a reduction by 0.7 percentage points from falling interest rates. They, too 
deduced that the increase in the debt service ratio in the Southeast Asian region (the 
most among other regions) is largely due to the growth of the debt volume itself. The 
World Debt Tables 1987/88 indicate that the growth in the debt volume is partly 
contributed by exchange rate factors because of an increasing amount of yen credit 
contracted as of 1985 onwards, hence raising the dollar value of the reported total debt. 
The short- term debt to total debt has a negative sign and is significant at the 90% level 
of confidence. The explanation of the negative sign in the overall region exactly applies 
here, that is, as of 1982 onwards, short-term debts were rationed and whilst at the 
same time there was a restructuring of short-term debt to longer-term debts thus short- 
term debt to total debt was falling as a result of the rescheduling process. 
The reserve to import ratio has a positive sign and is significant at the 90% level of 
confidence. The explanation in the overall sample also applies here; i. e. an increase in 
reserves financed by external borrowing when external borrowing was still available 
and a simultaneous decrease in imports; gave a higher reserve to import ratio. The 
export growth variable is not significant. 
The model has high overall statistical significance with a percentage correct prediction 
of about 87% and the likelihood ratio test shows significance at the 1% level. As to the 
predictive power of the model, at a threshold probability P* = 0.5, the model correctly 
explain 96% of non-rescheduling cases and 67% of rescheduling cases. By the 
alternative method of error minimization subject to a balanced distribution of errors, 
P* = 0.3 explains 87% of non-rescheduling cases and 85% of rescheduling cases 
correctly. 
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6.5.3 
.2 The Results For Model 2 
With the inclusion of the total debt to exports ratio and excluding the debt service ratio, 
the following differences are noted: - 
1) the reserves to quota ratio is not significant 
2) the current account deficits to exports remain significant at the 99% level of 
confidence. The elasticity value increases from -0.52 to -0.81 and is now ranked third. 
3) the use of IMF credits over its quota decreases in significance from the 99% level to 
the 97.5% level. 
4) the total debt to exports ratio is highly significant at the 99% level of confidence. The 
elasticity ranks first. 
5)the short term debt improves in significance from 90% to 97.5 % level of confidence 
and its elasticity ranks second. 
6) the reserve to import and exports growth variables are not significant. 
The overall statistical significance is also very high with a percentage correct predictions 
of 84% and the likelihood ratio test shows significance at the 1% level. At P* = 0.5, the 
model correctly explains 89% of non-rescheduling cases and 59% of rescheduling 
cases. By the alternative approach of error minimization, P* = 0.3 where the model 
explains 90% of non-rescheduling cases and 78% rescheduling cases. 
Having presented both the models for this region, the higher percentage correct 
predictions and the lesser amount of type 1 error in model 1 led us to choose model 1 as 
a better model. It is also theory consistent in which the debt service ratio is more 
important in this region in determining the probability of rescheduling. This is because 
(as mentioned earlier) the debt service payments rise not only together with the amount 
of debt but also with the rate of interest. 
In conclusion, there is a crucial need for this region to reduce current account deficits 
and total debts by curtailing imports by debtors, reducing interest rates by creditors and 
export price stabilization by the industrialised countries, especially on commodities to 
reduce the probability of rescheduling. Common to both the African and the Latin 
American regions is the use of IMF credits which increased sharply in the 1980 decade 
signalling debt problems. The greater use of IMF credits by both regions also implies 
that all other sources of financing foreign exchange scarcity vis-a-vis debt problems 
had been depleted and private financial capitals had been rationed 
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Short-term debt played an important role in affecting the probability of rescheduling in 
the Latin American region. The danger with this form of financing is there is a 
tendency for bunching of maturities when repayment falling due coincide with 
repayment for the longer term debts, and earnings could not be generated fast enough to 
repay. 
An examination of the ratios that are significant in this region suggest that all forms of 
financing either by export earnings or by capital inflows had been exhausted. 
cd Results for the ASEAN Region 
The sample size of this region is smaller (i. e. 35 country-year observations), hence 
most of the variables are insignificant. Therefore, the unrestricted model consists of 
the debt service ratio, current account deficits to exports and use of IMF credits over 
its quota as explanatory variables. Table 6.8 shows the results for the Southeast Asian 
region. 
Out of the three variables above, the debt service ratio is a significant determinant of 
the probability of rescheduling. It is significant at 97.5% level of confidence. The 
highest debt service ratios are from the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia (World 
Debt Tables 1988/89). The use of IMF credit is also a significant determinant (at the 
90% level). 
Unlike the Latin American and the African regions whose debt has very high dollar 
components, the debt contracted by the Southeast Asian region has a very high yen 
component. Whilst the Latin American countries experience relatively little from 
exchange factors as compared to interest rate factors, the Southeast Asian countries 
experienced increases of 8% to 10% in the dollar value of their debt because of 
appreciation of the yen and other major currencies. One can deduce that the increase in 
the debt service ratio in the Latin American region is partly due to the increase in interest 
rates that are tied to LIBOR, but the increase in the Southeast Asian region is the effect 
of exchange factor because the interest component of the ratio does not move with the 
movements of LIBOR. 
Table 6.8: Results of the Unrestricted and Restricted 
Model for the ASEAN Region 
unrestricted Model Restricted Model 
Fes ß estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
Constant 
-10.1348 - - -7.4440 - 
sr 0.2536 0.0136 0.0834 0.2506** 0.0135 0.0832 
(0.2483) (0.1638) 
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(3.7273) 
0.0189 0.0010 0.0163 0.0205** 0.0011 0.0179 
(0.0169) (0.0142) 
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Loo Mood function 
-5.44 - -5.73 Log of likelihood function 
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.6 Comparisons Among the Regional Results 
The debt service ratio is most important in the Latin American region and the 
elasticity value is highest among all regions indicating debts contracted are from 
international private markets and the vast bulk have floating interest rates. This naturally 
calls for a reduction in the debt service ratio. Rescheduling, while it does reduce the 
immediate debt burden as measured by the debt service ratio, will only postpone the 
debt problems or debt repayments to the future generation. It will also cause a reduction 
in a debtor's credit rating and affects their future participation in the credit market, 
especially when the perceived risks increase due to past rescheduling causes the spreads 
over LIBOR of future borrowings to increase. Therefore, the individual components of 
the ratio as mentioned elsewhere earlier should be dealt with. The ratio is significant in 
the ASEAN region because debts are also contracted from the international private 
markets, and an increasing amount has been from the yen credit market especially as of 
1985 onwards (World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1987/88). However, the elasticity 
value is not that significant. This reflects the effects of higher export earnings. The 
debt service ratio is not significant in the African region because debts contracted are 
mostly from official sources and are concessional in nature. It is the total debt to 
exports ratio that is most significant in this region whereby exports earnings are too low 
to sustain the amount of debt obtained. 
Short term debt to total debt is significant and has a relatively very high elasticity 
value in the Latin American region but not significant in the other regions. Bankers 
rolled-over short term debt prior to 1982 to the Latin American region and this is mostly 
used to service existing debt. The African region is simply not eligible to borrow short 
term debt from private sources. 
The ratio of reserves to quota is significant in the African region because quotas are 
very low for this region, hence raising the ratio itself. It is not significant in the Latin 
American region because the quota for that region is very high and reserves had been 
drained out in the period under-study. 
Table 6.9 in Appendix 2 shows the summary of all the previous studies of debt 
rescheduling using logit analysis, including our studies for the basis of comparison. On 
our overall results, the macro-economic variables that are significant are in line with 
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Cline's study. The three ratios that are highly significant are also highly significant in 
Cline's study. They are the current account deficit to exports ratio, the reserves to 
import ratio and the total debt to exports ratio. In another model of Cline's study it is 
the debt service ratio instead of the net debt to exports ratio that is highly significant, in 
which we found this as highly significant in the Latin American and the ASEAN region 
but not in the overall region. The fact that it is significant in Cline's overall result could 
be due to differences in the period under-study, especially in the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s when debt service ratios mounted in every region. Also, it is not significant 
in our overall result because of a trade-off effect from the African region whose debt 
service ratio does not play a part in determining the probability of rescheduling. 
Pertaining to the reserves to import ratio, similar to our study, Feder and Just (1977) 
also found it to be highly significant. This shows that increases in reserves are 
important to increase a country's liquidity regardless of whether the increase is due to 
external borrowings. If reserves are increased by borrowing this will lead to increased 
indebtedness, although it will allow a country to use up the reserves in times of 
financial deterioration. The other macroeconomic variable used in this study which is 
not significant is the growth of export earnings. Feder and Just found this variable to 
be significant during his period of study. It is not significant here presumably because 
export growth is negligible in the 1980s but there had been a great increase in export 
growth in the 1960s and the period before the second oil shock. 
On the financial variables, all three that are included are significant. Reserves to quota 
and short-term debt are significant determinants which is in line with Lloyd-Ellis, 
McKenzie and Thomas's study. In addition, the use of IMF credits over its quota is 
also significant. Although there could be an endogeneity problem here in the sense that 
the use of IMF credits may be an effect of rescheduling rather than a cause of 
rescheduling. However, the use of IMF credits over its quota still shows the liquidity 
position of a country and if a country exceeds it's quota, even if the quota is small, it 
is still an indicator of its liquidity position. 
6g Conclusions and Policy Implica 
. 
ions 
Table 6.10 below summarizes the significance level of the determinants of the 
probability of rescheduling according to different samples. The table also shows the 
common ratios that are significant in all samples or in most of the samples. 
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We can conclude that the most common determinants are the current account deficit to 
export and the use of fund credits to its quota, next comes total debt to exports. The rest 
of the variables vary in importance according to regions. This finding confirms the 
hypotheses that the heterogeneity of experiences and debt problems among regions will 
result in different determinants being significant in different regions. From the table, we 
can also see that some common ratios which are significant in the overall sample are not 
significant in the African region (eg. short-term to total debt ratio) or the Latin 
American region (eg. reserves to quota). By taking one overall sample size only, 
previous studies (Cline (1984), Feder and Just (1977), and Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and 
Thomas (1987)) had assumed common determinants of rescheduling across countries. 
This is a strong assumption given the heterogeneous nature of the sample countries. 
Significant Overall Aftica Latin 
Amer. (1) 
Latin 
Amer. (2) 
SEAsia 
At 99% level +CAX +CAX AX 
- 
+CAX 
+UF -+U- +UPU- + 
11 +TDX +TDX +DSr 
At 97.5% level 
-res not -res not +TJFC +r 
T IOM + 
-st 
At 90 0 level -st -st +I-FC 
+RESM 
The elasticity analysis could at least signal which variables have the highest influence 
on the probability of rescheduling, and by how much they should be increased or 
decreased to lower the probability. 
By going through rescheduling, a case by case approach is ensured for countries 
experiencing debt problems. The Latin American countries will benefit most from 
rescheduling at the times when they were experiencing debt crisis. The average change 
in the debt service ratio for rescheduling countries of Latin America over the period 
1982-85 was 
-7.5 percentage points (Gibson and Thirlwall, 1989, page 19). The fall 
was attributed to reductions in interest and amortization rates as well as improvements 
in export earnings. However, rescheduling will jeopardize their future applications for 
borrowings in the private capital market because of a lower perceived credit rating. As 
for the African countries, rescheduling does not ease their debt problems or their 
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overall financial problems because continuous flow of funds are needed for the 
economic growth and only write-offs of existing debt will ease the debt problems. The 
debt service ratio for example, had an average change of only -0.4 percentage points 
mainly because the African countries gain less from the fall in interest rate. The nature 
of debt contracted in the region is official on concessional terms. Continuous official 
funding from bilateral and multilateral sources are needed for development in general. 
As for the ASEAN region, funding for development are largely from the yen capital 
market in the 1980s, hence, countries should seek to borrow optimally by following 
closely the Japanese prime movements rather than LIBOR. 
The nature of the debt problems in the 1980s had been captured by the inclusion of both 
variables from the balance of payments and the financial variables which had been 
affected by internal and external shocks during that period. One therefore, could not 
conclude which of the two types of variables are more relevant because both are as 
important depending on individual cases. This reflects its liquidity position before or 
after rescheduling. 
1 Lloyd-Ellis, McKenzie and Thomas (1987) did conduct a study including the two 
types of variables in an annual sample for twenty-seven largest debtors only from 1977 
to 1981. The purpose is to prove their hypothesis that the financial variables are more 
important determinants of the probability to reschedule. They found only one out of 
four of the macroeconomic variables as significant but had an opposite sign, and three 
out of the five financial variables as significant (refer also to Literature Review 
Section). Taking still other previous studies by Cline (1984) and Feder and Just (1977) 
who showed that macroeconomic variables are important determinants, we believe there 
is some significance in the macro-economic variables in the wake of the 1980s debt 
problems. 
2 On all ratios mentioned from now onwards, the expected signs will be shown at the 
side of the variables 
3 Niehans, J, "International Debt With Unenforceable Claims", 1985 
4 There is no collinearity between variables and choice of variables are according 
to correlation coefficient, where variables correlate, a systematic elimination of 
insignificant variables at the 10% level of confidence in the regression equation 
are dropped. All variables tested are all the variables used 
by all previous 
studies discussed. 
CHAPTER 7: THE LINKAGE BETWEEN EXCHANGE RATE 
AND DEBT SERVICE 
7.1 
L Introduction 1 
During the deepening of the financial crisis in the international environment in the 
1980s, an important concern of the ASEAN countries, was what policy variable to 
target in the attempt to avoid falling into financial strains. The choice of target in the 
ASEAN countries was often the current account balance. However, the ASEAN 
countries did not adopt the monetarist policy of a gradual expansion of money supply at 
a preannounced rate, seeking a balanced budget and letting the exchange rate float 
freely, thus relying on the market to determine whether and how much the balance of 
payments should go into surplus or deficit (Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report, 
1988). The current account balance measures the degree to which a country borrows 
from or lends to the rest of the world. It also measures the extent to which savings 
exceed domestic investment. It becomes necessary to judge the sustainable and optimal 
capital flows to which the current account should be adjusted. 
However, the theory of optimal level of foreign borrowing or lending is not well 
developed. Eichengreen and Portes (1986) argue that there is no 
.. 
"accepted body of 
economic doctrine that can bring together in a comprehensive and systematic way the 
numerous forces - including actual and expected foreign exchange rate and interest rate 
differentials 
- 
that can serve as a response to overcoming financial strains". In the 
absence of the 'so-called' integrated body of guiding doctrine, Eichengreen and 
Portes establish three distinguishing features (shown in Figure 1) which interact with 
each other, which they believe are capable of causing a generalised financial crisis. Of 
these three features, the role of the exchange rate in causing the disturbances proves to 
be significant. 
According to Fig. 7.1, the linkages between debt default and bank failures, between 
exchange market disturbances and 
debt defaults, and between exchange market 
disturbances and bank failures give rise to a generalised financial crisis. Eichengreen 
and Portes suggest that there are two sets of factors involved 
in the propagation of a 
crisis: asset-market linkages, running from debt defaults and exchange market 
disturbances to the stability of the banking system; and the role of economic policy in 
blocking these linkages and thereby insulating the banking system and the macro- 
economy from threats to their stability. It 
is largely towards this issue 
- 
the linkages 
I Parts of this chapter has been published in Latifah and Ariff, (1992). 
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which run from debt service or debt default to exchange market disturbances which can 
cause instability in the financial system - that this chapter is directed. 
Fig. 7.1: Asset-Market Linkages 
Debt 5, Bank 
Defaults Failures 
Exchange- 
Market 
Disturbances 
Source: Eichengreen and Portes, 1986. 
Most available studies of the developing countries deal with the issue of what exchange 
rate regimes to adopt (eg. Black (1976)). One study on the ASEAN exchange rates 
focuses on trade issues (P. Rana (1981)). None, however, link the issue of exchange 
rate to debt service. 
This chapter analyses the movements of effective (import-weighted) exchange rates in 
each of the ASEAN countries and the linkages of such movements with the countries' 
debt service. We concern ourselves with the issue of whether exchange rates can be 
used as a response to overcome debt servicing difficulties. Section 2 outlines some 
approaches to exchange rates. Section 3 outlines the exchange rate regimes and 
responses of the ASEAN countries to the evolution of the international monetary 
system. A distinction is made between the Officially announced and the actual exchange 
rate regimes. In section 4, the trend and short-term variability of effective (import- 
weighted) exchange rates of the five ASEAN countries are presented. Section 5 
estimates the import demand as well as the export demand and supply functions for 
ASEAN countries. Finally, the effects of exchange rate changes on the value of exports 
are determined as a principle of balance of payments adjustment. 
7.2 Conceptual Issues on Exchange Rates 
7.3 
The main concern in this section is trying to find out the association between exchange 
rate and debt or debt service. We briefly examine the different exchange rate regimes 
and identify its connection with exchange market disturbances. With regards to the 
linkage between the exchange market and debt, we review the only study that shows 
such linkage which has relevance to our study - the study by Eichengreen and Portes, 
(1986). 
The breakdown of the par value system of exchange rates under the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971 brought hope that order could be restored by allowing all exchange 
rates to float freely (Black 1973). The prices of the goods which are traded among 
countries are supposed to coalesce into a form of purchasing power parity, resulting in 
reasonably stable exchange rates. Purchasing power parity is the earliest view on the 
determination of exchange rate, it stresses that exchange rate is equals to some domestic 
(p) price level to a comparable foreign price (P*) level, given by: 
S=p (7.1} 
where, S is the spot price of a unit of foreign exchange (MacDonald, 1990). PPP 
only considered traded goods. However, enormous financial flows among currencies 
may respond to causes other than the trade balances that are primarily responsive to 
the price comparisons embodied in purchasing power parities. 
Currencies were free to shift, and the free movement of exchange rates inhibits a 
source of instability in the foreign exchange markets due to speculative activities. This 
leads to the pure theory of floating as unacceptable. Yet the par value system did not 
work 
- 
not only because purchasing power parities had diverged as economic 
performance and inflation rates varied widely among countries, but also because the 
overlay of capital flows created new uncertainties. As a consequence, limited floating or 
managed floating has constantly been under experimentation. Meanwhile, attention has 
also been revived to the earlier "free floating" school - the doctrine of monetarism. 
The monetarist approach argues that domestic monetary expansion aligned with the 
expected growth rate over a period of years ensures comparative stability in average 
domestic prices. Stable prices provide a basis for developing stability in the exchange 
rates amongst currencies of similarly "monetarised" countries. That is, with money 
supply growth closely related to average growth in productivity, individual prices 
7.4 
changes will only fluctuate around a steady norm, and purchasing power parities 
among monetarised countries will support a relatively stable condition among their 
exchange rates. 
A steady, gradual increase in money supply, the objective of monetarism, will result in 
the monetary authorities being indifferent to any fluctuations in interest rates. Yet such 
rates may swing over a wide range due to the rise in the money supply. The 
consequences are flowing of funds into high-rate currency and out of others, thereby 
creating further conditions of instability in the foreign exchange markets. The currency 
attracting funds will tend to become overvalued in relation to its purchasing power 
parity with other currencies. The currencies whose interest rates are relatively 
unattractive will be sold, and then will become undervalued. As a result, a distortion 
will be introduced into the domestic economies of each as imports are stimulated by the 
overvalued currency, and exports, by the undervalued currency. 
The adjustment of balance of payments can be achieved by combining two types of 
measures. Firstly, there is the expenditure-switching policy which includes adjustments 
in import protection, export subsidies and the valuation of the currency. This is 
designed to switch demand from domestic to foreign sources of supply. Secondly, 
there is the expenditure-increasing/decreasing policy which includes monetary and 
fiscal policies, as well as policies that directly target savings and investment. Another 
policy variable used to adjust the current account balance is exchange rate protection. 
Holding down the exchange rate favours the production of traded goods at the expense 
of non-traded goods, which involves restraining domestic expenditure (consumption or 
investment) from a given national income. 
If an exchange rate is to play a role the desired band of currency appreciation or 
depreciation should be defined. There are two approaches to determine the desired 
amount of appreciation or depreciation. One is to depreciate (appreciate) the real 
effective exchange rate over a preceding period, then determine how much to appreciate 
(depreciate). The base period at the time the exchange rate appears to be in equilibrium 
should be chosen. The alternative approach requires the comparison of the desired and 
the actual current account balance. The degree of appreciation (depreciation) needed 
depends on the amount that brings about the desired changes in the expected current 
account balance. This requires information on the current account surplus (deficit), 
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export elasticities and import elasticities with respect to the change in the exchange rate. 
We use the second approach later in this study. 
Fluctuating exchange rates introduce exchange rate risks in investing and trading 
transactions and have an adverse effect on trade and capital flows. Exchange rate risks 
can be avoided in several different ways (such as forward markets and other hedging 
opportunities), but such facilities are not generally, though increasingly, available in 
developing countries. Currency blocs formation in response to generalized floating 
causes trade diverting bias. Floating exchange rates among developed countries induce 
increases in the cost of capital to developing countries because lenders will demand 
higher risk premiums to lend abroad to cover the greater exchange rate risk. Flexible 
exchange rates permit developed countries to pursue more independent interest rate 
policies, this might mean greater uncertainty for developing country's borrowing in 
international markets. With regard to reserves, fluctuations in the exchange rates can 
cause fluctuations in the value of reserves. There is a need to diversify the reserve 
portfolio to minimize losses. 
The link between exchange rate and debt is implied in the study by Eichengreen 
and Portes (1986) in that the linkages between the three distinguishing factors 
mentioned earlier results in the international financial crisis of the 1930s which has 
similarities with the situation in the 1980s. In his review of the international financial 
crisis of the 1930s, he identifies three factors which increased the international financial 
system's susceptibility to destabilizing shocks: flux in the foreign exchange market; 
rapid institutional change in the banking system; and dramatic shifts in the volume and 
direction of international lending. These have relevance to the recent developments. 
In principle, borrowing countries could have chosen to default on their external debts 
while defending the gold standard in the 1930s, to let their exchange rate go while 
maintaining debt service or to default and depreciate simultaneously. Sacrificing 
exchange rate and honouring debt was seen as a pragmatic approach because default 
automatically precluded additional 
foreign borrowing, while depreciation has less 
impact on credit-worthiness. It was even suggested that in so far as depreciation 
stimulated exports, it might 
facilitate foreign bond flotations. Nevertheless, policy 
makers themselves saw depreciation as a threat to national credit. The situation in the 
1980s are of similar context in terms of rescheduling although international 
reserves could not be 
defended. Ariff (1991) argues that apart from stimulating 
exports, depreciation could also 
increase debt burden in domestic currency terms. 
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In Eichengreen's et. al review of the international financial environment in the 1980s, 
he points out that the environment begins with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
payments settlement and exchange rate systems in the 1970s. The major events in this 
period brought deep structural change closely analogous to that of the 1920s, in the 
exchange rate system, in international lending and in financial institutions. 
Eichengreen et. al argue that the currency convertibility and the international 
institutions established at Bretton Woods seem to have survived in the guise, and gave 
the example of the European Monetary System (EMS) with its exchange rate 
mechanism which provides for a 'zone of (relative) monetary stability' among most of 
the EC currencies. Even outside the exchange market intervention in the EMS, the 
major currencies have not floated freely since 1973. Exchange rates have been regarded 
as important indicators or even targets for monetary policy, leading to intervention, 
whether sterilized or unsterilized. With regard to this Eichengreen et. al pose the 
question as to whether, by the end of the 1970s, the resulting exchange rate system was 
well suited to absorb major macro-economic and financial shocks, or whether the 
system propagated or even magnified such disorders, which might then be transmitted 
to the capital markets and the financial system (linkages 3 and 5). 
Since debt servicing capacity depends on trade flows, there is an indirect link from the 
exchange-market disturbances of the past decade to debt defaults (linkage III). Yet this 
differs from the link Eichengreen et. al identified in the earlier period, in which 
convertibility crises and the threat of exchange control induce withdrawals of short-term 
funds, which in turn can lead to default. In his view, exchange rate misalignments do 
not appear to have threatened the banking systems in either creditor or debtor countries 
(linkage V). But exchange rate uncertainty and volatility may have increased the 
importance of this link by offering banks new opportunities for speculation. Some have 
participated aggressively in these markets (often seeking to build up earnings depleted 
by bad loans). Some have not been successful. 
A more important example of linkage III can be found in the developing debtor 
countries themselves. In several cases, exchange rate over-valuation has led to massive 
capital flights by domestic residents, seriously exacerbating debt servicing difficulties. 
Insofar as over-valuation is a direct result of government policy, exchange market 
intervention rather than post 1973 exchange rate flexibility is the cause of the problem. 
on balance, Eichengreen et. al tend to agree with the view that flexible exchange rates 
have serve more as a shock absorber than as a source of destabilizing influences in the 
financial system or as a link in their transmission. The misalignments which this 
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flexibility has permitted, by removing a constraint on monetary and fiscal policies, have 
not themselves provoked financial crises or exacerbated financial instability, whatever 
their negative effects on trade and investment. It is in fact the process of correcting the 
misalignments without the appropriate coordination of macro policy mixes which may 
be highly destabilizing. There is a further indirect linkage from exchange market 
disturbances to debt servicing difficulties which was a major threat in the 1980s: 
exchange rate misalignments have resulted in pressure for protectionist trade policies, 
which impede the ability of debtor countries to earn the export surpluses they require. 
In the 1930s, debt default did not generally force down a debtor's exchange rate. On 
the contrary, debt service burden had that effect even to non-defaulting countries in the 
1980s. Pressures from the government budget and the need to run current account 
surpluses both work in this direction insofar as depreciation relieves the financial 
burden of supporting an overvalued exchange rate while raising net exports. 
Exchange Rate Regimes of ASEAN Countries 
March 1973 marked the adoption of floating exchange rates by major countries. The 
official and actual exchange rate regime of ASEAN countries seems to differ. The 
International Monetary Fund classification of exchange rate regimes is based on the 
reported policy of individual countries, 
but the actual regime being followed is often 
different. This is because some currencies that are officially floating are often managed 
in order to stabilize the rate, and conversely, some currencies that are officially pegged 
are frequently adjusted. Hence, in evaluating exchange rate policies, inconsistencies in 
official and actual regimes need 
be taken into account. 
The official exchange rate regimes of four of the five ASEAN countries, with the 
exception of the Philippines, pegged their currencies to a major currency within the 
prescribed margin of 1% 
during the Bretton Woods period of fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates. Indonesia and 
Thailand pegged their currencies to the U. S. dollar, 
while Malaysia and 
Singapore pegged theirs to the pound sterling. Only the 
Philippines allowed its currency to float during the era of the par value system. The 
Philippines peso was first floated in November 1965, but was pegged to the U. S. 
dollar in 1967. Because of severe balance of payments problems, however, the peso 
has been allowed to float again since February 1970. 
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By August 1971, the par value system showed signs of breaking down when some 
major currencies were allowed to float. The system was reinstated, however, after the 
Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971, only to collapse shortly thereafter. During 
this unsettled period in the international monetary system, the only countries in ASEAN 
which changed their exchange regimes were Malaysia and Singapore. Both decided not 
to follow the floating of the pound sterling in June 1972, and instead adopted gold 
pegging, with the U. S. dollar as the intervention currency (Rana, 1981). 
Attempts to revive the par value system failed, and finally in March 1973 major 
currencies started to float again. This time the floating system seemed likely to be 
permanent. In response to this, other countries began to seek suitable exchange rate 
policies. Of the five ASEAN countries, four (excluding the Philippines) have changed 
their regimes during the present system of generalized floating. Malaysia and 
Singapore floated their currencies from June 1973, and in September 1975 pegged 
them to an unclassified undisclosed basket of currencies within certain margins. 
Indonesia and Thailand followed the same course in November 1978. The Philippines 
has expressed its desire to peg the peso to a basket, but this proposal has not been 
pursued in the 1980s. 
To determine the actual exchange rate regimes adopted by the ASEAN countries, Rana 
(1981) uses the following rule; the regime is classified as managed floating if 
fluctuations of greater than a margin of 2.25% in the monthly dollar rates are observed 
with some frequency. Otherwise, the regime is classified as US dollar pegging. 
pegging to a basket presents a problem of classification due to difficulties in detecting 
whether exchange rate fluctuations are due to weight adjustments or to changes in the 
values of currencies composing the basket. Therefore, the rule above is also used to 
determine the actual exchange regimes of basket peggers. 
Rana's result of this exercise noted several differences between official and actual 
regimes can be noted: a) Indonesia and Thailand have continued to peg their currencies 
to the US dollar even after the declared change of policy in November 1978; b) The 
p iippines has discontinued floating and has again pegged its currency to the US dollar 
since July 1975; and c) Malaysia and Singapore have continued their policy of 
managed floating which was adopted in June 1973 in spite of their official change in 
policy. 
Indonesia adopted a managed-float exchange rate regime since 1978. Its exchange rate 
index is trade-weighted average exchange rate for a basket of currencies from 
Indonesia's major trading partners (including Japanese yen and US dollar). 
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Singapore, since 1980s, chose to target the nominal exchange rates rather than the 
interest rates or the growth of money supply. This is due to the objective of ensuring 
price stability and exchange rate is seen as an important anti-inflationary instrument. 
Though managed float, the currency seems to follow the movements of the U. S. dollar 
very closely (GATT Trade Policy Review, 1991: Singapore). 
There are no exchange controls in ASEAN but the Central Banks retain responsibility 
for exchange control matters (Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report, 1991). The 
ASEAN countries have a more integrated market than the pegger. However, the market 
for Malaysia and Thailand is not as integrated as the average floater. The implications 
on exchange rate regimes are that Singapore can expect a floating rate to be stable, at 
least in the short run, while other ASEAN countries may be able to tolerate relatively 
more flexible exchange rates than the average pegger. However, independent floating 
may still not be feasible for them. 
a Exchange Rate Variability and the Movements of Debt Service Ratio 
The ASEAN countries have experienced increased variability in their effective exchange 
rates, both nominal and real, since the advent of generalized floating. The variability 
has had some adverse effects on the trade flows of the ASEAN countries (Rana, 1981). 
This suggests that an exchange rate regime which would minimize the effects of third- 
country exchange rate fluctuations and other random external disturbances on the 
domestic market should be adopted. The increase in variability could heighten the 
region's susceptibility to debt servicing difficulties, especially if it impedes the flow of 
trade since debt is serviced mainly from trade earnings. 
In our analysis of the variability of the effective exchange rate, we focus on the 
effective (trade weighted) exchange rates. To account for the offsetting relationship 
between prices and exchange rates, a distinction is made between nominal and real 
effective exchange rates. 
The multilateral measures of exchange rate changes give an average change of a 
country's exchange rate against all countries. They are calculated by weighing changes 
in the exchange rate of a foreign country and the home country (relative to a base 
period) by weights that reflect the importance of the foreign country to the home 
country. Since the import-weighted exchange rates provide the closest approximation to 
effective exchange rates in the developing countries (P. Rana (1981)), an import 
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weighted exchange rate is used in this study. Also, Black (1976) has shown that the 
import-weighted exchange rate in small open economies approximates to the multilateral 
exchange rate model (MERM - developed by IMF) and suggests effects on trade 
balance. 
We use the equation below to calculate the nominal effective (import-weighted) 
exchange rate (NER) of country i: 
NEI1_I(mj/m; 
)*r, (7.2) 
r; 
where, 
r,, = the price of the US dollar in terms of country i's orb"s currency 
relative to 1980 (base year). 
m`' 
=value of country i's imports from country j as a proportion of 
m; 
country i's total imports. 
We calculate the index of real effective exchange rate (RER) using: 
(mflm, )*(rjIPj) 
REIS (7.3) (ri / Pi) 
where, 
Pýj =is the wholesale price index (WPI) in local currency for country i or j 
relative to base year 1980. 
An analysis of the movements of the effective exchange rate in the 1970s by Rana 
(1981) shows instability in the nominal effective exchange rate in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, mainly due to devaluations undertaken. Comparing April 1973 and 
October 1979 shows that the Indonesian rupiah, the Philippine peso, and the Thai baht 
had effectively depreciated by 38.5%, 13.5% and 3.7% respectively, while the 
Malaysian ringgit and the Singapore dollar had effectively appreciated by 10% and 
8.1 % (Rana, 1981). The loss of competitiveness due to the appreciating currencies of 
Malaysia and Singapore was, however, offset by low domestic rates of inflation. The 
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Indonesian rupiah and the Philippine peso are the most unstable currencies in the 
ASEAN. They have effectively depreciated substantially in the 1970s. Gains in 
competitiveness brought about by the depreciations have been more than offset by the 
rapid domestic inflation rates in these countries, hence causing balance of payments 
problems. For example, although the peso depreciated by 35% in the 1970s it had 
effectively appreciated by 42%. 
year Malaysia S. Korea Singapore Thailand 
N R N R N R N R 
1974 119.6 663.1 165.8 97.1 108.4 121.8 113.5 112.2 
197 108.3 13 
.8 138.8 9. 1 8.3 10 .4 1-1. 103.2 
1976 86 7 99 126.7 89.3 94.6 89.9 103.9 91.3 
1977 897 97.5 133.6 95.7 98.9 90 104.7 90.9 
1978 108.1 115.9 160.4 122.8 109.9 94.8 124 109.8 
1979 87.8 90 153.3 131.1 101.7 93.9 109.3 100 
1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
981 121.6 124.1 92.3 103.9 93.2 90.2 93.4 98.3 
1982 123.5 126.9 76.7 87.8 87.5 77.2 88.1 92.9- 
19P 111.9 116.3 75.3 86.9 90.1 74.7 87.7 94.3 
1984 99. 104.4 76.1 87.8 90.4 721 8 73 89.9 
1985 90.9 92.9 70.6 80.9 91.9 69.2 68.9 72.7 
1986 114.3 116.2 93.9 112 120.5 77.7 95.9 102.3 
198 113.9 116.3 111 13 
. 
131.3 90. 148.6 1 2- 
1 988 115.0 84.8 
1989 115.4 90 
7,99-0 
Year Philippines Indonesia 
N R N R 
1974 100.8 8 8.6 124.9 82.1 
1975 99.3 82.0 122.9 87.2 
1976 99.4 83.1 115.4 -93.7 
1977 99.3 84.4 110.5 88.4 
1978 113.2 96.5 
- 
123.6 100.4 
1979 106.9 99.1 - T22.2 76.0 
1980 100 100 100 100 
1981 100.3 105.1 82.9 8 
.9 1982 100.7 110.6 77.4 84.9 
1983 118.8 139.2 52.1 62.0 
1984 179.5 302.7 42.1 64.0 
1985 96.5 -T9-6.2 1.3 54.6 
1986 240.7 531.5 49.5 71.1 
1987 2 8.9 563.5 74.8 
1988 237.5 
1989 237. 
1990 
Source: Calculated Using equations 7.2 and 7.3 
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Rana (1981) measures the quarterly changes of the exchange rate by using the scale 
measures for Paretian distribution and the Gini's mean difference. The findings indicate 
exchange rate variability increased substantially during the generalized floating period 
(1973 to the present) in all ASEAN countries, as compared to the pegged period (1967- 
71). 
Our analysis of the movements of the effective exchange rate of the ASEAN countries 
in the 1980s is shown in Table 7.1, and on graphs in Figs 7.2. We also present the 
plots of debt service ratio (Figs. 7.3) for the purpose of detecting any linkages between 
the movements of exchange rates and the movements of debt service ratio. We establish 
a hypothetical situation whereby the effect of appreciating exchange rates, ceteris 
paribus, causes the debt service ratio to rise, while the rise in the debt service ratio in 
turn forces down the effective exchange rate, i. e. a vicious circle develop between the 
movements of the effective exchange rate and the debt service ratio. 
The graphs in Figures 7.2 show a distinctive trend in the effective exchange rates in the 
1980s in all of the ASEAN countries 
- 
their currencies appreciated in 1985 and 
depreciated to the lowest point in 1986-87 (except for Malaysia and Indonesia). The 
debt service ratio started to rise in 1984 reaching its peak in 1985 and remaining high 
from then on. The simultaneous movement of the debt service ratio and the exchange 
rate in 1985 was possibly due to the effect of the appreciating exchange rate in 1985 
itself which affected trade earnings hence reducing the ability to service debt and thus 
leading to an accumulation of debt service in the subsequent years. This is especially 
true in the case of the Philippines. Another reason may have been the particularly 
strong dollar currency in 1985 may have raised the debt service of all debtors. The 
effect of the deteriorating bilateral exchange rate with the U. S. dollar forced the debt 
service ratio to rise and the vicious circle we had hypothesised developed as rising debt 
service ratio forced down the effective exchange rates of the ASEAN countries in the 
following years (1986-87). 
From the graphs, the details of the movements of the effective exchange rates for each 
individual countries can be seen. Wide variations in the effective exchange rate of the 
Philippines and that of Thailand is observed. Comparing the figures between 1982 and 
1987 the currencies for the Philippines and Thailand depreciated effectively by about 
170% and 70% respectively. The debt service ratio of both countries during the period 
between 1982 and 1987 also show drastic increases. Between that period the debt 
service ratio increased by 9% in the Philippines and 10% in Thailand. Although the 
increase did not cause a problem to Thailand it did to the Philippines because it had 
already been trapped in debt problems in the early 1980s and had experienced financial 
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difficulties since then. The inverse relationship between depreciation and the debt 
service ratio in the Philippines is due to the fact that the prevailing liquidity squeeze 
deteriorated the financial situation yet earnings could not be generated via the 
depreciation that supposedly stimulated exports mainly due to the price inelasticity of 
export demand for its primary products. This forced the Philippines to devalue 
substantially in order to increase export earnings while at the same time additional debt 
inflow was resorted to as the only means of financing to ease liquidity. 
There is a one year lapse between the peak of the debt service ratio (1986) and the peak 
of the depreciation of the effective exchange rates (1987) in both countries. This means 
that there may be lagged response to the exchange rate being forced down by the debt 
service ratio. The year 1985 was a year in which the U. S. dollar was particularly strong 
in terms of other major currencies (Mathieson et. al, 1987). Having the denomination of 
their debts in U. S. dollar caused the debt service ratio to rise to its peak in 1986. 
As for the Malaysian currency, although the exchange rate fluctuates in the 1980s the 
variations are to a lesser degree than those of the two countries mentioned above. The 
Malaysian currency depreciated by about 25% between 1981 and 1983. The debt 
service ratio remained low in the early 1980s but shows an increasing trend since 1984. 
Currency fluctuations did not seem to have much impact on the debt service ratio which 
remained low between 1978 and 1984. In 1985 the currency recorded its sharpest 
appreciation since the last major appreciation in 1979. At the same time the debt service 
ratio reached its peak at 29%. A plausible explanation could be either a sharp 
appreciation in the exchange rate may be associated with a sharp reduction in the trade 
earnings that hampers the servicing of debt; or the debt service is raised due to 
exchange rate valuation changes. The current account balance does show a sharp drop 
of US$ 613 mit in that year. As opposed to most ASEAN countries where the debt 
service ratios remained at their peak after 1985 the debt service ratio of Malaysia fell by 
about 9% in 1986 as compared to 1985. This is due to the fact that the denomination of 
debt in yen currency began to rise in that period as compared to the dollar component 
when the dollar was strongest (Bank Negara Malaysia Report, 1987). 
The Indonesian currency followed a different pattern altogether from the movement of 
the currencies of the other ASEAN countries. The appreciating trend after 1980 
indirectly caused the debt service ratio to increase gradually until 1984 but sharply in 
1985 
- 
at the time when appreciation was at its highest level. The repayment of interest 
on debt had traditionally used up the trade surpluses leaving the current account 
balances to be negative since 1985. This forced the Indonesian government to devalue 
its currency in 1986-87. However, current account balances remained negative due to 
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interest payments on the existing large amount of debt accumulated. The debt service 
ratio rose to its peak in 1986 and 1987 the rise being 20% in excess of the 1980s 
figure. 
As mentioned earlier the exchange rate policy in Singapore and South Korea is 
considered as an important stable policy that contributed to the expansion of exports. 
The graphs in Figure 7.3 show distinctive trends in the effective exchange rate of the 
two NICs 
- 
an appreciation from 1980 to 1985 (with highest appreciation in 1985) 
and a depreciation in 1986-87 (highest depreciation in 1987). After September 1985 
the currencies of these economies followed the depreciating U. S. dollar. Between 
1985 and the first quarter of 1987 the Singapore dollar appreciated on average by 3%. 
In the same period the real effective exchange rate depreciated by 29% in Singapore and 
21 % in S. Korea. The debt service ratio in South Korea was stable in the period 1980- 
84 averaging 15%. In 1985 it rose to 30% which was the cause of concern for over- 
borrowing at that time. However, South Korea managed to reduce the debt service 
ratio to 24% in 1986 the reduction to a large part being a response to the effective 
depreciation of the currency. In particular the 59% depreciation of the S. Korean won 
against the Japanese yen between 1985 and April 1987 improved S. Korea's 
competitive position vis-a-vis Japan. In 1986 for the first time since 1977 South 
Korea's current account showed a surplus amounting to US $5 bn. Though the fall in 
oil prices and the decline in world market interest rates had contributed to the surplus, 
the major contribution to more than US $5 bn rise comes from exports as a result of 
the effective depreciation (Bank Negara Malaysia Report, 1988). In 1987, the debt 
service ratio remained high at almost 28%. 
The Singapore dollar had largely followed the rise in the value of U. S. dollar in 1980- 
84 and its fall in 1985-86. As in the early 1980s the basic balance and the inflationary 
pressures were both strong so that real appreciation was necessary. By 1985 the 
economy had gone into deep recession and inflation had been brought under control so 
that depreciation was sought vis-a-vis the basket. The near constancy of the exchange 
rate vis-a-vis of the U. S. dollar since 1985 led to a substantial depreciation of the 
Singapore dollar in relation to the currencies of its trading partners and competitors. 
The extent of depreciation in real terms (Balassa et. al (1987) calculated this by taking 
the average of the results obtained by using trading-partner and competitor weights and 
deflating by the wholesale and the consumer price index) was 34% between 1984 and 
the first quarter of 1987. Depreciation was 31% in real terms compared with 1981 
when the appreciation of the dollar had began. Considering that the Singapore dollar 
depreciated by 5% in terms of nominal effective exchange rates in the first half of 
1987 it would appear that the policy of following the U. S. dollar down resulted in an 
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undervalued currency for Singapore. Consequently the deficit in the balance of 
merchandise trade has declined and a surplus on the current account may remain in 
view of the reductions in the cost of labour even after the temporary favourable oil price 
factors of 1986 disappear. As for the debt service ratio, as always, remains very low 
with the highest ratio of 3.5% in 1985. In short for the two NICs the extent of the 
depreciation in real terms between 1981 and the first quarter of 1987 was largest for 
S. Korea (36%) followed by Singapore (31%). 
While more recent price data are not available calculations of nominal effective rates 
provide an indication of changes in real effective rates since price differentials amount 
to little in a short period of time. Between the first quarter of 1987 and the end of April 
1987, the extent of depreciation was 3% in S. Korea and 5% in Singapore. These 
depreciations have contributed to the development of major current account surpluses in 
S. Korea and Singapore. Real effective exchange rates fluctuated much more drastically 
in many other developing countries including Latin America. This meant periodic 
overvaluation in the exchange rate and uncertainty in economic decision making 
discouraged exports. 
Capital markets were freer in the ASEAN region than in Latin America. Interest rates 
remained positive in real terms though not prohibitively high generally avoiding low- 
return investments. Incentives provided for domestic savings also discouraged capital 
outflows which were further limited by some exchange controls. In contrast apart from 
their effects on domestic savings and investments artificially low interest rates 
reinforced the effect of overvalued exchange rates in contributing to the outflow of 
capital from several Latin American countries. 
In conclusion, consistent with the study by Eichengreen et. al, some linkage between 
debt service and effective exchange rate ratios do exist in the analysis for the ASEAN 
countries. Two major effects as hypothesised are: (1) the appreciation of exchange 
rates has an indirect effect in causing the debt service to rise, i. e. the appreciation 
causes loss of competitiveness in exports hence reducing exports earnings which 
further reduces ability to service debt. Devaluation on the other hand raises the export 
earnings and lowers the debt service ratio. However, the case of the Philippines is an 
exception - since debt had already become unmanageable in the early 1980s it had 
resorted to default and depreciate simultaneously; and (2) high debt service ratios 
force down effective exchange rates. The next section provides empirical evidence to 
support point (1) in the ASEAN region. 
? 
_S_ Estimating the Effects of Exchange Rate Changes 
7.16 
It is important to estimate the effect of the exchange rate on the trade balances of the 
ASEAN countries because the exchange rate policy may be one of the policies (besides 
the balance of payments policy) responsible for the ASEAN countries to service their 
debts. The substantial depreciation of the exchange rates of Singapore and S. Korea for 
example led to surpluses in their current account. Since debt has to be repaid out of the 
current/trade account surpluses and the exchange rate does play a role in the 
development of the surpluses, an analysis of the effects of the exchange rate is 
important. 
Estimating the effects of changes in an exchange rate on the trade balance requires 
information on the response of imports and exports to these changes. For the ASEAN 
countries it can be assumed that the prices of their imports are set on the world market. 
However, many of these countries may influence the prices of their exports. Since the 
ASEAN countries are not able to influence the prices of the goods they import the 
responsiveness of these imports to changes in the exchange rate will be determined by 
the domestic price elasticity of import demand. Whereas in the case of exports both the 
domestic price elasticity of export supply and the foreign price elasticity of export 
demand will be relevant. 
Among the countries concerned estimates of the price elasticity of import demand are 
available for S. Korea. The elasticity was estimated by Yoo (1984) as noted in 
Balassa et. al (1987) to be 0.50 for 1966-80 while an alternative estimate for 1966-84 
is 0.67 by Corbo and Nam (1987), also as noted in Balassa et. al. 
We use a single equation in the import demand function because it gives 
satisfactory estimates according to Goldstein and Khan (1987), incorporating the 
variables representing foreign demand (the real GDP of the industrialized countries) and 
the competitive position of a country's exports (the ratio of unit labour costs in Korea, 
for example, to that in the other ASEAN countries) is used. But the single equation 
estimation is not appropriate in the present case since the results are affected not only by 
changes in foreign demand but also by domestic supply. Rather, simultaneous equation 
estimation is necessary for indicating changes in the prices and the volume of exports in 
response to changes in the exchange rate. 
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7.5.1 Estimating the Import Demand Function 
The income elasticity of demand for imports, estimated out of an import demand 
function will enable us to obtain the elasticity value for the purpose of determining the 
elasticity of foreign exchange supply. The income elasticity of demand for import 
measures the proportional change in demand for imports with respect to a proportional 
change in the country's income. The income elasticity of demand for export measures 
the proportional change in the demand for a country's exports with respect to a 
proportional change in other countries' income. It is also important to state here that if 
a country's income elasticity of demand for imports is less than the income elasticity of 
demand for its exports, it is possible, other things remained the same, for a country to 
grow at a faster rate without imports growing faster than exports, and the balance of 
payments deteriorating. If however, a country's import elasticity is higher than its 
exports elasticity, it cannot grow at a faster rate without the balance of payments 
deteriorating unless relative price effects are favourable. 
This section attempts to estimate the import demand function for the ASEAN countries 
under the framework of imperfect substitutes suggested by Goldstein and Khan (1987). 
The key underlying assumptions for the imperfect substitutes model is; neither imports 
nor exports are perfect substitutes for domestic goods. If foreign and domestic goods 
are perfect substitutes, the followings are observed: a) production will be at constant or 
decreasing cost, hence, either the domestic or the foreign goods occupy the whole 
market; or b) each country will either be an importer or exporter of traded goods but 
not both. The co-existence of imports and domestic output and the existence of two- 
way trade causes the perfect substitutes framework to be rejected. Furthermore, there 
are price differences for the same product in different countries, as well as price 
differences between domestic and export prices of a given product in the same country. 
The 'law of one price' does not hold either across or within countries. According to the 
conventional demand theory, a consumer will maximize his utility subject to a budget 
constraint. The resulting demand function for imports thus represents the quantity 
demanded as a function of the level of income in the importing region, the imported 
good's own price and the price of domestic substitutes. In the simple model, only 
current income matters for import demand, and no distinction is made between secular 
or cyclical income movements. Assuming that the supply price elasticities for imports 
are infinite permits satisfactory estimation of the import demand equation by the single 
equation method, since the prices of imports can then be viewed as exogenous 
(Goldstein and Khan (1987)). The multiplicative import and export demand function, 
transformed to its logarithmic form are shown below : 
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LogM = 71 + 77, LogP + 172 logY 
where, 
M= the quantity of imports 
P= the price of imports relative to the price 
of domestic goods measured in common currency 
Y= real income 
(7.4) 
Therefore, 771 and 112 in equation (7.4) measures the price and income elasticities of 
demand for imports respectively. Domestic prices will be measured by the wholesale 
price indices and consumer price indices. 
The estimated results for the import demand function are shown in Table 7.2. The 
table presents the period covered, the two types of domestic prices - wholesale and 
consumer prices, the income and price elasticities and the test results. The estimated 
income elasticity is significant at the 1% level of confidence for all countries and in all 
cases, have positive signs which is consistent with theory. The estimated income 
elasticities fall in the range of 1.07 to 1.35 in Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea. In 
the absence of secular increase in the relative prices of imports, this implies the share 
of imports to GNP is expected to rise over time. An income elasticity of demand for 
imports in excess of unity implies an increasing penetration of imports into the domestic 
market. This is a typical situation in the three countries just mentioned. As a 
comparison, the income elasticities of demand for a representative industrial country fall 
in the range of 1 to 2 on both import and export sides (Goldstein and Khan, 1987). The 
income elasticity of demand for the Philippines and Thailand are relatively low 
(approximately 0.15 and 0.90 respectively). 
The estimated relative price elasticity i7l is significant at the 1% level of confidence for 
the Philippines and Thailand, and significant at the 10 % level of confidence in South 
Korea. As for the results for Malaysia and Singapore, the relative price elasticities 
have perverse signs (and is not significant at the 10 % level of confidence for 
Singapore). The relatively low but significant price elasticities ranging from 
-0.03 to 
-0.48 in the 
Philippines and Thailand show relative prices do play a role in the demand 
for total imports. The relative price elasticities for industrial countries lie in the range of 
-0.5 to -1.0 
(Goldstein and Khan, (1987)). 
Table 7.2: Estimates for Import Demand Equations 
-Countries Price Constant E as tici Test Results 
Type Income Price R2 Ad' R2 DW F-stat 
-Malaysia WP 
-10.11 1.35*** 0.26* 0.98 0.98 1.64 173.8- (1970- (0.06) (0.13) 
1987) 
CP 
-8.71 1.22*** 0.44* 0.98 0.97 1.75 195.9 (0.07) (0.18) 
WP 0.39 0.74"* 
-0.35*** 0.93 0.91 1.84 60.3 
Philippines (0.07) (0.17) 
1968-87) 
CP 
-0.18 0.85*** 
-0.33*** 
0.94 0.93 1.86 74.1 
(0.09) (0.11) 
WP 0.34 
0.76*" (0.07) -0.19*** (0.246) 0.93 0.91 1.91 50.8 1970-87) 
CP 
-0.15 . 
84 ( * * 0.93 0.92 1.93 62.1 0 08) (0.15) 
Singapore WP 
-6.30 1.07*** 0.06 0.98 0.98 1.21 226.5 (1971-87) (0.058) (0.12) 
CP 
-6.40 1.08*** 0.50 0.98 0.98 1.49 242.0 (0.11) (0.10) 
Thailand 
-2.01 0.98*** -0.49*** 0.96 0.9 1.28 198.2 (1965-87) (0.06) (0.19) 
CP 
-1.66 0.94*** -0.23* 0.95 0.94 1.28 156.9 (0.06) (0.16) 
(1970-87) WP 
-1.415 0.89*** -0.21 0.92 0.90 1.77 70.3 (0.09) (0.25) 
CP 
-1.08 0.86*** -0.04 0.91 0.89 1.92 66.8 (0.08) (0.17) 
S. Korea WP 
-8.99 1.28"' -0.15* 0.99 0.99 1.19 426.1 (1968-87) (0.09) (0.13) 
CP 
-9.29 1.31 -0.11 0.99 0.99 1.08 414.8 (0.08) (0.12) 
(1970-87) WP 
-8.85 1.18*** -0.06 0.99 0.98 1.40 212.0 (0.27) (0.16) 
Note: 
*** significant at the I% level of confidence 
** significant at the 5% level of confidence 
* significant at the 10% level of confidence 
Cp & WP are consumer and wholesale prices indeces 
i S2 Estimating the Export Demand and Supply Functions 
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In our estimates of the export supply and export demand function we use the 
simultaneous equation developed by Goldstein and Khan (1987) for industrialized 
countries. Two models of export demand and supply as in equation (7.5) and (7.6) 
below are estimated simultaneously so as to eliminate any bias arising from a two-way 
relationship between export quantities and export prices. In an equilibrium condition the 
world demand for an individual country's exports is specified in log-linear form: 
LogX 
= a, + a2Log( 
pw) 
+ a3LogYý' (7.5) 
x 
where, 
X= quantity of exports demanded 
PX = price of exports 
PX = weighted average of the export prices of the country's trading partners 
YW = weighted average of the real incomes of the country's trading 
partners. 
Since equation (7.5) is specified in logarithms a, and a2 are the (relative) price 
and real income elasticities of export demand respectively. It is expected that a2 will 
be negative and a3 positive. 
The supply of exports is specified as a log-linear function of the relative price of 
exports (i. e. the ratio of export prices to domestic prices) and of an index of the 
productive capacity of the country: 
LogX =A +Q2Log( 
pX) 
+ß3Y (7.6) 
where, 
X= quantity of exports supplied 
pX = price of exports 
P= domestic price index 
y= logarithm of an index of domestic capacity 
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Equation (7.6) embodies the hypothesis that as the price of exports rises relative to 
domestic prices, production for export becomes more profitable and, hence, exporters 
will supply more. In addition, exports are posited to rise, ceteris paribus, when there 
is an increase in the country's capacity to produce. We therefore expect the results to 
show both ß, and $2 to be positive. The equation can be normalized for the price of 
exports Px to yield: 
where, 
LogPx = ß4 +ß5L°gX +ß6Y+ß7LogP (7.6a) 
ß4 
p2 'ß5 ý2 'ß6 -/ 
J2 
'N7 = 
02 
02 
Since ß2, /i3 Z 0, we expect that #5 >_ 0; ß6 <_ 0; /37 >_ 0.. 
The parameter (/35) which is the price elasticity of the supply of exports can be 
obtained from (7.6a) by calculating (/32 )-' 
. 
As f2 tends to zero ß5 will tend to infinity. The estimated results by Goldstein and 
Khan (1987) for the industrialized countries, Greece and Korea by Balassa et. al 
(1986), and for Hong Kong by Reidel (1986) as noted in Balassa, are shown in 
Table 7.3. Our estimates of the domestic price elasticity of export supply, foreign 
price elasticity of export demand, as well as the elasticity of supply of foreign 
exchange for the ASEAN countries are shown in Table 7.4. 
The estimated parameters of the domestic price elasticity of export supply and the 
foreign price elasticity of export demand are then combined to derive the elasticity of 
supply of foreign exchange. The elasticity of supply of foreign exchange (E) 
representing the percentage change in export value associated with a1% change in the 
exchange rate depends on the domestic elasticity of export supply (/35) and the 
foreign elasticity of export demand (a2) according to the formula (Balassa and 
Williamson, 1987): 
E_ß5(a2-1) 
(ß5 + a2 ) 
(7.7) 
Domestic export supply elasticities in the industrialized countries range from 1.1 to 6.6. 
The estimates by Balassa et. al (1987) are between 1.8 and 2.3 for Greece and Korea 
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and 5 for Hong Kong. The Korean estimates show changes in export supply in 
response to changes in the exchange rate which is the concern of the present study. All 
other estimates concern the effects of changes in domestic export prices relative to the 
prices of non-export goods reflecting changes in the dollar prices of exports in the 
domestic prices of non-export goods as well as in exchange rates the effects of which 
are far from uniform. Foreign price elasticities of export demand (a2) range from -0.8 
to 
-3.3 for the industrialized countries except for a perverse estimate of +2.5 for Japan. 
The corresponding estimates are -1.0 to -1.1 for Greece and Korea. 
Table 7.3: Elasticity Estimates for Total exports 
Industrial Countries Period of study ßs a2 
Belgium 1955-70 +1.2 
-1.6 
France 1955-70 +1.9 
- -1.3 
German 1955-70 +4.6 
-0.8 
Italy 1955-70 +1.1 
-3.3 
Japan 1955-70 +2.9 +2.5 
Netherlands 1955-70 +2.5 
-2.7 
United Kingdom 1955-70 +1.5 
-1.3 
United States 1955-70 +6.6 
-2.3 
Developing Countries 
Greece 1960-78 +2.1 
-1.0 
Greece 1960-78 +1.8 
-3.4 
Hong Kong 1972-84 +5.0 infinite 
Korea 1965-78 l. 9 to +2.5 1.0 to 
-1.1 
Source: Balassa and Williamson (1987). Industrial Countries estimated by Goldstein and 
Khan (1987), Greece and Korea by Balassa et. al (1986a), Hong Kong by Reidel (1986). 
The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level except those for Japan 
which are significant at 10 % level. a. manufactured exports. 
From Table 7.4, the domestic price elasticity of export supply (ß5) ranges from 
+1.27 to +3.98. The estimated coefficient of (a2) in the export demand function is 
positive and significantly different from zero in all countries implying a positively 
sloped supply function for exports. 
Table 7.4: Elasticity Estimates for Total Exports for the ASEAN Countries 
Countries 
(1) 
Sample years 
(2) 
Elasticities for Total Export Demand 
(3) (4) (5) 
(a2) R2 DW 
Singapore 1970-88 
-1.44 0.99 2.47 
Malaysia 1968-87 
-0.753 0.93 2.01 
South Korea 1968-87 
-2.862 0.95 1.08 
Thailand 1968-87 
-0.636 0.99 1.75 
Indonesia 1970-87 
-8.03 0.99 2.39 
Countries Elasticities for export supply 
(6) (7) (8) 
(/3) R2 DW 
(Q5) 
(9) 
(E) 
(10) 
(171 ) 
(11) 
Singapore 0.37 0.99 2.24 2.70 
-3.717 1.07 
Malaysia 0.33 0.99 1.74 3.06 
-2.325 1.34 
S. Korea 0.25 0.98 1.00 3.98 
-13.740 1.18 
Thailand 0.79 0.99 2.15 1.27 
-3.269 0.89 
donesia 0.31 0.99 2.77 3.24 +6.09 
- 
Note: a2 = price elasticity for export demand 
ß5 
= price elasticity for export supply 
E= elasticity of foreign exchange 
r7l = price elasticity of import demand 
R2 and DW are the tests for the regression equations. 
Note: The results are significant at the 10% level of confidence. 
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As expected our estimated price elasticities of export demand for the ASEAN countries 
have negative signs and are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of 
confidence in most countries in the sample. Singapore and South Korea have estimated 
price elasticities greater than unity which implies a fairly large response of exports to 
changes in relative prices. This points to the important role of relative prices in 
determining the world demand for these countries exports. Strangely the price elasticity 
for export demand for Indonesia is 
-8 which is even higher than in the industrialized 
countries. This may be driven by the responsiveness of oil prices to world demand 
because oil is the major export. As for Malaysia and Thailand relative prices do not play 
much role due to the larger proportion of primary exports in the years understudy. 
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Column (10) in Table 7.4 shows the elasticity of supply of foreign exchange which 
ranges from 
-2.3 to -13.7 except for a perverse estimate for Indonesia (+6) (similar to 
the case of Japan in the study by Balassa). It can be deduced that the effect of aI% 
change in the exchange rate has the greatest impact on the export value of S. Korea. AI 
% appreciation will reduce the export value by 13.74 %. This is consistent with 
Dornbusch's (1987) argument that the effectiveness of devaluation depends on the size 
of a country's exports of manufactures. The larger the size the more effective is 
devaluation in developing countries. 
Between 1984 and April 1987 the won depreciated by 5% against the dollar, by 79% 
against the yen, by 64% against the Deutschmark, by 51 % against the French franc, 
and by 25% against the pound sterling. As mentioned earlier the depreciation 
contributed to the surplus in 1987 of US$ 5 bn. To effect a shift from US$ 5 bn to 6 bn 
of the current account in 1987 Balassa et. al (1987) estimated the magnitude of change 
of the exchange rate should be a 10% to 15% appreciation in real effective terms 
(Balassa and Williamson, 1987). The resulting change is said to undo less than one half 
of the 36% depreciation in real effective terms which occurred between 1981 and 1987. 
Our study shows a more optimistic figure for South Korea for the 1990s. If a I% 
change in the exchange rate can bring about a change of 13.7% in the value of exports 
the won then needs to appreciate by only 1% in the first quarter of the 1990s to 
maintain the current account surplus at US$ 5 bn. The more optimistic figure obtained 
is due to the more recent sample taken when S. Korea had already become an NIC 
(sample years from 1970 to 1986 
- 
whereas the study by Balassa et. al uses the sample 
years 1965 to 1978. It is also expected that the equilibrium exchange rate may have 
appreciated over time. The appreciation however has to be accompanied by reductions 
in import protection and export incentives. 
In 1986 Balassa et. al suggested that an appropriate objective for Singapore might be a 
zero basic balance which corresponds to a current account deficit of perhaps 1 billion 
dollars or at most a balanced current account. To attain this target the appreciation of the 
Singapore dollar should be in the order of 10% to 15% in real effective terms (Balassa 
and Williamson, 1987). Such an appreciation would undo nearly one-half the 
depreciation of the Singapore currency in real terms calculated by deflating price 
indices since 1981. In 1989, for example, Singapore had a current account surplus of 
2.3 billion, still our study confirms that the amount of appreciation suggested is what 
is required. A 10% to 12% appreciation will result in a reduction of US$ 0.8 bn in its 
1989 current account and an increase of US$ 0.5 bn in its imports since the price 
elasticity of import demand obtained is 1.07. A larger appreciation is not recommended 
because the rise in labour costs relative to prices has only been partially undone through 
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the recent cuts in labour charges. Table 7.5 in the Appendix shows an excerpt of the 
current account and trade position of the ASEAN countries. Singapore's flexible 
exchange rate arrangements made it feasible to adjust the exchange rate gradually. 
Forward premium in the exchange rate persist as evidenced by its low interest rate 
which is below foreign interest rates. 
A devaluation of the Thai currency might be an appropriate objective in the early 1990s 
considering that it has a current account deficit of about US$ 2.5 bn in 1989. Our 
estimate shows a devaluation of 1% of exchange rate could increase the export value by 
3.27 %. This means that a 10 % to 12 % devaluation of the exchange rate could raise 
about 1 bn of the current account balance or eliminating the current account deficit by 
I bn in 1989. 
As for Malaysia having experienced a current account deficit of US$ 0.18 bn in 1989 it 
should also adopt the policy of depreciating its currency. Since 1987 there has large net 
outflows as both public and private sectors made substantial repayments and 
prepayments of their foreign debts. New foreign borrowing has however declined. 
The governments policy since 1988 has been to continue reducing the external debts in 
favour of inflows of equity capital through direct foreign investment. Malaysia's debt is 
particularly expensive since it is denominated in currencies which have appreciated 
relative to the ringgit. Between 1986-89 the ringgit depreciated by 10% against the 
U. S. dollar, 55% against the yen, 50% against the Deutschmark, and 20% against the 
Singapore dollar. Low domestic interest rates are also encouraging the ringgit to slide 
and helping the ringgit to raise export earnings. Our analysis shows a positive 1% 
change in the exchange rate will cause a negative 2.33 % change in the exports value. 
This means a 10 % depreciation of the currency could at least increase the current 
account balance by US$ 0.04 bn or reduces the deficit by this amount. Since Malaysia 
has a substantial amount of debt to be repaid it should at least aim at zero current 
account balance in the 1990s. This requires a gradual devaluation of her currency by 
about 25% in the earlier part of the decade. 
In Indonesia the sale of fuel oils is almost offset by subsidies of fuel oil sales in the 
domestic market. It has nevertheless used less foreign aid than had been budgeted. The 
increased availability of domestically mobilised funds limits the growth of external 
indebtedness and helps to control inflationary pressures by restricting liquidity at a time 
of rapidly rising demand. More recent nominal depreciations offsets the high domestic 
inflation rates relative to its trading partners (GATT Policy Review, 1991: Indonesia). 
The real effective exchange rate has remain stable since early 1987. The government 
aims at decreasing the overall volume of foreign borrowings which implies a sharper 
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decline in terms of foreign exchange owing to the on-going steady depreciation of the 
rupiah. Real depreciation has a greater impact on Indonesia's non-fuel merchandise 
trade balance. Indonesia's ability to avoid the debt crisis is due to a large degree on its 
effective management of exchange rate policy (GATT Policy Review, 1991: 
Indonesia). 
7.6. Conclusion y 
The imbalance in financial performance among the ASEAN countries will not benefit 
the region as a whole in the future. Some of the countries focus their exchange rate too 
much on the U. S. dollar. Pegging it to a basket of currencies consisting of their most 
important trading partners would be more beneficial. Apart from appreciating their 
currencies to eliminate part of their surpluses, South Korea and Singapore should also 
liberalize imports especially imports of primary goods from the other ASEAN 
countries. Through this they could at least help encourage exports especially from the 
Philippines since depreciation of the pesos appears to have no effect on increasing 
exports earnings. For the NICs to maximize the chance of being able to accompany the 
appreciation with stimulative fiscal and monetary policies that might limit a recession, 
appreciation should be effected gradually. This will require the maintenance of inward 
capital controls in the form of debt for sometimes, but outward controls should be 
relaxed and directed to the other ASEAN countries. As for Malaysia and Thailand who 
are moving towards the export of more manufactures, it is appropriate for them to 
devalue gradually when the need arise to encourage exports. At the same time they 
should also limit inward capital inflows in the form of debt creating flows as well as 
limit the outward capital flows. The Philippines and Indonesia should enforce an 
outward capital control at once, reduce imports and attract more non-debt creating 
flows. With the above suggestions, the developing ASEAN countries may be able to 
have a timely and sustainable debt service. 
The study shows that changes in exchange rates do have an impact on ASEAN export 
earnings and debt service. Pertaining to relative price movements, a depreciation is 
expected to lead to a less-than-proportionate rise in export prices measured in the home 
currency, which means a fall in the foreign currency price but a rise in the volume of 
exports. The price of imports in domestic currency terms will rise leading to a lower 
import volumes, consequently leading to an increase in real net exports. The volume 
responses should be large enough to outweigh the negative terms of trade shift that 
arises due to export price rising less than import prices, hence, the trade balance 
improves. In general, this will happen in ASEAN since, Table 7.4 shows the sum of 
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the price elasticities, (a2 +/32), is greater than one, hence, the so-called simple 
Marshall Lerner condition which is infinity is not fulfilled. This is possibly due 
to the powerfull role of domestic price of exports relative to world price of 
exports in determining the quantity of exports demanded by the rest of the 
world. The terms of trade shifts more rapidly than the volume adjustment, the trade 
balance tend to deteriorate in the short-run before improving 
- 
the so-called J-curve. 
Where a country has little influence over it terms of trade the main channel through 
which exchange rates affect the economy is the ratio of traded goods prices to non- 
traded goods. 
Another issue of concern is that the currency denomination of debt has to be a function 
of the market in which borrowing is done. Thus, diversification among sources of 
borrowing would be a prudent policy. The share to be borrowed in each market should 
be roughly the same as the share of the specific foreign currency in the merchandise 
trade balance of the country. As a result fluctuations in debt service costs would be 
approximately offset by fluctuations in net earnings from foreign trade in goods. The 
same policy can be followed with respect to reserve holdings which should be co- 
ordinated with debt service and merchandise trade to hedge against the impacts of shifts 
in exchange rates. Implicitly the diversification rule is "borrow from countries to which 
you export and lend to countries from which you import". This reverses the typical 
practice of trade finance but then much of the ASEAN trade is financed in foreign 
centres. 
Unlike the Latin American countries, heavily indebted South Korea and the not-so- 
heavily indebted countries of Indonesia and Malaysia choose to sacrifice exchange rates 
to honour their debt. This practice is pragmatic since default leads to future exclusion 
from the credit market. Nevertheless, it is only possible to depreciate since in general 
depreciation does stimulate exports in the ASEAN region. In summary, in general, the 
management of exchange rate seems to have remove one uncertainty in resource 
allocation while allowing gradual liberalising of trade in ASEAN. 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
8.1 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
On the broader perspective, three most important debt aspects can be drawn 
from the thesis. Most importantly, the thesis shows that debt is an increasingly 
important means of financing economic development in the developing countries, 
at least up to a certain stage. In the course of financing economic 
development, debt can contribute towards the growth of output or debt can 
cause serious problems. The degree of debt problems varies from short-run 
illiquidity to long-run solvency. It calls for policy makers to identify 
systematically the sources (cost) and usage (rates of return) of debt since the 
fundamental condition for debt to bring in benefits is for the rates of return to 
be at least equal the costs, if not greater. In our macromodel, the cost of debt 
is shown by the coefficients on the interest rates factors while the benefits of 
debt is shown by coefficients on the growth of output. By rule of thumb, if the 
coefficient of growth of output is significantly different from zero and larger 
than the coefficient for interest rates, debt should bring in benefits. In the 
microeconomics perspective, the cost of debt (according to sources) is 
matched with the discounted net present value of future streams of rates of 
return on its usage on different types of debt-financed projects. 
In the ASEAN region, development was rapid in the 1980s and in association 
with development, debt mounted, especially when foreign direct investment was 
at a lower level relative to the amount needed for rigorous economic 
development. In the late 1980s, both debt and foreign direct investment 
increased 
- 
financing the even rapid growth of income (GNP) and deficits 
enlarged further. When a develoing country reaches a higher stage of development 
or when the growth of income is relatively high, there is a tendency for 
deficits to fall and the usage of debt decreases or a country can even become a 
net capital exporter (as in the case of South Korea). All qualitative evidences 
including the micro/real side factors as well as macro-policy issues, show that 
the ASEAN region's debt problem in the 1980s was that of a short-run 
illiquidity. The micro or real side factors include a wider export-base in 
tradables undertaken by the active role of private sector in the region, lower 
debt burden as evidenced by indicators of debt burden as shown in chapter 2, etc., 
hence, implying that rates of return on debt-financed projects is at least equals 
its cost, if not greater, or simply debt usage is profitable. Assessment of 
debt-financed investment projects constitute a thesis in itself, and further research 
in this micro-economics aspect of debt should be undertaken by researches to 
further investigate profitability issues. The macreconomic policy issues has been 
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dealt with in this thesis by the macro-model in chapter 5. Due to the nature 
of debt problem in the ASEAN is that of short-term illiquidity, observers view 
ASEAN as a profitable region for investment, possibly explaining why when 
debt mounted, foreign direct investment also increased. 
In the Malaysian data (representative of ASEAN countries), it is found that the 
private sector correlates strongly and positively with the external sector, 
whereas, the government sector has a weaker negative correlation with the 
external sector. This findings draws three fundamental points. Privatisation is 
an important form of structural adjustment in the region with the private sector's 
role becoming increasingly important in economic development in the ASEAN 
countries. Thus, project financing enables the cost of debt and the rate of return 
to be quantified. Secondly, by following a broadly balanced budget policy in 
recent years, the government releases domestic resources for use by the private 
sector. In many cases, privatisation of government projects seem more efficient 
and cost-effective, as in the case of privatisation in Malaysia. However, the 
release of resources are not enough to meet the demand by the private sector, 
thus the gap between private investment and savings need be filled with debt 
inflows. This shows that foreign exchange in the economy is inadequate, tax 
income are in domestic currency and frequently, may not matched the value of 
debt repayments. Hence, the importance of foreign exchange earnings. Thirdly, 
the existence of the strong correlation between the private and the external sector 
serves to show that the twin deficits need not necessarily be between the 
government and the external sector as claimed by the traditional twin deficits 
theory and empirical studies in the case with the U. S. 
While the ASEAN case shows that there have not been serious debt problems, 
the Latin American countries have experienced debt crisis in that massive 
reschedulings have occurred. This demonstrates the 'ill' aspect of debt, 
possibly 'wrongly' used and sourced. On the usage side, it is well 
demonstrated that debt mounted, deficits enlarged and growth of output have 
been negative. The consequence is rescheduling. On the source aspect, it is 
also well demonstrated that debt has been of floating interest rates and banks 
have been lending aggressively, with concentration on a few selected countries. 
On the specific perspective of the thesis, our model of debt and twin deficits 
addresses the three macro-issues stated in Chapter 4 section 4.1. The model is 
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timely for ASEAN given the continuous accumulation of debt and the inflow of 
foreign direct investments becoming uncertain at present (i. e. increasing at a 
lesser rate or in some cases stagnating), indicating that foreign direct 
investment tends to flow towards areas where the cost of labour are relatively 
cheaper such as in China and Vietnam. A more rigorous intra-ASEAN trade 
may enable ASEAN to reap the benefits of having different comparative 
advantage in each country, for example, the abundant labour and the raw 
materials that they provide. Surpluses ASEAN countries may also invest in 
the lower income countries such as the Philippines, to facilitate Philippine's 
recovery at the same time benefitting from its abundant labour. In the light of 
the above discussions, the contributions of the model are thus in line with the three 
areas mentioned. Firstly, the model contributes towards linking indebtedness and 
the twin deficits. Increased deficits is associated with increased indebtedness. 
Secondly, it contributes towards identifying the details of the internal policy 
variables that have effects on the twin deficits and increased indebtedness. The 
policy variables are numerous and it calls for policy makers to focus on these 
variables to identify exactly which variable contributes the most towards debt and 
deficits so that any policy action taken is most effective and efficient, and 
targeted towards solving the problem. Major policy areas identified involve tax 
policies (rates, revenues, elasticities, etc), financial policies (interest rates, 
investments, savings, debt, etc. ) and trade policies (import and export policies, 
exchange rates, etc. ). While the two aspects above constitute demand-side 
management, the final contribution deals with the supply-side management. The 
final contribution involves identifying the link between debt, twin deficits and the 
growth of output. A distributed lag of past outputs adjusts to last period 
investment (together with an initial endowment) gives output this period, which is 
also a determinant of deficits. In the new twin deficits model which also 
constitutes an aggregate demand and supply management, prices (domestic prices, 
relative export price to world export price, relative world import price to domestic 
price, exchange rate and interest rate) and output adjust to restore equilibrium in 
both the internal sector (AS=AD) and between the internal and the external sectors 
((M-X)=(G-T)+(I-S)). With these adjustments, they serve to show that exchange 
rates and interest rates alone do not fully adjust to equilibrate the external and 
the internal sectors as implied by the conventional twin deficits notion. Our 
model thus makes a contribution in this respect. Referring to equations (5.2') to 
(5.7'), exchange rates adjust only partially in the tax, export and import equations; 
it does not play a role in the other equations. Even in the import and export 
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equations, it only adjust partially and not fully because of the presence of 
subsidies and taxes in both the prices of imports and prices of exports. Thus, the 
conventional twin deficits outlined by Gordon or as in the Mundell-Fleming 
framework is rather oversimplistic and ad hoc. Further, output adjustments as 
denoted in equation (5.11) ensures a long-run equilibrium. However, to ensure 
a long-run dynamic model, the change in output resulting from a change in 
capital and a change in labour was further considered in section 5.5. Lc). 
While we are concerned with internal policy issues our model also has in-built 
transmission mechanisms for external shocks via exchange rates, the prices of 
exports and imports, and interest rates. External shocks that give rise to debt 
accumulation and debt problems like oil-price shocks, interest rate or exchange 
rate shocks, and terms of trade movements (as had been discussed in Chapter 1) 
can be accounted for in the model. By focussing on adjustments of these 
variables, policy-makers can insulate the economy against external shocks. 
The significance of the common variables appearing together in the three systems 
of equations (as in Table 5.2 chapter 5) is that they cause co-movements among 
the sectors, hence are targets for necessary adjustments as discussed above. 
The behavioural interdependence among sectors, as demonstrated by equation 
5.16 on page 5.35, makes it possible for policy targets be aimed at either one of 
the parameters stated to be increased or reduced to generate the desired balance 
on any of the sectors. 
As had been noted, the stage of development that a country is in seems to have 
connection with the type of financing that a country is engaged in. The case 
of South Korea demonstrates the higher the stage of development the lower is 
the usage of debt creating flows at the same time deficits eased. Further, 
when the external balance turns into a surplus, it permits a country to become a 
capital exporter rather than a capital importer. When a country becomes a 
capital exporter, earnings from profits repartriation (from investment) constitute 
an important source of foreign exchange. Also, the higher is the stage of 
development, the more a country contracts debt from the international financial 
markets rather than from official sources due to perceived creditworthiness by 
creditors and perceived efficiency and competitiveness of loans by debtors. 
High growth of output (income) generates higher tax revenues and taxes as a 
form of financing naturally become important contribution. When a country has 
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a high growth of income, it is automatically categorise as a creditworthy 
customer, debt creating inflows may be more competitive in terms of cost for 
lenders compete to invest. Investment inflows will also increased as had been 
the case in ASEAN. The effects of debt versus foreign direct investments 
versus tax can be detected according to our new twin deficits model by 
looking at their specific coefficients. The effects of permanent income and 
cyclical income on the importance of tax versus debt versus foreign direct 
investment can also be detected by the model. The effects of debt for tax 
substitution or the Ricardian Equivalence effects is applicable in the 
government equation on government debt and taxes. 
Other specific areas of contribution of the thesis are such as the logit study in 
Chapter 6 and the foreign exchange elasticity in chapter 7. The logit 
framework identifies debtors' difficulties in servicing debt, i. e. debtors' foreign 
exchange scarcity lead to demand for rescheduling. Secondly, macroeconomic 
variables together with financial variables (as opposed to taking either one of 
them) are important determinants of debt rescheduling signifying the importance 
of macro and micro policy areas in debt management. Thirdly, the study 
contributes towards capturing the effects of the heterogeneity of regional debt 
experiences that are shown by different determinants being significant in different 
regions. Fourthly, the elasticity effects facilitate policy decisions as to identify 
which determinants contribute the most in determining debt servicing difficulties 
thus, providing guidelines as to which variables should be focussed upon to deter 
rescheduling. The error management, i. e., by estimating the Type I and Type II 
errors, enables debtors and creditors to predictive crditworthiness, hence, 
enabling them to detemine whether credits are obtainable by debtors or can be 
given by creditors at a certain critical probability threshold. 
Further, some other characteristics of debt and debt problems are shown to differ 
among regions. In Latin America, debt problems reached their limit and they arose 
because of excessive borrowings after the second oil shock. The low-income 
countries of Africa have debt problems because of very low export earnings although 
the bulk of the debt contracted is official and concessional in nature. Debt in the 
ASEAN region has high yen components as of mid 1980s. At least different 
behavioural patterns among different regions are detected. 
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The final specific conclusion that can be drawn from the thesis is the elasticity 
of foreign exchange discussed in Chapter 7 which shows the percentage 
change in export earnings associated with a percentage change in the exchange 
rate, thus demonstrating the role of the exchange rate in influencing earnings. It 
is found that devaluation/appreciation of the currency does have quite 
significant effects on foreign exchange earnings. Exchange rate management is 
shown to be important in controlling the debt service ratio 
- 
that is, an 
appreciating exchange rate, ceteris paribus, is associated with a rising debt service 
ratio which in turn may force down the effective exchange rate. Income proves 
to play a more significant role in determining the volumes of exports and 
imports than prices in the ASEAN countries. 
To conclude, the thesis contributes to both the area of international finance and 
of development economics. Broadly, an improvement in the external account 
balance requires improvements in both the public and private sectors' 
financial position. Budget deficits do not necessarily cause external deficits in 
the sense budget deficits can be financed by seigniorage and domestic 
borrowings. However, when domestic capital markets are thin limiting domestic 
borrowing, there is more likely to be a close link. Both government and private 
sectors will borrow externally. A large proportion of external debts are 
sovereign debts possibly due to non-solvency condition of a country as opposed 
to a firm. 
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CLINE (1984) [1968-1982)* 
VARIABLES ; A ; B (C) (D) E 
Debt service ratio 
Reserves to imports 
Inflationary erosion of debt 
Amortization 
. . . . . 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. Current Account deficit/exports 
Savings rate 
Growth of output 
GDP 
Global borrowing 
Net debt to export 
Export growth 
No of observations ; 640 ; 640 670 670 ; 574 
Rescheduling cases 22 22 22 22 20 
Chi-squared 772 762 ; 812 795 700 
Error (percentage) 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; Type 1 9.1 ; 18.6 ; 9.1 ; 13.6 ; 10.0 
Type II 13.6 14.6 13.0 16.1 + 12.5 
* Period of Study 
- 
not included 
- 
included but not significant 
Feder and Just (1977) [1965-1972) 
VARIABLES ;A (B) (C) D 
Debt service ratio 
Imports/reserves 
Amortization/Debt 
Income/capita 
Capital inflow/debt service ; 
GDP growth 
Export growth 
No of observations 238 238 238 238 
Rescheduling cases 21 21 21 21 
Likelihood ratio index 0.9222 0.9217 0.9086 ; 0.9019 
Likelihood ratio statistics 304.26 304.09 299.79 279.56 
Type I error 13 
LType II error (%) +56 
Lloyd-Ellis, Mckenzie and Thomas (1987) 
ANNUAL DATA [1977-1981] 
Variables LOGIT Heckman FIML 
EXP 
TLA 
ST 
AT 
RESQUOT ; 
R2 ý 0.426 ; 0.426 0.426 
LLFI ý 
-19.82 -19.50 
ST 
- 
MILLS RATIO 
-ý- 
SIGMA 
--; 
" RHO I-I- 
R2 
- 
0.507 ; 0.670 
LLF2 
-13.495 ;- 
LLFI+LLF2 
- -16.013 -15.861 
SEMI-ANNUAL DATA [1977-1985] 
Variables LOGIT Heckman FIML 
TLA 
MT 
UT 
UA 
RESQUOT 
" NOR 
VOR 
. WAGP ' 
W 
DUM 
" 92 0.198 0.197 0.199 
LLF1 
-170.28 -169.40 
ST 
RESQUOT ; 
- 
WAM 
MILLS RATIO 
- 
. SIGMA 
RHO 
- - 
92 
- 
0.752 ; 0.721 
LLF2 
- 
0.981 
- 
LLF1+LLF2 
-170.28 -168.42 -168.42 
OUR STUDY [1980-19861 
Variables 
- 
; 
Overall 
Results Africa 
Regional 
L. Amer. (1) 
Samples 
L. Amer. (2) SEA 
Resquot 
CAX 
tjFC 
' Dsr 
TDX 
- 
ST 
- 
' RESM s 
_ 
Xgro 
- 
Likelihood 94.27 38.39 46.28 49.76 6 86 Ratio Test . 
Pr. correct 81.40 79.59 85.71 84.03 ' 94 28 
predictions . 
pseudo-R2 ' 0.303 0.245 0.373 0.390 0.182 
g 0.2292 0.2653 0.2269 0.2269 0.057 
Sample size 301 147 119 119 35 
itscheduling cases 69 39 27 27 2 
Error rates 
Type I 19% 18% 15% 22% 10% 
Type II 15% 21% 13% 10% 8% 
* Using the method of minimizing the total error subject to a 
relatively balanced distribution of errors, and focussing on 
minimum possible type I error. 
ijaPENDIX III 
-rahle 7.5: Current Account Balance and Trade Position for ASEAN (mn US dollars) 
oun Item 1985 1 986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
S. Korea CA bal 
-887 4617 9854 14161 5056 -2172 Ex rt 26442 33913 46244 59 8 1408 63123 
Import 26461 29707 3 11 
-65127 
Sin a ore CA bal -4 
- 
319 224 1306 
7 - - 
2338 2170 
Export 2137 13 7 79 0 
Im rt 24362 23402 29910 40338 45713 80 
Ma sia CA b -613 -123 2636 
- - - 
1817 
-175 -1672 
Export 15133 
- 
13547 17 734 208 2 24825 28956 
Import 56 113 10302 11918 15306 20926 
-27032 
Thailand ' CA bal 
-1537 247 -365 
- - 
-1655 
- 
-2455 -7282 
Export 7059 8803 115 93 1] 5 781 1 824 22811 
Import 81 841 1 01 1 22772 
- 
Indonesia CA bal -1923 -3911 -2098 
- '- 
-1397 -1108 -2369 
Export 18: 527 1439 77 Ug 19 97 
Import 12705 11938 12532 13831 16310 20734 
p1i mes Aal - 4 95 - - -1465 -2695 
Export 4629 4842 5720 7074 7821 8186 
Import 5111 044 6737 59 81 10419 122 
_; o : IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
Table 6.6a: Results of the Unrestricted Model: With and Without Debt Service Ratio: 
for the Latin American Region 
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model 
-Variables ß estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
estimates Marginal 
effects 
Elasticity 
effects 
nstant 
-3.4469 - - -4.0382 
re not 
-0.1024 -0.0179 -0.3199 -0.1991 0.0349 0.6238 (0.1962) (0.2137) 
-CA- X 2.2612 0.3966 
-0.5065 3.7337 0.6549 -0.8364 (0.8673) (1.1508) 
ufc 0.0099 0.0017 0.7984 0.0078 0.0014 0.6575 
(0.0038) (0.0041) 
sr 0.0708 0.0124 1.1739 
(0.0311) 
TD 
- - - 
0.0097 0.0017 1.9995 
- 
(0.0031) 
-ST 
-6.4655 -1.1342 -0.8847 -8.1331 -1.4267 (4.5158) (4.8582) 
-RESM 0.0482 0.0084 0.7478 0.0023 0.0004 
-1.1129 (0.0311) (0.0353) 
xo 
-0.0364 -0.0064 -0.0016 0.9292 0.1629 0.0359 (1.4141) (1.6913) 0.0419 
Number of observations = 119 Rescheduling cases = 27 
of likelihood function 
-40.03 -37.73 Log of likelihood function 
-63.723 -63.723 Likelihood ratio test 47.386 51.986 
% correct predictions 7li 
.5 84.03 Pseudo R2 0.4181 0.4071 
0.2269 0.2269 
p<0.5 pzO. 5 p<0.5 pz0.5 
0 88/92 4/92-- 0 82/92 10/92 
y =96.65 = y = 
.1 =10.87- 
1 7 18/27 1 71/27 17 
1 =33.33 =66.67 
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